Murder and Paranoia in Turkey
The Boston Globe Editorial
Thursday, January 25, 2007
( turk.php)
THERE WAS a huge turnout in Istanbul Tuesday for the funeral of the
assassinated journalist Hrant Dink. Mourners held up placards saying,
"We are all Armenians" and "We are all Hrant Dink." It was a
heartening display of support for values that the slain editor of the
bilingual paper Agos defended at the cost of his life: free speech,
acknowledgment of the 1915 genocide of Armenians in Turkey, and
reconciliation between Turks and the 60,000 Armenians who remain in
Turkey.
Encouraging as that affirmation of tolerance and pluralism may be,
Dink’s murder and his funeral illuminate a dangerous conflict that
pervades state and society in Turkey.
Speaking at the slain editor’s graveside, the Armenian Patriarch
Mesrob II said: "We continue to hope that the Turks will recognize
that Armenians are Turkish citizens who have been living on this soil
for millennia and are neither foreigners nor potential enemies." What
is shocking about this plea for understanding is that it needed to be
made. The patriarch’s hope for Turkish acceptance of Armenians as full
citizens who can be loyal to Turkey reflects a deeply rooted confusion
about something called Turkish identity.
Dink was killed by a 17-year-old who had been given a gun and told to
carry out the murder by an ultra nationalist from his home town who
had served 10 months in prison for bombing a McDonald’s. The assassin
told police he had seen something on the Internet alleging that Dink
had said, "Turkish bloodis dirty." This was an allusion to the
Armenian-Turkish editor’s conviction under an odious law that makes it
a crime to insult Turkish identity.
For the people who marched in Dink’s funeral cortege, there is a clear
connection between the nationalist paranoia that produced such a law
and the murder of writers and intellectuals who are branded as
disloyal. That nationalism has been nourished on political myths that
are rooted in the ideology propounded by the founder of the
post-Ottoman Turkish state, Kemal Ataturk.
Turkey’s military and security services — what some Turkish liberals
call a "deep state" that acts independently of elected governments —
have interpreted Kemalism in a way that defines cultural and
linguistic autonomy for Kurds and other minorities as a rebellious
challenge to the ideal of Turkishness.
The secular ideology derived from Kemalism has been equally intolerant
of outward shows of religious piety, prohibiting women and girls from
wearinghead carves in school.
To gain entry to the European Union, Turkey’s political leaders will
have to conduct a broad educational campaign, uprooting myths about
the mass murder of Armenians and the military’s dirty war against the
Kurds. Before Turks can take on a new European identity, they will
have to redefine what it means to be Turkish.
al_opinion/editorials/articles/2007/01/25/murder_a nd_paranoia_in_turkey/
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