IEOM STATEMENT OF PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
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[02:39 pm] 14 May, 2007
Yerevan, 13 May 2007- The International Election Observation Mission
(IEOM) for the 12 May parliamentary elections in Armenia is a joint
undertaking of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA),
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the
European Parliament (EP).
This statement of preliminary findings and conclusions is delivered
prior to the completion of the election process, including the
tabulation and announcement of final results, the handling of possible
post-election day complaints or appeals, and the installment into
office of the newly elected members of the National Assembly.
The election is assessed in line with OSCE and Council of Europe
commitments, other international standards for democratic elections
and national legislation. The final assessment of the election will
depend, in part, on the conduct of the remaining stages of the election
process. The OSCE/ODIHR will issue a comprehensive final report,
including recommendations for potential improvements, approximately
two months after the completion of the election process. The PACE
will present its report at its Standing Committee meeting on 24 May.
The institutions represented in the IEOM stand ready to continue to
support the authorities and civil society of Armenia in the conduct
of democratic elections.
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
The 12 May 2007 elections for the National Assembly of the
Republic of Armenia demonstrated improvement and were conducted
largely in accordance with OSCE and Council of Europe commitments
and other international standards for democratic elections. The
Armenian authorities and other actors in the electoral process took
steps to address previous shortcomings, but were unable to fully
deliver a performance consistent with their stated intention that
the election would meet international standards, and some issues
remained unaddressed.
The Election Code was considerably amended and improved since
the 2003 parliamentary elections, and provides a good basis for
the organization of genuinely democratic elections, although some
shortcomings remain. The amended Election Code clarifies a number
of ambiguities in the process as well as the legal consequences of
non-compliance.
The election authorities generally worked efficiently in the
pre-election period, and were technically well equipped and prepared
for election day. Candidate registration was carried out by the Central
Election Commission (CEC) and the Territorial Election Commissions
(TECs) in an inclusive manner.
Other positive aspects of the pre-election process included:
The CEC demonstrated ongoing efforts to enhance transparency of
election procedures, such as a schedule of regular press briefings
and the provision of key information on its website.
Substantial training of election officials and voter education efforts
took place.
For the first time there was a central and computerized voter
register. The police, as the responsible agency, took proactive
measures (along with the CEC and others) to correct inaccuracies and
involve the electorate in upgrading the voter list through telephone
hotlines and advance publication of the voter list on the CEC website.
There was visible and dynamic campaigning by many contestants in both
the proportional and majoritarian contests, which took place in a
permissive environment.
There was extensive media coverage of the election, with an apparent
effort to enable most parties and candidates to convey their messages,
although largely devoid of critical viewpoints.
Public media adhered to legal requirements concerning allocation of
free airtime during the official campaign period.
Women’s representation in the electoral contest was improved in line
with the amended Election Code providing that women should constitute
at least 15 per cent of each proportional contest party/bloc list
and be in at least every tenth position on the list.
However, the following issues raised concerns:
Gaps remain in the regulatory framework for elections.
Existing regulations to address important areas of the electoral
process, such as early campaigning and issues of possible vote buying
were not implemented.
The intertwining at all levels of political and business interests
is of concern, especially in view of relatively weak provisions and
enforcement regarding transparency and disclosure of campaign finances.
The mechanisms to regulate the election process and correct
irregularities were mostly passive. Publicly identified concerns were
generally not acted upon in the absence of formal complaints.
The complaints and appeals process brought to light inconsistencies
and contradictory elements in the legal framework.
TEC leadership "troikas" (chairperson, deputy chairperson and
secretary) were dominated by representatives of the Republican Party,
Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) Dashnaktsutiun and appointees
of the President, which challenges the spirit of balanced composition
as intended by Election Code provisions.
The majoritarian contests were characterized by a low number of
candidates – just under three per constituency on average. Seven out
of 41 constituencies had only one candidate.
The separation of the ruling party and the State appeared to be less
than distinct in some important elements of the campaign, the most
visible of which was the convergence of the election campaign of
the Republican Party with a longer-running campaign celebrating the
fifteenth anniversary of the Armenian Army, sponsored by the Ministry
of Defense.
Negative newspaper articles relating to private comments by an
opposition leader, allegedly recorded surreptitiously, and subsequent
public remarks by the president referring to those comments as a
serious criminal act, introduced a negative element to the campaign
environment. Some violent incidents occurred during the campaign
period, but they appear not to have significantly impacted upon the
overall electoral environment.
On election day, voting took place in a mostly calm atmosphere. The
conduct of voting was assessed positively in the vast majority of
polling stations observed (94 per cent). Training of PEC members
was evident with PECs generally following procedures, including the
checking of voter identification.
Domestic observers were present in 82 per cent of the polling
stations. Some identified problems included: unauthorized persons
present in polling stations (17 per cent), overcrowding (14 per cent)
and challenges to secrecy of voting due to the construct of voting
booths (17 per cent). Problems of an apparently more deliberate
character emerged in some parts of the country. A few instances of
tension due to the conduct of proxies or unauthorized persons were
observed.
People voting more than once were observed in two TECs and potential
vote fraud schemes were identified in two cases.
Counting was mostly conducted according to procedures but in 17 per
cent of polling stations observed the organizational requirements
led to difficulties and consequently to an assessment of the counting
as bad or very bad by IEOM observers. In a number of observations (6
per cent), the voter’s choice on the ballot was either not declared,
not shown to those present, or results for contestants not announced.
Difficulties compiling protocols were observed in 20 per cent of
PECs, and significant errors in 8 per cent. In at least three TECs,
PECs completed protocols at the TEC premises, representing a lapse
in procedure and the potential for results falsification.
Deliberate falsification of results was observed at four polling
stations, and an attempt in two polling stations.
While the IEOM does not have a complete impression of the results
tabulation due to the slow rate of tabulation, although apparently
within the legally prescribed timeframe, IEOM observers recorded
procedural and technical errors.
Two issues of concern which did not impact on the election process
itself were also noted by the IEOM: The Armenian authorities’
last-minute denial of visas to OSCE/ODIHR observers seconded by one
OSCE participating State (Turkey) was not in line with the commitment
in the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen document to invite election observers
from any other OSCE participating State.
Prior to the elections, the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission
(EOM) received criticism from State authorities, including in public
written statements, that called into question both the veracity of
its findings, and its methodology. The IEOM does not agree with such
criticism and stands by the findings of the OSCE/ODIHR EOM third
interim report.
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
Background
The 12 May 2007 elections were to elect 131 seats in the National
Assembly (parliament). Members of the National Assembly are elected
for five-year terms.
Ninety seats are elected on the basis of a national proportional
contest of party/bloc lists, and 41 by majoritarian contest in
single-mandate constituencies.
In the proportional contest, to win election a party must pass a
threshold of 5 per cent of the valid vote, while a bloc must pass
7 per cent. In the majoritarian contests, the candidate polling the
highest number of votes is the winner (first past the post).2
Previous elections in the Republic of Armenia in 2003, 1999, 1998,
and 1996 have been assessed as falling short of OSCE commitments and
other international standards for democratic elections.
Changes in the political landscape affected the 2007 electoral
competition. For this election, the Armenian Republican Party, ARF
Dashnaktsutiun and the United Labour Party did not enter the election
as a coalition, although they were partners in government, while the
Orinats Yerkir (Law-based State) Party left the government coalition
in 2006. New political forces emerged, notably the Prosperous Armenia
Party, while others fell into abeyance.
Prime Minister Andranik Margaryan, leader of the Republican Party,
died suddenly on 25 March. Serge Sargsyan was named on 26 March to
take on the party leadership functions, and on 4 April President
Kocharyan appointed him as prime minister.
Legal Framework
The legislative framework for elections in Armenia consists mainly of
the Constitution and the Election Code. The Code has been substantially
amended since the 2003 National Assembly elections, and provides a
good basis for the conduct of democratic elections.
However, gaps remain in the regulatory framework for elections, and
there were also failures to implement certain existing legislative
provisions. The Election Code guarantees State support and cooperation
for campaigning on an equal basis. The formal campaign period begins
after the registration of candidacies.
The Code does not address what constitutes campaigning, and whether
campaign activities or fundraising by election participants and third
parties are permitted prior to the campaign period.
The CEC rejected a complaint against early campaigning brought by an
NGO against Orinats Yerkir. The CEC found that the distribution of a
leaflet constituted campaigning, but indicated that the absence of a
clear prohibition on early campaigning, and constitutional protections
for political expression and assembly, prevented it from concluding
that there had been a violation.
The Constitution requires openness of political party and campaign
finances, but deficiencies in disclosure, reporting and overall
supervision were noted. The absence of clear prohibitions on early
and indirect campaigning, and deficiencies in enforcing party and
campaign finance regulations, leave scope for electoral contestants
to exceed campaign finance limitations. This could subvert the intent
of campaign finance limitations stipulated in the Election Code.
The CEC has no competence to investigate whether a party/candidate
has failed to disclose relevant financial transactions outside the
campaign fund a contestant must established.
Examination of the available 2006 financial reports of political
parties by the OSCE/ODIHR EOM indicated that they lacked detail
and could not serve as a sufficient basis for monitoring campaign
finance. It is also questionable whether the reported amounts are
accurate: for example, Prosperous Armenia reported that it had
no income, expenditures or property at all in 2006. The Election
Code prohibits parties and candidates, during the official election
campaign, from giving or promising goods and services to voters –
commonly referred to as "vote buying". The statutory provision
does not appear to require specific intent to influence a voter to
constitute a violation. The OSCE/ODIHR EOM directly observed one
episode of provision of goods by a political party that met the legal
definition of prohibited conduct in an election campaign. Generally,
the legal prohibition was not enforced. The prosecutor-general informed
the OSCE/ODIHR EOM that his office would act only in cases in which
intent to influence voters could be demonstrated.
During the campaign period substantial attention in the media to
government activities included a prominent focus on Prime Minister
Sargsyan. The manner in which his public appearances around the country
were presented by the media, not clearly differentiating between his
roles as prime minister and leader of the Republican Party, appeared
to confirm the difficulty in applying legal provisions concerning
political campaigning by officials.
Election Administration
The election administration comprises the CEC, 41 TECs (corresponding
to the 41 majoritarian constituencies), and 1,923 Precinct Election
Commissions (PECs). The CEC and TECs are permanent bodies, while
PECs were formed by 27 April. The amended Election Code provides for
a more balanced composition of election commissions: one member is
nominated by the president, one each by the six parliamentary factions
and the "peoples’ deputy" group (deputies elected as non-partisan),
and one "judicial servant". There is a hierarchy of appointment,
each representative on the CEC nominating one member to each TEC,
who in turn nominated a member to each of the PECs under that TEC.
During the pre-election period the CEC made notable improvements in
its efficiency and transparency of procedures. All necessary election
preparations were made within the required timeframe.
The CEC established a schedule of regular press briefings, and
introduced on its website a chart on complaints it had considered. In
accordance with amendments to the Election Code requiring publication
of election results by precinct, the CEC introduced a networked
computer system linking it to the TECs. TECs appeared to be well
prepared for the elections and generally to be working in a collegial
manner.
However, the TEC leadership "troikas" (chairperson, deputy chairperson
and secretary), although elected by the TEC, were dominated by the
representatives of the Republican Party, ARF Dashnaktsutiun and
appointees of the President. This challenges the spirit of balanced
composition as intended by Election Code provisions.
In two TECs, members acknowledged that the Orinats Yerkir-appointed
member had been removed from the TEC troika because that party was
now in opposition.
Influence of local selfgovernment bodies over the work of TEC 17
(Artashat) and TEC 19 (Yeghednadzor) appeared to breach the provisions
for independence stated in the Election Code.
PEC leadership "troikas" had a more diverse composition than TEC
"troikas". PECs were extensively trained for election day and provided
with materials explaining election day procedures in detail. The CEC
produced short TV films explaining election day procedures to voters,
which were broadcast throughout the official campaign period.
Election code amendments enacted in 2005 charged the police with
compiling a centralized and computerized voter register. For these
elections, additional efforts were made by the police and CEC as well
as by local community leaders, political parties and NGOs to correct
inaccuracies (mainly surplus names and voters registered at incorrect
addresses). The police and the CEC repeatedly called through the
media for public cooperation to correct the voter list, which could
be checked on the CEC website or at polling station premises, and
errors then reported to election authorities or via police hotlines.
Candidate registration was inclusive. All twenty-four parties and
one bloc that applied were registered by the CEC, and no individual
candidate from any list was refused registration. After two parties
withdrew their lists, twenty-two parties and one bloc were on the
ballot for the proportional list contest. Of the 141 persons who
submitted documents for registration as majoritarian candidates,
135 were registered by the TECs. Five withdrew before registration,
and there was one refusal due to incomplete documentation. A small
number of withdrawals after registration (commonly citing negligible
prospects of winning), and two de-registrations (see below) resulted
in a total of 119 candidates in the majoritarian contest – an average
of just under three per constituency.
No party sought to field a candidate in every constituency (only the
Republican Party attempted a countrywide presence). Most parties
decided to concentrate resources instead on the proportional
election. There were seven constituencies with only one candidate,
and eleven with only two candidates.
The majoritarian contests reflected local rather than nationwide
political dynamics.
Complaints and Appeals
The Election Code permits appeals to the courts against actions
(or inaction) of election commissions.
The CEC and TECs have responsibility under the Code to review actions
by subordinate election commissions.
There was a discernible deficit in this regard due to evident
passivity and lack of initiative by the electoral and other authorities
responsible for upholding the regulatory framework, who stated that
they would only take action upon receipt of a formal complaint.
While complaints received by the CEC were handled with overall
transparency, some of its official responses (these were not
characterized as "decisions") were not sufficiently reasoned. For
example, in response to a complaint by Orinats Yerkir that a mayor
had breached the requirement for provision of state-owned premises as
campaign venues free of charge, the CEC confirmed the definition of
state property as central government and not local self-government
property.4 However, this was contrary to practice already widely in
evidence during the campaign.
A small number of complaints were filed with TECs, and none
upheld. TEC and court decisions in some instances were arbitrary and
inconsistent. A court ordered TEC 19 to deregister two candidates,
on the basis of an application by a third candidate. However, another
court rejected a complaint that TEC 39 should deregister a candidate
(while not disputing the substance of the complaint) on the grounds
that a rival candidate did not have competence to apply to court for
a candidate’s deregistration.
The Election Code and provisions of the Civil Procedure Code on
election-related disputes declare election-related first instance
court decisions to be final and not subject to appeal, but in six
decisions on complaints rendered on 3 May the court of first instance
granted the right of appeal, citing different provisions of the Civil
Procedure Code. Additionally, the constitutionality of Civil Procedure
Code provisions has been challenged in the Constitutional Court.
Campaign Environment
In the official campaign period, vigorous campaigning by most
parties and majoritarian candidates was discernible throughout
the country. Municipal and community authorities, almost without
exception, met their obligations to designate places for the
display of campaign materials. Besides these designated spaces,
and advertising on commercially rented installations, a permissive
environment prevailed, with posters widely placed on public and
private buildings and installations.
There was a flexible approach towards the formal procedure whereby,
on the basis of requests received and forwarded by the TECs, municipal
and community authorities should put venues for campaign meetings
at the disposal of political parties and candidates on the basis of
equality and free of charge. In instances where parties or candidates
applied instead directly to the municipal and community authorities,
this was apparently with the approval of the TECs.
Most parties appeared to favour an approach of holding previously
unannounced or short-notice rallies, without prohibitive action from
the authorities.
Highly visible and prevalent publicity to commemorate the fifteenth
anniversary of the Armenian Army, sponsored by the Ministry of Defense,
was launched prior to and ran throughout almost the entire campaign
period. This was mainly visible in Yerevan, where about half the
electorate resides. At a late stage in the campaign, the Republican
Party campaign converged with the Army’s anniversary campaign, with
evident crossover of campaign messages and featured participants. The
merging of the image of the party (whose leader was until recently
the Minister of Defense) with the symbols and accomplishments of the
armed forces was evident.5 As a result, the separation between the
ruling party and the State appeared to be less than distinct.
The Russian-language newspaper Golos Armenii published two editorials
negatively describing a conversation between an opposition party
chairman and a diplomat, allegedly clandestinely recorded. The
editorials contended that the opposition leader was seeking a negative
assessment of the parliamentary elections by the international
community. These events and subsequent public remarks by the president
referring to the aforementioned comments as a serious criminal
act, introduced an element of pressure into the election campaign
environment.6 Although the authorities have yet to underscore that free
expression and secrecy of private communication are protected by the
Armenian Constitution, they have said that an investigation would be
undertaken. Further information on the investigation is still pending.
Widely circulating and apparently speculative comments about activities
in preparation for election fraud could indicate mistrust and cynicism
among the electorate. A person working for a majoritarian candidate
in TEC 25 was arrested for vote buying on 9 May. The OSCE/ODIHR EOM
also heard allegations that some voters were under pressure to vote
for certain parties or candidates, for fear of consequences such as
job dismissal. A candidate (and incumbent deputy) from Syunik region
confirmed that workers at a large enterprise he owned were obliged to
vote for him, but he characterized this as consistent with contemporary
global corporate management styles.
There were some violent episodes shortly before and during the
official campaign period, but their connection to the elections,
or to election rivalries, was unclear, and they did not appear to
impact on the electoral environment countrywide.
Media Environment
The Election Code provides for airtime to all candidates based on
"equal conditions". Each registered party/bloc in the proportional
contest was entitled to a maximum 60 and 120 minutes of free airtime
and no more than 120 and 180 minutes of paid airtime on public
television and radio respectively.
The CEC allotted the sequence of appearances in free and paid airtime
by lottery. Public media adhered to their obligations in a somewhat
formalistic manner: public TV H1 decided that all free campaign slots
could be broadcast daily as a bloc, in the time period set by the CEC
but outside primetime viewing. Almost all parties and blocs used their
free airtime. On 19 April a majoritarian independent candidate appeared
during the free airtime allocated to a party. Instead of deregistering
the party for breaching the Election Code prohibition on transfer of
airtime to another contestant, the CEC issued a general warning. The
country’s leading private broadcasters offered to air paid political
advertisements, while local TV stations limited paid spots mostly
to majoritarian contests, if at all. The national broadcasters’
advertising rates were criticized as prohibitively expensive by
a number of contestants, and were high when compared to regular
commercial rates.
Political and electoral events were extensively reflected in newscasts
and current affairs programmes in the broadcast media.7 Many media
outlets tried to cover a broad range of political subjects, and thus
to comply with legal provisions requiring equal conditions. Most
monitored TV channels, however, devoted the highest portion of
political information in newscasts to the government and to the
Republican Party, the ARF Dashnaktsutiun and Prosperous Armenia.
The two public broadcasters (H1 television and Public Radio) mostly
guaranteed access to the media for contestants. Public Radio offered
balanced political coverage (both in time and tone). H1 covered a
number of political subjects, with the government accounting for the
highest portion (21 per cent of predominantly neutral and positive
coverage). It was also the only broadcaster to pay most attention
to the opposition Armenian People’s Party (12 per cent). However,
coverage of Orinats Yerkir questioned the channel’s objectivity –
H1 was the only television channel to present the first Golos Armenii
editorial (see above) verbatim in its main news programme. Later it
aired at least twice the president’s public remarks referring to the
party chairman’s private comments.
Notwithstanding the editorial freedom to inform the public about these
events, H1 did not meet the basic journalistic standard of presenting
a response from Orinats Yerkir.
The four nationwide TV channels – H1 and the private channels H2,
Armenia TV and ALM TV provided extensive coverage of the government
(with 26 per cent on H2).
All monitored private broadcasters dedicated most of their political
news to the Republican Party (ALM TV and Armenia TV), Prosperous
Armenia (H2, Shant TV and the highest portion in Kentron TV), or
ARF Dashnaktsutiun (Yerkir Media). This coverage was positive and
devoid of critical comment. Television coverage of the elections
presented overtly positive and neutral information, minimizing any
critical viewpoints. Only radio stations, mainly RFE/Radio Liberty,
broadcast critical viewpoints voiced by different contestants and
voters. The print media displayed a diversity of views, including
critical views, although no single media source could be relied upon
to present balanced coverage. The media generally respected a silence
period that started 24 hours prior to the election day.
Participation of Women
Women are under-represented in political or public life in Armenia. In
the outgoing government, one of sixteen ministers is a woman, and
seven of 131 deputies in the outgoing parliament are women. The
amended Election Code requires the inclusion of 15 per cent women
for party/bloc lists in the proportional contest (as compared with
5 per cent in 2003), and in at least every tenth position in the
lists. However, of the 119 candidates contesting the 41 majoritarian
seats, only five were women (running in three constituencies). The
visibility of female candidates in the electoral campaign was low.
There are very few women in the election administration: two of
nine CEC members, 15 per cent of TEC members and only three of 41
TEC chairpersons are women. Eleven TECs are all male. At PEC level,
women are better represented: EOM observers reported 38 per cent
women as members of PECs, including 23 per cent as chairpersons.
Domestic and International Observers
Fifty-two domestic observation groups observed election day. The CEC
refused accreditation to ten NGOs, mainly because they did not meet the
requirement that relevant activities were included in their statute,
and deregistered one on the grounds that it violated the provision of
non-partisanship.8 Domestic observers were present in 82 per cent of
polling stations visited by the IEOM during voting and during 89 per
cent of counts. In addition to international organizations represented
in the IEOM, the CEC accredited observers from the Executive Committee
of the Commonwealth of Independent States and its Interparliamentary
Assembly.
A recent amendment to the Election Code limits access by international
organizations wishing to observe elections in Armenia: the amendment
requires that international organizations must be explicitly invited by
one of the state bodies (the President, National Assembly, Government
and CEC).
Election Day and Vote Count
On election day, voting took place in a mostly calm atmosphere. The
conduct of voting was evaluated as very good or good in 94 per cent
of polling stations.
In many cases where it was assessed as problematic this
was due to overcrowding (14 per cent) and the maintenance of
conditions for secrecy of voting with the open-front voting booths
(deficiencies in this regard were observed in 17 per cent of polling
stations). Overcrowding – largely a consequence of challenging
conditions at premises available to serve as polling stations, and
poor weather in some parts of the country meaning that voters were
unwilling to wait outside – caused one PEC in TEC 30 (Vanadzor)
to close the polling station some 30 minutes early, denying the
possibility to vote to people who were waiting.
Unauthorized persons were present in 17 per cent of polling stations.
Problems of an apparently deliberate character were observed in TECs
concentrated in parts of Aragatsotn, Armavir, Ararat, Gegharkunik,
Lori and Vayots Dzor regions, leading to a higher prevalence of
IEOM observers’ negative assessments. People voting more than
once were observed in polling stations in TECs 23 (Sevan) and 31
(Vanadzor-Alaverdi); an attempt by the PEC to conceal the same activity
at a polling station in TEC 39 (Vayots Dzor) was observed. Outside
one polling station in TEC 31 IEOM observers saw people having what
appeared to be a false data page (including photograph) inserted into
their passports, suggesting preparation for voter impersonation fraud.
Vote buying was observed at another polling station in the same
constituency. In a polling station in TEC 4 (Arabkir, Yerevan) a
voter was observed taking a photograph of his marked ballot with his
cellphone, an act consistent with a rumoured vote fraud scheme. The
CEC had previously responded with a decision on 9 May banning the
use of camera phones in voting booths.
Among episodes of tension connected to the behaviour of party/candidate
proxies or unauthorized persons, there were chaotic scenes at a
polling station in TEC 29 when Prosperous Armenia representatives
threatened the PEC and stole the ink pad used for the PEC stamp,
causing voting to be temporarily suspended.
Counting mostly was conducted procedurally correctly, but in a number
of of polling stations (6 per cent) where the IEOM observed counting
the voters choice on the ballot was either not declared or shown to
those present by the PEC chairperson, or the number of votes cast
for contestants was not announced aloud. Nearly 20 per cent of PECs
were observed to have difficulties compiling the protocols, and 8
per cent made significant procedural errors or omissions. In cases
observed at TECs 13 (Erebuni, Yerevan), 19 (Vagharshapat), and 24,
among others, PECs only completed protocols for the majoritarian when
at the premises of the TEC, which is at best a lapse of procedure
and at worst a way of facilitating results falsification. Deliberate
falsification of results was directly observed at one polling station
in TEC 16 (Masis), one in TEC 17 (Artashat) and two in TEC 29 (Spitak),
where votes cast for smaller parties were redistributed to the piles
of six major parties; a similar falsification was observed being
attempted at a polling stations in TEC 11 (Shengavit, Yerevan) in the
proportional contest and TEC 7 (Malatia-Sebastia, Yerevan), in the
majoritarian contest. Security bags with ballots brought from one PEC
were observed to have been opened when they were delivered to TEC 13.
While the IEOM does not have a complete impression of the results
tabulation due to the slow rate of tabulation, although apparently
within the legally prescribed timeframe, IEOM observers recorded
procedural and technical errors. TECs should finish tabulation and
reporting of results within 18 hours of the end of voting, i.e. by
1400 hours on 13 May, and some informed IEOM observers that they
would not begin tabulation procedures until 0600 hours.
MISSION INFORMATION & ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The OSCE/ODIHR opened its election observation mission in Yerevan on
21 March 2007 with 15 experts and 29 long-term observers deployed in
the capital and around the country. On election day, 411 short-term
observers were deployed in an International Election Observation
Mission (IEOM), including 59 observers from the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly (OSCE PA), 32 from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe (PACE) and 13 from the European Parliament (EP). In total,
there were observers from 44 OSCE participating States. The IEOM
observed the voting in over 1,150 and counting in 110 polling stations
throughout the country (out of 1,923 polling stations countrywide),
the transfer of PEC results to TECs in 40 TECs and the tabulation of
results in 30 TECs after polling stations closed.
Ms. Tone Tingsgaard (Sweden), Vice-President of the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly and Head of the OSCE PA delegation, was appointed as
Special Co-ordinator by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to lead the
OSCE short-term observers. Mr. Leo Platvoet (Netherlands) headed the
delegation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,
and Ms. Marie Anne Isler Beguin (France) headed the delegation of
the European Parliament. Ambassador Boris Frlec (Slovenia) is Head
of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission.
The IEOM wishes to thank the authorities of the Republic of
Armenia for the invitation to observe the elections, the Central
Election Commission for providing accreditation documents, and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other state and local authorities
for their assistance and cooperation. The IEOM also wishes to express
appreciation to the OSCE Office in Yerevan for their support throughout
the mission, and resident embassies of OSCE participating States and
other international institutions for their cooperation and support.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
