THE KURDISH QUESTION IN TURKEY: PAST AND PRESENT
Ragip Duran interviewed by Jake Hess
ZNet, MA
May 17 2007
Ragip Duran is a prominent Turkish journalist and political activist.
A lecturer in media studies at Galatasaray University in Istanbul,
he has worked for and published in dozens of outlets, including Agence
France-Presse, the BBC, scores of Turkish newspapers, and the French
daily Liberation. Mr. Duran has reported from Paris, Istanbul, London,
and Northern Iraq, in addition to publishing several books on media
and political issues. In 1991, he received the Journalist of the Year
award from the Turkish Human Rights Association.
When asked to comment on Mr. Duran’s work, Noam Chomsky told me: "Ragip
Duran is an outstanding journalist and media analyst and critic. More
than that, he is one of the remarkable group of prominent Turkish
intellectuals who not only protest draconian laws and harsh repression,
but constantly undertake civil disobedience in protest against them,
risking and sometimes enduring harsh punishment. There is nothing
like them in the West. They deserve our respect and admiration and
support and — if we have the courage — emulation."
Like dozens of his colleagues, Mr. Duran has been persecuted for
his brave journalism. In 1998, he was sentenced to seven months’
imprisonment for publishing an article based on an interview with
Kurdistan Workers’ Party leader Abdullah Ocalan. Amnesty International
condemned Mr. Duran’s incarceration, designated him a "prisoner of
conscience" and demanded "his immediate and unconditional release". The
Committee to Protect Journalists also campaigned on Mr. Duran’s behalf;
their Executive Director at the time, William A. Orme, Jr., called him
"one of Turkey’s finest journalists".
Mr. Duran was subsequently awarded the Hellman/Hammett Freedom of
Expression prize by Human Rights Watch. In 2000, he was a Nieman
Fellow at Harvard University.
The following interview took place in Istanbul in May, 2006. It is
presented here in light of ongoing tensions between Kurdish guerrillas
and the Turkish army in southeastern Anatolia.
JH: Since the Republic was proclaimed in 1923, the Turkish government
has tried to create a unified ‘Turkish’ identity, refusing to
officially recognize minorities. What has this assimilationist policy
meant for the Kurds?
RD: Correct – as you said the Kurdish issue became a Kurdish problem
mainly after the creation of the Republic in 1923. Or even between
’23 and ’25, there was a relatively good atmosphere between Turks
and Kurds. But this notion of a nation-state created a big problem
for the Kurds.
One nation means one nation, one language, one flag. This does not
fit with Turkey because there are not only Turks and Kurds but so
many other national, ethnic, religious minorities living in this
country. The heritage of the Ottoman Empire was, of course, richer
than [the Republic of] Turkey, and it did not have this problem
of minorities because everyone was a minority. During that time,
before 1923, if you spoke to a man on the street, he would first say
he was an Ottoman. There was this umbrella identity – everyone was
a subject of the Empire – then he was a Turk, Armenian, Kurd, Greek,
I don’t know what.
The problem for Kurds today is the refusal of the Turkish state
to officially recognize the existence of the Kurdish identity – of
the Kurdish political, economic, historical or social and cultural
identity. You can’t find the word "Kurdish" in any official Turkish
text – I mean laws. There is none. Even recently, one or two years
ago, the ban on Kurdish language broadcasting was lifted. But what
was legalized was not called the "Kurdish" language, but Kirmanji
and Sorani, which are dialects of Kurdish.
So again, the problem, one of the main demands of the Kurds, is that
they should be recognized officially, which means legally. It should
be written in the constitution that this country does not belong
only to Turks, but to Turks and Kurds. Kurds should not be called
"minorities", which is true, because there are ten to twenty million
of them living in this country. We can’t know the exact number,
because on the census, it is not possible to identify as "Kurdish".
So everyone in this country is considered "Turkish", despite their
origin.
So, the Kurdish problem is mainly a political problem, a legal
problem. Of course there is a economic, historical, social dimension
also. But Kurds, if they are claiming their own identity, are called
"terrorists", "separatist" or in any case are second-class citizens
in this country. For instance – and this is not only for Kurds – but
in this country we do not have a governor, a general, a high-ranking
official who is not "Turkish." And not only Turkish, but Muslim –
and not Alevite, but Sunni…
The Kurdish problem is also a geographic problem, because the southeast
of Anatolia [where most Kurds in Turkey reside] is the most backward
part of the country, economically speaking, and this backwardness is
the result of policy. Turkey is not a poor country.
You may be shocked – the streets of Istanbul look like a fairly
typical, European city. But when you travel to Van, or travel between
Van and Diyarbakir, you will see some areas which are nothing like what
you’re seeing here. This backwardness and poverty has been explicitly
fostered by the Republican government since 1923. The thinking has
been that if Kurds became educated, trained and wealthy, they will
present a much bigger danger for the nation state, because they will
divide the country. This is the view of Ankara.
So, it is hard to be a Kurd in this country. I should also say
Kurds are not [only] living in Turkey. As you know, they are in
three other Middle Eastern countries – Iran, Iraq and Syria. But
the Kurds of Turkey are in a special situation. The largest Kurdish
population is based in Turkey. Turkey in comparison to Iran, Iraq and
Syria is the most democratic country. There are problems in Turkish
democracy, but compared to Iran, Iraq and Syria, Turkey is the most
democratic. Economically speaking, it is also the strongest country,
aside from Iran’s oil wealth, that’s something else. In relations
with the Western world, Turkey is much closer politically to the US
and Europe, in comparison to its neighbors.
But the problem is the way Ankara is treating the Kurds in Turkey.
Kurds here have the least political rights. In Iran, Iraq, and Syria,
there is no Kurdish problem, because Tehran, Baghdad and Damascus
recognize the Kurdish reality. In these countries, areas are referred
to as "Kurdistan"; the term is used in the official media every day. If
you say "Kurdistan" in Turkey, you will be accused of separatism. It’s
just the name of an area; it’s really bizarre. If you say "Miami",
should you be accused of separatism?
In the official media [in Turkey], the word "Kurdistan" is used
every day, [in reference to the] "Kurdistan Democratic Party", or
"Patriotic Union of Kurdistan", Jalal Talabani’s party – that’s okay.
But in reference to Turkey, no – Kurdish areas here are the ‘east’
or ‘southeast’ of Anatolia or Turkey.
So, personally speaking, I know from my Kurdish friends, the Kurds
of Turkey do not feel as equal citizens of this state. They have
their official citizen ID, but they do not feel that they belong
completely because the army of this state is oppressing Kurds,
because the cultural institutions are denying Kurdish culture,
the legal institutions of this country are punishing Kurdish people
because of their thoughts.
I think the correct position is to allow the Kurds to do what they
want to do. If they want to live with Turks, okay, that’s their
problem. If they want to leave Turkey and create their own state,
their own autonomous region, it’s again up to them. It’s not up to
me, as a Turk, to decide the future or destiny of the Kurds. But
unfortunately, in this country, because Kurds are not officially
recognized, nobody asks the Kurds what they want to do.
So, I mean, to answer your question in one sentence, I will repeat,
it is psychologically, politically, socially difficult to be a Kurd
in this country, in this city. You have to hide your own identity,
because nationalist, pro-state, non-tolerant people can very easily
accuse you of dividing the country, of killing women and children,
accuse you of being an agent of Westerners – the EU, Americans –
or even Northern Iraqis, things like that.
The most recent Kurdish uprising in Turkey began in 1984 and ended
in 1999. What were the causes and consequences of this conflict?
Correct – the ninth president of the Republic, Suleiman Demirel, said
that was the twenty-seventh Kurdish uprising since 1925. It began
in 1925 with the Sheik Said uprising, and there have been minor and
major uprisings since then, between 1925 and 1999.
There have been some historical studies published on this, some of
them coming directly from the PKK [Kurdistan Worker’s Party, which led
the uprising] – activist publications – some from Turkish, Kurdish,
French or American historians. This last uprising is interesting for
many reasons. First of all, it was the longest one, lasting fifteen
years. No other uprising lasted that long…
I will try not to side with hierarchy, but one of the most important
things, for a ‘backward’ society, like the Kurds, was that for the
first time, women fought in this uprising, on the battlefields, in the
mountains. So it was a great emancipation of women in Kurdish society,
which is a major sociological change. Unfortunately, this liberation
was not complete, because although women escaped from the pressure
of their families, they have came under a different dictatorship,
an undemocratic Party dictatorship…
The recent uprising also changed many things in Turkish cultural
life. For the first time, many Turks, who had never been to the
eastern part of [Anatolia], who perhaps had Kurdish friends in school
or the army, were able to learn that there are ten to twenty million
different people – non-Turks – in this country. It also drew attention
from the outside world, mainly Europeans, and had great influences
on Turkish social, even media life. For instance, in the last ten
years, so many soap operas about Kurds have been on TV – in a very
reactionary, conservative way – but, Turks now know there are Kurds
in this country. The uprising introduced into Turkish social and
cultural life the Kurdish reality.
When I have to say something about the results, well, the Kurds lost
the fight for many reasons. Politically speaking, they were not able
to make a good alliance. The PKK (mainly) was mostly isolated in its
fight against the Turkish anti-democratic state. Even the Turkish
leftists were under the influence of the official ideology that denied
the Kurdish reality, and were not very helpful…[the PKK] made many
mistakes, were unable to make a good balance between political and
armed struggle, or make use of alliances with foreign allies in Iraq,
Syria, Iran or the EU.
And of course, the Turkish state was very harsh. The repression against
Kurds was very harsh. The Turkish army made no distinctions between
armed guerrillas and innocent peasants. So they also called innocent
peasants "PKK militants", because they had been unjustly oppressed.
I interviewed twice [PKK leader Abdullah] Ocalan, and in the first
interview, in 1991, he told me, "The Turkish army is my best ally."
Because whenever they raided villages, many people would go to join
the PKK, because the Turkish army was so oppressive.
Looking from Ankara’s side, they were unable to understand that this
is a political problem. They only perceive the Kurdish problem as a
security problem, so it can be solved by military means. They do not
speak of the historical, social, political and cultural dimensions of
the problem. Since 1925, military means have been unsuccessful, after
eighty years, we have the Kurdish problem. Only peaceful, political
means can solve the problem. And the solution, I repeat, is the
official and social recognition of the Kurdish reality and identity.
There have been some initiatives from the state, but they were quickly
covered by the Turkish army. The raison d’etre of the Turkish army is
more or less the PKK – they need always a controllable PKK, to show
that the Turkish army is necessary and important for Turkish society.
During the most recent conflict, between two and three million
Kurds were left homeless by the Turkish army. What has become of
these refugees, and what, if anything, is the Turkish state doing to
assist them?
That’s a very tragic aspect of the Kurdish problem, and class status
influenced what happened to people…When the poorest people, living in
very small hamlets, were expelled, they could only go to the nearest
village. Wealthier people could go to Diyarbakir or Istanbul, and
the very richest went to Germany, or France…
What’s happened in Diyarbakir recently is more or less a result of
this brutal, forced exodus. These people are now far from their home
village, so of course they aren’t happy. Most want to go back, but
unfortunately, their villages were often burned or destroyed. They
have been going to tribunals, first in Turkey and then to the European
one in Salzbourg, asking for their rights, because they have the
right to return to their home towns. Of course, the Turkish state
is refusing to give money to these people for the reconstruction of
their villages, because if they offered material help, it would be
understood as an admission of responsibility for the destruction,
which of course is the reality. It was the Turkish army.
But even during the conflict, the Turkish army always claimed that
it was the PKK destroying the villages, because the people refused
to collaborate with them. Of course, there are cases like that, but
only three or five. Among three million people, perhaps, we don’t
know, 100,000 were displaced by the PKK, which was also a violent
organization, but not as violent as the Turkish state, because they
didn’t have the means to be as violent…From time to time, for
propaganda aims, [the Turkish army says] ‘here, peasants are wrecking
their village’, shown on the TV, but when we study it in detail,
we understand these are not real peasants, but what we call ‘Village
Guards’, which are pro-state militia – Kurdish – but fighting the PKK.
The refugees are now living in very poor conditions on the outskirts
of Istanbul, Adana and other major cities, in shantytowns.
>>From 1999 until 2004, the situation in the southeast appeared
relatively quiet to the outside observer. What was happening during
that time in terms of the Kurdish movement, and Turkish military
activity?
Correct, there are many reasons for this relative calm. First of all,
as you know, in 1999, Ocalan was arrested and there was a unilateral
ceasefire from the PKK. This diminished to almost zero the number
of clashes in the area. The PKK took all of its activists, mostly to
Northern Iraq, but also Syria and Iran. When you don’t have fighters,
there will be no clashes.
The period also coincides with European Union harmonization reforms
by the Turkish government, which bring, on paper at least, freedom
and democracy, including rights for Kurds, such as the right to
broadcast in their mother tongue, an end to capital punishment, and
so on. That was a relatively good period for Turkey in general, and
Kurds in particular. Shops were re-opening, trade was picking up –
because there is no industry in the area, most revenue comes from
trade between people.
There’s also the AKP, the governing party. The Prime Minister went
at least twice to the area and made very good speeches recognizing
the Kurdish problem. People who are in power were not accepting that
there was a political problem, but only a terrorist or separatist
problem. [Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan] had enough courage
to say that there was a political problem, and admitted that the
state had made some mistakes over there… So these were good signs
in terms of solutions to the Kurdish problem, peaceful and political
solutions. But at least three tendencies became problems.
First of all, Turkey, under pressure from the military and far-right
nationalistic parties, fell out of the European track, instead of
enforcing the implementation of harmonization reforms. This is not
only the fault of the Turkish government – the Europeans were not
welcoming Turkey very much.
The second tendency is the crescendo of nationalism in this country
– anti-Greek, anti-Armenian, anti-EU and of course anti-Kurdish
nationalism that was growing larger and larger. Kurds became very
disappointed about what was going on – the Prime Minister was promising
so many things, good things, but doing nothing. The Semdinli case,
when those who were attacked by the Turkish army were accused by the
Turkish media. So there’s been a very high degree of disappointment
– and this is behind what’s happening in Diyarbakir, with all the
young boys and girls going to the streets and throwing stones at
the police or gendarmerie, rioting, and so on. They’ve had enough –
no future, education, hope, and this is the only way they can show
their political disappointment.
In June 2004, Kongra-Gel, an organization considered synonymous with
the PKK, called off its ceasefire and resumed armed hostilities with
the Turkish government. Who is Kongra-Gel, what are its goals, and
what is the political context of its emergence?
They’re [the PKK] trying to form a legal party. They’ve changed
their name three or four times, and this is mainly for political and
legal reasons. Kongra-Gel was established after Ocalan was arrested
[in 1999]. They have changed policy, saying there will be no more
[armed insurrection], that they don’t want to divide the country,
that Kurds and Turks should live together in a peaceful way. Also,
the PKK has been listed as a terrorist organization by the USA, EU
and so on, and by changing their name, they would like to show that
they are also politically changing.
Which was, unfortunately, not the case every time. First of
all, it’s very easy to tell, using the internet and their own
publications, that the high-level staff in all of these organizations
has been the same. But they want to show that they are changing
politically…instead of being a small militant group, PKK, they would
like to be a more popular organization, and it is not only make-up,
it shows they are actually changing…
The situation in the southeast has heated up in the last few months.
Turkey recently increased its troop presence by thirty thousand,
allegedly as part of ‘ongoing anti-terrorist efforts’. How would you
respond to that, and how would you characterize the situation now?
In the last two or three months, PKK activists have been very active in
the border areas, and there have been clashes with the Turkish army. So
this is more or less classic. After Newroz, the Kurdish New Year,
the area becomes very militarized. This time, the PKK is also unhappy,
because there has been no progress on Ankara’s side in terms of solving
the problem. They also need to show that they are always on the field,
and so they began their attacks, and Ankara is responding to that.
But, there’s a new element, since ’86 or ’87, when the Saddam regime
was in Iraq, Ankara and Baghdad signed some a convention called Hot
Pursuit, so the Turkish army was able to go inside Iraqi territory
in the fight against the PKK. Which is not the case now, because
there is an autonomous administration in Northern Iraq, headed by
Massoud Barzani, in the American-backed Iraqi state. So the Turkish
army won’t be allowed to go inside Iraqi territory like it used to.
Ankara is calling this a routine operation to defend our borders,
our territory, but it was written in the Turkish press that there are
250,000 soldiers in the area. Again, it shows the summer will be hot
in the area, and that Ankara is insisting on a violent solution.
Ankara has been using a military solution since 1925, and it has been
unable to defeat the Kurdish struggle.
So the newest thing is that Turkey was always friendly with the Kurds
in Iraq, because they were trying to provoke them against the PKK.
There is a very famous saying in the Middle East: ‘you should love the
Kurds of your neighbor, and beat your own Kurds.’ So the relationship
between Baghdad, Tehran, Damascus and Ankara is like that…
Now the situation has changed. I don’t think the Turkish army,
without the permission of the USA, will enter, and as you know,
Ankara was always accusing America of not fighting the PKK, saying,
‘what is the difference between PKK and al-Qaeda?’…So there’s a
problem between Washington and Ankara about what to do about the PKK.
Of course, America’s only ally in the area are Kurds, and they do not
want to hurt their relationship…so we will see what happens…I don’t
think the Turkish army will be able to go into Iraq like in the past.
In your opinion, what’s the minimum requirement to end the conflict
in the southeast?
There has to be official recognition of the Kurdish identity. Kurds
are asking to have their identity recognized in the constitution, and
also for the majority of Turks to accept the Kurdish identity…they
should understand that the existence of more than one ethnic group
in the country is not a source of division, on the contrary, it is a
source of richness…but Kurds are considered a danger to the Turkish
state in the minds of the upper classes. This mentality has to be
changed. Kurds are our brothers, just like Greeks and Armenians.
The Kurdish issue in Turkey has attracted some significant
international attention. For example, Amnesty International organized
a letter-writing campaign for the release of Leyla Zana, and has
monitored the situation in the southeast closely. What impact has been
the impact of this solidarity work, and what can American activists
concerned with the plight of the Kurds do to help?
I think like, in any other fight for freedom and democracy,
international solidarity is important. Not material, but moral support
for people who are fighting against rightist governments. It makes
you feel like you aren’t alone, it gives you more motivation…
Against neoliberal globalization, there is also the globalization of
the fight for democracy, the fight for freedom.
To take some individual cases, so many people who have been persecuted
by the Turkish state or army were able to find refuge in some European
countries…I think American activists have also done much. For
instance, Noam Chomsky, and the Committee to Protect Journalists and
Helsinki Watch, both based I think in New York, have done very correct,
very good jobs protecting journalists, many journalists have been
killed [in the southeast] and in Istanbul. And Human Rights Watch, by
publishing reports to let world public opinion know what is happening
here. Information is important, publishing well done reports where
the Turkish government is obliged to reply, [is important].
I do not have any advice to any foreign activist, because they know
better than me their own situation. But I think spreading the news,
the information, and just as you have done, not only to be satisfied
reading or writing abroad, but to come here and see on the field
what is the Kurdish problem, what is the freedom problem, what is
the democracy problem, is something I think is really important. So,
just to finish, I will say ‘welcome’.
Jake Hess, a graduate student at Brown University, welcomes feedback
at JakeRHess(at)gmail.com
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