The Baltimore Sun
June 10, 2007 Sunday
FINAL EDITION
LET’S PRETEND
What to be skeptical about: the proposal by Russian President
Vladimir V. Putin to use a Russian radar site in Azerbaijan as an
outpost of America’s missile defense system.
What to be even more skeptical about: America’s missile defense
system.
Mr. Putin has been railing against plans by the Bush administration
to install a radar station in the Czech Republic and 10 missile
interceptors in Poland, which he portrays as provocations aimed more
at Russia than at Iran or some other Middle Eastern nation. He
threatened to re-target Russia’s missiles against European cities –
which may have been a ploy to try to divide Western Europe and the
U.S., but if it was, it went over very poorly with its intended
audience. Then, last week, he made his surprise suggestion: Why not
work together in Azerbaijan? Maybe, he added, the interceptors could
be set up in Turkey or Iraq, or be stationed at sea.
Let’s pretend for a moment that the missile defense system is a
workable idea. The Russian proposal, in that case, makes a small
amount of sense. Because Azerbaijan borders on Iran, radar there
would be able quickly to pick out a hostile missile; a problem is
that Azerbaijan would be almost as quickly overflown and it would be
difficult to hit the offending missile if the only guidance came from
its rear. But that Moscow has even opened the door to thinking about
cooperation with the U.S. comes close to being a triumph for
Washington.
Now, let’s drop the pretense. The missile defense system has to be
one of Washington’s all-time boondoggles. It costs about $10 billion
a year. Tests have overwhelmingly been failures, except those that
were so trumped up they were next to meaningless. Just last month, a
test was declared a "no test" by the Missile Defense Agency, because
the target missile didn’t end up in the right part of the sky to get
picked off.
Mr. Putin must know all this. There are probably people around
President Bush who know it, too. Indeed, someday in the distant
future, the U.S. may have a functioning system – but it’s important
to understand that the mode at the moment is strictly rhetorical (and
contractual, of course). The Russians may have suggested Azerbaijan
as a distraction, or to make it harder for the U.S. to move forward
against popular opinion in the Czech Republic and Poland. It may be
tied in with a recent tilt by Moscow in favor of Azerbaijan in its
long-simmering dispute with Armenia, which in turn has to be seen in
the context of Azerbaijan’s abundant and westward-flowing Caspian
oil.
Any opportunity to work together with Moscow, instead of against it,
would be welcome – if only the missile defense shield were something
worth working on.