CAUCASUS ARMS RACE
By Vicken Cheterian
Le Monde Diplomatique, France
Jul y 3 2007
The Georgian defence minister, David Kezerashvili, caused a sensation
in May when he announced an increase in the 2007 military budget,
which will now be $550m. Budget revenue for the year will total
$2.1bn. According to the official figures, defence spending has
increased tenfold since the rose revolution, and the real figure
must be even higher. Tbilisi has also announced that it will send
reinforcements to Iraq soon, increasing the size of its contingent
from 850 to 2,000. Georgia will become the third largest military
contributor to the US-led occupation forces. Since 2001 Georgia has
received substantial US military aid in training and equipment.
But why does Georgia need to spend so much? It barely had an army
before the revolution and must make serious efforts if it wants to
join Nato in the near future, one of the government’s top priorities.
Military experts in Tbilisi are complaining that most of the best
officers trained under the US programme have now left the military,
citing the shortage of housing and low pay. Part of the current budget
increase will fund new officers’ quarters and higher wages.
But the government has other goals. The Georgian army has just
finished building a new base for more than 3,000 soldiers at Senaki,
near Abkhazia. A second base is being built at Gori, 30 minutes’ drive
from Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. Georgia also spends
much of its defence budget on procurement, including Ukrainian-built
tanks and field guns, and equipment from the arsenals of east European
countries that recently joined Nato and want to dispose of outdated
Soviet weaponry. Many of the Georgian army’s recent purchases are
not Nato-compatible but could be used in future combats in the
self-proclaimed independent republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Military spending in Azerbaijan has also increased dramatically,
from $135m in 2003 to $871m in 2007. With a steady flow of oil
revenue now that the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is running, the Azerbaijani
president has promised military spending on a par with the entire
budget of Armenia. Baku has also purchased ground-attack jets,
tanks, artillery and multiple-launch rocket systems. Since 2003 the
Azerbaijani leadership has asserted that if the current negotiations
with Yerevan do not give it control over Karabakh and the six adjoining
Azerbaijani provinces, currently occupied by Armenian forces, then
it will use force to get its way.
Armenia is keen to catch up in the arms race, and spending has risen
from $100m in 2005 to $210m in 2007. It is determined to support the
Karabakh armed forces, financially and through military cooperation.
This tiny republic has a population of only 150,000. Yet it maintains
a fighting force of up to 20,000 and is spending heavily on a third
line of defences.
There are still three Russian bases in the region. Batumi and
Akhalkalaki in Georgia are being evacuated, but there are no plans to
close the base at Gumri in Armenia. There is also a large radar system
at Gabala in Azerbaijan. The US has increased military cooperation with
all three countries, particularly Georgia. The Georgian government
even announced that it would be prepared to locate parts of the US
anti-missile system on its territory, prompting a furious response
from Moscow.
This fast arms race might give political leaders in the Caucasus
a false but dangerous sense of strength. Since the collapse of the
Soviet Union there have been five wars in the region. Millions still
suffer the consequences. As recent events in the Middle East and
Central Asia have shown, it is easier to start a war than to end it.