"LOSING" ON DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGE
Timothy W. Brown
American Chronicle, CA
Aug 28 2007
The August 2007 by-elections in Lebanon were held to fill the
parliament seats that became vacant by assassinations earlier this
year. Former president Amin Gemayel, whose son Pierre was slain in
March, lost to a relatively unknown candidate in the early August
elections. In the New York Times (10 Aug 2007) article, "U.S. Backs
Free Elections, Only to See Allies Lose" by Hassan M. Fattah,
describes how Mr. Gemayel’s demise was more than like attributed to
his backing by the United States rather than a split Christian vote,
the Armenian vote, and alleged election rigging. In January of 2006,
the U.S. backed Fatah lost to HAMAS in the Palestinian Authority
elections, and in August 2007, Amin Gemayel and his March 14 movement
lost to Kamil Khoury and the Free Patriotic Movement. Why do United
States backed/supported political parties and candidates come up on
the losing side in their countries elections? Hassan Fattah points out
the paradox of American policy in the Middle East [is that] promoting
democracy on the assumption it will bring countries closer to the West;
almost everywhere there are free elections, the American-backed side
tends to lose (2007, A4).
In both instances free elections occurred in keeping with the promotion
of democracy in the region as part of President Bush’s "Greater Middle
East Initiative." However, the rhetoric of the Bush’s Greater Middle
East Initiative did not translate into the interest of the United
States and Israel. For example, when HAMAS came to power in January
of 2006, everyone was taken by surprise. The HAMAS victory did not
exactly figure into the political calculations of Washington and Tel
Aviv while Mr. Gemayel’s defeat also was not conducive to western
interest. Now in both instances the losing parties were backed by
the United States, so back to the question to be addressed, why do
United States backed/supported political parties and candidates come
up on the losing side in their countries elections?
Now one would think that with support of the world’s most powerful
democratic country’s backing, an election victory should be a slam
dunk for a political party or candidate in any free election. There
are many answers and approaches to addressing the previous question,
but, the failure of U.S. backed candidates stems from the fact
that American interest are perceived as synonymous with Israel’s,
the tumultuous administration of democracy in Iraq which has put
PM Maliki between a rock and a hard place, and the interest driven
tendency to support candidates, factions, and regimes with shoddy
human rights records rather than institutions of governance.
America policy = Israeli policy
Traditionally, the United States unwavering support of Israel has
always been source of contention for American foreign policy in the
region. In part, regional analysts say, candidates are tainted by
the baggage of American foreign policy from its backing of Israel to
the violence in Iraq. Every president since 1947 has felt a special
commitment to Israel’s security that has not been matched by a
comparable commitment to any other state in the region. Many Arabs
perceive the United States media and policy-makers as dominated by
the Zionist lobby. United States policy in the region is viewed
as biased through the sanctioning acts of Israeli aggression,
unwavering support and funding for Israeli policy, and a general
dehumanization and indifference toward the plight of the Palestinian
people. The Bush administration has largely adopted a laissez faire
approach to the Middle East peace process and in the course allowed
Israel’s continued suppression of the Palestinian resistance. The
United States’ long standing refusal to allow consideration for the
Palestinian Liberation Organization’s agenda and, on balance, a biased
sponsorship for the Israeli state, continues to send a destructive
message to the neighboring Arab nations.
The Administration of Democracy in Iraq
The most formidable challenge for the United States has been
the post war/Saddam processes of the Iraqis building a functional
central government that can emanate authority from Baghdad. Although
sectarianism pervades much of the government’s disarray, the presence
of occupation forces and the strong "colonial" influence of the United
States have not been conducive to Iraqi political cohesion.
The involvement of an external power, especially the United States,
for its invasion of Iraq and the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib
has complicated an already exceedingly difficult and often volatile
situation. The difficulties involved in kick-starting the post-war
process of political reconstruction in Iraq have demonstrated this
point amply. The fact that Washington is the dominant force behind
discussions over the future shape of the country’s political and
constitutional framework means that groups whose support base is
primarily contingent on their opposition to superpower machinations may
find the cost of participation too high to bear. Some groups, such as
Muqtada Al-Sadr and his supporters, realize they can generate greater
political capital by remaining outside the U.S.-sponsored Governing
Council and the Interim Government than they can from being on the
inside. The perception that Washington is dictating the agenda and
delimiting the sovereignty of the Interim Government has, for many
Arabs, effectively discredited the process of implementing a liberal,
pluralist political system in Iraq.
Maliki between a Rock and a Hard Place
Maliki’s strong backing by the United States has put him between a
rock and a really hard place. The United States support of Maliki has
caused other coalition groups in his government to become disaffected
from him as Prime Minister while his nexus with Iran has made his
Arab neighbors skeptical of buttressing his government in order to
contribute to stability of the country and the region. A part of the
above scenario is partly responsible for the disintegration of his
government and the strong criticism for which has become a target.
Some American officials privately describe him as a paranoid failure,
while his only recent success has been a meeting… with senior Sunni,
Shiite and Kurdish leaders. It yielded little more than promises of
future compromise. And yet, Mr. Maliki remains. That appears to be,
in part, because neither the Americans nor the Iraqis can agree on
who is supposed to lead. In the absence of a strong alternative to
Mr. Maliki, both camps have come to rely on a game of criticize and
run. The Americans bash him, and then say it is up to the Iraqis to
decide what to do. The Iraqis call him a sectarian incompetent, and
then say they are waiting for the Americans to stop acting as his
patron. With sectarian concerns aside, the pervasive problem seems
to be the perceived control and influence that Washington exerts upon
the office of the Prime Minister.
In terms of replacing the PM, A few Iraqi politicians have already
begun to look elsewhere. Shatha al-Musawi, a Shiite lawmaker close
with aides to Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, said…that she had approached
several people outside the known officials and asked them to campaign
as potential prime ministers. All refused, she said, declining to
name them. "They don’t want to be dirtied," she said.
"Being dirtied" more that likely meant being subject the American
political hegemony and being perceived as an actor of Washington’s
interest as opposed to Iraq’s.
Washington’s Interest At The Expense Of Good Governance
For decades the United States primary security interest in the Gulf
region has been the safe passage of petroleum energy resources to
the West and the stability and security of those countries that
produce them. Washington, in promoting its interest in the region,
has unconditionally backed the state of Israel and certain Sunni Arab
states in the region. For years America has tolerated non-democratic,
unreforming Middle Eastern allies, trading liberty for stability. It
was often more convenient to befriend autocrats than condemn them for
their oppressive policies. America’s new-found enlightenment may be
undermined by a record of defaulting to the higher politics of oil,
military basing rights, and alliances of convenience. The application
of double standards, supporting friendly Arab nations like Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and Tunisia, while censuring others for similar infringements
of political freedom, civil liberties and human rights, undermines
U.S. standing as the champion of universal freedom.
The current war on terrorism has further fueled the argument as the
United States indulges Pakistan (self-appointed military government)
and Uzbekistan (repressive authoritarian government) as convenient
neighbors in the Afghanistan war. Treatment of prisoners in Iraq,
Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay, justified or not, has tarnished
America’s standing as a defender of human rights. Finally, the issue
of favoritism toward Israel is central to the Arab states’ claim of
an uneven United States policy in the region.
Supporting the leaders of regimes, with questionable and shoddy human
rights records, makes the promotion of freedom and democracy appear
hypocritical and incongruent with the American ideal of it. The
citizens that live under authoritarian military, monarchial, and
dictatorial regimes in the Middle East clearly see the incongruence
between the American rhetoric of freedom, democracy, and their
governments’ actions towards them, for example, in the suppression
of political opposition and freedom of the press.
Choosing Sides, Factions, and Candidates As Opposed to Supporting
Institutions
The concept of divide and conquer and promoting one group over another
was a key tenant of colonial governance and imperial rule for European
countries that had established colonies in Africa and Asia in the 19th
century. The concept of choosing sides and promoting one group over
another for the sake of the interest of the colonial power laid the
template for disunity, mistrust between ethnic groups, and sectarian
strife after former colonies had gained independence from their
European patrons. The colonial paradigm of divide and conquer, or
moreover, the backing and supporting of particular groups, factions,
and candidates has inevitably caused the recipients of American
patronage to not fare so well. In part…, candidates are tainted by
the baggage of American foreign policy from its backing of Israel
to the violence in Iraq. But more important…, American support
is often applied to one faction instead of to institutions, causing
further division rather than bringing stability (Fattah 2007, A4).
"The Americans think that supporting democracy should create positive
reactions," said Nicola Nassif, a columnist with the left-leaning
Lebanese daily Al Akhbar. "No one can be against democracy,
sovereignty, independence and freedom. But not if it upsets the
internal power balance, not if it empowers one party against the
other, especially in a country where supporting one group can lead
to violence and even civil wars." Lebanon’s Christians are generally
more sympathetic to the United States than are other Arabs. But the
tension between Prime Minister Fouad Siniora’s American-backed faction
against an Iranian-backed one was palpable in…the election.
And despite an expected sympathy vote, Mr. Gemayel was running
to fill the seat vacated by the assassination of his son Pierre,
and the former president’s name recognition. Lebanese Christians in
the mountainous Metn region, along with a smattering of Shiites and
others who live there, voted for the more unlikely team: one allied to
Hezbollah, seemingly sympathetic to Iran and Syria, and most of all,
in opposition to America.
Considerations for Further Democratic Development
The promotion of democracy in the Middle East does present challenges
to American policy in the region especially in the aftermath of
the Iraq war and other events of concern in the Persian Gulf. To
be considered are the following concerning democracy development in
the in the region: 1.) the outside imposition of a western template
for democracy in the region will prove non-conducive for democratic
development in the Middle East. Turki al-Rasheed, a Saudi reformer
for democracy, states that "Voters invariably frown on strength
coming from abroad; the only legitimate sources of strength any Arab
politician can turn to are based on either tribal power or religious
ties." Any American or Westerner who has visited the Middle East
in the last three years has heard Arabs protest time and again that
"democracy cannot be imposed from the outside." Democratic development
in the Arab world will ultimately be the result of internal dynamics,
pressures, and contradictions.
2.) Secularism has lost currency in the politics of the region. For
years, the United States has depended upon secular pro-western regimes
to promote its interest in the region, for example, the Shah of Iran,
and even the late Saddam Hussein. Secularism lost currency, if it
really ever had any, due to the fact that it simply was viewed as a
western construction by a majority Muslims that put them at social
and cultural odds with the westernized elites that formed the upper
strata of certain post-colonial Middle East societies.
3.) Islam has become a political force to be reckoned with and will
continue to pervade the politics of the region, as a matter of fact; it
is the new political currency in the greater region. The AKP’s decisive
victory in Turkey, which for the record is not an Arab country,
underscores this point; the late 2005 Egyptian parliamentary elections,
in which the Muslim brotherhood fared well against Mubarak’s National
Democratic Party, is exemplary of the future impact of Islam in the
political spheres of the Middle East, and a harbinger for secular,
authoritarian, and undemocratic regimes that have been long resistant
to change or reform.
End Notes
1. Hassan M. Fattah, "U.S. Backs Free Elections, Only to See
Allies Lose" New York Times, nytimes.com, (10 August 2007), p A4,
east/10arab.html?ex=1187496000&en=953076bd8dcf 71db&ei=5070&pagewanted=all&emc=eta-1.
2. John C. Buss, Democratization as a United States Strategy for
Middles East Security USAWC Strategy Research Project (18 Mar 2005),
12, iles/ksil219.pdf
.
3. Daniel Neep, Dilemmas of Democratization in the Middle East: The
Forward Strategy of Freedom, Middle East Policy Council, Vol. XI,
Fall 2004, No.3
4. Damien Cave, "Iraqi Premier Stirs Discontent, Yet
Hangs On," New York Times, nytimes.com, (18 Aug2007),
middleeast/19iraq.html?_r=1&n=Top%2fReference% 2fTimes%20Topics%2fPeople%2fM%2fMaliki%2c%20Nuri%2 0Kamal%20al%2d&oref.
5. Ibid.
6. Buss, 11.
7. Fattah, A4.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Steven A. Cook, U.S. Democracy Promotion in the Middle East:
Is it Working, Council on Foreign Relations, Op Ed (16 Aug 2005),
cracy_promotion_in_the_middle_east.html.
Timothy W. Brown A.A. General Studies, Elizabethtown Community College,
2004 Currently pursing a B.A. Middle Eastern Studies through American
Military University 20 year US Army veteran and a Desert Storm/Shield
combat veteran
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