Author: Alex Nanijanian

After passing up on several opportunities to sign a peace deal, first in Brussels, then in Spain at a summit of European leaders on October 5, and later in Kyrgyzstan at the summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Armenia and Azerbaijan's leadership may have finally agreed on a peace deal document to be signed “in the coming months,” according to Armenia's prime minister Nikol Pashinian.

The document is based on a May 2022 peace deal proposed by Azerbaijan, consisting of five principles which include recognizing each other's territorial integrity, the absence of territorial claims, abstaining form threats, demarcating the border, and opening transportation links. At the time, there was no mention of the final status of Karabakh nor of the ethnic Armenian population living in Karabakh. Following Azerbaijan's military offensive into the formerly disputed Nagorno–Karabakh region on September 19, 2023, the status for these last two points changed. On September 28, the government of Nagorno–Karabakh announced it will dissolve itself by 2024 and nearly all of the ethnic Armenians living in Karabakh have fled the region amid fears of living under the government of Azerbaijan. Several former and current officials of Nagorno–Karabakh were detained in the aftermath of the September 19 military operation.

The Nagorno–Karabakh area has been under the control of its ethnic Armenian population as a self-declared state since a war fought in the early 1990s, which ended with a ceasefire and Armenian military victory in 1994. In the aftermath of the first war, a new, internationally unrecognized, de facto Nagorno–Karabakh Republic was established. Seven adjacent regions were occupied by the Armenian forces. As a result of that war, “more than a million people had been forced from their homes: Azerbaijanis fled Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the adjacent territories, while Armenians left homes in Azerbaijan,” according to the International Crisis Group.

The tensions lingered over the following decades. In 2020, Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a second war that lasted for 44 days. That war changed the status of the region. Azerbaijan regained control over much of the previously occupied seven regions and captured one-third of Karabakh itself.

On November 10, 2020, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia. Among several points of the agreement, Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed that 1,960 Russian peacekeeping forces would remain in the parts of Karabakh “not recaptured by Azerbaijan and a narrow corridor connecting with Armenia across the Azerbaijani district of Lachin.”

Since the signed November 2020 agreement, mutual accusations of ceasefire violations continued unabated. So did mutual hostile rhetoric at the government and local levels, diminishing any prospects for peace.

As such, one question loomed: will there be another war? The most recent events on September 19, 2023, answered that question.

On October 30, 2023, Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan said, “three [out of five] main principles of peace and normalization of relations,” were agreed upon and that if both parties remained faithful to those principles, “the signing of the peace treaty becomes realistic,” reported OC Media.

But it is not just about the peace deal. In the words of Kommersant newspaper journalist Kirill Krivosheev, “If the Armenian presence in the region is no longer a political factor, what is there to argue about?” If anything, the deal would simply be a framework he notes. In addition, there are still a few items on the agenda, including “the fate of Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh, and eight Azerbaijani enclaves in Armenia, Azerbaijan's plans to connect Nakhichevan, its exclave that borders Armenia, Turkey, and Iran, to the rest of Azerbaijan, and who would operate this route,” as well as, “whether displaced Karabakh Armenians will be allowed to enter Azerbaijan.”

“Resolving these issues will take years and will depend on the shift of power dynamics in the region. For now, signing a rudimentary peace treaty that deters Azerbaijan from further escalation would be a good result for Armenia. Baku knows this, and will therefore try to squeeze everything it can from the situation before signing any such document,” argues Krivosheev.

Resolving the transportation routes — specifically the one across Armenia to Azerbaijan’s exclave of Nakhchivan — remains contentious. This specific route is known as the “Zangezur corridor,” which is what Baku calls the route to Nakhchivan — Azerbaijan’s remote enclave sandwiched between Armenia, Turkey, and Iran. The route — albeit not mentioned by its name — was part of a ceasefire agreement signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the aftermath of the 44-day war the two countries fought in 2020. The agreement read:

The Republic of Armenia shall guarantee the security of transport connections between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in order to arrange unobstructed movement of persons, vehicles and cargo in both directions. The Border Guard Service of the Russian Federal Security Service shall be responsible for overseeing the transport connections. Subject to agreement between the Parties, the construction of new transport communications to link the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic with the western regions of Azerbaijan will be ensured.

In a recent interview with the local media, President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan described the route as “a strategic project”:

True, there is no word ‘Zangezur corridor’ in it because I included the term ‘Zangezur corridor’ in the geopolitical lexicon afterwards. However, it is explicitly stated there that there should be a transport connection between the western regions of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, and Armenia should provide it.

The corridor is also important for another regional player and Azerbaijan's ally: Turkey.

Now, Azerbaijan claims it is no longer interested in the corridor, not in its current form anyway. On October 25, in an interview with Reuters, Hikmet Hajiyev, a top aide to Aliyev said, “Azerbaijan had no plans to seize Zangezur.” Hajiyev added that the country was working with Iran instead.

Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani prime minister Nikol Pashinyan has unveiled a regional transport proposal — “Crossroads of Peace” —  that would connect Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Georgia through Armenia, describing it as an “important part of the peace agenda in the South Caucasus,” according to reporting by OC Media.

Both Baku and Yerevan have officially made peace pledges before but tensions loomed despite the promises. Whether a deal will be signed by the end of the year will show whether commitments to peace are as genuine as the leaders say they are.

https://globalvoices.org/2023/11/03/armenia-and-azerbaijan-vow-peace-for-now/

By MATTHEW MOSS

During a visit to Paris this week, Armenia’s Defense Minister Suren Papikyan met with French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu. During meetings a contract for the procurement of three Thales Ground Master 200 medium range radar systems was signed. the GM200 has a 160 mile range and is based on a AESA 3D radar. Additionally, Papikyan also signed a letter of intent to procure an undisclosed number of MBDA Mistral MANPADS which will supplement the Russian-manufactured Igla and Verba MANPADS currently in Armenian service.

In the wake of continued tensions with Azerbaijan, following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and the 2023 Azerbaijani offensive that saw the collapse of the Republic of Artsakh, Armenia is looking to modernise its military. During a press conference in Paris, Defense Minister Lecornu said “the protection of the sky is something that’s absolutely key” and said that France would help Armenia train ground defence forces and support modernization efforts. “We stand by our defence relationship [with Armenia], even though we’re not part of the same military and political alliances. It is based on the simple principle that you need to be able to defend yourself,” Lecornu concluded.

In a statement published by the French Ministry of Defense about the Franco-Armenian meetings, the potential for French training of Armenian troops was further outlined:

“In the field of infantry, Sébastien Lecornu raised the possibility of triggering operational training missions on Armenian soil in three departments: dismounted combat, mountain combat and precision shooting. At the same time, Paris is proposing the opening of a military advisor position to best support the Armenian army in its operational strengthening.”

Israel cannot justify weapons trade with Azerbaijan, which undermines democracies and enables military aggression and ethnic cleansing.

Israelis have not been the only people under fire this past month, however. Azerbaijani dictator Ilham Aliyev continues to celebrate his conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Azerbaijani advance and threat of genocide forced that mountainous region’s indigenous Armenian population to flee en masse into Armenia proper. For the first time since St. Gregory the Illuminator converted Armenia to Christianity in 301 AD, Nagorno-Karabakh will be devoid of a Christian community, except perhaps for a few whom the Azerbaijani government treats as living museum exhibits for visiting dignitaries on the stage-managed visits. The Aliyev regime, meanwhile, now openly talks about continuing its advance, perhaps even to the Armenian capital of Yerevan.

Aliyev’s decision to address disputes with Armenia by war rather than diplomacy rests largely on the qualitative edge Azerbaijan gained when Israeli companies agreed to sell him top-shelf military technology against which Armenia had no defense. Thousands of deaths over the past three years were, therefore, unnecessary. 

Prior to the Israeli weapons sales, Minsk Group diplomats from the United States, France, and even Russia, alongside their Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts, had already outlined a far more comprehensive and just agreement. Armenian and Azerbaijani negotiators had largely agreed to an Armenian return of occupied Azerbaijani districts, swaps of unsustainable enclaves, and a right of return to Nagorno-Karabakh for Azeris who fled in the early 1990s. The agreement would have also enshrined the basic democratic freedoms that Nagorno-Karabakh enjoyed. Discussions had advanced to discuss timelines and identify potential external peacekeeping forces, perhaps from the Scandinavian countries. What changed Aliyev’s calculation was, in part, the advanced weapons systems Israel was willing to provide. Between 2016 and 2020, Israel accounted for almost 70 percent of Azerbaijan’s “major arms” imports. 

Israel might justify its weapons trade with Azerbaijan in arms-for-energy calculations or Azerbaijan’s willingness to assist Israeli infiltration of Iran. Such excuses fall flat. The Abraham Accords meant that Israel had energy options beyond Azerbaijan. Journalists might criticize the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) human rights record and foreign policy, but its political rights and civil liberty scores are double those of Azerbaijan, according to the latest Freedom House rankings. Most importantly, the UAE does not incite genocide against its rivals, nor does it harbor irredentist ambitions as Aliyev does.

Nor is the threat Iran poses to Israel a reason to back an increasingly erratic dictator. Not only does Azerbaijan have its own reasons to counter Iran regardless of any Israeli incentives, but Israel also has other options in Iraqi Kurdistan, a region they have thoroughly penetrated. In hindsight, the weaponry Israel exported to Azerbaijan would have been better utilized to defend Israel’s own borders with Gaza and Lebanon.

Nor should anyone in Washington accept Jerusalem’s arguments that their arms dealing with Azerbaijan was strategic only. Money matters. For years, Israeli officials downplayed American concerns about Israel’s technology trade with the Chinese Communist Party. When push came to shove, Israeli businesses hoped to profit off the trade. When the diplomatic dispute came to a head, Israel’s initial refusal and arrogant dismissal of American concerns escalated the crisis unnecessarily. 

Just as the Biden administration rallies to prevent the escalation of attacks on Israel, it is also imperative the United States act to constrain Aliyev before he commits even more gross violations of human rights. Azerbaijani forces wearing arms patches celebrating the first Armenian Genocide raise concern about his ultimate intent. So does the arrest of both billionaire and former State Minister Reuben Vardanyan (a former colleague of Samantha Power at the Aurora Foundation) and Foreign Minister David Babayan. Every Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Turkey sees the parallels between their detention and the 1915 arrests of Armenian intellectuals that kicked off the first Armenian Genocide. When it comes to genocidal intent, the only difference between the Azerbaijani army and Hamas is the targets of their ambition.

Just as congressmen demand Washington reconsider its relationship with Qatar, a state that effectively serves as Hamas’ banker, so too do representatives and senators demand the Biden administration cut off military aid to Azerbaijan. Frankly, both steps are long overdue, but if the goal is to prevent further Azerbaijani aggression and to compel the withdrawal of Azerbaijani forces from dozens of square miles they occupy in Armenia proper, it is also necessary to sanction the Israeli enablers of Azerbaijani aggression and ethnic cleansing. While defending Israel in its existential struggle is right, such support should not mean sacrificing the world’s oldest Christian state. Standing up to racist aggression should not be an either-or prospect; we can do both. 

This is why it is necessary to target Israeli individuals complicit in Azerbaijan’s genocide with Magnitsky Act sanctions.

In 2017, Israel’s Aeronautics Defense Systems Ltd. reportedly demonstrated the use of a suicide drone against an Armenian position in order to win an Azerbaijani contract. Israel’s state attorney’s office summoned Amos Matan, the company’s chief executive officer; his deputy Meir Rizmovitch; development director Haim Hivashar; and marketing director David Goldin. In 2020, Matan stepped down against the backdrop of the criminal investigation and appointed Moshe Elazer, the naval systems director at Israeli defense contractor Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, to be his replacement.

In 2019, the Israeli Defense Ministry reinstated the Aeronautics Defense Systems’ export license so that the company might resume arms sales to Azerbaijan. Subsequently, dozens of cargo flights departed Israel for Azerbaijan, allegedly loaded with arms. Such weapons transfers undermined multilateral diplomacy and convinced Aliyev he had a license to kill and made Israel complicit in Nagorno-Karabakh’s ethnic cleansing. 

If Aeronautics Defense System’s peacetime attack on Armenian positions was a shot heard around the South Caucasus, perhaps designating past and current officers of the company under the Global Magnitsky Act could be a shot heard from Jerusalem to Ankara and Baku to Moscow. Israel has every right to act in defense of its own security, given the existential threat it faces from Iran and the terrorist challenges it faces from the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Still, Israeli government officials and business people should have no right to undermine democracies or grease the wheels of ethnic cleansing. Being both a US ally and a terror victim themselves should not provide immunity for Israeli defense executives to profit from similar abuses. 

Israelis are right that they are a sovereign country, not an American satrapy. They can make their own decisions. By the same logic, however, they should not expect U.S. support for the commercial decisions their defense executives make; quite the contrary. When Israel acts as egregiously as it has in the South Caucasus, those most involved in drone exports should expect consequences. If they do not wish to face those, then it is time they find a better client than Azerbaijan.

Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.