IRAN ISSUE FORCES TURKEY TO A CROSSROADS
Justin Vela
Asia Times
May 25 2010
Hong Kong
ISTANBUL – Turkey entertained United Nations Secretary General Ban
Ki-moon in Istanbul at the weekend and basked in praise for its
efforts, along with Brazil, in securing a nuclear fuel swap deal
for Iran.
Ban told Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan that he welcomed
Ankara’s diplomatic efforts since it improves the chances for a
diplomatic solution to Iran’s standoff with Western nations over its
nuclear program.
On Monday, Iran handed a letter to the United Nation’s nuclear
watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, in which it
outlined the swap deal in which 1,200 kilograms of its low-enriched
uranium would be handed to Turkey in exchange for nuclear fuel.
Turkey’s involvement in the Iran issue comes at a critical time.
Tehran faces a fourth round of UN sanctions as well as sanctions
from the United States over its uranium-enrichment program, which it
insists is for peaceful purposes.
Turkey recently hosted a conference on ending the conflict in war-torn
Somalia; Ban was also present at this event. Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev was also in the country recently to discuss energy routes
and sign US$25 billion in agreements, including a $20 billion deal
for a massive nuclear power plant to be built on Turkey’s southern
Mediterranean coast.
These diplomatic efforts have been backed up by the travels of Turkish
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, whose visits to countless countries
in the past few years have been a hallmark of the ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP) government.
Davutoglu describes a “zero problem” foreign policy approach as the
country’s driving force. This was outlined in his 2001 book Strategic
Depth. The title alludes to Turkey’s distance from global players,
its own neighbors, and the assets of both.
Believing Turkey to be centrally located, Davutoglu advocates
the expansion of the country’s influence throughout the region,
increasing ties with all willing countries, and becoming more of an
independent power.
The “activist” foreign policy, coupled with Erdogan lashing out
at Israel to cheers from Arab countries and continuing a friendly
relationship with Iran, has prompted debate whether the mildly Islamist
AKP is turning its back on the European Union (EU) and trying to
create some kind of neo-Ottoman Islamic caliphate.
While Davutoglu is known to balk at the term neo-Ottoman, Turkey’s
expansion of influence through a policy of engagement and commercial
trade is beginning to have one of the largest effects on the region
in recent years. The successes have been clear.
Turkey has aided talks between the US and insurgents in Iraq, brought
together the prime ministers of Serbia and Bosnia, and mediated
talks between Israel and Syria. The country has seen an expansion
of visa-free travel and the number of flights from Turkey to Asia,
Africa and the Middle East has increased.
In March, the country turned down a standby International Monetary
Fund loan because it did not need the emergency funds and imports
and exports have grown from the same period last year.
Though both countries refused to cut defense spending, inroads also
have been made with Greece, Turkey’s historic rival.
This type of foreign policy has earned more raised eyebrows then
applause, however, especially as the AKP tries to enact constitutional
reforms aimed at curbing the judiciary and the military ahead of
parliamentary elections next year.
Far less attention is being paid to the fact that Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk, the founder of the modern Turkish republic, had a motto of
“peace at home and peace in the world”. Turkey has long sought to
secure good relations with other countries, especially its friends, who
are defined by strategic support and mutual interests and, also, its
neighbors who are potential customers for Turkey’s expanding markets.
This type of foreign policy, one of non-interference and cooperation,
is a path Turkey has long tried to follow. Numerous agreements and
non-aggression pacts have been signed, such as the Balkan Pact with
Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia and the Treaty of Saadabad with Iraq,
Afghanistan and Iran, a country that Turkey has not had problems with
for more than 300 years, despite sharing a 499-kilometer border.
The Balkan Pact was meant to protect the participating countries from
the rise of fascism in Europe and the Treaty of Saadabad was meant as
a promise of non-aggression towards participating countries. Turkey
knows it is a country at the crossroads. A policy of open relations
is aimed at staving off conflict, which, along with being draining
for Turkey, would also most likely provoke internal instability from
the country’s Kurdish or other ethnic factions.
As Davutoglu recently wrote, “There are more Bosnians in Turkey than
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, more Albanians than in Kosovo, more Chechens
than in Chechnya …”.
The agreements also do not come without benefits for Turkey. For
example, the Lausanne Strait Agreement, which settled boundaries
contested after World War I, led to the Turkish republic being
recognized as the successor to the Ottoman Empire.
During the Cold War, Turkey sided with the West against the threat of
communism, something which Ataturk had deemed incapable with modern
Turkey. It also joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
in 1952, serving as the alliance’s eastern flank.
Unhappy with the term neo-Ottoman, Davutoglu has done his best to
steer comparisons of Turkey’s modern foreign policy to the “Ostpolitik”
of West Germany in the late 1960s and 1970s.
Ostpolitik, a policy of change through rapprochement, saw
communication, agreements and commercial relations better the relations
between West Germany and East Germany, Russia, and other Soviet
satellite states. While the incremental improvements in relations
did not change certain fundamental demands, such as West Germany’s
demand for reunification, the two Germany’s eventually recognized
each other and were both admitted to the UN.
Similar policies of detente were carried out by the Vatican towards
the Soviet Union and by South Korea towards North Korea from 1998-2008.
Today, Turkey’s foreign policy is emblematic of an again powerful
country defining itself in the post-Cold War era. However, though
it is expanding its influence in the region, Turkey does not see
itself as turning its back on the EU. Rather, Turkey sees itself
as extending the EU’s transformative power while at the same time
finding new markets for its own growing production.
“If you look at the situation 20 years ago when Turkey had tension
with Greece, tension with Bulgaria, tension with Russia, active
hostility towards Syria, the situation has eased,” says Andrew Finkel,
a British journalist who has worked in Turkey for 20 years. “Of course
one of the main objectives of the foreign policy is to ease the wheels
of commerce.”
Turkey may be frustrated with the slowness of its EU accession process,
but half its trade is still with the EU and the number of European
businesses in Turkey are growing. The US has remained Turkey’s chief
arms supplier for decades.
One of the most obvious ways Turkey has shown its ability to win hearts
and minds is its famous soap operas, which have become popular with
millions of viewers in the Middle East. “My impression is that these
people are hooked not because Turkey is a moderate Islamic country,”
says Ayhan Kaya, a professor of International Relations at Istanbul’s
Bilgi University.
“People are hooked by the soap operas because they give a rather
European perspective of Turkey to Middle Eastern countries. This is
why Turkey is becoming so magnetic.”
The soap operas raise issues such as premarital sex, children born
out of wedlock, spousal abuse, romance and love. These are issues not
openly talked about in the majority of the Arab world, yet Turkey is
bringing them out in the open and forcing them into the discourse of
family life.
While Turkey tries to foster good relations and serve as a negotiator,
the limits of its “zero problem” foreign policy are at the same
time being tested. Despite the Iran swap deal, Western countries
are pressing ahead with sanctions for the regime. With more than $10
billion in trade and Turkey’s second-biggest energy supplier, Ankara
has long tried to serve as a negotiator in the conflict between Iran
and the West, despite being accused of stalling sanctions.
However, when faced with having to make a final decision on how to
vote, Turkey is expected to side with its NATO allies in the West
and vote for sanctions, creating another fissure in the region.
Turkey also made strides with its nemesis Armenia this past year,
only to see the efforts collapse in March. The failure to open the
border with Armenia and move towards some type of rapprochement was
likely linked with Azerbaijan’s dissatisfaction with the lack of
resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Russian pressure,
according to Stratfor, an intelligence company.
Turkey has been impeded by Russia in the past. After the end of
the Cold War, Turkey tried opening up to Central Asia, feeling it
had a mission and ethnic affinity there. However, it found itself
in territory where Russia also believed it had a natural right to
influence and retreated from the region.
“If you raise your profile you are going to attract competitors.
People will try to undermine you,” says Finkel. Now Russia and Turkey
are becoming closer. The agreements the two countries signed recently
perhaps not only acknowledge Turkey’s growing regional power, but also
highlight how unacceptable Russia finds Turkey hosting the Western
backed Nabucco natural gas pipeline.
Currently, it appears that Nabucco, despite years of doubt, will be
built, undermining Europe’s reliance on Russian energy. At the same
time, Turkey is also set to host Russia’s South Stream pipeline, which
is supposed to transport energy to Europe and is preparing to enter
into several different energy ventures with its northern neighbor. It
is unsure if Turkey will be able to host the two competing pipelines or
will bow to Russia pressure and shelve Nabucco. The question persists:
Does Turkey truly need the West?
Justin Vela is a freelance journalist currently based in Helsinki,
Finland.
From: A. Papazian