By MK Bhadrakumar
[The position Turkey takes in the confrontation between Russia, NATO
and the US is arguably more crucial than ever]
Being a “swing state” may have tactical advantages, but when life gets
tough and the tough get going, there could be consequences. Turkey
faced such a moment of truth 100 years ago. It faces a similar
predicament today.
At a meeting on Thursday in Ankara with the European Union
ambassadors, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called for bold
action in developing relations between the two sides in 2022. He said
full membership of the EU remains Turkey’s strategic priority and it
is “in our common interest to act with a long-term strategic
perspective rather than prejudices or fears.”
According to Erdogan, Turkey-EU cooperation is vital and without
Turkey’s “extraordinary efforts, Syria and Europe would have faced a
different landscape.”
Ankara has convinced itself that Washington is keen to revive its
problematic relationship with Turkey, since, as a commentary in the
pro-government Sabah newspaper noted this week, “After all, at this
very moment, the position that Turkey will take in the confrontation
between Russia, the NATO alliance and the United States is more vital
than ever. As a proven and indispensable member of NATO, Turkey is an
important strategic partner for both sides.”
Expectations are high in Ankara after reports appeared in the Greek
media this week that Washington has had a rethink on the so-called
EastMed project, a 1,900-kilometer subsea pipeline designed to supply
Europe with natural gas from the Eastern Mediterranean.
To recap, Greece, Cyprus and Israel signed an agreement in 2020 for
the construction of the pipeline to deliver natural gas from their gas
fields in the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe by 2025. The project was
expected initially to carry 10 billion cubic meters of gas a year to
Europe.
The 6 billion euro (US$6.85 billion) project had robust US backing and
a final investment decision was expected this year, but in a statement
on Sunday, the US State Department said it no longer supported the
project, since Washington was shifting its focus to electricity
interconnectors that can support both gas and renewable energy
sources.
The statement said: “We remain committed to physically interconnecting
East Med energy to Europe. We support projects such as the planned
EuroAfrica interconnector from Egypt to Crete and the Greek mainland,
and the proposed EuroAsia interconnector to link the Israeli, Cypriot
and European electricity grids.”
US backing is crucial for the project’s viability and Turkey is
inclined to read political meaning into Washington’s U-turn. Ankara
had strongly opposed the pipeline’s route through disputed maritime
territories claimed by both Turkey and Greece.
This is a major political decision by Washington, which knew that
Israel had hoped to earn huge income out of exporting gas to Europe
from its massive Leviathan and Tamar fields.
Turkey has approached the new year with the assessment that during
2022, it is going to be wooed as an ally by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the EU. In anticipation, Ankara proposed to
Washington in late December the establishment of a “joint strategic
mechanism.”
Erdogan’s key aide Ibrahim Kalin followed up the initiative with the
US national security adviser on January 10. According to a statement
by Ankara, within the scope of global and regional issues, views were
exchanged on the Ukraine crisis, the protests in Kazakhstan, the
normalization process with Armenia, and the developments in
Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Ethiopia.
The statement said Kalin conveyed to Jake Sullivan that the Ukraine
crisis should be resolved through dialogue and cooperation and Turkey
was ready to contribute in every possible way. Furthermore, Kalin
underlined importance of the “protection” of Ukraine’s territorial
integrity. (Turkey has a dynamic military relationship with Ukraine,
especially in supplying attack drones.)
In a related development, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar
revealed last Saturday that Turkish and US officials were preparing
to hold negotiations in Washington to discuss F-35 fighter jets, and
“preparations are under way.”
That is to say, Washington and Ankara are addressing Turkey’s removal
as a partner from the American F-35 fighter jet program after its
purchase of Russian-made S-400 missile defense systems.
Akar was cautiously optimistic that an acceptable solution may be
found. Turkey was a partner in the F-35 program and had planned to buy
a hundred F-35As jets. Curiously, although Turkey was excluded from
the F-35 program and its Defense Industry Directorate has been facing
US sanctions since 2020, Turkish contractors are still manufacturing
parts for the fifth-generation jet.
Meanwhile, on a parallel track, Erdogan also proposed to US President
Joe Biden last November to purchase 40 new F-16 fighter jets and about
80 modernization kits to upgrade Turkey’s existing fleet.
Clearly, notwithstanding a welter of bilateral disagreements ranging
from Syria policy to sovereign rights in the Eastern Mediterranean and
beyond, Turkey has been exploring avenues for positive dialogue with
the US. Ankara estimates that although Turkey is a toxic subject in
the Washington Beltway, the Biden administration is not willing to go
for a rupture.
Suffice to say, Erdogan has been hoping that the US attitudes toward
Turkey might change now that Ankara’s stance vis-à-vis the great-power
competition is becoming consequential.
Indeed, Turkey’s role in the Black Sea region, Ukraine, the near
alignment in Ankara’s and Washington’s interests in Iraq and Libya,
Turkey’s growing footprint in sub-Saharan Africa (where Russian and
Chinese influence is expanding) – all this could be game-changers in
the co-relation of forces.
However, Erdogan’s main problem is his own credibility. His hobnobbing
with Islamic State (ISIS) and al Qaeda in Syria apart, he turned his
back on the West and sought Eurasian integration, and even toyed with
the strange idea of Turkey’s membership in the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO).
Turkey’s Arab neighbors viewed his neo-Ottoman ambitions with distaste
and suspicion. In reality, Erdogan is returning home like a prodigal
son. Yet he is fantasizing that he is indispensable to the West, NATO
and Russia. The truth is, the West may accept Turkey back, but will it
accept Erdogan?
Erdogan is trying hard. Turkey took eight days to react to the recent
developments in Kazakhstan. It has not gone unnoticed. President
Kassym-Jomart Tokayev repeatedly alleged that extremists and
terrorists from the Middle East were involved in stoking the unrest in
his country who were trained by foreign powers and were
battle-hardened. Kazakh officials say the plot was masterminded from
“a single source.”
It doesn’t need much ingenuity to guess who that “single source” could
be. It simply cannot be Turkey. But among the large number of
militants who have been detained and are being interrogated by Kazakh
authorities, there is a large number of foreigners, possibly in their
hundreds, including Americans and Turks.
The point is, Turkey has been promoting an Islamic identity among
Kazakhs and facilitating and supporting Kazakh militants’
participation in the conflict in Syria. The nexus between nationalists
and mafia elements in Turkey and Kazakhstan is an open secret.
The Russian media have reported a surge in tensions on the
Armenian-Azerbaijani border while the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) peacekeeping mission was helping to stabilize the
situation in Kazakhstan, with Armenia chairing the post-Soviet bloc.
The influential Moscow daily Kommersant reported on Thursday that the
CSTO mission to Kazakhstan was actively criticized in Turkish and
Azerbaijani media outlets, although “no dissatisfaction has been
expressed officially.”
Erdogan conducted his first telephone conversation of 2022 with his
Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin on the eve of the eruption in
Kazakhstan. The Kremlin readout said among other things that Russia’s
proposals to the US and NATO regarding various security guarantees
were discussed.
Two days later, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu had a conversation
with his US counterpart Antony Blinken in which, according to the
Turkish readout, the main topic was the tension between Russia and
NATO over Ukraine.
Blinken himself tweeted, “Good call with Turkish Foreign Minister
@MevlutCavusoglu. The United States and Turkey continue our close
coordination on the threat of Russian escalation in Ukraine and,
separately, to deepen cooperation bilaterally and as @NATO Allies.”
Two days later, on January 6, Çavuşoğlu also spoke with Russian
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. The readout said the two discussed the
NATO-Russia Council meeting and current developments in Kazakhstan,
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Caucasus.
Apropos of such “intense diplomatic traffic in Ankara,” the
pro-Erdogan Sabah newspaper noted: “It is likely in the new year that
not only the countries where normalization steps are ongoing but also
NATO and the EU will knock on Turkey’s door much more in 2022, as is
the case with Russia.”
Running with the hare and hunting with the hound is exciting and may
seem the smart thing to do. But a hundred years ago, Ottoman Turkey
paid a heavy price.
Its decision to facilitate Germany’s attack on Russia in the Black Sea
would ultimately lead to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of
Ottoman citizens, the Armenian genocide, the dissolution of the
empire, and the abolition of the Islamic Caliphate.
*
M K Bhadrakumar is a former Indian diplomat.