CivilNet: Syunik: The Reality on the Ground

CIVILNET.AM

06:18

[OPINION]

By Gevorg Tosunyan

It’s impossible to get a full picture of what’s taking place in Syunik from Yerevan or from any other city․ You have to be on the ground, climb the military posts, visit the villages, and talk to the people. While on a reporting project, I traveled the entire length of Armenia’s southernmost Syunik Province, from Goris to Meghri. With Azerbaijan now on the other side, this is the reality on the ground. 

Russian border guards in Syunik

We were interviewing a volunteer serviceman in a military post in one of the villages in Syunik, near the town of Kapan, when we heard shots being fired in the distance. We wrapped up the interview, and the servicemann called the commander to ask which fired the weapon. The commander responds that it didn’t come from an Armenian position. So it was the Azerbaijanis.

"The Russians will get unsettled now. They want to know who did it. They don’t allow a single shot to be fired. Even firing drills are not allowed,” the serviceman tells us.

On our way back to Kapan from the military post, we noticed a Russian border guard speeding to the frontline.

Away from this region, the general public seems to have the impression that the Russian border guards are only stationed on the Shurnukh road, which in some places passes through the territories handed over to Azerbaijan. The reality is that Russian border guards are roaming Syunik’s entire frontline. At times, the Russians find out about certain tensions and respond even before the Armenian or Azerbaijani armies.

The eight kilometers of the Chakaten-Kapan road and most of the Shurnukh-Vorotan road pass through the territory handed over to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijanis have placed the now famous "Welcome to Azerbaijan'' sign on those sections of the road. We are told that a few days ago, some people from nearby villages shot at the sign, and in response, the Azerbaijani army blocked the road. The situation was resolved with Russian mediation. Since that day, a Russian border guard vehicle has been parked in front of the sign day and night.

The military posts

Earlier in February, the Armenian border guards announced that any journalist wishing to travel to and film in Syunik must obtain permission from the National Security Service. So why doesn’t the government want journalists to go near military positions and speak with servicemen? I found the answer after visiting more than 20 military posts near the frontline. I saw Armenian volunteers and soldiers who with their own means are creating living and bathing conditions for themselves on the mountains. Meanwhile, the opposing Azerbaijanis have and continue to establish well-built tent settlements.

Azerbaijanis and Armenians deployed to this area at the same time, but the opponent was more prepared, at least that’s how it looks from Syunik.

Armenian volunteers and servicemen in the military positions have poor living conditions. But no matter how unpleasant, the volunteers don’t even consider leaving. They say that if they leave, the Azerbaijanis will move forward and position themselves in their place. So the volunteers stay and wait for the army to replace them. The Armenian army is in the process of setting up official military posts and deploying soldiers to the entire frontline of Syunik.

There won’t be any official news about this situation. But now, more than ever, we must be honest, raise the issues and find solutions.

Don’t underestimate the opponent and don’t overestimate us

I am from the generation that was fed a tale in which the Armenian soldier is smart and the Azerbaijani soldier is cowardly and ignorant. This short-sighted approach was one of the factors that led to our defeat.

After spending just a few days in Syunik, I was convinced that the enemy knows how to make us anxious, how to remind us of our defeat. At the moment, this is not done with weapons but with ordinary psychological tricks. The "Welcome to Azerbaijan" sign on the road is an example.

Most of the Vorotan road is now under Azerbaijani control. Once you exit that section, on the left side of the road you see Russian and Azerbaijani soldiers. Azerbaijanis have placed a fence on their side, and their flag accompanied by a soldier with a gun is always visible to both passing and arriving vehicles.

Azerbaijanis have also set up large white tents in their positions, at least four in each. Three out of four might be empty, but they try to give the impression that the area is controlled by a lot more of them than there really are.

For the dreamers

From Meghri, a southern town in Syunik near the border with Iran, we decided to return to Yerevan not via the main road, but by the secondary one, which passes through Shvanidzor, Tsavov, and Chakaten. At the foot of one of the mountains, there is a small village, or rather a collection of homes․ There are about 50 houses and churches — all abandoned, destroyed or half-destroyed. This village is not even on the map, but it is an important reminder for everyone who passes by it that we are indifferent towards our homeland. 

The villages near Kapan, especially the communities closest to Karabakh, are half-ruined and abandoned, while the natural beauty remains indescribable.

When I am told that we will bring back Kars, Ardahan, and the rest of Artsakh, these abandoned villages come to my mind. At times, it seems that those who dream of an Armenia from sea to sea cherish that dream more than they cherish what we have now.

Turkish press: One of the oldest feelings to exist: The history of love

Throughout history, couples have inspired countless masterpieces with their impossible loves that caused wars, controversy and mostly ended in tragedy. (Shutterstock Photo)

Love, in its simplest definition, is the intense affection a person has for another person, an entity or even a thought. Although the way it manifests itself is constantly changing, it is one of the oldest emotions since the world came into existence. The most evident form of this feeling, which has been the main theme of poems, stories, songs and movies for centuries, can be seen on Valentine's Day. This feeling, which has expressed itself in different ways throughout all cultures and in all segments of societies for millennia, may have been hidden in handwritten letters in the past but nowadays, it manifests itself as an emoji in instant messages. From the past to the present and the future, it continues to leave stories for generations to come.

The use of the word "love" is different in every language. The more languages there are in the world, the more words there are that describe love. Even though the words are different, even the heroes, the land and the stories themselves are different, the feelings left by people are the same. For this reason, we can say that love is a universal feeling. But love is also a social concept as much as it is universal. The way it expresses and presents itself varies from society to society and even over time. Even people in the same society but of different classes can have a different understanding of love. For that reason only, love is sociological.

Romeo and Juliet, engraving from a painting by A Noack, from Letture di famiglia (Family Readings), Year V, 1856, Trieste. (Photo by Icas94 / De Agostini Picture Library via Getty Images)

In ancient Greece, love meant complete harmony and perfect beauty. In fact, this sublime feeling manifested not only among humans but also among gods. Fast forward to medieval Europe, we saw the meaning of love beginning to change. Love was more apart of morality than a pure feeling. People began expressing a love that has become a virtue, one that should be preserved in a sacred marriage bond. Although this was not the case among the layfolk, love among the nobles had become virtuous, far from the evils and sexual urges that were under the influence of the church. Love, which changes according to geography, religion and even social class, has been influential in Anatolian lands for centuries and has been passed on from generation to generation.

Asia Minor also witnessed many great legends of love, folk songs to crown the dark evenings and stories to be conveyed from language to language. The common feature of these legendary loves is that the lovers could never meet, and even if they did, the ones who left their marks on our hearts were impossible to keep. The people who carried these legendary loves to the present day were folk poets called "aşık," or lovers, in essence. Accompanied by a bağlama, a type of saz and an eight or ten-stringed lute, they traveled from village to village, town to town, telling stories of love and lessons in life. Being a bard (aşık/folk poet) was also not for everyone. The person who would fall in love had to gain this ability by experiencing this feeling deeply. Just like in the story of Resul, who becomes Aşık Garip for the sake of his love.

Majnun in the Desert, 1431 from the collection of the State Hermitage, St. Petersburg. (Photo by Fine Art Images/Heritage Images/Getty Images)

After his death, Hodja Ahmet, a wealthy Tabriz merchant thought to have lived between the 16th and 18th centuries, leaves his inheritance to his son Resul. Resul, who went about his days spending his inheritance with his friends, loses all of his money one day. Not being able to hold on to any job, he starts working as an apprentice with folk poets, but he isn't very successful in that either. One night, Resul sees an old dervish drinking bade (wine) in his dream, and in the same dream, Shah Senem is also drinking bade. Turns out that they both have the same dream the same night and fall in love with each other. Resul, who was very impressed by the dream he saw, starts playing the saz. This love turns the apostle into Aşık (Bard) Garip. After that day, Resul travels around the world in search of Shah Senem. Traveling from Tabriz to Tbilisi, Resul finds his big love here. The story is that Shah Senem's father, Bilge Sinan, does not want to give away his daughter to a poor boy. Aşık Garip travels the cities and plays his saz in village coffee shops. He managed to save up the gold that Bilge Sinan requested as a dowry, returns to Tbilisi and marries the girl he loves. But love stories in this region do not always have such happy endings. Most of the time, despite all the struggles and obstacles, lovers cannot meet, and their love consumes them, just like Kerem and Aslı.

Illustration of Layla holding a bird in the palace, from the Persian version of Leyla and Mecnun. (by Edmund Dulac, British, 1882 – 1952), 1911. Screenprint. (Photo by GraphicaArtis/Getty Images)

Sometime in the 16th century, Kerem, the son of the Sultan of Isfahan in Iran (or Persia as it was known), falls in love with Aslı, the daughter of an Armenian monk who is the sultan's treasurer. However, the two are not meant to be together as they share different beliefs. The Armenian monk cannot accept this situation and flees with his daughter Aslı. Kerem goes after Aslı with her friend Sofu Kardeş. Traveling all over Anatolia, Kerem writes poems to the beauties he sees in Aslı, sharing his troubles with everyone he meets and asks around to find his love. During these journeys, a miracle happens. Kerem runs into the pasha of Aleppo. The pasha, who has a liking to Kerem, manages to persuade the Armenian monk. In the end, Kerem and Aslı marry. But the story doesn't end here. The monk is actually not willing to officiate their marriage. He casts a spell on the shirt his daughter wears on her wedding night. The buttons of the shirt cannot be undone. Unable to free Aslı from this shirt, Kerem takes a deep sigh and burns to ash with flames coming out of his mouth. Baffled and heartbroken by what has happened, Aslı cries over the ashes of her beloved and a spark ignites her hair. She, too, dies by fire. And finally, the lovers' ashes meet.

This is just one of the versions of Aslı and Kerem's love, and there are variations of their story in Azerbaijan and Armenia among many other countries. And in Anatolia, there are countless other legends that tell of lovers who could not be reunited. Leyla and Mecnun, Ferhat and Şirin and many other epics told by folk poets for centuries are some of the most widely known. Although the names and places may change, a recurring theme draws attention. Love was not an easy phenomenon in Anatolian culture. There were obstacles to overcome, roads to travel. And even if these lovers succeeded, it was not guaranteed that you'd be with the one you loved. In these legends, lovers were tested in various ways and expected to achieve extraordinary deeds. Sometimes they were expected to cross deserts like Mecnun, and sometimes they had to pierce a huge mountain like Ferhat. Likewise, Romeo and Juliet, whose tragedy was famously depicted by William Shakespeare in the Italian city of Verona, was no walk in the park either. They all had to overcome difficult tasks to prove their love.

Shirin Visiting Farhad, from The David Collection. (Photo by Fine Art Images/Heritage Images/Getty Images)

As much as love is a feeling that exists between two people, it is also a social construct, and at times, a class phenomenon. All the love stories told until this time also reveal the social conditions of the period and society's understanding of love. Love is often not a matter concerning two people, but their religious beliefs, economic factors and social classes. There were social factors, not mountains or monsters, standing as an obstacle against Kerem and Aslı's love – Bilge Sinan said Kerem was not fit for marriage as he was not at the same economic level and the Armenian monk opposed Kerem because he belonged to a different religion. Likewise, Romeo and Juliet were children of hostile families, and this was the only obstacle to their love.

After all, love is one of our highest and noblest feelings. It's not in vain, so let's not write poems and sing songs for it for centuries. Love is one of the oldest feelings to exist, yet it continues to impress us with the same freshness and same effect. Love continues to exist in spite of the changing ages, industrial revolutions, world wars and technological revolutions and takes shape with them. Maybe there are no monsters today, but love stories continue to be passed on. And as the song "Historia de un amor" by Mexican Luis Miguel goes, "Es la historia de un amor, Como no hay otro igual." (it's the history of love, there is like no other.)

‘My goal is to participate in world and Europe championships’ – Armenian freestyle wrestler

Save

Share

 14:13,

YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 11, ARMENPRESS. Member of Armenia’s freestyle wrestling team Razmik Papikyan says one of his priorities this year is to participate in the world and European championships.

He told Armenpress that currently he is in a good shape and has already started to prepare for the international tournament which will be held this month. “We didn’t stop the trainings also during the coronavirus-related restrictions. We were training in the fresh air and were using every possible occasion to train in our gyms. I am in a good shape now”, he said.

On February 10 Razmik Papikyan received a title of sports master by the respective decrees of the President and the minister of education, science, culture and sport.

“My goal is to have a good participation to this year’s world and Europe championships”, he added.

The 61-weight freestyle wrestler has made his first international performance in Stockholm in 2016 at the U18 Europe Championship where he won a silver medal. He is the 5th prize winner of the World Cup.

Film: Armenia’s ‘YEL’ to be screened at Utah Dance Film Festival

Panorama, Armenia
Feb 10 2021

Armenian short dance film “YEL” has made it to the top 40 out of hundreds of dance film applications and will be screened at the Utah Dance Film Festival on 28-29 May, its director Rima Pipoyan said in a Facebook post on Tuesday.

Earlier in January, film line producer Lilit Gabrielyan said the project was launched with the aim of presenting Armenian art to the world with joint efforts and once again expressing “all the strength and endurance of our soul” through culture.

The dance film is about the struggle of polarities inside a human being and the reaction she or he may have when faced with all the contrasts of the outer world. And only self-overcoming can give a human being the feeling of victory.

After the Karabakh War, Iran Faces Stiff Competition in the Caucasus

The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies
Feb 1 2021
By Emil Avdaliani February 1, 2021

BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,910 February 1, 2021

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The Second Karabakh War changed the geopolitical landscape in the South Caucasus. Much has been written on Russia’s and Turkey’s gains, but Iran’s diminished position has gotten less attention. Though not involved in the military operations, Iran saw a steep decline in its geopolitical fortunes in the region as a result of the war.

In the wake of the Second Karabakh War, Iran now finds itself facing Turkey’s growing influence north of its border. Ankara gained a corridor through Armenian territory, potentially anchoring itself in the Caspian region. This will represent a major challenge for Iran, which (together with Russia) has viewed the Caspian region as within its sphere of influence.

Despite troublesome ties, Azerbaijan has served Iran as a transit country for the north-south transport corridor stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Baltic Sea. Increased Turkish economic influence, to say nothing of its enhanced military influence, will limit Iran’s ability to build closer ties with Baku.

Iran’s dilemma is also complicated by its wide-ranging interest in keeping good bilateral ties with Turkey. Ankara’s relationship with Tehran is complex and marked by periods of both collaboration and conflict over the Kurdish issue and in Syria.

In a way, the conclusion of the Karabakh war signals some positive trends for Tehran. The West failed to provide a diversified foreign policy toward the region, which allows an adaptation to the changing circumstances on the ground. The Western political retreat from the region suits Iran’s vision—but it also propels Turkey and Russia to fill the vacuum, which does not correspond to Iranian interests. Indeed, Ankara’s recent proposal to create a six-nation pact involving the South Caucasus states plus Russia, Turkey, and Iran is a sign of changing geopolitical trends that will not necessarily work in the Islamic regime’s favor.

Iran’s unfavorable position was clearly visible on the diplomatic front. During the war, Seyed Abbas Araghchi, the regime’s deputy FM for political affairs, toured Baku, Moscow, Yerevan, and Ankara to help end the war. On November 4, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stressed Iran’s support for the Araghchi peace plan, but with little result. Neither the belligerents nor Turkey or Russia expressed any interest in the plan.

The war also disrupted the equilibrium Tehran has been trying to uphold since the 1990s. The fear of a strong Azerbaijan and a weakened Armenia has been at the heart of Iran’s geopolitical vision—but the existing balance of power was no longer tenable, because the geopolitical landscape in the South Caucasus is no longer what it was at the time of the 1994 ceasefire. Turkish military and economic involvement in Azerbaijan has tipped the balance. Azerbaijan’s economic power, propelled by oil and gas revenues, also contributed to the changes. The status quo around Karabakh could no longer be sustained. The question for Iran was what could be done to secure its position.

In fact, Iran could do little to prevent the growth of Turkish influence. To keep Turkey at bay in the long run, Moscow (whose position largely dovetails with that of Ankara) and Tehran had to make sure Azerbaijan was rewarded for its military success with the return of lost territory. This could explain Iran’s changing rhetoric during the war. Over the course of the six weeks, Tehran sent four official representatives of the Supreme Leader to visit the north and stress that “Nagorno-Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan,” and that Baku has every right under Islamic law to seek to liberate occupied territory. On November 3, Khamenei said, “Azerbaijani lands occupied by Armenia should be liberated and returned to Azerbaijan.”

Beyond the Turkish factor, there is also the Russian factor. Some 2,000 Russian peacekeepers are now stationed in Nagorno-Karabakh. Their presence some 100 km from the Iranian border is another source of tension for Tehran, which will have to devote time, resources, and perhaps even troops to adjust to the new geopolitical reality.

This could mean a gradual elevation of the South Caucasus in Iranian foreign policy to almost the same level as other theaters, like, for instance, the Middle East. Iran’s policies toward the South Caucasus have been based more on geopolitical interests than on the ideological principles and rhetoric that permeate the Iranian leadership’s policies toward most of the Middle East. At times, a pragmatic realpolitik was mixed with elements of ideology, historical experience, and balance-of-power calculations, but overall this made the region less important for Iran’s calculus than other theaters of geopolitical tension.

It is still unclear what Azerbaijan’s victory will mean for Iran’s Azerbaijani minority. Complications for Tehran might ensue as ethnic Azerbaijanis living in Iran could be emboldened in their own nationalistic aspirations. The problematic ethnic situation was on display during the recent visit by Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Baku, which prompted Tehran to accuse Ankara of purposefully interfering in Iran’s internal affairs. (With that said, the potential threat of ethnic troubles is at times overstated by analysts. Pan-Turkic [pan-Azerbaijani] sentiments among the Azerbaijanis of Iran are effectively dealt with by the regime.)

A much larger potential problem for Iran is that Azerbaijan could be used as a jumping-off point for foreign powers to project influence into northern Iran. Beyond Turkey, Azerbaijan’s relations with the US have been of concern to Iran since before the 2020 war. Though Washington often criticizes Baku, the two countries’ interests converge on a number of issues. They work together to promote European energy security, expand trade and investment, and combat terrorism and transnational threats. Mercenaries from the American company Blackwater (now called Academi) trained Azerbaijan’s marines, and the US supplied vessels for the Azerbaijan navy.

A bigger fear for Tehran is the potential growth of Israeli influence—perhaps even a clandestine Israeli presence in Azerbaijan, as some western media sources have claimed. The Karabakh war showed how dependent Baku is on Israeli technology. In many ways this support was critical to its victory. Azerbaijan-Israel relations have advanced to such a level that reports have emerged about Baku trying to mediate tensions between Turkey and Israel. Baku and Jerusalem also share energy interests, and their mutual concerns about Iran are a powerful incentive. But it is unlikely that Baku will openly challenge Tehran’s interests. Clever diplomacy will be needed to navigate among Turkish, Israeli, and Iranian interests.

Iran is facing a new and different geopolitical configuration in the South Caucasus. It was left out of the negotiation process, and is witnessing a disruption of the balance of power in which Azerbaijan is much stronger and Armenia much weaker. Russia and Turkey managed to advance their military interests, and Iran now has to change its traditional calculus toward the region.

A large resource base will be needed if Iran is to halt the diminishment of its position and compete against the might of Russia, Turkey, and second-tier powers such as Israel. The prospects are not especially bright, as the Islamic Republic’s efforts to assert soft and economic power have often alienated the three South Caucasus states.

View PDF

Emil Avdaliani teaches history and international relations at Tbilisi State University and Ilia State University. He has worked for various international consulting companies and currently publishes articles on military and political developments across the former Soviet space.

https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/caucasus-iran-influence/

Bavra-Ninotsminda checkpoint on Armenian-Georgian border resumes work

Public Radio of Armenia
Feb 7 2021

The Bavra-Ninotsminda checkpoint on the Armenian-Georgian border resumed its work at 10:00 am today, the Armenian Embassy in Georgia reports.

The checkpoint will be open from 10:00 to 18:00.

Trucks can cross the checkpoint continues round the clock.

The entry of Armenian citizens to Georgia is possible only after vaccination (two doses), and Georgian citizens can enter Armenia only in case of a special exit permit issued by the relevant Georgian authorities.

Third earthquake recorded in Armenia in a day

Aysor, Armenia
Feb 6 2021

The Seismic Protection Service of Armenia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations has recorded another magnitude-2.3 earthquake in the country on February 6 at 11:49 a.m. local time, 4 km northeast of Shorzha village, and 10 km beneath the surface.

According to MES, at the epicenter the quake measured magnitude 2-3.

The seismic activity was also felt in Shoghakat village of Armenia’s Gegharkunik with magnitude 2-3.

Quakes were also recorded on February 5 at 7.36 p.m. 5 km northeast from Shorzha village of Armenia’s Gegharkunik province with magnitude 4.7 and 10 km beneath the surface and on February 6 at 00.06 a.m. 5 km northeast from Shorzha village with magnitude 3.7.

The MES reported that weak and medium quakes will be recorded in Armenia and nearby territories during the upcoming days.

  

World Bank provides Armenia with $7.4 million to improve hospitals’ capacity

ArmBanks.am, Armenia
Feb 5 2021
World Bank provides Armenia with $7.4 million to improve hospitals' capacity
05.02.2021 14:49

YEREVAN, February 5. /ARKA/.Armenia’s health system response to COVID-19 and potential future pandemics, including hospitals’ capacity for case management and intensive care, will benefit from $7.4 million in Additional Financing for the Disease Prevention and Control Project, approved today by the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors, World Bank reported today.

It said the project will support the Government of Armenia in closing financing gaps for the construction and equipment of Martuni Medical Center in Gegharkunik region, and for the construction and equipment of a new medical center in Vayots Dzor region.

The challenges experienced in providing hospital care are acute, especially in Vayots Dzor region, which has not received investments to upgrade the hospital infrastructure for several decades. Due to limitations in hospital capacity during the pandemic for clinical management of COVID-19 cases in Vayots Dzor region, cases requiring intensive care were transferred to hospitals in surrounding regions, introducing delays in accessing services and increasing the risk of mortality.“Strengthening the supply of quality health care services has been at the heart of our support to Armenia’s health reforms,” said Sylvie Bossoutrot, World Bank Country Manager for Armenia.
“I am particularly pleased that this project will allow over 137,000 people in the Gegharkunik and Vayots Dzor regions to access quality medical care. I am also very proud of the number of regional medical centers we helped construct and equip: 18 in total, as a result of the longstanding collaboration between the World Bank and the Republic of Armenia.”

These investments, which benefit from lessons learned during the pandemic about building more inclusive health systems, will contribute to strengthening Armenia’s health resilience going forward.

“The COVID-19 pandemic has illustrated the critical importance of universal access to high-quality health care at the hospital and primary health care levels to respond to non-communicable diseases, detect the spread of infectious diseases, and prevent premature mortality,” said Dr. Adanna Chukwuma, World Bank Task Team Leader of the project. 

“Support provided through this project will reduce the time and monetary cost of accessing essential services, especially in the underserved region of Vayots Dzor.”

The $7.4 million in Additional Financing is an IBRD loan of variable-spread, with a 14.5-year grace period and a total repayment term of 25.5 years.

Since joining the World Bank in 1992, and IDA in 1993, commitments to Armenia have totaled approximately $2,434,734 million. -0-

Armenian American Museum Announces Historic Groundbreaking in Summer 2021

Press Contact:
Shant Sahakian, Executive Director
Armenian American Museum and Cultural Center of California
(818) 644-2214
[email protected]

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

ARMENIAN AMERICAN MUSEUM ANNOUNCES HISTORIC GROUNDBREAKING IN SUMMER 2021

Glendale, CA (January 25, 2021) – The Board of Trustees of the Armenian American Museum and Cultural Center of California have announced the historic groundbreaking of the highly anticipated landmark center in Summer 2021 – a major milestone for the community that has been years in the making.

The Glendale City Council officially kicked off the groundbreaking year with the approval of the refined museum building design and the waiving of city permit and plan check fees valued at $671,000.

The Armenian American Museum will rise to a two-level 50,820 square foot museum complex built on a one-level semi-subterranean parking garage. The first level will feature the grand lobby, auditorium, learning center, demonstration kitchen, gift shop, and administrative offices. The second level will be dedicated to the permanent and temporary exhibition galleries as well as the collections archives.

The cultural and educational center’s programming plans include producing and hosting powerful, immersive, and thought-provoking permanent and temporary exhibitions, leading meaningful dialogues and discussions through engaging public programs, providing educational programs for adults, youth, kids, and families, preserving Armenian heritage through the museum’s collections and archives, and serving as an iconic venue for memorable experiences, gatherings, and celebrations.

“The highly anticipated groundbreaking of the Armenian American Museum represents a historic accomplishment for our community, and we believe it will be a symbol of hope and spirited resiliency for America, Armenia, and Artsakh during these challenging and unprecedented times,” stated Executive Chairman Berdj Karapetian. “The Board of Trustees and museum leadership wishes to express its sincere gratitude for the steadfast commitment and generous support of our donors, stakeholders, committees, volunteers, and government partners for this collective achievement.”

The Armenian American Museum was born in 2014 when the Armenian Genocide Centennial Committee Western USA officially adopted the museum as its landmark project to honor the memory of the 1.5 million martyrs who perished in the Armenian Genocide and to help build and define the next centennial of the community as a message of strength, perseverance, and hope for future generations.

In 2015, the museum’s Board of Trustees was established, entrusting the governance of the project to ten united Armenian American cultural, philanthropic, and religious non-profit organizations. The Board of Trustees includes the Armenian Catholic Eparchy, Armenian Cultural Foundation, Armenian Evangelical Union of North America, Armenian General Benevolent Union Western District, Armenian Missionary Association of America, Armenian Relief Society Western USA, Nor Or Charitable Foundation, Nor Serount Cultural Association, Western Diocese of the Armenian Church of North America, and Western Prelacy of the Armenian Apostolic Church.

In 2018, the Glendale City Council approved the museum’s $1-per-year Ground Lease Agreement, officially marking Central Park as the future site of cultural and educational center. The initial term of the Ground Lease Agreement will be 55 years with options to extend the lease term for four 10-year periods totaling 95 years. The museum will neighbor the Downtown Central Library, Museum of Neon Art (MONA), and The Americana at Brand.

In 2019, the Glendale City Council approved an $18.5 million makeover and expansion of Central Park. The proposal includes the creation of a new central lawn connecting the museum and library, an outdoor amphitheater for live performances, a children’s park with playgrounds and splash pads, and outdoor recreational amenities for the community. The city and museum plan to collaborate on the programming of outdoor events in the downtown park.

The Armenian American Museum has assembled a team of experienced museum and industry professionals to provide guidance and expertise in construction, design, programming, and development for the landmark center. The museum’s design team led by Alajajian Marcoosi Architects will be formally submitting the project’s construction documents to the City of Glendale to initiate the plan check process.

The museum’s Groundbreaking Campaign has raised more than $14 million in contributions, pledges, and grants. The State of California has invested an unprecedented $8 million in support of the center through the efforts of Governor Gavin Newsom, Senator Anthony J. Portantino, and Assemblymember Adrin Nazarian. Los Angeles County has contributed $1 million to the center through a generous grant by Supervisor Kathryn Barger. The Board of Trustees plan to announce naming opportunities for the legacy project later this year.

The museum will be announcing its plans for the Groundbreaking Ceremony in Spring 2021.

For more information, visit https://www.ArmenianAmericanMuseum.org.

The mission of the Armenian American Museum and Cultural Center of California is to promote understanding and appreciation of America’s ethnic and cultural diversity by sharing the Armenian American experience. The vision is a cultural campus that enriches the community, educates the public on the Armenian American story, and empowers individuals to embrace cultural diversity and speak out against prejudice.

###

Shant Sahakian
Executive Director
Armenian American Museum and Cultural Center of California
116 North Artsakh Avenue, Suite 205, Glendale, CA 91206
Office: (818) 351-3554, Ext. 702
Direct: (818) 644-2214
www.ArmenianAmericanMuseum.org


.pdf



JPEG image


Armenian American Museum and Cultural Center of California Rendering Central Park View.jpg

JPEG image

Russian ‘Peacekeeping’ in Karabakh: Old Model, New Features, Mission Creep (Part Three)

Jamestown Foundation
Jan 26 2021

The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Karabakh was the only Soviet-legacy conflict that did not feature Russian “peacekeeping” troops during the 26-year period between the first armistice, in 1994, and the latest armistice, of November 10, 2020. The interposition of Russian troops would only have ensured perpetual stalemate and Russian manipulation of the unresolved conflict. It would have precluded Azerbaijan from regaining its Armenian-occupied territories under international law. At the same time, even Russia-friendly leaders in Yerevan realized that Russian military protection of Armenian territorial gains would have hastened the loss of Armenia’s own independence vis-à-vis Russia. Thus, both Azerbaijan and Armenia tenaciously resisted the notion of Russian “peacekeeping” through the years. Ultimately, Armenia’s bilateral alliance with Russia did somewhat undermine Armenia’s independence by 2013; but even at that stage, Yerevan did not take the further step of inviting Russian “peacekeeping” troops.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Minsk Group, mediating this conflict from 1992 onward, had envisaged a peacekeeping operation with multinational composition, under a legitimate international organization’s mandate. The Minsk Group’s co-chairing countries—Russia, the United States and France—agreed among themselves as well as with Armenia and Azerbaijan, from 1994 onward, that any peacekeeping contingent would not include troops from the co-chairing countries, nor from regional countries (“no co-chairs, no neighbors”). That formula was mainly designed to exclude Russian, US and Turkish troops from any peacekeeping operation. The Minsk Group co-chairs’ conflict-settlement proposals to Baku and Yerevan always included the deployment of multinational peacekeeping troops as part of the package (see EDM, November 25, December 1, 3, 7, 2020).

The most recent package proposal of that nature was submitted by the Minsk Group’s co-chairs to Yerevan and Baku in June 2019, according to the Kremlin’s retrospective account (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, January 20, 2021). By 2019, however, the Armenian government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian had blocked the political negotiations, thus rendering any discussion about multinational peacekeeping moot. By mid-October 2020, facing disaster in the 44-day war, Pashinian turned receptive to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s proposal for a Russian unilateral “peacekeeping” operation. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev played a winning hand, negotiating the armistice terms with Putin after Baku had achieved most of its territorial objectives in Karabakh (see EDM, November 12, 13, 25, 2020).

Russia’s unilateral operation circumvents and deceives the Minsk Group’s co-chairing countries and the OSCE writ large. It also contravenes the basic United Nations–approved norms and standards for peacekeeping operations, as followed by legitimate missions worldwide, except by Russia in its claimed domain (see Part One in EDM, January 21, 2021). Nevertheless, both of these institutions have—each for its own reasons—met this affront with silence.

The Minsk Group’s mandate from the OSCE had included the task of considering a multinational OSCE peacekeeping force in the Karabakh conflict theater. For this purpose, the OSCE had, as early as 1994, formed a “High-Level Planning Group” (HLPG) comprised of a small number of seconded military officers “to make recommendations to the Chairman-in-Office regarding a possible OSCE multinational peacekeeping force.” However, its mandate turned out to be insufficient for that purpose. And even an OSCE multinational civilian observation mission would have required (among other things) unanimous consensus—a euphemism for Russian approval. Twenty-six years later, the HLPG was still in existence, this time chaired by an Albanian officer appointed by the OSCE’s 2020 Albanian chairmanship (Shrmonitor.org, October 28, 2020; Osce.org, January 14, 2020).

The OSCE never undertook a peacekeeping operation due to lack of capacity, expertise and resources, as well as Russia’s internal veto. This latter factor makes it unlikely that the Minsk Group could have initiated a credible peacekeeping operation in Karabakh. The Kremlin would, at the very least, have used its veto power to stonewall the negotiations over the operation’s mandate, composition, and financing; and it would, at best, have allowed an ineffective operation. Institutional embarrassment is the likely reason behind the silence of the OSCE’s 2021 Swedish chairmanship and the Minsk Group’s US and French co-chairs in the face of Russia’s deception.

While the OSCE is accustomed to, and embarrassed by, Russia thwarting, harassing or manipulating this organization’s field missions, the attitude seems to be different at the UN headquarters. The UN Secretary General’s Office, responsible for handling peacekeeping (peace support) operations, is indirectly legitimizing Russia’s Karabakh operation, notwithstanding its incompatibility with the UN’s own norms and standards (see above). Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had ambitiously sought a direct endorsement: he wanted “the UN Security Council to welcome the armistice agreement” with the peacekeeping clauses as its centerpiece (TASS—Mezhdunarodnaya Panorama, November 12, 2020). The UNSC had, in 2015, unanimously adopted a resolution supporting the Minsk Two “agreement” against Ukraine—a document that Moscow routinely invokes to this day.

In the Karabakh case, UN endorsement has been limited to expressions of “relief,” “welcome” and “gratitude” from Secretary General António Guterres, via his spokesperson as well as directly, to Lavrov over Russia’s deployment of “peacekeepers.” The UN Secretary General’s Office proposes to work with Russia and its “peacekeeping” troops in the field for humanitarian tasks (TASS—Mezhdunarodnaya Panorama, November 10, 13, 23, December 3, 4, 10, 2020). Such cooperation would add an unwarranted semblance of legitimacy to yet another Russian sphere-of-influence rebuilding effort.