Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is visiting southern Syunik province on Monday, accompanied by numerous security officers. Since early morning, the locals have blocked number of roads leading to Goris town, protesting against the PM's visit.
After attending the Sisian City Pantheon, Pashinyan enter the local church, lit a candle and approached a clergyman. The latter appeared to snub Pashinyan's offered handshake and instead showed the exit door.
10:41, 22 December, 2020
STEPANAKERT, DECEMBER 22, ARMENPRESS. President of Artsakh Arayik Harutyunyan received today Deputy Prime Minister of Armenia Tigran Avinyan, the Presidential Office told Armenpress.
A number of issues relating to the restoration of infrastructure in Artsakh were discussed during the meeting. The officials, in particular, highlighted the necessity of ensuing electricity supply and communication for Martuni town and other settlements of Artsakh, as well as launching a house-building project. They agreed to further harmonize and multiply the joint efforts for overcoming the post-war difficult socio-economic situation.
Editing and Translating by Aneta Harutyunyan
09:54,
YEREVAN, DECEMBER 25, ARMENPRESS. The Ministry of Defense of Artsakh released the names of 45 more servicemen who were killed in action in the war, bringing the total number of identified KIAs to 1860.
As of December 20, authorities had said they have examined 3248 bodies of the war victims, of whom 1860 are identified as of December 25. DNA testing is implemented in the identification process. Meanwhile, the Artsakh authorities continue searching for bodies in the battlefields.
Editing and Translating by Stepan Kocharyan
QAMISHLI, Syria — Inside a dusty and dark workshop on the banks of the Jaghjagh river in northeast Syria, Misak Antranik Petros uses an ancient pottery wheel to throw different shapes from clay.
The 85-year-old Syrian potter of Armenian origin said his family has practised the craft for more than 450 years.
"The profession was passed down from one generation to another like an inheritance," he said. "Now, my son is taking it up."
His workshop is located inside an ancient mud-brick house near the city of Qamishli, administered by Kurdish authorities who control much of northeastern Syria.
It is cluttered with pots, tools and classically shaped vases, mostly covered in dust.
Petros and his two sons spend most of their time in the humid space, heated by an old wood-burning stove.
"I dont like to clean the clay off my hands because I like the texture," he told AFP from his workshop.
Petros was only a teenager when he had to take over for his sick father and become the main potter of the family.
He has since become a master of the craft, and is keen to pass his skills on.
"I am happy when I see the door of the workshop open and my son working inside," he said.
"This craft deserves to be preserved."
Syria's nine-year-long war has killed more than 387,000 people and displaced millions from their homes.
Petros and his family were largely spared with their home and workshop dodging damage.
Of Petros's two sons — Anto and Yerevan — the former is likely to follow in his footsteps as a professional potter, especially after receiving training from his father.
"His hands need to be balanced," Petros said of his son, like a trapeze artist "walking on a tight rope".
Sitting at the pottery wheel, Anto, 43, moulds a clay vase with expert hands while his father watches.
The young man said he is just as enthusiastic about the craft.
"I can't stop pottery for even two days because my hands miss it," Anto said.
"If God blesses me with a child, I will teach them this craft the way my father taught me."
Photos By DELIL SOULEIMAN
“The [Artsakh] Security Council attempted to understand the opponent’s resources. We sent a letter regarding this to the [Artsakh] Defense Army, to which the response was that we must ask Armenia’s Ministry of Defense.
I called [Armenia’s] Minister of Defense [David Tonoyan], who gave an evasive answer, something to the effect that the information is secretive.
We wanted to get details about weapons, military units but they made it clear that they could not provide that information to us. Secondly, we could not go to the [military] positions ourselves. The Security Council is an advisory body, yet without having information about the opponent, we had to develop a plan.”
“Karabakh was to gather 17,500 reservists. The first stage [of the war], which required 7,500-8,000 reservists, was roughly 90% complete.
Nothing happened after that. There was freedom of movement for reservists, they could come and leave when they pleased. I notified both Armenia’s prime minister and Karabakh’s president regarding this issue.
When the army sees that we can not suppress the enemy's drones and artillery, they become afraid.
The commanders of the military unit are not able to perform a task either, because they are trained to lead 2,000 people and not 4,000.
[Artsakh Defense Army Commander] Jalal Harutyunyan was obliged to promote a 19-year-old to a lieutenant or a commander of a platoon. This is the result of ten years of bad personnel policy.
When the military commissariats were sending reservists to Jabrayil, did they not understand that it should be those who previously served in Jabrayil? They should have been properly organized. Let them conduct an honest investigation so that our society will clearly understand what happened.”
“On the morning of September 27, the Armenian side lost 50 percent of its anti-aircraft resources and 40 percent of its artillery.
Within a few days of advancement into the south, the enemy changed the length of the front, the line of contact from 270 kilometers to 470 kilometers. We didn’t possess the resources to cover that front.
I suggested setting up a command post in the south and sending Movses Hakobyan [the then head of the military control service and former Chief of the General staff of the Armenian Armed forces, and former commander of the Artsakh defense Army] in that direction. He later said that he did not go due to personal problems. If this commander refuses to do his job, what could we demand from a junior officer, a regiment commander?
When the enemy broke through and reached Jabrayil, it expanded towards Khudaferin. At this point, I suggested closing the road near Kiant-Horadiz and cutting the enemy off. I personally suggested it to Jalal Harutyunyan, and he personally participated in the plan. Two brigades were formed. By closing that road and closing their supply line, we would not arrive at the current situation.
When our brigades arrived, the Azerbaijanis greeted our tanks with flags, not realizing that they are Armenian. Azerbaijan suffered the loss of 150 personnel. But the second Armenian brigade does not even try to move forward, to strengthen the position․ The commander is wounded in the leg, the deputy does not carry out orders, etc.
An investigation should find out why the two brigades could not fulfill their task and who is to blame.”
In the village of Sghnakh [the Azerbaijanis] had set up a base and were stretching towards Shushi. There were three Armenian battalions. The Arajadzor battalion had to enter Avetaranots and take the hill, cut off the enemy from the road and surround Sghnakh on both sides, forcing the enemy to retreat from Shushi.
In the village of Shosh, the commanders are told about the operation. On the night of November 5, I was told that the Arajadzor battalion refused, then the two Armenian battalions refused as well.
Let the investigation find out what they said, why such a situation was created.”
“We did not have an anti-aircraft force, we had six Tor missile systems, four of which were destroyed.
Now people say there were weapons that Armenia did not give.
I say, Armenia gave what it had.
All the tales about our having had weapons are not true. We did not have them. For obvious reasons, Russia was not obliged to give us weapons, we had to buy them at the time. Nobody owed it, we had to have it.”
Russian troops deployed to Upper (“Nagorno”) Karabakh exceed by far the number stipulated in the November 9 armistice agreement (see EDM, November 12, 13) due to the additional deployment of Russia’s Humanitarian Response Center personnel. This supplementary manpower is drawn mainly from military or militarized institutions—Ministry for Emergency Situations, Ministry of Defense, Federal Security Service (FSB)—the numbers of which have yet to be disclosed (see Part One in EDM, December 8). That personnel, augmenting the “peacekeepers,” has taken charge of civil-administration tasks in Upper Karabakh (post-conflict reconstruction, infrastructure maintenance, distribution of humanitarian assistance).
The “peacekeeping” troops’ commander is a three-star general, Rustam Muradov, with another flag officer (Major General Andrei Volkov) as chief of staff. Such a high-ranking command looks disproportionate to the official number of 1,960 “peacekeepers.” Prior to this mission, Muradov served as Russia’s chief representative on a joint armistice observation center in Ukraine’s Donbas, then as a combat commander of Russian forces in Syria (Hero of Russia award for the victory in Deir ez-Zor). Muradov is a native of Dagestan and an ethnic Tabarasan (Kavkazsky Uzel, November 12).
Although Russia does not officially recognize the Karabakh “republic,” Russia’s “peacekeeping” and “humanitarian-response” missions do cooperate with the de facto authorities (as Russia also does in the unrecognized Transnistria, and did in Abkhazia and South Ossetia long before recognizing them officially). Such cooperation with the de facto authorities is not only well-nigh inevitable for practical considerations but also politically useful, as it helps to entrench the de facto authorities and advance their eventual acceptance on the international level.
The Karabakh “republic’s president,” Haraik Harutiunian, “officially” received Muradov as early as November 13 and then received the department heads of Russia’s emergency situations ministry, Lieutenant General Igor Kutrovsky and Vladimir Solovyov, on November 17. The meetings dealt with cooperation between Karabakh’s authorities and the two Russian missions (Armenpress, November 13, 17, 23). According to Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, “cooperation with Nagorno-Karabakh’s leadership has been established” (TASS, December 4).
Russia’s “peacekeeping” and “humanitarian” missions currently operate in Karabakh de facto, without a legal basis thus far. According to Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russia is only now “considering the legal implications of the Russian peacekeepers’ area of responsibility” (TASS, December 7). Maps published by Russian military authorities show that area of self-arrogated responsibility covering the entirety of the Armenian-controlled rump-Karabakh (divided into a northern and a southern area of Russian responsibility). It does not currently extend to the Azerbaijani-controlled southern part of Upper Karabakh.
Russia’s “peacekeeping” operation violates at least two cardinal norms established by the United Nations for legitimate peacekeeping operations: requiring a UN or other legitimate international mandate as well as barring troop contributions from neighboring countries or from countries already involved in the conflict at issue. Russia has also breached the consensus of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Minsk Group and its co-chairmanship (Russia, United States, France), whereby any hypothetical peacekeeping operation in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict theater would have to exclude troops from countries allied to either side, from neighboring countries, or from the co-chairing countries. These exclusions, covering Russia and Turkey first and foremost, held from the Minsk Group’s foundation in 1994 until October–November 2020, at which point Russia proposed and deployed its “peacekeeping” operation, blindsiding the US and French co-chairs as well as the OSCE and the UN.
Russia is not only Armenia’s military-strategic ally but is now also accurately considered the “guarantor of Karabakh’s security.” Russia practically guarantees the Karabakh “republic’s” separate existence, as opposed to its return to Azerbaijan without a “republic’s” status. Above and beyond the local Armenian population’s safety, Russia guarantees the continuation of the “Karabakh republic’s” state structures: its own “president, government, parliament,” complete with the Karabakh Defense Army. Similarly, Russia had protected the proto-states in Abkhazia and South Ossetia while recognizing Georgia’s territorial integrity officially from 1991 through 2008, at which point Moscow recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia officially. At present, Moscow continues recognizing Moldova’s territorial integrity officially, even as it operates a Russian protectorate in Transnistria.
Moscow has taken the position all along that its security guarantees for Armenia do not cover Karabakh. This remains Moscow’s official position, but its “peacekeeping” and humanitarian operations have turned Russia into the “Karabakh republic’s” protector, a fact clearly recognized by all parties concerned. While respecting Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity officially, Moscow acts to make the restoration of that integrity conditional on negotiation processes that Russia can decisively influence, thanks primarily to its military presence on the ground.
The United Nations looks content, as it has been all along (Tajikistan 1992–1997, Abkhazia and South Ossetia 1992–2008, Transnistria from 1992 to date), not only to tolerate Russia’s breaches of the UN’s own peacekeeping standards but to legitimize them directly or indirectly. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, informed Lavrov by telephone that he “welcomes Russia’s role in achieving the armistice” and that “UN agencies will interact with Azerbaijan, Armenia and with Russia’s peacekeepers to resolve the humanitarian problems” (TASS, December 3). Guterres’s spokesperson, Stéphane Dujarric, followed suit, urging “all sides to carry out the armistice stipulations,” and modestly confining the UN’s own role to humanitarian assistance. Guterres plans to dispatch a fact-finding mission “to assess together with Russia” the needs for humanitarian assistance in Karabakh and adjacent districts. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations plans merely to send a humanitarian de-mining mission to Karabakh (TASS, November 23, December 3, 4).
The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations presides over peace-support missions worldwide, excepting the conflict theaters in former Soviet territories. All UN secretaries general and their peacekeeping departments have, from 1992 to date, conceded a Russian peacekeeping monopoly there. Such a monopoly is a basic ingredient to Russia’s sphere-of-influence rebuilding efforts.
Moscow does welcome international organizations to play auxiliary roles alongside Russian “peacekeeping” missions. A symbolic international presence on the ground confers a semblance of legitimacy on Russia’s unilateral operations without influencing them in any way—not even objecting to Russia’s breaches of the UN’s own peacekeeping norms (see above). Russia has successfully used the UN and OSCE in this way in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and it has played cat-and-mouse with the OSCE in Transnistria and in Ukraine’s Donbas.
Russia currently encourages the United States and France, co-chairing countries of the Minsk Group, to associate themselves with Russia’s “peacekeeping” efforts in Karabakh. According to Lavrov, the US and France could usefully participate by mobilizing international humanitarian assistance and contributing to the preservation of historical and religious monuments in the area (TASS, December 7).
Moscow agreed in principle, on November 11, to a limited presence of Turkish unarmed military-technical observers in a Russian-Turkish joint center on the ground “in Azerbaijan.” However, Moscow currently obstructs the negotiations with Ankara regarding the parameters of the joint center. The Russian side apparently attempts to confront Turkey with the alternative options of having a modest Turkish presence or none.
The unrecognized Karabakh “republic’s” state structures (president, parliament, government, army) are not going away but continue to exist and function under Russia’s protection. This situation basically reproduces the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia before 2008, until Russia ended up recognizing them as independent “states.” They were and remain Russian protectorates. The long road to their official recognition included Russian passportization of their residents and inclusion into Russia’s security, economic, logistics, and information spaces (see EDM, June 18, 2014, December 2, 2014, December 7, 2020; see Commentaries, February 5, 2010). According to Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, Karabakh’s “parliament” is drafting “legislation” to confer “state-language” status on the Russian language alongside Armenian (TASS, December 2).
10:34, 8 December, 2020
YEREVAN, DECEMBER 8, ARMENPRESS. Some of the Armenian captives currently held in Azeri custody have been given the opportunity to telephone their families, lawyer Artak Zeynalyan, who represents the families of the Armenian POWs in the ECHR, told ARMENPRESS when asked to elaborate on the results of the court’s decision on imposing urgent measures against Azerbaijan.
“Certainly this also contributes for measures to be taken in the direction of exchanging the captives. These are preliminary complaints, urgent measures, which precede the main complaint. We will submit a separate appeal on the cases of the torture and violence against the captives,” he said.
Editing and Translating by Stepan Kocharyan