11:54, 9 April, 2021
YEREVAN, APRIL 9, ARMENPRESS. Armenian-American philanthropist Hirair Hovnanian, the founding benefactor of the Armenian Assembly of America and member of the Board of Trustees of Hayastan All-Armenian Fund, passed away at the age of 91.
Other details weren’t immediately available.
Editing by Stepan Kocharyan
18:12, 6 April, 2021
YEREVAN, APRIL 6, ARMENPRESS. The Court of General Jurisdiction of Yerevan published the decision on the application of the defense party to terminate the criminal prosecution against the second President of the Republic of Armenia Robert Kocharyan under Article 300․1 of the Criminal Code. ARMENPRESS reports judge Anna Danibekyan announced that the Court has decided to suspend the criminal prosecution against Robert Kocharyan, Yuri Khachaturov, Seyran Ohanyan and Armen Gevorgyan on the basis of absence of the case of the crime.
The decision can be appealed to the Court of Appeal.
12:39,
YEREVAN, MARCH 31, ARMENPRESS. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Ara Aivazian held a telephone conversation on March 31 with Archbishop Paul Richard Gallagher, Holy See’s Secretary for Relations with States, the Armenian foreign ministry told Armenpress.
Minister Aivazian reaffirmed Armenia’s readiness to further deepen and strengthen the relations with the Holy See, which he said, are based on common historical and spiritual values. They exchanged views on the actions aimed at the close dialogue and the strengthening of the dynamics of high-level talks.
The officials discussed regional security and stability-related issues. The Armenian FM highlighted the calls of Pope Francis for the stop to the military operations and the establishment of peace in the post-war period.
The Armenian FM presented the ongoing steps aimed at addressing the humanitarian problems caused by the Turkish-Azerbaijani aggression. As a matter requiring urgent solution, the minister highlighted the safe repatriation of the Armenian prisoners of war who are held captive in Azerbaijan.
Emphasizing the urgency of preserving the Armenian religious and cultural heritage in the territories of Artsakh which have come under the Azerbaijani control, the Armenian FM strongly condemned Azerbaijan’s policy of deliberately destructing the Christian cultural values. In this sense he attached importance to the active interference of the international community.
Editing and Translating by Aneta Harutyunyan
14:54,
YEREVAN, MARCH 31, ARMENPRESS. Armenia’s Minister of High Technological Industry Hakob Arshakyan has announced his resignation in a statement on social media.
“Today is my last working day as Minister of High Technological Industry.
As a citizen of Armenia, I consider unacceptable the use of force by an official against any citizen, we ought to move on the path of having a violence-free society.
As a high-ranking official, a person representing Armenia in the international arena, I ought to serve the public with my own experience as an example. Thus, I am expressing my intolerance to violence, both psychological and physical. I hope what has taken place will serve as a lesson for our public and we will love each other a little bit more and will respect everyone’s right to personal, family life.
I first of all want to thank Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan for the trust and the opportunity of serving our Homeland in this high position. I also want to thank our colleagues of the government for the joint productive work”, he said and also thanked the ministry, its whole staff for the joint work.
Editing and Translating by Aneta Harutyunyan
Environment Ministry rejects Lydian Armenia’s request for more water use from Arpa River
16:01, 25 March, 2021
YEREVAN, MARCH 25, ARMENPRESS. The Ministry of Environment has refused to grant Lydian Armenia a permit for using more water from Arpa River’s lower currents for the exploitation of Amulsar – the gold mine currently halted pending the government’s decision whether or not to allow it’s resumption due to environmental concerns.
The head of the ministry’s department in charge of issuing permits, Artyom Mkhitaryan, told ARMENPRESS that in 2020 the company received a permit for using water in volumes of 11 l/s from the Arpa River’s lower channels, and now the company requested to have a permit for 41,3 l/s.
Mkhitaryan said they rejected the request based on the 2016-2020 government decision regulating the Ararat basin territory. Mkhitaryan said it doesn’t envisage allowing the use of such volumes.
Lydian Armenia had earlier applied to the authorities to get permission for using more water from Arpa River’s Darp streamlet and the Arpa River’s upper channels, but was rejected in both cases.
Lydian Armenia is now disputing the ministry’s decision concerning the Darp streamlet at the administrative court.
Editing and Translating by Stepan Kocharyan
12:40,
YEREVAN, MARCH 26, ARMENPRESS. Member of Parliament Hayk Konjoryan from the ruling My Step bloc says discussions are ongoing over the amendments to the Electoral Code, including discussions with the Venice Commission.
He said the amendments envisage not just changing the electoral system, but numerous other changes as well.
The amendments package, which is already submitted to the Venice Commission, includes the issue of thresholds, increasing financial transparency, and several other changes which will improve the electoral code, Konjoryan said. “And we are ready to realize this commitment. The decision on shifting to a simple proportional electoral system has been made. At this moment discussions continue, our discussions with the Venice Commission also continue,” he said.
The Venice Commission is expected to issue its opinion soon.
Editing and Translating by Stepan Kocharyan
Russia’s military “peacekeeping” intervention in Upper (“Nagorno”) Karabakh in November 2020 laid the foundation for a Russian de facto protectorate (see EDM, December 8, 10, 2020).
The Second Karabakh War (September 27–November 9, 2020) has resulted in a partition of Azerbaijan’s former Upper Karabakh Autonomous Region (obsolete Russian acronym: NKAO). The war’s victor, Azerbaijan, currently controls one third of that territory, while Russian troops and the Armenian authorities of the unrecognized Karabakh republic centered in Stepanakert control about two thirds. All of Upper Karabakh is universally deemed—also by Russia, emphatically—as being a part of Azerbaijan.
The Armenian-inhabited “NKAO” had been supposed to receive a legal-political status through an international negotiation process—the Minsk Group—that operated from 1994 to 2020, inconclusively. Following this war and partition, however, the “NKAO” no longer exists as a territorial or political unit. Its remaining territory, moreover, is being turned into a Russian protectorate with both military and civil-affairs dimensions (see EDM, January 21, 22, 26, 2021). All these new facts render the status issue moot.
Yerevan and Stepanakert currently estimate the population of rump–Upper Karabakh (the unrecognized Karabakh republic) at 105,000 to 110,000, including the registered war refugees from Karabakh sheltered in Armenia. Those refugees’ number was last cited by Armenia’s government at 20,000 (Civil.net, Arminfo, February 3, 4), as against 35,000 to 40,000 cited by the Stepanakert authorities (Armenpress, February 11, 15).
The number of war refugees from Karabakh registered in Armenia had peaked at some 90,000 to 93,000 last December (Armenpress, December 25, 29, 2020). Most of them have been encouraged to return to Upper Karabakh since then. Yerevan and Stepanakert are acutely conscious that Armenian outmigration from Upper Karabakh would undermine their effort to wrest this territory from Azerbaijan. This is why their officially released data might overstate the size of Upper Karabakh’s population.
Outmigration could also weaken the rationale for Russia’s military presence to guarantee the security of Karabakh Armenians. Accordingly, Russian “peacekeeping” troops have helped organize the mass return of war refugees from Armenia to Upper Karabakh, using buses under Russian military escort. The number of Russian-escorted returnees reached 50,000 on January 19, by the Russian military’s count (Mil.ru, January 19) and inched upward afterward, at 52,712 by the most recent Russian count on February 26 (Mil.ru, February 26). A far smaller number of refugees returned with their own transportation means and have not been officially or reliably counted.
Incomparably higher, approaching one million, is the number of Azerbaijanis displaced from the seven inner-Azerbaijani districts that Armenian had forces seized in 1993–1994 and Azerbaijan regained in November 2020. The tripartite armistice declaration of November 9, 2020, had stipulated that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) would oversee the return of all refugees and displaced people. Preempting the UNHCR, however, the Russian military largely took over this process in Upper Karabakh for Armenian refugees.
The Armenian side nevertheless remains apprehensive about population decline in this territory. Attempting to address this problem, “President” Haraik Harutiunian has announced the re-launch of a “state” program of artificial insemination in order to increase local birth rates (News.am, January 17).
Russia’s “peacekeeping” mission in what Moscow itself deems as Azerbaijani territory has no agreed-upon mandate; and Russia’s military presence there has no legal basis. It does, however, have Baku’s carefully weighed consent as part of the November 9 armistice declaration; it was not imposed on Baku, but was worked out through genuine give-and-take negotiations; and the mission’s actual execution by Russia is subject to constant adjustments through negotiations with Baku. This bilateral process has, to all intents and purposes, excluded Armenia from any significant role or initiative. Yerevan seems merely to react and largely comply with Russia’s initiatives in Upper Karabakh.
Without making any formal arrangements, therefore, Russia has become the real and recognized guarantor of Upper Karabakh’s security. Armenia has lost the guarantor’s role after 26 years of filling it (1994–2020). Yerevan has not only exhausted its resources in the recent, lost war but has also been outplayed diplomatically by Baku in the triangular process with Moscow.
Some Stepanakert officials, including the Security Council’s chief, Major General Vitaly Balasanian, and “parliament” chairperson Artur Tovmazian, have publicly registered Armenia’s loss of the guarantor’s role. They have clearly identified Russia’s “peacekeepers” along with the Karabakh “republic’s” forces as security guarantors, omitting Armenia from the equation (Artsakhpress, February 26; Artsakh Public TV cited by Arminfo, March 13). Russia, moreover, is bringing substantial humanitarian and reconstruction aid to Upper Karabakh, taking over also the “social guarantor’s” role from Armenia.
Armenian nationalism kept firmly aloof from the “Russian World” (“Russkiy Mir”) even when operating in alliance with Russia. This distinctiveness remains intact in Yerevan. However, Stepanakert seems to consider moving toward the Russian World as a way of ingratiation with Moscow. Karabakh’s unrecognized “foreign affairs minister,” David Babaian, has issued an irate indictment of Azerbaijan’s disrespect for Soviet-era military memorials in the territories regained from Armenian control (News.am, March 8). The “parliament” in Stepanakert is considering draft laws to confer official status on the Russian language in the Karabakh “republic’s” administration and its mass media. A debate is ongoing on whether Russian should become an “official language” on par with the literary Armenian language or, alternatively, a “working language” to be used when necessary (Azatutiun.am, March 12).
Some international observers expect Russia to begin (after a decent interval) distributing Russian passports in the Karabakh “republic,” turning the recipients into citizens of Russia and potential labor migrants there. This would reproduce the model used earlier in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria and, currently, in Donbas. The case of Upper Karabakh, however, differs from those previous cases. Stepanakert’s as well as Yerevan’s top priority is to keep the population firmly attached to the land in the “republic,” since population loss would negate the Armenian claims to this territory (see above). Russia is also interested in keeping its would-be protégés in place, so as to justify its military presence and even augmenting it if deemed necessary in the future. Launching Russian passportization while at the same time strongly discouraging emigration could be a solution that would satisfy Moscow, Yerevan and Stepanakert
.
The Gates of Zangezur in Armenia
Putin Holds Phone Conversation with Aliyev, Pashinyan
The Russian foreign ministry of Friday declined to comment on Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s revisionist and threatening declaration that Armenia’s Zangezur is a “historic Azerbaijani territory.”
Aliyev made the statement on March 5 during a speech at an economic summit, saying that a so-called corridor linking mainland Azerbaijan to Nakhichavan would run through Zangezur.
A reporter for Armenia’s Public Television channel on Friday asked Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharove whether Moscow considered Aliyev’s statement about Zangezur a gross violation of international law and an infringement of Armenia’s sovereignty, and whether it was a violation of the tripartite statement signed on November 9 on the unblocking of regional transport communications and routes, reported the Arka news agency.
Zakharova sidestepped the question and instead praised the “generally constructive approach demonstrated by both Baku and Yerevan within the framework of the trilateral working group chaired by the vice-premiers of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan,” Arka reported.
Zakharova stressed that the main task of the working group has been to find ways for unblocking all economic and transport links in the region.
“We hope that the same focus on positive and mutually acceptable points of contact will prevail both in official comments and in Armenian and Azerbaijani mass media,” added Zakharova.
With such a provocative statement, calling Zangezur an ‘historic Azerbaijani territory’ and making reference to an imaginary corridor, the President of Azerbaijan deliberately undermines the implementation of the November 9 and January 11 trilateral statements,” said Armenia’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Anna Naghdalyan last week. She stressed that “Article 9 of the November 9 trilateral statement does not mention the establishment of a corridor.”
“Such rhetoric contradicts Azerbaijan’s obligations. It is a blatant challenge to international law, and in no way does it contribute to the stability of the region and threatens all states in the region,” added Naghdalyan last week.
On Friday, Russian President Vladimir Putin held telephone conversations with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Aliyev.
The Kremlin reported that Putin discussed practical aspects of the implementation of the November 9 and January 11 agreements on Karabakh and observed that the ceasefire was strictly being respected and the regional situation remained stable and calm.
The Kremlin statement added that Pashinyan and Aliyev reportedly praised “the productive activities of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in the contact line and along Lachin corridor.”
Issues related to unblocking economic and transport links in the South Caucasus were also discussed, with the sides saying they were satisfied with the activities of the working group co-chaired by the deputy prime ministers of the three countries.
Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan held a telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
A readout of the call from Pashinyan’s office also added that he and Putin discussed Armenia-Russia cooperation issues.
With the Turkish pro-government media already flooded with conspiracy theories, anti-Semitism and propaganda, Pope Francis I's current visit to Iraq has prompted Islamist conspiracy theorists to raise the issue that the visit amounts to Western meddling in Turkey's affairs, Ahval reported.
One of the most prominent pro-government Islamist columnists for the Yeni Safak newspaper, Yusuf Kaplan, described the pontiff's visit as a Vatican-Zionist siege.
Ibrahim Karagul, another pro-government Islamist columnist, commented on a photo taken during a meeting between the Pope and Ayatollah Sistani, a leading spiritual leader of Iraqi Shia Muslims.
He referred to the photo as alarming noting the image can be used to write a book.