Author: Arsine Chaltikian

Asia Times



[India and Iran can gain from any US-brokered Afghan peace dividend
and as stakeholders their cooperation can be a game-changer]

by MK Bhadrakumar
February 3, 2021        

By a fortuitous happening, the official heading the
Pakistan-Afghanistan-Iran Division in India’s External Affairs
Ministry, J P Singh, was in Iran on the weekend, hot on the heels of
senior Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar.

It is improbable they met. It is equally improbable that the Indian
diplomat failed to take note of the Taliban co-founder’s mission to
Tehran.

India’s policies on Afghanistan and Iran are poised for a radical
makeover. An opportunity presents itself to dovetail them into a new
regional strategy. Creative thinking is needed while navigating among
friends and rivals in an increasingly crowded, complicated and
competitive regional environment.

According to media reports, J P Singh held political consultations in
Tehran and also took stock of the development of the Shahid Beheshti
terminal at Chabahar Port at his meeting with Rasoul Mousavi,
assistant to Iran’s foreign minister and director-general for West
Asia in the Foreign Ministry.

Importantly, he called on Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to
discuss the regional and international situation.

Indian diplomacy is being proactive, given the fast-moving
developments in the situation around Iran. The Persian Gulf is at a
historic crossroads, with the new Joe Biden administration in the US
attributing “a critical early priority” to the Iran nuclear issue.

President Biden’s choice of Robert Malley as the new US special envoy
for Iran and Maher Al-Bitar as director of intelligence in the
National Security Council undoubtedly signal that a determined push to
engage with Iran is just ahead. Clearly, Biden will not brook
“spoilers,” especially Israel.

Robert Malley was the lead US negotiator in the Barack Obama
administration when the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement was concluded.


Three key points

His return is indicative of three things: a) Biden wants negotiations
to start immediately and has brought in a veteran “Iran hand” who is
completely familiar with the issues; b) in Malley, Biden has a
negotiator whom he trusts and whom Iranians would have dealt with; c)
Malley believes that the normalization of Iran ties is in US interests
and is crucial to the new West Asian strategy that Biden has spoken
about.

Maher Al-Bitar, on the other hand, is a veteran on West Asian affairs
with expertise in intelligence work who served as general counsel to
Democrats on the House Intelligence Committee and played a key role in
the first impeachment of former president Donald Trump. Biden has
known him for a long time.

But, significantly, he is a Palestinian-American who worked as the
director of Israeli Occupation-Palestinian affairs on the National
Security Council under Obama and had a stint with the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) in the Near
East in Jerusalem.

Traditionally, Israel has influenced White House policies in the
Middle East by “indoctrinating” the NSC with dubious, doctored
intelligence on Iran that served its purpose. However, with the
induction of Malley and Bitar, that is not going to be possible.

Of course, this doesn’t mean that Biden is indifferent to Israel’s
genuine security concerns. Rather, Biden will not allow Israel to
undermine his policies on Iran.

Suffice to say, the Indian establishment should take the usual Israeli
bluster vis-à-vis Iran with an extra pinch of salt. Israel is throwing
tantrums and threatens to attack Iran, feeling frustrated over Biden’s
intention to reverse Trump’s Iran policy, but even within Israel,
these threats ring hollow.

In the above scenario, a US-Iranian engagement is to be expected
shortly, which will lead to the lifting of sanctions. That means India
can look forward to reviving cooperation with Iran on the big scale
that Prime Minister Narendra Modi conceived in 2016-2017.

The timing of J P Singh’s consultations shows that New Delhi senses
that the ground is shifting in the Iran situation. Singh has conveyed
an invitation to Aragchi to visit Delhi for a “political dialogue”
with top policymakers, and a session of the joint economic commission
is also being planned.


Iran and Afghanistan

Meanwhile, Mullah Baradar’s mission to Tehran has thrown much light on
Iran’s thinking on the Afghan situation. Among Indian analysts, there
is a notion that Iran has aligned with the Taliban. Nothing could be
further from the actual state of play.

Indeed Iran, like most countries, has kept lines of communication open
to the Taliban in recognition of their control over nearly half the
country, but that never translated as Tehran favoring a Taliban
takeover. On the contrary, it is useful to recall that Tehran almost
went to war with the Taliban once in the late 1990s after the killing
of several Iranian diplomats in the consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif.

Iran’s top priorities are border security – especially drug
trafficking and cross-border terrorism – and, secondly, the great
concern over Shiite empowerment in Afghanistan. To this end, Tehran
keeps good relations with the established government in Kabul. Most
important, Iran wants an inclusive settlement in Afghanistan that
accommodates the interests of all ethnic and religious groups.

Interestingly, Tehran coordinated Mullah Baradar’s visit with the
Afghan government before scheduling it, thus underscoring the robust
support it extended to the idea of a genuine power-sharing in Kabul
that is acceptable to the incumbent government.

Top Iranian security officials have unequivocally conveyed to the
Taliban delegation that Tehran is firmly opposed to any takeover in
Kabul, no matter Iran’s deep aversion to the continued Western
occupation of Afghanistan.

Foreign Minister Javad Zarif told the visiting delegation: “We support
an inclusive Islamic government with the presence of all ethnicities
and faiths, and deem it necessary for Afghanistan.”

Fundamentally, India and Iran are on the same page as regards the
Afghan peace process. This gives India the opportunity to turn the
regional connectivity that Chabahar Port provides to work closely with
Iran at a practical level to stabilize the Afghan situation, which is
a shared objective.

If the US-Iran engagement gains traction, it is entirely conceivable
that Chabahar Port would overnight transform as the regional hub for
the international community to connect Afghanistan and Central Asia
with the world market.


‘Big picture’

Indian diplomacy should work with a “big picture” in view, with the
full realization that the Pakistan-centric Afghan policies hitherto
pursued, heavily orientated toward security concerns, have outlived
their utility. The good part is that there is no conflict of interest
between India and Iran in regard to regional security and stability.

If a broad-based inclusive government takes shape in the peace process
with genuine power-sharing among various groups and factions, India
and Iran stand to gain from the Afghan peace dividend. And as
stakeholders, their cooperation can be a game-changer in regional
security.

The bottom line is that India and Iran have common moorings in their
strategic autonomy. (Indira Gandhi was the first Indian leader to
realize this.)

Once the sanctions are lifted, Iran’s integration into the world
economy will dramatically deepen. There is no country in the entire
West Asian region that can match Iran even remotely in the sheer scale
of its vast and diverse mineral resources, strong agricultural and
industrial base, high level of scientific and technological know-how,
large domestic market and trained manpower.

*
M K Bhadrakumar is a former Indian diplomat.