Heritage.org, DC
June 2 2006
Putin’s Legacy and United Russia’s New Ideology
by Ariel Cohen
Backgrounder #1940
June 1, 2006 | |
a/bg1940.cfm
`The Party has been, and remains, the main organizing and
coordinating force capable of leading the people along the path of
profound Socialist renewal….’
– Mikhail Gorbachev
With the fall of the USSR, the Russian post-Soviet elite was
demoralized by the collapse of Soviet power and sought a new
direction. For a time, ideol – ogy took a back seat to market reforms,
competition, and repudiation of government control. However, `men of
the state’ and `men of force’ – known in Russian as `derzhavniki’ and
`siloviki’ – have reversed this trend.
The resurgence of nationalist rhetoric has acceler – ated markedly
since the 2000 election of Russian President Vladimir Putin and the
rise of oil prices. With Putin’s departure scheduled for 2008, his
United Russia party will require more than fond memories of the
popular president to maintain the support and trust of the people. It
needs a coherent political doctrine. This effort has finally been
accomplished.
In February 2006, Vladislav Surkov, Putin’s deputy chief of staff and
chief political strategist, delivered an extensive speech at a United
Russia political semi – nar.[1] For the first time, he outlined the
underlying ideology, goals, and aspirations of the Russian
Feder – ation’s largest political party. Surkov’s speech was
sub – sequently published in two consecutive issues of Moskovskie
Novosti, a formerly liberal weekly, under the title `The General
Line’ in direct allusion to the term applied to Soviet Communist
Party policy between the 1920s and 1980s. The speech was later widely
reprinted elsewhere, and media leaks from the Kremlin indicate that
such wide circula – tion amounts to publication of the new official
Kremlin doctrine.[2]
Surkov’s speech defines the strategic direction that Putin wants
Russia to pursue, the goals to which she should aspire, and how the
party can lead the country to achieve those goals. Much of it was
reflected in Putin’s State of the Federation speech to both houses of
the Duma, Russia’s parlia – ment, on May 10. It combines democratic and
mar – ket rhetoric with deliberate actions of power centralization and
ideological and economic nationalism bordering on protectionism.
This ideological treatise is a great insight into the Kremlin’s
thinking and policy. Recent steps under – taken by the Russian
Federation and public state – ments by Russian officials indicate that
Russia may be asserting its dominance abroad, especially in the
former Soviet area. The speech provides a number of reasons for the
United States to reevaluate its policies toward Russia and act on the
basis of what is realistic and possible.
Importance of Surkov’s Speech
Surkov’s speech is intended both to outline a social contract between
the Russian leadership and the Russian people and to ensure that
United Rus – sia continues to enjoy its position as the dominant party
in Russian politics. If this social contract is accepted, United
Russia will have succeeded in cre – ating an ideological framework for
national unity and a road map to national greatness; at the very
least, it will have ensured its position as a ruling party until the
presidential elections of 2012 or even beyond. This is a greater
accomplishment than previous attempts to create a ruling party in
post-Communist Russia, such as Russia’s Choice (1993) and Our Home
Russia (1996).
The text of the speech and the timing of its deliv – ery reflect
Russia’s social, political, and economic trajectory, including
aspirations of single-party rule, energy superpower status, and
geopolitical conflicts and alliances. All of this is contingent upon
United Russia maintaining its status as the only political party in
Russia with the means to implement its political agenda.
Democratic Rhetoric vs. Restrictive Reality
On the positive side, Surkov entreats Russians to become more active
in politics, to familiarize them – selves with all sides of current
debates, and to be part of the solution to Russia’s myriad pressing
problems. His refusal to condone expropriation of private property is
also hopeful. The development of a propertied class that is
encouraged to partici – pate politically may be a decisive factor in
the future growth and strengthening of democracy in Russia. The
growth of such a class may increase calls for stronger protection of
property rights and rule of law as well.
These would be welcome developments, as they not only help to improve
the current situation in Russia, but also would enhance the security
of for – eign investments in Russia. Unfortunately, how – ever, the
current situation indicates that it is the bureaucracy, not the
elected political leadership, that calls the shots in Putin’s and
Surkov’s Russia.
Also promising are Surkov’s calls for picking up the pace of economic
reform and integrating more fully into global markets. Increased
openness to trade will likely foster improvements in economic
efficiency, management, and transparency, all of which have suffered
throughout the post-Commu – nist transition.
These democratic and free-market ideals will benefit Russian society
if they are put into practice. However, calls for strengthening
democracy coin – cide with legislation restricting representation and
participation. Assets continue to be concentrated in the hands of a
well-connected few. Simply put, in today’s Russia, democratic
rhetoric is contradicted by increasingly centralized political
practice.
Single Party Rule: A Democratic Deficit
United Russia was created in December 2001 by combining the pro-Putin
Unity and former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov’s and Moscow mayor
Yuri Luzhkov’s Fatherland-All Russia parties. It was a political
construct of the Kremlin: the party of power, meant to occupy the
center of Russia’s body politic.
United Russia is now the most powerful political party in the Russian
Federation, with an estimated 100,000 members. Its showing in the
March 12, 2006, regional and local elections, in which it won 197 out
of 359 regional legislative seats, was a clear indicator of its
strength.[3] Surkov suggests that, as with Germany’s Christian
Democrats and Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party after World War II,
United Russia should remain the dominant force in Russian politics
for the next 10-15 years, and recent changes in the electoral system
may ensure that this will come to pass.
At this point, no opposition group in Russia appears capable of
posing any real threat to United Russia’s overwhelming share of
popular support in the 2007 parliamentary or 2008 presidential
elec – tions. However, the Kremlin is taking steps to rein in potential
political challengers, first by abolishing the election of Duma
members in `single mandate’ electoral districts, opting instead for
national party lists. Such a proportional electoral system seriously
weakens the relationship between a voter and his elected
representative. Deputy Director of the Cen – ter for Political
Technologies Boris Makarenko has called this a `further stage in the
consolidation of a monolithic system.'[4]
Rodina (Motherland), a leftist nationalist party that many suspect
was created by Kremlin officials to siphon off support from the
nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and the
Com – munist Party, was barred from participation in the December 2005
Moscow City Duma elections for inciting racial hatred.[5]
The Duma is considering several amendments to electoral law.
Ostensibly aimed at strengthening the party system by creating a
small number of large parties, these laws, if passed, will rob the
opposi – tion of their only means of competing with United Russia:
through coalitions.[6] Another legislative proposal would authorize
governors, who are Kremlin-appointed, to abrogate mayoral powers.
Although so far ignored by the West, such extraor – dinarily broad
powers will prove effective in con – solidating the Kremlin’s top-down
authority.[7]
If all of the proposed electoral changes come to fruition, governors,
mayors, and political parties will all be Kremlin-controlled,
ensuring a predict – able outcome in the future parliamentary and
pres – idential elections. The Kremlin is consolidating its own power
at the expense of opposition forces and raising the possibility that
United Russia will dom – inate politics in the Russian Federation for
at least the next two electoral cycles (2007-2008 and 2011-2012).
At present, the majority of United Russia’s popu – lar support is
derived from the popularity and cha – risma of President Putin, whose
approval ratings fluctuate between 65 percent and 75 percent.[8] It
is unlikely that the next president will share Mr. Putin’s appeal and
popular support. United Russia must therefore replace the personal
legitimacy of its leader with a more long-lasting ideological
founda – tion to provide legitimacy for future leaders. Creat – ing a
sense of unity, pride, and common purpose that is closely linked both
to Putin and to United Russia may allow the party to stay in power
even with a weak next president.
Strategic Resources
By maintaining control of the executive branch, the judiciary,
security services, government-owned companies, and the parliament,
United Russia offi – cials will be able to secure control over their
share of the profits from nationalized resources[9] and, in many
cases, expand the assets that they effectively control. At a recent
conference in Moscow, Minister of Economic Development and Trade
German Greff cited the acquisition of assets by large state-owned
companies as a threat to Russia’s economic health. Minister of
Finance Alexei Kudrin echoed this sen – timent, asserting that the
state should play a smaller role in Russia’s economy.[10] Economists
in Russia, Venezuela, and Bolivia agree that asset holding by the
`state’ or `people’ in reality means beneficiary ownership by
specific politicians and senior bureaucrats.
Government officials are reluctant to release their hold on strategic
economic sectors because these same officials control and benefit
from these assets. Gazprom, Russia’s behemoth state-owned gas firm,
is chaired by First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. Rosneft,
the state-owned oil firm that forced a sale of Yugasnknefte – gaz, the
production arm of YUKOS, below mar – ket price, is chaired by Igor
Sechin, the Kremlin deputy chief of staff. Alexei Kudrin, despite his
calls for less government control over the econ – omy, chairs the
Russian state diamond monopoly, Alrosa.[11]
The melding of business and politics has created a pressing need by
government officials to maintain the status quo at all costs. As is
true elsewhere in the world, men whose wealth relies on government
control of strategic economic sectors are unlikely to loosen their
grasp on those resources, or on the political machinery that controls
those resources, for the sake of reform.
Surkov stresses in his speech that the nationaliza – tion of strategic
resources is in the interest of distrib – uting wealth among the
Russian population. Russian GDP per capita has grown dramatically,
from $1,170 in 2000 to $3,400 in 2004. However, income ine – quality in
the Russian Federation remains remark – ably high. Energy superpower
status certainly benefits Russia as a whole, but it benefits members
of the political-bureaucratic-security elite with access to
government-controlled resources far more than it benefits others.
Aside from its domestic implications, Russia’s energy superpower
status is a means to protect sovereignty and exert influence abroad.
Auton – omy is desirable for any state; however, Russia is using
zero-sum game analysis and tactics in the global energy markets to
promote its economic interests.
Alexei Miller, CEO of Gazprom and Deputy Energy Minster of the
Russian Federation, recently threatened that `attempts to limit
Gaz – prom’s activities in the European market and politicize questions
of gas supply’ might induce Russia to shift its export focus to
Asia,[12] and these sentiments were echoed by President Putin
him – self.[13] Russian leaders were particularly upset about
resistance in Europe to selling gas-distribu – tion networks, such as
Centrica in the United Kingdom.
Surkov asserts that in the global economy, Russia can either be a
spider or a fly – an apt metaphor, as it reveals Russia’s attitude
toward competition in global markets, which includes neither
compro – mise nor cooperation.
`Enemies of the People’
Russia is to achieve full autonomy as a global geopolitical player by
successfully manipulating energy markets. Energy superpower status
under the guidance of United Russia is the key to Russia’s future,
and anyone who would thwart Russia’s aspirations – oligarchs,
opposition groups, terror – ists, foreign powers – is an `enemy.’ Surkov
seeks to rally popular support by identifying those who seek their
own ends and oppose United Russia’s grand strategy as being among
these common enemies.
`Oligarchic revanchists’ provide a perfect scape – goat for the
troubles of the post-Communist period, an ideal backdrop for the
emergence of the great leader who creates order out of chaos, and a
conve – nient rationale for nationalization of the most lucra – tive
sectors of the Russian Federation’s economy. Surkov and others often
allege that in the 1990s, oligarchs stole all of Russia’s assets and
profited from them, denying ordinary Russians their rightful share of
national resources. According to Surkov’s narrative, President Putin
(despite being a senior Yeltsin official and designated successor)
saved both Russia and its valuable resources from the oli – garchs. In
this new age of order and democracy, these greedy individuals are no
longer permitted to use Russia’s resources to their own advantage,
but must use them instead for the Fatherland and the people.
Despite their alleged heinous crimes, however, oligarchs are
deserving of membership in Russia’s elite – provided that their
transgressions do not contradict Kremlin policy. Roman Abramovich,
former partner of Boris Berezovsky in ownership of Sibneft, the
Siberian oil company, is responsi – ble for the expatriation of
billions of dollars. Putin however, recently reappointed him
gover – nor of Chukotka, a province in the far Northeast of Russia.
`Isolationists,’ or nationalist extremists, are a threat to the
leadership of the Russian Federation because they are bad for both
domestic stability and international perceptions of Russia. Isolating
ultra-nationalists is necessary to maintain an image of
respectability abroad and the ability to keep order at home, despite
alarmingly frequent instances of hate crimes.
However, Russian law enforcement has been remarkably lenient in
punishing the crimes of these `enemies of the Russian Federation.’
For example:
In early 2006, a Russian nationalist wielding a knife stabbed nine
people in a Moscow syna – gogue. He was sentenced to 13 years in
prison, but despite his claims that the attacks were inspired by
anti-Semitic Web sites, the charge of inciting interethnic hatred was
dropped, much to the surprise and consternation of human rights
activists.[14]
In 2004, a nine-year-old Tajik girl was murdered in a brutal attack
by a group of Russian nation – alists whose ringleader was sentenced to
five and a half years on a charge of `hooliganism.'[15]
In 2006, an Armenian teenager was stabbed to death in Moscow by
skinheads, apparently on racist grounds.[16] According to an Amnesty
International report, in 2005, 31 people were murdered and 382 others
were attacked in race-related incidents in Russia.[17]
In addition to racially motivated crime, Russian officials have
exhibited an alarming degree of reli – gious intolerance. Young Russian
Orthodox Chris – tians, who claimed that the exhibit had offended them,
vandalized an exhibition of atheist art at the Sakharov museum. A
Moscow court dismissed the case against them.[18] In January 2005, a
group of Duma representatives called for the banning of all Jewish
organizations in Russia, claiming that these groups incite ethnic
hatred and `provoke anti-Semitism.'[19] There have been recent calls
for offi – cial Russian Orthodox chaplains in the Russian military and
the teaching of Russian Orthodoxy in state schools without any
corresponding proposals with respect to other religions.
The Kremlin is doing very little to combat these `oligarchic
revanchists’ or `isolationist national – ists.’ The reason is that
these elements, in addi – tion to being useful as political scarecrows
and scapegoats, provide justification for new laws to restrict the
activities of non-governmental organi – zations (NGOs) that have little
to do with political extremism.
As for enemies from outside the Russian Federa – tion, the Kremlin
seems similarly ambivalent about the West, which is an invaluable
trade partner but which also embodies democratic values and the rule
of law. This foreign menace is all the more rea – son to support United
Russia’s vision: a plan to ensure that Russia no longer has to bow to
Western influence.
Why the West Should Be Concerned
Taken at face value, Surkov’s speech identifies Russia’s goals in
both domestic and foreign policy and indicates whom Russia might
consider ene – mies and friends. The doctrine also sheds light on a
reality that many have been loath to admit: The period of the
post-Communist honeymoon is over.
While the United States and the Russian Fed – eration can have common
interests and reasons to cooperate, the U.S. must evaluate Russian
poli – cies over the past five years. From the perspective of American
national interests, these include (among others) developing ties with
China and Iran, energy security, non-proliferation, democ – racy, human
rights, and the rule of law. Russia is no longer weak and does not
rely on Western funds and favor to maintain its place in the global
order.
President Putin’s May 10, 2006, State of the Fed – eration address
indicates that the Russian leader – ship intends to refashion the state
as a capable counterweight to the United States, not only
eco – nomically, but demographically and militarily as well. Putin
called for women to return to their tra – ditional role of
childbearing, and for government subsidies to mothers, in order to
reverse the current population decline. He also emphasized the need
for drastic improvements in all aspects of Russia’s military, from
manpower to better ballistic missile defense, as protection against
those that would undermine Russia’s sovereignty. In a not-so-veiled
reference to U.S. foreign policy, he stated, `Com – rade wolf knows
whom to eat – he eats and does not listen to anyone.'[20]
The goal of United Russia and its president is to make Russia once
again an autonomous interna – tional player by returning to the values
that made it strong in the past. If United Russia is successful, the
U.S. and other Western powers must engage Russia on an entirely new
level: as a competitor, not as a junior partner.
Will the Doctrine Work?
The predictive value of the doctrine outlined in Surkov’s speech is
contingent on its fulfillment, which in turn relies on United
Russia’s performance for the next 10 to 15 years. United Russia must
attempt to hold on to hundreds of thousands of its current members
once President Putin is no longer at the helm.
Surkov’s speech appeals to a broad range of the Russian population.
Its nationalist undertones are tempered by denunciation of
ultra-nationalists. Its excoriation of oligarchs is offset by its
call for pro – tecting Russian businessmen and creating a new Russian
business elite.
As in China, economic growth may provide an antidote against a
decline in the party’s popularity. At the moment, Russia is flush
with cash, benefit – ing from skyrocketing prices of oil and gas. But
energy prices are volatile, and many oil and gas consumers are
becoming convinced of the need to diversify supply sources,
especially as Russia’s mis – handling of the Ukrainian and Georgian
supply controversies contributed to Europe’s mistrust of Moscow. It
is possible that a synthetic ideology will not suffice to keep United
Russia in power once the Kremlin’s coffers are not so full.
Russia’s economy has seen healthy growth – about 7 percent a year for
the past five years – and there is little expectation that oil and gas
prices will decline any time soon. However, the high costs of
exploration and of oil and gas in Russia’s inhospitable physical and
investment climate, as well as stifling government control, make
eco – nomic slowdown a real possibility. Although Surkov says quite
clearly that reprivatization is not a desirable option, Russia has
weak rule of law and a track record of arbitrary changes in and
application of its tax codes. Lack of predictability and insufficient
protection of investor rights is a strong deterrent to foreign
investment, specifi – cally in non-natural resources sectors of the
econ – omy. If these sectors do not grow, the Russian economy will be
at the mercy of fluctuations in commodity prices.
Instead of privatizing Gazprom, however, Rus – sia has transferred to
it a significant part of the oil sector and is using the giant
company as an instru – ment of foreign policy. As the government’s
appe – tite for spending grows, Russia will likely have to rely on its
stabilization fund to finance the govern – ment budget.[21] The Kremlin
may be faced with mounting economic difficulties sooner than
expected.
How the United States Should Respond
In order to protect not only U.S. interests, but also the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the states of the former Soviet Union,
the U.S. should adopt the following measures:
Recognize that Russia is an autonomous actor no longer willing to
play second fiddle to the United States. It is seeking to limit U.S.
pres – ence and influence in the areas in which it has the ability to
project military and political power. These areas include Central
Asia, the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. The U.S.
should promote the principle of territorial integrity in Georgia and
Moldova. Overall, it should encourage negotiations and non-military
solutions.
Continue to support diversification of energy transit routes in
Eurasia, specifically from Kaza – khstan and/or Turkmenistan across the
Cas – pian, to be linked with Europe through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
oil pipeline and the Baku-Erzerum gas pipeline via Turkey.
Encourage Russia to sign the Energy Charter, an international treaty
on energy production and transportation, which promotes foreign
investment in the energy sector through trans – parency and
accountability.
Support free media, the rule of law, and demo – cratic political
development in Russia through NGOs. These include both indigenous
Russian NGOs and foreign NGOs working in Russia. The Department of
State and the National Endowment for Democracy should identify,
support, and expose to their peers abroad those young politicians,
writers, and media personal – ities who disseminate the values of
democracy, tolerance, and human rights and support polit – ical and
economic liberty.
Conclusion
Vladislav Surkov’s ideological treatise is a great insight into the
Kremlin’s thinking and policy. Recent steps undertaken by the Russian
Federation and public statements by Russian officials indicate that
Russia is trying to assert its dominance abroad, especially in the
former Soviet area.
Surkov’s speech provides a number of reasons for the United States to
reevaluate its policies toward Russia on the basis of what is
realistic and possible. There may be relatively little that the U.S.
can do to affect Russian domestic politics, but America can and
should be prepared to support those who seek freedom.
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is a Senior Research Fellow in the Douglas and
Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Pol – icy Studies, a division of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies,
at The Heritage Foundation. The author wishes to thank Con – way Irwin
for contributing to this paper.
Appendix
The World According to Surkov
Russia’s Historic Legacy
At present, there is no consensus in Russia as to the assessment of
events in its past, nor is there any consensus as to which direction
it should take in the future. Russia is a European country, but there
are differences between the Russian Federation and countries with
deep traditions of Western demo – cratic values. `The fundamental
values of democ – racy are ingrained in the citizens of the U.S.A.,
England, France. Wake them up in the middle of the night – they’ll
start telling you about human rights and so forth.’ These values
should take on greater meaning in the daily lives of Russians, and
Russians should develop their ability both to act according to these
values in their interactions with one another and to triumph over
opponents by means of an ideological offensive. `[T]he party, so that
it may retain its dominant position in the polit – ical system (and
that is our fundamental goal), must more actively master the skills
of ideological warfare.’
Nikolay Berdyaev, an important early 20th cen – tury Russian
philosopher, said, `It is necessary to strive for a free and fair
society. Without freedom there can be no justice. Justice demands
freedom for all people.’ Berdyaev was a Russian thinker, and this was
a Russian thought, unlike the works of Marx or Hegel. Russians should
respect their ances – tors and should not pass undue judgment on the
Soviet Union, as it is associated with `all our close kin, it is in
fact we ourselves.’
There were two great achievements of the Soviet Union. The first was
its powerful ideological mes – sage, which spread worldwide and
included an understanding of freedom and justice. Soviet
power – ideological, military, and even moral – was hugely influential
on a global scale. It was even popular among Western intellectuals
and contrib – uted to the liberation of colonies. It played a major
role in world history, and that is something that Russians should
remember.
The other astonishing achievement of the Soviet Union was
industrialization. Russians today are profiting from this
inheritance, which includes rail – roads, pipelines, factories, and
nuclear weapons.
The Soviet Union had its negative side as well. Its repressive,
closed Soviet society, `in which results are evaluated by party-dogma
rather than pragma – tism, produced an ineffective elite…. Society was
not only unjust, it also wasn’t free. It did not address the question
of material needs’ and `obviously fell behind the new quality of life
of the Western coun – tries in satisfying the demands of the people.’
A Time of Crisis
The Soviet Union’s downfall was inevitable. `The Russian people
themselves chose this fate – they rejected the socialist model’ as
inconsistent with their search for freedom and justice. However, the
USSR tried to reform, to embrace the democratic values embodied in
the Soviet constitution. The constitution of the USSR and its
language about democracy made `the Soviet Union, uncondition – ally,
the greatest modernization project. It already carried with it the
seeds of democracy.’ The col – lapse was the result of the Soviet
people’s finally holding their country accountable for its promises
of democracy, and `the loss of territory, the loss of population, the
loss of a huge part of our economy’ was the price that Russia paid.
After the downfall, because of disillusionment with the Soviet
government, there was widespread belief that `government is evil…and
having reduced it to nothing, everything would turn out fine. Of
course, this vacuum [of power] was filled, and it was exactly these
ambitious and self-serving commercial leaders who placed themselves
in the myriad opportunities for power…. [E]ntire minis – tries,
regions, parties found themselves under the control of independent
financial groups, moreover under direct and literal control.’
The framers of the Soviet constitution did not foresee leadership by
commercial interests. The constitution was not written for the
purpose of sub – jugating elected officials to people with money.
Democracy in the oligarchic period of the 1990s was not rule by many,
nor was it rule by a substan – tial number. `You could count these
people on your fingers…. [A]s a result, all the foundations of
democracy were distorted…. If that was a democ – racy, then I don’t
know what democracy is.’
Freedom of speech during this period took on its own special meaning.
`[L]eading television net – works became weapons in the hands of famous
oli – garchic groups’ who used them to gain access to and divide among
themselves even more govern – ment assets. Although privatization in
and of itself is a good thing, it was carried out by means of
awk – ward and confusing schemes, such as rigged oil-for-food auctions.
`In the federal system chaos ruled.’ Centrifugal forces threatened
Russia’s territorial integrity in the 1990s, especially rebellion in
Chechnya and the inability of disparate regions to agree on a federal
budget. In the midst of these centrifugal forces, Russia `was on the
verge of losing its sovereignty.’
Russia’s Democratic Development
`If we want our society to be democratic, to pos – sess sovereignty and
be an actor in world politics, we must develop our democracy, and
here fundamental human rights are part of the strengthening the
struc – ture of civil society. I see the [United Russia] party first of
all as an instrument of civil society, as an instrument of societal
participation in political life and in power…a self-regulating and
non-commercial organization of a completely different kind…an
insti – tute of civil society, a self-organization of citizens.’
Regarding changes in the political system in Rus – sia, such as the
move to proportional representa – tion in the parliament, a
proportional system is more democratic, as it will require a greater
num – ber of votes for United Russia to have a majority in parliament:
`more votes than all other electoral lists combined.’ This is a means
to strengthening the opposition and the party system in general.
As for presidential appointment of governors, and the oft-repeated
question of how this helps to win the war on terrorism, it helps to
avoid the chaos of the 1990s, in which there were too many parties,
leading to the atomization of society. The goal of these changes is
to `benefit society, strengthen its foundations.’
Among the political reforms of the past few years is the creation of
the Public Chamber: `a new organ for the realization and development
of opportunities for cooperation between government structures and
societal organizations.’ In effect, the Public Chamber is intended as
an intermediary between the Kremlin and non-governmental
organizations.
But democracy has one great enemy: corruption. It also has a
downside: poverty. The government of the Russian Federation has yet
to prove its effec – tiveness in providing a social safety net and
seeing that wages are paid; for the `stable development of free
society, free economics demands fairer distri – bution of GDP.’
The Path to Greatness: Obstacles and Opportunities
The fundamental threats to Russian sovereignty are international
terrorism, military conflict, lack of economic competitiveness, and
`soft’ takeovers by `orange technologies [U.S.- and
Western-sup – ported opposition movements] in a time of decreased
national immunity to foreign influence.’
Although military conflicts are not a current threat, anything can
happen, and the army, navy, and nuclear weapons are the `foundations
of [Rus – sia’s] national sovereignty.’ Russia’s economic growth,
though impressive, started from a very low level. Structural reform
has dragged out for far too long, and this will eventually take its
toll on growth. Other problems include enormous govern – ment
expenditures, budgetary problems, and lack of development.
The liberal idea that with full liberalization, all of these problems
will right themselves is erroneous. Russian society must `work out a
realistic model of further development. President Putin himself
already outlined this model, although we find our – selves at the
beginning of the road. We must use our competitive advantage and
develop it.’
Energy Superpower
Russia should be an energy superpower. The energy industry is the
state’s main enterprise and brings in the lion’s share of Russia’s
GDP. Becoming an energy superpower requires technological
improvements in the fuel-energy complex; other – wise, Russia relegates
itself to the role of exporter of raw materials, at which point `we
become spetsnaz, guarding their [the West’s] pipelines.’ Russia
already has the resources – research organizations, people, and
specialists – with which to achieve technological advances in its
energy sector.
As regards Russia’s strategic industries, `national is not
necessarily governmental. But the fuel-energy complex, strategic
communications, the financial system, and defense must be chiefly
Rus – sian,’ while other industries must open themselves to foreign
investment.
It is necessary for Russia to control certain sec – tors in order to
carve out a place in the global hier – archy. `Only the direct
participation of Russian companies in the creation of global
information links will be able to guarantee Russia a place in polite
society. Our sovereignty and who we are in the world’s spider web
[the Russian term for the Internet] – spiders or flies – depends on
this.’
Another threat to Russia’s sovereignty is `soft invasions…. [T]hey
blur values, declare the gov – ernment ineffective, provoke internal
conflicts. `Orange technology’ shows this very clearly.’ There is
only one way to prevent a `soft invasion’ or `color revolution,’ and
that is by creating a `nation – ally-oriented leading layer of
society.’
It is also vital that Russia not give up its sovereign interests for
the interests of others. Russia must par – ticipate in the global
economy’s multinational corpo – rations: `multinational, not trans-,
supra-, or just national. The economic future is not in the
disap – pearance of great nations, but in their cooperation.’
There are problems with Russia’s business elite: namely, that many
Russian businessmen take their families and assets offshore. `It is
not important that he have offshore accounts, let him have them. But
mentally he does not live here, in Russia, and such people will not
help Russia, and they will also not take care of Russia.’ Russia’s
future relies on transformation of the Russian business elite into a
national bourgeoisie.
Any talk of contradictions between business and government is a
`delusion. Business is in contradic – tion with society, because a
government official takes his cues from society.’ Disavowing a
populist position calling for expropriation of the assets of the
rich, Russia must protect its business class, who in return must `pay
taxes and respect traditions and morals.’ The other element of a
leading class of society is an effective bureaucracy. `The
bureau – cracy must make a transition from quasi-Soviet,
quasi-competent, accustomed to defeat, to a com – petitive, competent
community of civil servants, because it is here that we lose in
relation to the cor – poratism of other governments.’
Russia’s educational system is `not bad, but we must develop it,
reorient it, and very important is that it produce a national elite.’
Education is `the creation of a nation, the organization of life and
the culture of the nation.’
Russia’s Enemies
Russia’s enemies are those who demand that Russia take a step back
and those who demand that Russia take two steps back.
The first group are `oligarchic revanchists’ – those who profited from
the chaos of the Yeltsin era and are nostalgic for those times.
`Whereas before – hand they influenced decisions, now, to be honest,
they exercise no special influence. People have many motives for
turning back the clock. There are potential leaders of this school of
thought. And for – eign sponsors. Unconditionally, we cannot have a
restoration of the oligarchic regime because that is a road to
nowhere…leading to a great loss of sover – eignty and democracy…. But
the potential danger of their return exists, we shouldn’t dismiss
them.’
The second group – those who would take two steps back – are
`isolationists.’ They call themselves `patriots,’ but one should not
sully the word by using it to describe them. They are neo-Nazis. `The
difficulty of establishing democracy in our country, the double
standards of Western politicians stimu – late disappointment in
democratic values. Secret CIA prisons in Europe, illegal use of force
in Iraq, `orange’ revolutions in neighboring countries – these hardly
contribute to the popularity of democratic ideas.’ Analysis of this
new `enemy list’ follows.
The Role of United Russia
`United Russia’s goal is not just to win in 2007, but to think about
what everyone should be doing to guarantee the domination of the
party for the next 10-15 years’ in order to prevent these enemy
political forces from knocking Russia off its current political path.
People should engage in political debate; if you do not discuss among
yourselves, how will you convince others? Forget about right and
left. The party is for people of all stripes – left, right, sol – diers,
teachers, businessmen. `All who aren’t against us are for us,’ and
efforts should be made to form coalitions, even with opposition
parties.
Political discussions can be used to develop new approaches for
achieving the national project. In order to educate themselves, party
supporters should `study the ideological documents of the president
and the party.’
—————————————– —————————
[1]For a detailed summary of Surkov’s speech, see the Appendix.
[2]Vladislav Surkov, `General’naya Liniya,’ Moskovskie Novosti, No. 7
(1324), March 3-9, 2006, pp. 10-11; Vladislav Surkov, `General’naya
Liniya,’ Moskovskie Novosti, No. 8 (1325), March 10-16, 2004, pp.
10-11.
[3]Marina Mokhovets, `The March 12 Triumph: United Russia Is Today’s
CPSU,’ WPS Media Monitoring Agency, March 17, 2006, at
(May 11, 2006).
[4]Aleksei Titkov, `Proposals for Transition to a Proportional
Electoral System and the Prospects for Multi-partisanship in Russia,’
Carnegie Moscow Center, May 24, 2004, at
(May 1, 2006).
[5]For example, Rodina leader Dmitry Rogozin has appeared in a
television spot calling dark-skinned migrants from the Cau – casus and
Central Asia `trash’ and suggesting that the streets of Moscow should
be swept of such `trash.’ Rodina was expected to make a strong
showing in the elections, and analysts suggest that the real reason
for its exclusion was to ensure electoral victory for United Russia.
See Claire Bigg, `Russia: Nationalist Party Barred from Moscow
Election,’ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 28, 2005, at
58b58d-
c196-4cb1-b0f8-6db948f452c7.html (May 11, 2006).
[6]`Duma Set to Toughen Election Laws,’ Kommersant, April 11, 2006,
at ;id=66 5355 (May 11, 2006).
[7]Francesca Mereu, `Mayors Could Lose Their Powers,’ Moscow Times,
April 5, 2006, at
/2006/04/05/ 002.html.
[8]Yuri Levada Analytical Center, `Putin Approval Stands at 72% in
Russia,’ Angus Reid Global Scan: Polls and Research, April 14, 2006,
at on
/viewItem/itemID/11551.
[9]Natalya Olenich, `The Laws of Attractiveness,’ Gazeta.ru, March
13, 2006, at
STYLE=739318018&PRESENTÛ=985,AN=222750
611,FM= 9,SEARCH=MD.GenericSearch (May 11, 2006).
[10]Gleb Bryanski, `Ministers Call State’s Asset Grab a Threat,’ The
Moscow Times, April 5, 2006, at
5/043.html.
[11]Ibid.
[12]Peggy Hollinger, `Gazprom Threat Adds to EU Fears on Supply,’
Financial Times, April 20, 2006, at
– istration/barrier?referer= arch?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-8&rls=GGLG, GGLG:2005-40,GGLG:en&q=hollinger+threat&lo cation=http%3A//news.ft.com/cms/s/1bfa611c-d09c-11 da-b160-0000779e2340.html
(May 11, 2006).
[13]Guy Chazan, `Putin Uses Asia in Power Play on EU,’ The Wall
Street Journal, April 27, 2006, at
752882973 6665-search.htmlKEYWORDS=Putin+Europe+gas&
COL LECTION=wsjie/6month (May 11, 2006).
[14]`Moscow Synagogue Attacker Appeals Sentence on Mental Health
Grounds,’ Israeli Insider.com, April 4, 2006, at
90.htm (May 11, 2006).
[15]Claire Bigg, `Russia: Sentences in Tajik Girl’s Slaying Spark
Public Outcry,’ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 31, 2006, at
4fe30c-
5ee2-4543-9401-f8b29f08cdbd.html (May 11, 2006).
[16]`Moscow Police Arrest Teenager in Connection with Fatal Stabbing
of Armenian Student,’PRAVDA.Ru, April 24, 2006, at
06/79470-
Armenian-0 (May 30, 2006); see also Nick Paton Walsh, `Armenian
Student Killed in Moscow Race Attack,’ The Guardian, April 24, 2006,
at ,,175981 4,00.html (May
26, 2006).
[17]`Human Rights Group Raps Russia for Tide of Racial Violence,’ The
Wall Street Journal, May 5, 2006, at
348
-search.htmlKEYWORDS=amnesty+international+
ru ssia&COLLECTION=wsjie/6month (May 11, 2006).
[18]Lera Arsenina, `Secular Court Supports Religious Zealots,’
Gazeta.ru, August 12, 2003, at
tml (May 11, 2006).
[19]Steve Gutterman, `Russian Lawmakers Target Jewish Groups,’
Associated Press, January 25, 2005, at
s/2005/
01/25/russian_lawmakers_target_jewish_grou ps?mode=PF (May 25, 2006).
[20]Anatoly Medetsky, `Comrade Wolf Eats Without Listening,’ The
Moscow Times, May 11, 2006, at
1/003.html.
[21]Rudiger Ahrend and William Tompson, `Russia’s Economy: Keeping Up
the Good Times,’ OECD Observer, October 2005, at
aid/1658/
Russia’s_economy_:_Keeping_up_the_good_t imes.html
(May 11, 2006).
http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasi
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http://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/media/70524.htm
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/11/b0
http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?idr=1&
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http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/03/47
http://english.pravda.ru/news/hotspots/24-04-20
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http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114678700255544
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