A1+: The RA Men’s Chess Championship has a new leader

Հունվար 16, 2022


Տիգրան Պետրոսյանի անվան շախմատի տանը կայացան Հայաստանի շախմատի առաջնությունների 5-րդ տուրի պարտիաները:

Տղամարդկանց մրցաշարում միանձնյա առաջատար դարձավ արցախցի գրոսմայստեր Մանուէլ Պետրոսյանը, որն ընթացիկ խաղում սևերով հաղթեց Զավեն Անդրիասյանին և վաստակեց 3,5 միավոր: Նրան հաջորդում են 5 շախմատիստ, որոնք ունեն 5-ական միավոր: Դրանք են նախկին առաջատարներ Սամվել Տեր-Սահակյանը, Հայկ Մարտիրոսյանը, Արման Փաշիկյանը և նրանց միացած Հովհաննես Գաբուզյանն ու Շանթ Սարգսյանը:

Կանանց առաջնության մրցաշարային աղյուսակը 5 տուրից հետո միանձյա գլխավորում է գործող չեմպիոն Սուսաննա Գաբոյանը, որն այս տուրում սևերով հաղթեց իր հետ հավասար ընթացող Նարե Առաքելյանին և վաստակեց 4 միավոր: Նրանից կես միավորով ետ են մնում գրոսմայստեր Մարիա Գևորգյանն ու միջազգային վարպետ Մարիամ Մկրտչյանը, որոնք այս տուրում նույնպես հաղթանակ տարան:

Վաղը կկայանան 6-րդ տուրի պարտիաները: Մանուէլ Պետրոսյանը սպիտակներով կհանդիպի գործող չեմպիոն Հովհաննես Գաբուզյանի հետ: Կանանց մրցաշարի առաջատար Սուսաննա Գաբոյանը սպիտակներով կխաղա հետնապահ Աստղիկ Հակոբյանի հետ:

Armenian, Turkish envoys meet for first talks on normalizing relations

EurasiaNet
Jan 14 2022
Joshua Kucera Jan 14, 2022
Mt Ararat stands behind the Armenian capital. The national symbol is across the closed border in Turkey. (iStock/guenterguni)

Envoys from Armenia and Turkey have met in Moscow to launch negotiations over normalizing relations.

The envoys – Serdar Kilic, a senior Turkish diplomat; and Ruben Rubinyan, the deputy speaker of Armenia’s parliament – met in Moscow on January 14. Following the meeting the two sides issued identical, optimistically worded statements.

“During their first meeting, conducted in a positive and constructive atmosphere, the Special Representatives exchanged their preliminary views regarding the normalization process through dialogue between Armenia and Turkey,” the two foreign ministries said. “Parties agreed to continue negotiations without preconditions aiming at full normalization.” The meeting was not filmed and afterwards the envoys did not speak to the press.

The two envoys were appointed in December as part of their countries’ moves toward restore ties in the wake of the 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. That war resulted in the return to Azerbaijan of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, which Armenia had occupied since the first war between the two sides in the 1990s.

The seizure of those territories in 1993 was what prompted Turkey to close the border. While Armenia has long been in favor of normalizing relations, Turkey – under pressure from its Azerbaijani allies – refused as long as the occupation continued. “With that issue off the table, Turkey began to signal its readiness for new talks with Armenia soon after the war,” the International Crisis Group wrote in an analysis previewing the January 14 talks.

The Moscow meeting was the most concrete step yet that the two sides have taken to normalizing relations. They will have to overcome a number of obstacles and potential spoilers: Turkish and Azerbaijani commentators have been putting forward public demands conditioning restoring Ankara-Yerevan relations on other issues, like Armenia renouncing control over Nagorno-Karabakh or giving up the cause of international recognition of the 1915 Armenian genocide.

That, in turn, has given fuel to Armenia’s political opposition and nationalists in the Armenian global diaspora, who have been trying to portray the talks as a unilateral concession by a weak Armenian government to their enemies. And many ordinary Armenians, who might have been in favor of restoring ties with Turkey before the war, have become more wary in the light of Turkey’s open, strong support of Azerbaijan’s 2020 offensive and a reawakening of anti-Armenian discourse in Turkey.

But no preconditions have been officially put forward, a fact that the January 14 statement emphasized. And in the days ahead of the talks the signals were mostly positive.

In late December, Azerbaijan Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov said that Baku “fully supports” Armenia and Turkey’s normalization efforts. It was Azerbaijan which scuttled the last attempt at normalization, the 2009 process that became known as the “protocols.”

“Having long posed the greatest impediment to a Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, Baku’s public and private tone has changed dramatically in the wake of its victory,” the Crisis Group analysts wrote. “Some senior bureaucrats in Baku privately suggest that Turkish-Armenian normalization might even help smooth their own post-war relations with Armenia by showing the benefits of shifting from a war footing to an everyone-wins focus on trade.”

A foreign policy commentator in the Turkish pro-government newspaper Daily Sabah portrayed the talks with Armenia as part of a broader push by Ankara to improve many of its strained relations around the region, including with the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.  “These recent efforts of normalization and pro-active diplomatic initiatives will constitute Turkey's priority foreign policy agenda for 2022,” wrote the analyst, Tahla Kose, in a January 14 piece.

And the fact that Russia is brokering the talks suggests that one early concern – that Moscow would try to scuttle them for fear of Turkey gaining more influence in the region – has been evaded. Russia’s involvement also is likely to blunt the objections from Armenia’s internal opposition, which has warm relations with Russia.

While a recent flareup on the border resulted in four soldiers killed – three Armenian, and one Azerbaijani – there has nevertheless been diplomatic progress between Baku and Yerevan, as well.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, at a press conference the morning before the Kilic-Rubinyan meeting, said that Armenia and Azerbaijan were close to reaching an agreement on one of the key issues in their bilateral agenda: agreeing on a demarcation of the two countries’ border. “Literally yesterday I was speaking with an Armenian colleague, who had a new proposal, we will send it along to Azerbaijan. We will see how to make [an Armenia-Azerbaijan-Russia commission working on border issues] work it out as quickly as possible.”

Also that day, Farid Shafiyev, the head of an Azerbaijani government-run foreign policy think tank, said in an interview with Interfax-Azerbaijan that Baku and Yerevan had reached a spoken agreement to create a border demarcation commission.

Joshua Kucera is the Turkey/Caucasus editor at Eurasianet, and author of .

https://eurasianet.org/armenian-turkish-envoys-meet-for-first-talks-on-normalizing-relations 

Russia Is Worried About Challenges in the Caucasus

FP - Foreign Policy
Jan 14 2022

By Eugene Chausovsky, a nonresident fellow at the Newlines Institute.
Volunteers and reservists take part in a military training course in Yerevan, Armenia, 
on Oct. 22, 2020. KAREN MINASYAN/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

The first two weeks of 2022 have been eventful and consequential ones for Russia and its neighbors. Last week, Russia sent troops into Kazakhstan via the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in response to widespread unrest, while this week Russian officials have been engaged in a series of high-stakes talks with U.S. and NATO officials over Ukraine. However, there is another region that has been overlooked but that may prove to be just as dynamic in the coming weeks and months: the Caucasus.

Already, there has been an uptick in military hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan along their shared border in recent days, more than a year after large-scale fighting between the two ceased, just as envoys from Armenia and Turkey held their first round of talks on political normalization in Moscow on Jan. 14. Both of these developments can be seen as ripple effects from the brief war that broke out over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh in late 2020, a conflict that led to the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces to the region and to a recalibration of the political and security landscape of the area. In turn, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has served as both a strategic backdrop to, and important precursor of, the events currently unfolding in Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

Russian military deployments in the post-Soviet space may have various causes and motivations, but each has at its root a fairly straightforward objective for Moscow: to entrench its influence as the dominant external power in the region and to prevent or limit the influence of other external powers. For example, in the case of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in 2014, it was to limit the influence of the West, including the European Union and especially NATO, following a pro-Western revolution in Kyiv. The same was the case for Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008, coming just months after Georgian and Ukrainian membership aspirations were recognized by the bloc at the Bucharest summit.

Moscow’s intervention in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2020 was intended to stem the tide of territorial losses by Russia’s ally and fellow CSTO member Armenia at the hands of Azerbaijan, which was more independent and not an institutional ally. But the manner and timing of Russia’s intervention also had elements of self-interest, enabling Moscow to maintain ties with both Baku and Yerevan.

Stepping in was meant also to limit the influence of Turkey, whose security support for Azerbaijan via weaponry including TB2 drones proved pivotal in helping the country’s forces break through Armenian defenses. Thus, Russia intervened as a mediator to oversee a cease-fire and transfer of territory in and around Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia to Azerbaijan, which was painful to accept for Yerevan but at the same time was much less than what Armenian forces would have otherwise likely lost on the battlefield. Armenia and Azerbaijan both agreed to the Moscow-brokered armistice, with its implementation consisting of the deployment of 2,000 Russian peacekeepers in November 2020.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict highlighted Russia’s regional power status and Moscow’s continued ability to shape events, but it also revealed that Moscow’s influence has limitations. After all, Russia’s preferred outcome would have been the prewar status quo, but Azerbaijan, along with its own ally in Turkey, was able to forcefully challenge this status quo. This challenge substantially raised the profile of Ankara in the region, with Moscow agreeing to a joint Russian-Turkish monitoring center to oversee the cease-fire implementation and Russia having no choice but to acknowledge the important regional power role played by Turkey.

The year since has also revealed key constraints to Russia’s influence in the region. Despite the presence of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh, both Armenian and Azerbaijani forces have violated the cease-fire on a periodic and sometimes deadly basis. And Turkey has been able to leverage its increased influence for its own political and economic gains, most notably in its support for Azerbaijan’s regional transport and infrastructure initiatives and its diplomatic outreach to Armenia to resume trade and flights, and to revive the long-dormant process of political normalization.

To be sure, Russia has played an important part in all of these discussions, but Moscow is no longer the only major actor in shaping the geopolitics of the Caucasus. While Russia’s military presence in the region mitigated the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it has not been enough to prevent eruptions of violence or to bring about a sustainable peace. In the meantime, Turkey has proved its willingness and ability to directly challenge Russia in the region, even as the two countries cooperate in other spheres such as energy and weapons sales. The world is becoming more multipolar, which can serve as both a benefit and a challenge to entrenched powers—including Moscow.

This brings us back to the unfolding events in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. In the Ukrainian case, Russia is still trying to push back against the political, economic, and security influence of the West, while seeking guarantees against the prospects of NATO enlargement it has fought to avoid. In Kazakhstan, Russia is less worried about the West, but it could see its position as the dominant external power giving way to others, including China and perhaps even Turkey. While Russia has established a pragmatic division of labor of sorts with China in Central Asia, Moscow cannot be sure this working arrangement will last forever. And Russia can be even less sure of Turkey’s intentions, considering that the two have been on opposing sides of conflicts in such areas as Syria and Libya, and that Turkish TB2 drones are now being sold to the likes of Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.

Thus, there is a broader connection between what is happening in the Caucasus and the events that are unfolding in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The Kremlin finds its dominant power status in the former Soviet periphery being challenged from numerous directions, and Russia’s CSTO deployment in Kazakhstan and its military maneuvers along the Ukrainian border are intended to show that Moscow is both able and willing to use military force to maintain its position as the dominant regional power in the post-Soviet space.

However, such military actions may only take Russia so far, and they have their own risk of blowback. For example, Russia has to consider that its CSTO deployment to Kazakhstan may set a dangerous precedent, as other member states like Armenia are no strangers to mass protests and unrest. For example, if violent demonstrations were to erupt in Armenia in the future, would Russia have to intervene again? And if so, could it be certain such an intervention will succeed? Such questions could become increasingly relevant as Armenia and Azerbaijan continue to stare each other down and Turkey and others look to expand their position in the region. The Caucasus may soon prove to be no less dynamic and consequential than Eastern Europe or Central Asia, both for Russia and the powers with which it contends.

Eugene Chausovsky is a nonresident fellow at the Newlines Institute. Chausovsky previously served as senior Eurasia analyst at the geopolitical analysis firm Stratfor for more than 10 years. His work focuses on political, economic, and security issues pertaining to Russia, Eurasia, and the Middle East.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/14/russia-csto-caucasus-nagorno-karabakh/

Deadly clashes break out once more at Armenia-Azerbaijan border

France 24
Jan 12 2022
In this Wednesday, Nov. 25, 2020 file photo, An ethnic Armenian soldier stands guard next to a Nagorno-Karabakh flag on a hill near Charektar in the separatist region of Nagorno-Karabakh. © AP – Sergei Grits

Armenia said Wednesday that the number of its soldiers killed in border clashes with Azerbaijan had risen to three, in the most serious outbreak of fighting between the ex-Soviet adversaries in months.

Azerbaijan previously said one of its soldiers died in the fighting on Tuesday along the disputed and volatile border region, where tensions are still high in the wake of a war between the Caucasus nations in 2020.

Armenia's defence ministry said in a statement Wednesday that the body of an Armenian serviceman was discovered with fatal gunshot wounds in the vicinity where "intense skirmishes" had erupted on the previous day.

Two soldiers wounded in the fighting were in a stable condition, the defence ministry added.

Both sides have accused the other of initiating "provocations" that sparked the exchange of fire that left one Azerbaijani soldiers and the three Armenian troops dead.


The deaths represent a serious threat to a ceasefire implemented with
 Russia's help in November 2020 that brought an end to six weeks of brutal warfare that claimed the lives of 6,000 people on both sides.Armenia said earlier that its military had been targeted by artillery and drones in its eastern border area, a claim Azerbaijan denied.

The war centred around control for Nagorno-Karabakh, a sparsely-populated and mountainous separatist region inside Azerbaijan that had been controlled for decades by Armenian fighters.

As part of the ceasefire agreement, Armenia handed back large areas that the breakaway region had controlled for decades, including Kalbajar, where Azerbaijan said its soldier had been killed in the recent escalation.

(AFP)

Ombudsman: Azerbaijan is launching provocations in Armenia territories where it earlier invaded

  NEWS.am  
Armenia – Jan 12 2022

YEREVAN. – The Office of the Human Rights Defender (Ombudsman) of Armenia has received calls from the residents of Kut, Norabak, Verin and Nerkin Shorzha villages of Gegharkunik Province, in connection with Azerbaijan’s provocation yesterday on the border with Armenia, ombudsman Arman Tatoyan told a press conference Wednesday.

"We are in touch with everyone. Residents heard the sound of artillery," the ombudsman added.

Tatoyan stressed that Azerbaijan is launching aggressive actions in the Armenian territories which it invaded in May last year.

But the same time, the ombudsman noted that this invasion had taken place earlier, in October 2020, during the Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) war, in the direction of Tsav village near Kapan city  of Syunik Province.

"Therefore, we need to talk about the Azerbaijanis’ invading the sovereign territory of Armenia, and globally, the need for the withdrawal of Azerbaijani forces, and not only about the 'May invasion,'" Tatoyan said.

The ombudsman reiterated that the presence of Azerbaijani military near Armenian villages has no legal basis, especially since they appeared there under the threat of a new war. He added that when the ombudsman speaks about this, the respective statements should not be distorted.

"Yesterday's actions are proof of that. They [i.e., the Azerbaijani military] are so close that the [Armenian] civilian population hears the sound of artillery. There is no time. Events are developing rapidly. The longer we delay, the more the rights of the [Armenian] residents will be violated," Arman Tatoyan concluded.

Kazakh Scat airline resumes Aktau-Yerevan flights

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 14:41,

YEREVAN, JANUARY 10, ARMENPRESS. The Kazakh Scat airline is resuming Aktau-Yerevan-Aktau flights, the Embassy of Armenia in Kazakhstan said in a statement.

The Embassy said that the Aktau-Yerevan flight will be carried out today, on January 10, at 18:00-18:20.

On January 2, protests sparked in several cities of Kazakhstan. In several days, they escalated into mass riots and assaults at the bodies of authority in many cities. Thousands of people were injured, and there were casualties. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev asked the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for assistance. CSTO peacekeepers have already commenced their mission in Kazakhstan. Airlines had to change their flight schedules. Several airlines even canceled their flights of coming days.

Armenpress: Two cases of COVID Omicron variant detected in Armenia

Two cases of COVID Omicron variant detected in Armenia 

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 20:30, 8 January, 2022

YEREVAN, JANUARY 8, ARMENPRESS. Two cases of Omicron variant of COVID-19 have been detected in Armenia, the National Center for Disease Control and Prevention said in a statement, adding that both are imported cases. 

“As COVID-19 patients they underwent an epidemiological examination. Upon their arrival in Armenia, samples of their nasal mucosa were examined also by sequestration method, as a result of which the Omicron variant was detected. 

Both patients are in satisfactory condition, they have not been hospitalized, receive treatment at home”, the statement says.

The Ministry of Health of Armenia again urges citizens to follow all the rules, to get vaccinated in order to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and its variants.

Brazilian football star Ronaldo tests positive for COVID-19

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 11:46, 3 January, 2022

YEREVAN, JANUARY 3, ARMENPRESS. Brazilian World Cup-winner Ronaldo tested positive for COVID-19 on Sunday, forcing him to cancel his appearance at celebrations for the 101st anniversary of his first-ever team, Cruzeiro, the club said.

The 45-year-old ex-striker “is fine, with light symptoms, and will now undergo a period of rest and social isolation, in line with medical advice”, Cruzeiro, which Ronaldo bought last month, said on Twitter.

Director General of the WHO warned about the great wave of getting infected because of new strains of COVID-19

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 20:46,

YEREVAN, 29 DECEMBER, ARMENPRESS. The Director General of the WHO Tedros Ghebreyesus warned that it is possible that a “new tsunami of cases” will occur because of appearing of “Delta” and “Omicron” new strains in the world, ARMENPRESS reports he told the reporters at the briefing.

Ghebreyesus mentioned that the cases increase because of “Delta” and “Omicron” strains, and cases of hospitalization and death increase with it. He named particularly worrisome the fact that “Omicron” strain is more infectious. “It can create tsunami of cases, which will significantly strengthen the pressure on the healthcare systems” he said.

Ghebreyesus mentioned that the situation in the world improved related to the supply of vaccines. “But paying a lot of attention to booster vaccinations by rich countries can again become a reason of lack of vaccines among poor countries.” said the Director General of the WHO by urging the rich countries and manufacturers of vaccines to work together to reach the implementation of the goal of achieving  vaccination of 70 percent of the population of every country.