Author: Boris Nahapetian

Asia Times


By Kaveh Afrasaiabi


Cooperation pact will put Iran firmly on China's Belt and Road
Initiative and promises to change the region's strategic calculus


In recent weeks, Iran and China have been hammering out the details of
a potentially momentous cooperation deal meant to span the next
quarter-century and chart a future decoupled from the United States.

Under the terms of a draft viewed by Asia Times, China will invest
tens of billions of US dollars in Iran as part of Beijing’s ambitious
Road and Belt Initiative. The 25-year agreement includes economic,
security, and military dimensions.

Such a deal is particularly important for Iran’s ailing energy sector,
which is in dire need of substantial investment to refurbish an aging
oil industry, which requires upwards of $150 billion for much-needed
modernization of wells, refineries and other infrastructure.

The negotiations are ongoing, even as the Donald Trump administration
continues to pin hope on Iran’s economic strangulation by a unilateral
maximum pressure strategy and against the backdrop of growing US-China
rivalry.

If approved by the Iranian parliament, the plan represents a major
affront to the Trump administration’s relentless pursuit of Iran’s
economic isolation in the international community. As expected, news
of the China-Iran agreement has set off a chorus of condemnation in
the West.

Some Iranian opponents in exile have branded the plan as the Islamic
Republic’s “sellout” to China and view it as a testament to China’s
ability to transform Iran into one of its “satellites.” Critics have
falsely claimed the plan contains a “monopoly clause”, most
controversially granting China control over one of Iran’s Persian Gulf
islands.

Reputed leaked versions of the agreement, clearly aimed to undercut
the deal, have been published in Farsi and in English and claim to
include provisions that could be perceived as harmful to Iran at
China’s expense.

Should China undertake such a massive long-term investment in Iran, it
is very likely that Beijing will take over the strategic Iranian port
of Chahbahar — the country’s outlet to the Indian Ocean.

The port enjoys a waiver from US sanctions imposed on Iran, which was
granted as a nod to India’s ambitions for the port. In Tehran’s view,
New Delhi has squandered that opportunity by effectively siding with
the US on oil sanctions and failing to make adequate investments in
the port.

The new Iran-China agreement points to both nations’ changing
strategic calculus in the current international milieu, where
international norms and principles have been eroded largely by the
Trump administration’s unilateral and aggressive policies vis-a-vis
Tehran and Beijing.

Slowly but surely, a triumvirate of China, Iran and neighboring
Pakistan is forming. This alliance could also encompass Afghanistan
and over time is expected to add Iraq and Syria, strategic anathema to
Washington and New Delhi.

A complementary new agreement between Iran and Syria, praised by
President Bashar al-Assad, signifies Iran’s intent to retain its
strategic foothold in that war-torn country, both as a gateway to
Lebanon and the Arab world and deterrent to Israel. That has come
irrespective of Israeli-Gulf Arab pressures, including recent attacks
inside Iran.

Much like responding to “maximum pressure” with “maximum resistance,”
Iran traditionally exerts counter-pressure to any regional and or
extra-regional pressure.

Tehran understands itself to be as a pivotal power in West Asia and
the Middle East, and can be expected to retaliate against the culprits
behind recent attacks on Natanz nuclear facility and the Parchin
military complex at a time and place of its choosing.

A final China-Iran deal would be a win-win serving the national
interests of both sides.

For sanctions and pandemic-hit Iran, it will offer important leeway to
economically survive at a difficult juncture, when Iran’s military and
nuclear sites are targeted for destruction, likely by a concerted
effort involving Israel and some Arab Gulf states.

According to a Tehran-based political scientist who wishes to remain
anonymous, “the purpose of these attacks on Iran might be related to
the perception that the Trump administration is willing to strike a
deal with Iran in the next few months prior to the November
elections.”

In turn, this raises questions about Trump’s real Iran strategy,
notwithstanding the major recent setback for the US at the UN Security
Council, which flatly rejected a draft US resolution on Iran calling
for an indefinite arms embargo.

Moreover, a UN expert denounced the US drone killing in January of
Iran’s top general Qasem Soleimani and nine other Iranian and Iraqi
officials as ” unlawful and arbitrary under international law.”

According to the UN report, the drone attack violated Iraq’s
sovereignty and in turn has “institutionalized” Iranian hostility
toward the US, making it nearly impossible for any Iranian official to
engage in direct diplomacy with the Trump administration. That’s
particularly true since Iran’s new parliament led by hardliners
commenced its work.

President Hassan Rouhani’s moderate government is about to enter a
lame-duck period prior to the presidential elections in 2021, making
it less and less capable of any major foreign policy initiatives.

Some analysts in Iran contend that there is still a narrow window of
opportunity for a new Tehran-Washington deal, prompted partly as a
reaction to the amentioned Tehran-Beijing agreement.

Given Iran’s post-revolutionary position of “superpower equidistance,”
the agreement with China reflects a “new look East” approach by Tehran
while under Washington’s pressure. At the same time, it serves the
opposite logic of a “new look West” for the sake of navigating the
treacherous currents of a new cold war in favor of equilibrium.

That assumes, of course, that Washington is willing to ease its
persistent sanctions and threats. That remains to be seen. Meanwhile,
the recent spate of suspicious fires and sabotage at the Natanz
nuclear facility and Parchin military complex will embolden Iran’s
hardliners, who see no ground for optimism of a possible US policy
shift.

They see China’s steadfast defense of Iran at the UN Security Council
as a testament to Beijing’s reliability. Iranian hardliners are also
cognizant of their country’s ability to serve China’s BRI, not only
for the 80 million-strong Iranian market but the larger Eurasian
landmass encompassing some 4.6 billion people.