Author: Chakhmakhchian Vatche

FRANCE TELECOM PINS SERIOUS HOPES ON ARMENIA

Noyan Tapan
Nov 6, 2009

YEREVAN, NOVEMBER 6, NOYAN TAPAN. Orange Armenia company held a
reception in Yerevan on November 5 in connection with the start of
its activities in Armenia. Orange Armenia represents France Telecom in
our country. Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan attended the reception.

Director General of Orange Armenia Bruno Dutois stated that the company
will provide the best services in Armenia. President of France Telecom
Didier Lombard expressed satisfaction at the fact that a new country
is joining France Telecom. In his words, the reason for the company’s
entrance into Armenia is "the intimacy that we feel exists between
Armenia and France".

RA Minister of Transport and Communication Gurgen Sargsyan said the
entrance of this French company into Armenian market will contribute
to the development of Armenia’s economy, especially its communication
sector, and will strengthen the friendship of the two countries. The
company has already made investments of 90 million dollars and is
among the ten biggest taxpayers in Armenia. France Telecom pins serious
hopes on Armenia, while Armenia expects this company to provide high
quality mobile phone and Internet services.

MARXIST PARTY LEADER WILL NOT WITHDRAW HIS CANDIDACY IN NAME OF PASHINYAN

Tert
Nov 6 2009
Armenia

Leader of the Marxist Party of the Republic of Armenia Davit Hakobyan,
nominated for the supplemental election at N10 electoral district,
stated today he isn’t going to withdraw his candidacy neither in
favour of Nikol Pashinyan nor for anyone else.

"I will not withdraw may candidacy for anyone, neither will I ‘support’
anyone or feel much respect for my brothers and colleagues," stated
Armenia’s main Marxist during today’s press conference.

A supplemental election was scheduled at N10 electoral district after
businessman and MP Khachatur Sukiasyan resigned from his mandates. Six
people nominated their candidacy in this election. Davit Hakobyan and
chief editor of Haykakan Zhamanak ("Armenian Times") Nikol Pashinyan
(supported by the Armenian National Congress) are among the candidates.

TURKEY’S MECLIS WILL GIVE POSITIVE CONCLUSION ON PROTOCOLS: RPA SPOKESPERSON

Tert
Nov 6 2009
Armenia

December 7 is the deadline by which point Turkey’s Meclis
Foreign Relations Committee must give its conclusion on the signed
Armenia-Turkey Protocols, after which point it will be included in
the agenda of Turkey’s Grand National Assembly’s (known as Turkiye
Buyuk Millet Meclis) plenary session.

Secretary of Republican Party of Armenia parliamentary faction, RPA
press spokesperson Eduard Sharmazanov stated at a press conference
today that Turkey’s Meclis will give a positive conclusion on the
Protocols ratification.

"On December 7, Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan is to visit Washington
and meet US President Barack Obama, so the Foreign Relations Commission
of the Meclis, I am sure, will give a positive conclusion.

Otherwise, it’s not that he will not be welcomed with open arms, but
rather, he will not be received in Washington at all," Sharmazanov
said.

Commenting on why he is convinced that he will not be received in
Washington in case Turkey’s Meclis’s commission gives a negative
conclusion, Sharmazanov said that his confidence is based on the
statements made by U.S. President Obama and State Secretary Hillary
Clinton, by which they called upon the parties to establish relations
without preconditions.

REPORTS FROM L.A. SARGSYAN AND COLLEAGUES ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE IN ASTROPHYSICS

Science Letter
November 3, 2009

According to recent research from Armenia, "Optical classifications are
provided for 18 infrared objects whose spectra have been obtained with
the Spitzer space telescope. An attempt is made at classification in
terms of the spectral energy distributions (SED) based on photometric
data from the SDSS and 2MASS (11 objects, 4 of which also have SDSS
spectra) archives. 7 of the objects are classified using the SDSS
spectra, and other sources are used for 5 of the objects, 4 of which
cannot even be classified using spectral or photometric data."

"For 3 of the objects, the classifications according to photometric
data and the SDSS spectra are the same, so it is to be hoped that
the proposed classification can be used for classifying many objects
when only photometric data are available. These objects have also
been classified according to their IR spectra. The IR and optical
classifications are mostly in agreement when they are compared,"
wrote L.A. Sargsyan and colleagues (see also Astrophysics).

The researchers concluded: "Morphological descriptions of the objects
are also given."

Sargsyan and colleagues published their study in Astrophysics
(Optical classification of 18 infrared galaxies. Astrophysics,
2009;52(3):377-382).

For additional information, contact L.A. Sargsyan, VA Ambartsumian
Byurakan Astrophysics Observ, Byurakan, Armenia.

Publisher contact information for the journal Astrophysics is:
Springer, Plenum Publishers, 233 Spring St., New York, NY 10013, USA.

ALEXANDER ISKANDARYAN: INFORMATION ON WASHINGTON’S RECOGNIZING NKR IS IMPLAUSIBLE

PanARMENIAN.Net
04.11.2009 17:19 GMT+04:00

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ "In my view, information on ‘Washington’s recognizing
NKR independence’ is far from plausible," Caucasus Institute Director,
political scientist Alexander Iskandaryan told a PanARMENIAN.Net
reporter. "Perhaps, it’s beneficial to Russia, but nothing can be
said for sure since the source is unreliable," Armenian expert noted.

In the meantime, an anonymous Armenian expert said such information
might have been disseminated by Russian intelligence services.

Washington has actually imposed a tough ultimatum on Azerbaijan,
saying that "US will recognize Nagorno Karabakh’s independence in case
the country attempts to resume military operations," Yeni Musavat
Azerbaijani pro-opposition party’s official Web site reported. The
information was later disseminated by other media.

Baku claims that Washington, in the person of Deputy Assistant
Secretary Tina Kaidanow, responded to Baku’s bellicose statements on
Karabakh conflict settlement. Furthermore, Americans insist that they
possess information on Azerbaijan’s making secret preparations for war.

Observers believe Baku’s rhetoric is accounted for by the fact that
territorial integrity issue is not included in the agenda of talks
over Karabakh status, NEWSru.com reports.

TURKISH PREMIER SAYS NEW FOREIGN POLICY BOOSTS FOREIGN, REGIONAL PROFILE

Anadolu Agency
Nov 1 2009
Turkey

Ankara, 31 October: Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said
on Saturday, "we have nothing to do with people who see terrorism as
a legitimate way and kill innocent people on this path."

Addressing the nation, Erdogan said that they would not let terrorism
capture Turkey, adding that they had to open a new page in history
which would bring dialogue, harmony and integration instead of hostile
feelings and aggressive judgments.

Erdogan said that the process "democratic move" was in fact a
multidimensional "national unity" process. He added that the object of
the democratic move was not only to end terrorism but also to remove
the obstacles before the well-being of the country and brotherhood
of the people.

This is a move of love, peace and brotherhood, he added.

Erdogan said that they wanted everybody in the country to have basic
rights and freedoms without question.

We want everybody in this country to count on the state, and feel
safe in democracy, said Erdogan.

Erdogan said that Turkey’s active foreign policy vision was boosting
the international prestige of the country each day. He added that
Turkey had been in a very pleasing period regarding the solution of
regional problems and relations with neighbours.

Erdogan said that October was a very fruitful month, adding that
Istanbul hosted IMF-World Bank meetings on 6 and 7 October, and
nearly 15,000 people from 200 countries visited Turkey for these
meetings. He said that also Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly
meeting took place in Istanbul on 23 October.

He said that Turkey hosted many high-level international summits
and meetings in recent years and it showed the rising international
prestige of Turkey.

Recalling that they held very beneficial diplomatic meetings with
close neighbours and friendly countries in October, Erdogan said that
formal protocols were signed by Turkey and Armenia on 10 October
to normalize relations. He added that on 14 October, Armenian and
Turkish presidents watched a soccer game between the national teams
of the two countries in Turkish northwestern province of Bursa.

Erdogan expressed hope that the disagreements between Turkey and
Armenia would be solved by historians and scientists, and the two
countries develop relations.

We also want Upper Karabakh issue between Armenia and Azerbaijan
to be solved through dialogue, said Erdogan adding that Turkey had
always seen interests of Azerbaijan as the interests of Turkey.

Erdogan also said that Turkey and Syria mutually lifted visa procedures
in October, adding that the relations between the two countries were
gaining momentum each day.

Noting that they paid a historical visit to Iraq on 15 October,
Erdogan said that Turkey and Iraq signed a total of 48 memorandums
of understanding to develop cooperation almost on every area.

Erdogan said that now Turkey was getting prepared to mutually start
a strategic cooperation process with Russia.

Regarding his visit to Pakistan, Erdogan said that they held very
fruitful meetings and exchanged views about regional peace, global
economic crisis and international matters. He added that Turkish
businessmen made important connections with Pakistani business circles.

Noting that he proceeded from Pakistan to Iran, Erdogan said that
they launched new initiatives to increase economic and commercial
relations. He added that they discussed to restore peace in the
Middle East as well as energy policies, fight against terrorism and
nuclear weapons.

Erdogan said that Turkey’s stance about Iran’s nuclear programme
was clear, adding that Turkey wanted to live in a region which was
purified from nuclear weapons.

TURKISH-ARMENIAN SOCCER DIPLOMACY: A DIRECT HIT AT AZERBAIJAN’S FOREIGN POLICY ARCHITECTURE
Elnur Soltanov

Today
57107.html
Nov 2 2009
Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan is not happy with the two protocols signed between Armenia
and Turkey on the 10th of October in Zurich, Switzerland. The most
common explanation has been that despite all the verbal promises by
its strategic ally, Baku is not sure that the opening of the borders
will be tied to the partial withdrawal of Armenian armed forces from
the territories in and (especially) around Nagorno-Karabakh. But the
level of disappointment in Azerbaijan cannot be fully explained away
by an unfavorable behavior of the brotherly government.

For Azerbaijan, the Turkish border initiative amounts to more than
that. Namely, it is poised to destroy the foreign policy architecture
Azerbaijan has been meticulously building since the mid-1990s around
Karabakh issue, leaving behind uncertainty and confusion. This is
what makes the repercussions of the Turkish-Armenian conciliation so
unbearable for Azerbaijan.

After military defeats in and around Nagorno-Karabakh between 1992 and
1994 and the concomitant cease-fire freezing the situation lopsidedly
in Armenia’s favor, in the spring of 1994, Azerbaijan started to
pursue a new foreign policy strategy. It may have begun by default,
yet by the mid-2000s it has evolved into a clearly, if unofficially,
defined foreign policy doctrine. The nature of the strategy was simple,
invoking the memories of the Cold War. It was to be built on Armenia’s
economic isolation and strategic marginalization. The situation was
Armenia’s choice to an extent, but Azerbaijan was intent on fully
capitalizing on the trend.

Armenia was to be left out of the regional energy and transport
projects and deprived of the benefits of the burgeoning Turkish
economy. This also meant closer relations with Russia and Iran,
outsiders in the Western-dominated global politics. Azerbaijan,
on the other hand, revitalizing its economy, becoming a significant
link in the Western energy security, and increasing the power of its
military, was to eventually make Armenia more willing to concede on the
negotiating table its enormous gains obtained in the battlefield. The
vision and the resources (which, essentially, were hydrocarbons)
behind the project were coming from Azerbaijan, which also had a
significant degree of control over it.

Until recently, the strategy was paying off to the apprehension
of the Armenian and the satisfaction of the Azerbaijani side. The
enormously expensive and rewarding Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline
and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline have already been
successfully completed by 2006. The third main transport link,
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad was slated to be finished by 2011/2012.

When Armenians helped to freeze the international investment flow into
the latest project pointing to the intentional isolation of Armenia,
Azerbaijan, in one of the best indications of its willingness to
spearhead and finance the strategic trend, opened up its treasury
generously offering $220 million to Georgia to be paid back in 25
years with a symbolic interest rate of 1 percent.

The dynamism that the pipelines and hydrocarbon revenues have been
generating has had an economic and geopolitical multiplier effect along
the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey axis, of which Armenia was not a part.

Armenian economy was definitely lagging behind with an associated
demographic downturn. According to CIA Country Report, Azerbaijan’s
economy grew twice as fast as the Armenian economy between 2006 and
2008. Its GDP per capita, almost even with that of Armenia a couple
of years ago, was 30 percent more than Armenia’s $6,300 by 2008.

Azerbaijan’s arms purchases, steadily increasing since the early
2000s was starting to offset Armenian military arsenal, seasonally
flooded by Russia’s huge military transfers. In fact, the military
budget of Azerbaijan could be effectively catching up with the entire
state budget of the Republic of Armenia for 2009.

Partly as a result of continuing economic difficulties and overall
insecurities, Armenia’s population size has been stuck around 3
million, while Azerbaijan has grown by a million since 1994 to over
8 million. According to the International Monetary Fund’s forecasts
these trends are to continue for at least the next five years. The
hard economic blows of the Russian-Georgian war and the global economic
downturn of 2008 were the latest indications of how fragile Armenia’s
situation was compared to that of Azerbaijan.

It is difficult to say how much longer it would have taken for Armenia
(if ever) to be more willing to make concessions. The pace was slow
but the strategy and vision of the Azerbaijani political establishment
was clearly defined and things were, it seemed, moving in the right
direction. It is here that the deep disappointment on the part of
the Azerbaijani government lies.

The Turkish move, and there are many reasons to believe that the
initiative came from Turkey, removed the most fundamental pillar out of
the Azerbaijan’s foreign policy architecture. True, the architecture
was being designed by Azerbaijani vision and built by Azerbaijan’s
relatively rich energy resources. But the fundamental pillar necessary
for the success of the isolation project was Turkey’s willingness to
cooperate in keeping Armenia at bay.

For Azerbaijan the timing of the Turkish initiative makes it especially
worrisome. It began after Azerbaijan’s resource-led projects and
investments have already been made. One does not change the direction
of the multibillion pipelines and railroads overnight.

In the same context, it is only with the completion of the pipelines
in 2006 that a true economic gap started to emerge between Azerbaijan
and Armenia with real security implications. As soon as Azerbaijan’s
foreign policy architecture started to show real signs of success
Turkey defected.

Of course, there could be positive implications to the Turkish-Armenian
conciliation for Azerbaijan, yet it is undefined, unofficial and is as
possible as the opposite result. Despite the Justice and Development
Party, or AKP, government’s verbal promises, Karabakh is not built
into the border initiative which has been internationalized and
already slipping off of Turkey’s control.

What could be gone are not only the clarity of the tools and the
purpose of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy strategy around Karabakh,
but also the relative control Baku had over the overall process
targeting the resolution of the conflict. With the signatures in
Zurich, the future of the occupied lands of Azerbaijan is a function
of the overly internationalized Turkish-Armenian relations. Azerbaijan
has lost the initiative.

>From the Azerbaijani perspective, its clear, controllable, working
and priority strategy has been replaced by an unclear, uncontrollable
and an untested alternative. The status quo around Karabakh, which
is unfavorable to Azerbaijan, is no longer the driving force of
the regional political configurations; it has become an appendix to
the internationalized Turkish-Armenian relations. And Turkey, the
international community and Armenia, in dwindling the order down to
zero, are less concerned about Azerbaijani preferences in the zone
of conflict.

One cannot help but remember that Turkey felt betrayed when the United
States decided to withdraw its Jupiter medium-range nuclear missiles
from Turkish soil to resolve its differences with the Soviet Union
after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. The current situation between
Azerbaijan and Turkey is not exactly analogous to the aforementioned.

The latter is only a worse case from the Azerbaijani viewpoint.

In the Jupiter crisis the strategy and resources belonged to a more
powerful ally and Turkey was only trying to beef up its overall
strategic position bandwagoning with the overwhelming global American
initiative. But in the case of Turkey and Azerbaijan, a unilateral move
by a more powerful ally is perceived as wasting Azerbaijan’s resources,
Azerbaijan’s strategy and Azerbaijan’s initiative. It would not be an
exaggeration to say that this strategy was shaping the very identity of
the Azeri foreign policy. One of the biggest and overlooked challenges
of the Turkish-Armenian protocols will be dealing with the destruction
of this foreign policy architecture and identity, and the uncertainty,
confusion and the lack of direction it leaves behind.

PROFESSOR KARAOSMANOGLU: TIME FOR MILITARY TO RESPECT DEMOCRACY

Today’s Zaman
8-8-professor-karaosmanoglu-time-for-military-to-r espect-democracy.html
Nov 2 2009
Turkey

Ali Karaosmanoglu, an academic with expertise in civilian-military
relations, has said the military’s "hands-off" position on politics
has become more visible since the second half of 2007 but that it
should do more.

"The military should accept that the last word is with the civilian
authority, and the military should believe in democracy," he told
Today’s Zaman for Monday Talk as the discovery of a military plan,
the "Action Plan to Fight Reactionaryism" to discredit the government
has revealed once again the deep divisions that exist within the
state, mainly between the military-led bureaucrats and the political
authorities.

There are signs of much improvement in civilian-military relations,
on the other hand, Karaosmanoglu said; for example, despite the
military’s April 27, 2007, "electronic ultimatum" to the government,
the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) was re-elected in
the July elections of that same year, increasing its vote to about 46
percent from 34.29 percent in the November 2002 elections. And since
then, civilian-military relations have begun to take a new turn as
the military’s role in politics has become less visible.

However, the Turkish Council of Forensic Medicine (ATK) recently
confirmed the authenticity of an action plan signed by a colonel which
allegedly intended to unseat the ruling party. The plan is currently
the subject of judicial process.

Karaosmanoglu, whose article "Turkish Security Culture: Evolutionary
or Carved in Stone" appeared in a book published last week by the
Netherlands-based Centre for European Security Studies (CESS), holds
the view that the ups and downs in the process of consolidating
democracy in Turkey should not prevent us from seeing the "whole
picture."

You hold the view that the Turkish Armed Forces [TSK] does not involve
itself in politics as much as it used to do. How have you reached
this conclusion?

First of all, this is a requirement for consolidating democracy
in Turkey. One sign in that regard can be seen in the reforms in
2002-2005 [in order to fulfill the European Union’s Copenhagen
criteria]. Those reforms considerably decreased the military’s
influence in politics. The military did not oppose these developments;
indeed, it was willing for these reforms to be implemented.

Why?

Because the military saw that democratization would be good for the
country, and they concluded that the state would be empowered if it
adapted itself to changing conditions.

What kind of conditions?

Take the Annan plan. Most of the members of the military were opposed
to the Annan plan, but despite of their opposition, they cooperated
with the civilian government. This example shows that the military is
trying to ease the state’s adaptation to the changing international
environment. And there have been ups and downs in the process.

Would you elaborate on this?

For example, the military issued an "electronic memorandum" [or
e-ultimatum on April 27, 2007] to express its reservations during
the presidential election. This showed that the military did not
favor a takeover of the government by a military coup d’état. The
ruling AK Party government reacted harshly to the "memorandum." Plus,
the military’s interference proved ineffective, as demonstrated by
the landslide electoral victory of the AK Party. Then the Dolmabahce
meeting between the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and former
Chief of General Staff Gen. YaÅ~_ar Buyukanıt took place. Following
that meeting, we started to see increasing cooperation between the
military and government. And the cooperation continued in various
areas.

Civilian-military relations take a new turn Could you talk more about
these areas? In what areas have you noticed cooperation between the
government and the military?

We can see that in the improvement of relations with Armenia, and
more importantly we can see that in the Kurdish issue and the fight
against the PKK [the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party]. One reason
for this cooperation between the military and government has been that
the fight against terrorism has become an international issue. And
the Kurdish issue has taken on international importance as well.

How?

Following the occupation of Iraq, an autonomous Kurdish region
gained strength there. In addition, the PKK has been involved
in the drug trade. Moreover, it has been revealed that the PKK’s
financial resources came partly from international sources. Plus,
conducting cross-border operations in 2007-2008 required diplomatic
preparations and initiatives. Therefore, the national aspects of
the issues started to interact with the international aspects, and
interestingly the international aspects have come to the fore. When
international aspects become prominent, the political aspects of the
issues become prominent as well, increasing the need for the civilian
government’s prominence. It has been obligatory to give priority to
the civilian government in that regard. This has been an important
development in civilian-military relations. And Turkey has taken
a step forward in that regard, independent of the reform process
required for membership in the European Union.

If international aspects had not required such a development, would
you say that improvements in civilian-military relations could not
have happened?

They still could have occurred; that was one factor. There were other
international factors, too. With globalization, democratization,
respect for human rights and the supremacy of law have gained more
importance. Parallel to these developments, the norms of legitimacy
have changed, both internationally and domestically. Changing norms
of legitimacy required the state to adapt to this change. This was
seen both by the government and military. Then arose the need for the
renewal of the state, be it by adapting to new norms, establishing
new relations or forming new institutions.

‘Kurdish opening likely to continue’ Where do you think the Kurdish
opening is going?

There are ups and downs. The arrival of the members of the PKK led to
anger in the society in general. In addition to this, the government
has perceived the manner in which the DTP [Democratic Society Party]
received the PKK members, holding joyous celebrations, as a political
move. The government has halted the process of receiving more members
of the PKK, but this halt is most probably only temporary and the
process is likely to continue.

How long do you think it will take until society sees another group
of PKK members coming back to Turkey?

It might take a long time until that happens again. But the important
thing is that the process will continue.

Why do you see this process in a way that there will be no turning
back?

It is because there is a process of cultural change occurring in
Turkey. This change is about political culture, which has already
gone a long way in the process of change. It is no longer stoppable. A
change in political culture has become obligatory. The renewal of the
state as necessary has been seen in the history of state tradition in
Turkey. In the Ottoman Empire the state renewed itself and adapted
to changes, and the elites cooperated in the process. [Scholars]
Å~^erif Mardin and Kemal Karpat explain this issue in detail. We
are going through the same thing today in the republic: The state
has to adapt itself to the changing conditions in order to sustain
itself. This is a part of our political culture. That’s why it is an
unstoppable process. And it will go on until democracy is consolidated.

‘EU can accelerate change in Turkey’ Is it realistic to think about
a time period for that?

The process can only be expedited. The European Union is important
in that regard because the EU can have a role in facilitating the
reform process in Turkey, as we have seen before. This was the case in
2002-2005. This process is also useful because it creates interaction
between Turkey and the EU; Turkey learns more about Europe and Europe
learns more about Turkey and some prejudices are eliminated in the
process as some channels for dialogue are opened. Those channels of
dialogue make it easier to offer new ideas. [In a meeting with experts
from Europe on the issue of civilian-military relations in Europe and
Turkey] we saw that there are differing practices and rules in each
country of Europe. So what is the goal of the European Union criteria?

What is it?

Its goal is to establish a framework which is democratic, but the
inside of this framework is blank and it presents many opportunities.

If a country, for example Turkey, uses this opportunity, it can produce
a civilian-military relations model which can be quite democratic. The
important thing is to make good use of this opportunity.

What is the essence of the matter in reconsidering civilian-military
relations?

It is important to understand that the military is an important
institution. Its duty is to protect the nation, and that’s why it has
weapons. But the military should not try to create political influence
by depending on the power that comes from having weapons. Moreover,
the military should be subordinate to the civilian authority. In
addition, the civilian authority should be involved in dialogue
with the military and should take military expertise seriously. The
civilian government should consult with the military in matters of
security and defense, but at the same time it should have the power
to control all military spending. In addition to this, the military
should accept that the last word rests with the civilian authority,
and the military should believe in democracy. This is the essence of
the matter. These are the European criteria. This is the framework
which can involve different models. Although the military commanders
continue to make declarations on public and political matters, Turkey
is moving toward a regime with more political initiative and less
direct military influence over politics.

What do you think the role of the opposition is in the process?

A consensus among the political parties on establishing a more
democratic balance between secularism and Islam and between the
Kurdish question and the unitary state would certainly increase the
possibility of more democratic control over the military and its
complete subordination to civilian authority.

PREMATURE TO SPEAK ABOUT RUSSIA’S, ARMENIA’S AND TURKEY’S COOPERATION PROJECTS, SAYS TURKISH AMBASSADOR

Tert
Oct 29 2009
Armenia

Signing of the Armenian-Turkish Protocols in Zurich gives evidence of
the wish not only to establish relations between the two countries
but also to improve Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, said Turkish
Ambassador to Russia Khalil Akinci in his interview to Russian paper
Nezawisimaya Gazeta.

According to Akinci, it is still too untimely to speak about Russia’s
cooperation projects with Armenia and Turkey. "It is necessary that
the Turkish [parliament] Mili Majlis firstly ratifies the Protocols.

During the ratification process, wishes to normalize
Armenian-Azerbaijani relations will be voiced at the Turkish
parliament. It’s not always that our parliament submits to the
government’s requests. And the government’s policy is that good
relations with neighbours are established," the ambassador concluded.

PRESS RELEASE
Catholicosate of Cilicia
Communication and Information Department
Contact: V.Rev.Fr.Krikor Chiftjian, Communications Officer
Tel: (04) 410001, 410003
Fax: (04) 419724
E- mail: [email protected]
Web:

PO Box 70 317
Antelias-Lebanon

CONSULTATIONS WITH PRELATES AND REPRESENTATIVES OF DIOCESES IN IRAN

Upon the invitation of His Holiness Aram I, the Prelates and members of the
National Council of the Dioceses in Iran met at the Catholicosate in
Antelias. During the two-day consultations 23-24 October 2009, the
representatives met with the Executive Committee and Religious Council of
the Catholicosate under the Presidency of His Holiness Aram I.

The representatives discussed emerging issues affecting community life in
Iran, and ways to strengthen relations among the dioceses and between the
dioceses and the Catholicosate in Antelias.

##
The Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia is one of the two Catholicosates of
the Armenian Orthodox Church. For detailed information about the dioceses of
the Cilician Catholicosate, you may refer to the web page of the
Catholicosate, The Cilician
Catholicosate, the administrative center of the church is located in
Antelias, Lebanon.