Azerbaijani president to discuss NK settlement with Putin

AZERBAIJANI PRESIDENT GOING TO DISCUSS KARABAKH SETTLEMENT WITH VLADIMIR PUTIN

PanArmenian News
Feb 14 2005

14.02.2005 15:27

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ In the interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta Russian
newspaper Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated of his intention to
discuss the Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement with Vladimir Putin
during his visit to Moscow. In his words, similar discussions were
held in the course of the previous meetings and this summit will not
be an exception. “Moreover, during the Armenia-Azerbaijan meeting held
within the frames of the CIS summit last year Russian President joined
out talks thus proving Russia’s interest in the conflict settlement”,
he said.

ANKARA: =?UNKNOWN?Q?G=FCl?= assures Azerbaijan on Armenia policy

Turkish Daily News
Feb 11 2005

Gül assures Azerbaijan on Armenia policy
Friday, February 11, 2005

‘Turkey’s policy on this matter is clear. The people of Azerbaijan do
not need to worry,’ says Gül relating to the closed Turkish-Armenian
border gate

ANKARA – Turkish Daily News

Turkey gave assurances to Caucasus ally Azerbaijan that its border
gate with Armenia would remain closed unless Armenia ends occupation
of the Azeri territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, which has displaced
hundreds of thousands of Azeris.

“The border gate is closed at the moment. The continuing occupation
and the fact that almost a million Azeris are currently displaced
constitute a big obstacle for any change in Turkish policy,” Foreign
Minister Abdullah Gül told a joint news conference after talks with
visiting Azeri counterpart Elmar Mammedyarov.

Turkey closed its border gate with Armenia and severed diplomatic
ties with Yerevan in the last decade in protest of the Armenian
occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh. Ankara says normalization in ties is
related to Armenian troop withdrawal from the occupied territory, in
addition to Yerevan’s official acceptance of the current borders with
Turkey and stopping its support of Armenian lobby efforts to get
international recognition for an alleged Armenian genocide during the
late Ottoman Empire.

Yet, European Union aspirant Turkey has been facing pressure from
Europe to revise its Armenia policy and to open the closed gate with
landlocked Yerevan, something that has alarmed Azerbaijan.

“Turkey’s policy on this matter is clear. The people of Azerbaijan
do not need to worry,” Gül said, indicating that bilateral ties with
Armenia will return to normal when the occupation ends as a result of
peace talks on the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.

Mammedyarov’s talks in Ankara come weeks before he meets Armenian
Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian in Prague on the dispute.

He and Gül also discussed bilateral economic ties. Turkey and
Azerbaijan are partners in a multi-billion dollar project, called the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, to transport Azeri crude oil to western
markets through Georgia and finally to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of
Ceyhan.

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is expected to become operational
soon, with the first delivery of oil scheduled for mid-2005. Gül said
he was confident that the project would be completed on time.

The energy cooperation is set to expand further when a natural gas
pipeline linking Azerbaijan’s Shahdeniz gas fields to Turkey’s
eastern province of Erzurum starts operating. Mammedyarov said the
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline could become operational in 2006 or
2007 and added that Turkey could import some of the natural gas from
this pipeline to European countries.

Seeking Azeri support to end KKTC isolation:

Gül also sought Baku’s backing for efforts to bring into force
international pledges to end the isolation of Turkish Cypriots.

Gül reportedly told Mammedyarov that Azerbaijan would become a
model that other countries could follow if it takes steps towards
ending the isolation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(KKTC).

Mammedyarov said in response that his government would work on the
issue and encourage Azeri companies to do business in Turkish Cyprus.

Mammedyarov was received by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer later in
the day.

–Boundary_(ID_6aDtGlUlJ5EnicMYumOvBA)–

The covered sky

Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
February 11, 2005, Friday

THE COVERED SKY

SOURCE: Vremya Novostei, February 9, 2005, p. 4

by Nikolai Poroskov

Heads of 10 countries of the Commonwealth: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
and Ukraine met on February 10, 1995, and signed Accord on the CIS
United Antiaircraft Defense System. The Accord does not have a
definite expiry date; it is open for new subscribers who accept
provisions of the CIS Air Space Defense Concept and Plan of
Co-operation of the United Antiaircraft Defense System. Georgia and
Turkmenistan have stayed away from programs within the framework of
the CIS United Antiaircraft Defense System since 1997.

These days, the CIS United Antiaircraft Defense System comprises 19
fighter regiments (11 of them Russian), 29 antiaircraft missile
regiments (11 Russian), 22 technical formations (9 Russian), 2 units
of radar and jammers (both Russian), 4 antiaircraft defense brigades
(all of them Kazakh). Antiaircraft missile regiments have Osa, Buk,
S-75, S-125, S-200, and S-300 complexes of different models. Fighter
aviation is represented by MIG-23s, MIG-29s, MIG-31s, and SU-27s.
Here is an interview with Lieutenant General Aitech Bizhev, Russian
Armed Forces Second-in-Command in charge of the CIS United
Antiaircraft Defense System.

Question: Many things changed in these last ten years. The CIS
Headquarters for Coordination of Military Co-operation is being
ousted by the analog from the Organization of the CIS Collective
Security Treaty. Does it have any effect on the CIS United
Antiaircraft Defense System?

Aitech Bizhev: The United System is working nowadays, performing the
functions for which it was established in the first place: protection
of air borders of the Commonwealth, joint control over the use of air
space, exchange of information on air situations, missile and air
raid warnings and dealing with them. We succeeded in restoration of
the system of mutual exchange of information ruined by the collapse
of the Soviet Union. We also set up the structure of forces on duty
and organized combat training. Exchange of information on situations
in the air is constant. In fact, it is automatic at least among
central command posts of the Air Forces and Antiaircraft Forces of
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

Question: But weapons and military hardware of the United System have
to be constantly repaired and upgraded every now and then. In the
meantime, Russia alone has the industrial facilities to build
antiaircraft complexes…

Aitech Bizhev: Spare parts needed to maintain antiaircraft military
hardware of CIS countries are provided in accordance with Decree 1953
of the president of the Russian Federation (December 1, 2000).
Whatever needs repairs is repaired in Russia. Every now and then,
teams of specialists themselves travel to the units with military
hardware in need of repair. Unfortunately, some standard acts of the
Russian Federation interfere with development of military-technical
co-operation, paradoxical as it is. However, changes in the acting
legislation initiated in the last 2-3 years only diminish
effectiveness of military-technical co-operation and attractiveness
of services enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex.
Coordinating Committee for Antiaircraft Forces drew some proposals it
forwarded to the Federal Service of Military-Technical Co-operation.
Their acceptance will ameliorate the situation.

Question: NATO organized air defense of the Baltic States as soon as
it expanded. How is combat duty within the framework of the United
System organized?

Aitech Bizhev: Antiaircraft defense forces of Russia and Belarus were
the first to organize joint combat duty. Following that, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Russia signed a trilateral Instruction on joint
actions of antiaircraft defense forces on duty. The forces went on
duty in March 2000. These days, we have joint combat duty with units
and formations of the Armenian, Belarussian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and
Uzbek armies. Needless to say, our work together allows for better
protection of the borders, lessens the stress of forces on duty, and
is generally less expensive. For example, it enabled us to cut down
the number of Russian units with radar turned on.

Question: How is the United System financed?

Aitech Bizhev: It is financed in accordance with the Provision on the
financial planning, establishment, restoration, and improvement of
the System. Money is provided as specified by the annual financial
plan endorsed by the CIS Council of the Heads of States. The plan
indicates how much is to be spent on establishment and modernization
of antiaircraft defense means, how much on joint functions, and how
much on joint modernization programs. All money is transacted from
budgets of participants to the bank account of the Coordinating
Committee. It is managed by Coordinating Committee chairman a.k.a.
Russian Air Force commander-in-chief. As for units of national armies
and modernization of national antiaircraft defense systems, every
country is on its own.

Question: What do you mean by “joint programs”?

Aitech Bizhev: The CIS Council of the Heads of States endorsed
Portfolio of the joint programs on June 20, 2000. Their fulfillment
maintains and modernizes national antiaircraft defense systems of all
countries in accordance with their needs. We hope eventually to form
regional antiaircraft defense systems in the East European, Central
Asian, and Caucasus areas. We already drew up a portfolio on
establishment of the united Russian-Belarussian antiaircraft defense
system. Joint programs are implemented in the form of joint combat
training. Command exercises and drills involving command structures
and forces on duty of the United System have been under way since
1995. More than 20 drills and exercises took place already. As a
rule, they involve tactical teams of Russian and CIS armies. They
drill co-operation between command structures and forces on duty in
dealing with trespassers, in assistance to craft in distress. Not
long ago, Russian, Belarussian, and Kazakh fighters executed a
maneuver-requiring landing on each other’s airfields. An AWACS-type
craft was involved in the exercise.

Exercises of the Combat Brotherhood series are organized on a regular
basis, on Russian testing sites for the time being. They always
include elements of shooting practice. Almost 70 batteries of
antiaircraft missiles, up to 60 crews of fighter, ground-strafer, and
bomber aviation, and dozens crews of radar operators participated in
the series. Servicemen will find tactical situations tricky indeed
this year. We have come up with some ideas on how to make life hard
for jammers and for whoever will have to deal with targets. Crews of
antiaircraft complexes will have to be put in the standby mode and
launch on the march. Armenia, Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Belarus
(the latter hopes to test its automatic control system) will
participate in the exercise. Our crews will travel to Balkhash in
Kazakhstan to execute test with the S-400 complexes. A command
exercise on our central command post will take place in April.
Strategic aviation aircraft will play targets. This is going to be
the first such exercise, but not the last.

Question: Here is a situation that is not at all impossible: a border
of some member of the CIS United Antiaircraft Defense System is
violated. Will Russia come to this country’s help?

Aitech Bizhev: Yes, it will. Forces on duty of the invaded country
make a report to the central command post. Forces and means of the
United System are put on full alert. “All weapons free” decision are
made by commanders-in-chief of the Air Forces and Antiaircraft
Forces.

Translated by A. Ignatkin

Calm before the Chechen storm?

Christian Science Monitor
Feb 10 2005

Calm before the Chechen storm?

Rebels urge Russia to peace talks before Feb. 22 cease-fire deadline.

By Fred Weir | Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

MOSCOW – A surprise unilateral cease-fire ordered by two top Chechen
rebel commanders has Moscow abuzz with debate. Experts are asking, is
it a genuine chance for peace, a PR stunt, or an artificial lull
before a fresh storm of Beslan-style terrorist assaults?
Few see much hope of ending the Chechen war, now well into its sixth
year, unless there is a political breakthrough that sees the Kremlin,
the separatist rebels, and pro-Moscow Chechen forces sit down
together to seek a settlement.

President Vladimir Putin appears determined to stay his chosen
course, which involves signing a treaty with the Kremlin’s handpicked
Chechen leader Alu Alkhanov – perhaps as early as this May – that
will lock Chechnya into Russian permanently. But amid reports that
the rebels could have acquired a nuclear device or radiological
weapons, many experts see only an escalating cycle of violence in the
offing.

“The situation in Chechnya is currently at a dead end,” says
Alexander Iskanderyan, director of the independent Center for
Caucasian Studies, in Yerevan, Armenia. “The key to its solution is
in the Kremlin, but I see little hope of change there.”

Aslan Maskhadov, Chechnya’s rebel president-in-hiding, called
attention this week to the self-imposed cease-fire, which had been
announced last month on a rebel website but went largely unnoticed.
He portrayed the move as an olive branch to get peace negotiations
started, and urged Russian leaders to take up the offer to talk
before the cease-fire expires on Feb. 22.

“If our Kremlin opponents are reasonable, this war will end at the
negotiating table,” he told the Moscow daily Kommersant, in a rare
interview published Monday. “If not, blood will continue to be
spilled for a long time but we will reject any moral responsibility
for this continued madness.”

The cease-fire was endorsed by Shamil Basayev, the notorious Chechen
field commander who has claimed responsibility for many terror
strikes against Russia, including the 2002 seizure of 800 hostages in
a Moscow theater and last September’s school siege in Beslan that
left 331 people dead, half of them children. In an interview
broadcast by Britain’s Channel 4 News this month, Mr. Basayev
declared: “We are planning more Beslan-type operations in future
because we are forced to do so.”

That threat gained ominous traction this week when self-exiled
Russian tycoon Boris Berezovsky said a “Chechen businessman” had once
offered to sell him a miniature nuclear weapon stolen from former
Soviet stockpiles. “It is a portable nuclear bomb,” Mr. Berezovsky
said. “Some part of it is missing at the moment, but these are small
details.”

Russia’s Foreign Ministry quickly denied that, saying that all
Soviet-made “suitcase bombs” are accounted for. But independent
experts say Chechen militants may well have the means to produce a
“dirty bomb,” with deadly radioactive materials wrapped around
conventional explosives. “They probably don’t have a real nuclear
weapon, but we know they have had access to radioactive substances in
the past,” says Pavel Felgenhauer, a Moscow-based security expert.
“This threat is very real. A dirty bomb could make part of a Russian
city uninhabitable for 100 years. We may expect anything after the
cease-fire ends.”

Though the Kremlin has not responded to Mr. Maskhadov’s peace
overture, pro-Moscow Chechen leader Mr. Alkhanov said the only issue
he is willing to discuss with rebel leaders is their surrender.
“Negotiations with those who have engaged in bloody crimes against
society are absolutely out of the question,” he said. “The only real
salvation for such people is to give themselves up and confess their
crimes.”

There is doubt about whether the cease-fire, which was to take effect
Feb. 1, is holding. Russia’s official ITAR-Tass agency, which usually
reports peace and order prevailing in Chechnya, quoted Russian
commanders Thursday saying there have been up to 20 rebel attacks
each day this week.

Some experts say that Maskhadov, elected in Chechnya’s only
internationally recognized polls in 1997, no longer controls rebel
forces and is a fading force. “Maskhadov is just one of the leaders
of the Chechen resistance, and not even the strongest,” says Mr.
Iskanderyan. “[The cease-fire] may be just an attempt to show he’s
still relevant.”

But 17 prominent Russian human rights activists issued a statement
Wednesday warning that Chechnya was turning into an “eternal
conflict” and urging the Kremlin to take up the offer for
negotiations as “practically the only way of stopping Chechnya’s
transformation into yet another front in the confrontation between
radical Islam and Western civilization.”

The pro-Moscow Chechen government insists that reconstruction of the
war-torn republic has made great strides, though there is little
independent information. At a Moscow press conference this week,
Alkhanov said the treaty being drafted will settle the conflict by
granting Chechnya some economic autonomy “within the federal
constitution.”

But according to Malik Saidulayev, a Moscow-based businessman and
Chechen community leader, there is no security, order, or prospect
for peace in Chechnya.

The Kremlin’s “policy of Chechenization of the conflict has failed
and the situation in the republic has grown much worse,” he says.
“The war is not ending, it is spreading to the rest of the Caucasus
region.”

–Boundary_(ID_aMMM7rJDXeUy9/5gCkHrYw)–

http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0211/p07s01-woeu.html

BAKU: Azeri MP sees Russian deputy speaker’s Karabakh remarks as”dri

Azeri MP sees Russian deputy speaker’s Karabakh remarks as “drivel”

Ekho, Baku
10 Feb 05

The statement by the deputy speaker of the Russian State Duma,
Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, that the inclusion of Nagornyy Karabakh in
the Commonwealth of Independent States could facilitate a solution to
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is “drivel”, Azerbaijani MP Aydin
Mirzazada has said. “I don’t think he understands very well what
he says,” the MP told daily Ekho. The newspaper itself noted that
while Zhirinovskiy’s statement does not represent Moscow’s official
position on the problem, Russia has always backed Armenia as its
“historical ally” in contrast to Azerbaijan which is the “hireling
of the American imperialism”. The following is the text of Nurani’s
and R. Orucov’s report by Azerbaijani newspaper Ekho on 10 February
headlined “Zhirinovskiy suggests including Nagornyy Karabakh in the
CIS”; subheadings have been inserted editorially:

While the results of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit
to Azerbaijan are still being discussed in Baku and plans are being
drawn up ahead of the Year of Azerbaijan in Russia, rather alarming
statements are being made in Moscow. For instance, some media, in
particular Regnum news agency, have reported that the leader of the
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and the deputy speaker of
the Russian Duma, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, has outlined his own vision
of a solution to the Nagornyy Karabakh problem.

“Compromise solution”

In a news conference in Moscow, Zhirinovskiy said the Nagornyy Karabakh
conflict is as impossible to resolve as the dispute between Israel
and Palestine. However, he expressed his confidence that the conflict
could be resolved if Nagornyy Karabakh is admitted to the CIS.

Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, as Regnum explains, thinks that neither Armenia
nor Azerbaijan will agree to the loss of Nagornyy Karabakh. “If Russia
insists that Nagornyy Karabakh be joined to Armenia, Azerbaijan will
take offence and vice versa,” he said. But he went on to say that
“Nagornyy Karabakh is a historical part of Armenia and is called
Artsakh”. And this leads to a simple conclusion – Nagornyy Karabakh’s
entry into the CIS, according to Zhirinovskiy, is a “compromise
solution”. Of course, the Russian audience was threatened with western
expansion again. The deputy speaker said the West is trying to apply
the so-called Dayton model [peace arrangement for Bosnia-Hercegovina]
to the Karabakh problem.

“Under such circumstances the Armenians will act as the Serbs, while
the Azerbaijanis are to be the Kosovan Albanians. The West wants to
suppress Armenia and create a 20m-strong Azerbaijan,” Zhirinovskiy
said. Obviously, Zhirinovskiy did not elaborate what the Dayton
arrangements had to do with the Kosovan Albanians.

However, it remains unclear whether at issue is the recognition of
Nagornyy Karabakh’s “independence” with its subsequent entry into
the CIS or its transfer into some sort of “direct administration”
of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

But frankly speaking, this can barely change the gist of the issue. If
Zhirinovskiy’s “compromise” envisages Karabakh’s entry into the
CIS as a fully-fledged member, then, let’s face it, this will
mean the fulfilment of the Karabakh separatists’ demands. Because
having received the status of “an independent state”, they will
have the opportunity to realize their “meatsum” [Armenian word for
unification] idea. But if Zhirinovskiy suggests introducing “direct
administration” of a part of Azerbaijani territory by the CIS, then we
are actually reviving the idea of putting Nagornyy Karabakh in “direct
administration” of Moscow, a suggestion first voiced in 1990. Then
Moscow set up a special committee headed by Arkadiy Volskiy. What
happened then is remembered only too well: Karabakh first seceded
from Azerbaijan “temporarily” and then this status became permanent
with all this entails.

Kremlin’s “official position”

It goes without saying that Zhirinovskiy has simply expressed his
own opinion and it would be “incorrect” to construe his statement as
the official position of the Russian authorities, not to mention
Zhirinovskiy’s ingrained habit of making super-extravagant
statements. But Zhirinovskiy’s shocking statements often
represent… [ellipsis as published] the Kremlin’s “official position”.

In other words, despite Azerbaijan’s latest advances to Moscow, which
have started to worry the West, they have failed to produce a tangible
shift in the “balance of Moscow’s sympathies and aversions”. It
still considers Armenia to be its “historical ally” and “brother”,
while Azerbaijanis are “hirelings of the American imperialism”
similar to the “Kosovan Albanians” (whether the West is prepared to
protect Azerbaijan as it did the Kosovan Albanians is the topic for
an altogether different discussion). And Moscow is even more unlikely
to relinquish the “confessional and historical priorities” which have
defined its policy in the South Caucasus for almost 300 years now –
starting from Peter the Great’s order to settle Armenians in the
Caspian region. And maybe Zhirinovskiy’s escapades suggest that we
need to think very carefully before making advances to Russia.

“Drivel”

When commenting on Zhirinovskiy’s statement, a representative of
the ruling New Azerbaijan Party in the Milli Maclis [parliament],
Aydin Mirzazada, described it as “drivel”.

“Although this man occupies the post of the deputy chairman of the
State Duma, I don’t think he understands very well what he says.” It
is known to all that Nagornyy Karabakh is a part of Azerbaijan,
the MP said.

“The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe [PACE] recently
recognized Nagornyy Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory controlled by
the separatist regime. PACE documents say that Armenia controls a
considerable portion of Azerbaijani territory. And this is stated by
a body of which Zhirinovskiy himself is a member,” Mirzazada said.

Zhirinovskiy has already made a number of unrealistic and aggressive
statements and each time the Russian official circles disowned them.

“I think statements like that are put in Zhirinovskiy’s mouth by
certain nationalistic circles interested in friendship with Armenia
and some Azerbaijani territories. But the CIS is the Commonwealth of
Independent States, while Nagornyy Karabakh is a part of Azerbaijani
territory. Therefore, I think Zhirinovskiy’s statement can only be
seen as drivel.”

ASBAREZ Online [02-10-2005]

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1) Armenian Businessman Denies Turkish Newspaper Report
2) Famous Turkish Author Urges Recognition of Turkish Atrocities
3) Turkey Ignores Armenian Calls for Joint Renovation of Historical Monuments
4) Absenteeism in Armenian Parliament

1) Armenian Businessman Denies Turkish Newspaper Report

YEREVAN (Armenpress)–Arsen Ghazarian, the chairman of the Union of
Manufacturers and Businessmen, denied reports by the Turkish newspaper Zaman
that he, along with the head of the Youth Party of Armenia Sarkis Asatrian,
met
on Wednesday with Ankara Trade Chamber president Sinan Aygun in Ankara.
According to Zaman, Aygun told the two Armenians that turning incidents of
the
past into a blood feud brings no benefit. “Now, Turkey is a democratic country
and we have forgotten these incidents,” he was quoted as saying.
But Ghazarian, on Thursday, adamantly denied that a delegation visited
Turkey,
much less met with Aygun. “The report in Zaman is another concoction of the
Turkish press and it is not the first instance when I have to deny its
reports.
This proves, once again, that one should not take seriously what Turkish
newspapers write,” he said.
Zaman, meanwhile, quoted Asatryan as saying that Armenians do not want
anybody
to intervene in Turkey-Armenia relations: “Third countries like the United
States, France, Azerbaijan, Uruguay, and China should not intervene in
relations between Turkey and Armenia.”

2) Famous Turkish Author Urges Recognition of Turkish Atrocities

ISTANBUL (Combined Sources)–In Turkey’s Hurriyet newspaper, renowned Turkish
author Orhan Pamuk discussed the necessity to speak truthfully of the massacre
of one million Armenians and 30,000 Kurds.
“This topic should stop being taboo,” Pamuk stressed. He said that though
many
avoid discussion of the topic, he is ready to speak.
“State leaders consider that there is no need to address it, as there is a
problem in relations with Armenia… I am not interested in the issue of state
relations with Armenia. Many people were annihilated here,” he said.
In his latest book, Snow, Pamuk deals with the theme of clashes between
civilizations and the role of Islam. A young Turk named Kerim Alakusoglu
returns to Istanbul for his mother’s funeral. In a dangerous political
atmosphere, the truth concerning Kerim and the snow-covered old world city of
Kars is revealed.
Pamuk, one of Turkey’s leading novelists, began to write regularly in 1974.
Five of his books have been published in English: Beyaz Kale (The White
Castle,
1991), Kara Kitap (The Black Book, 1995), Yeni Hayat (New Life, 1997), My Name
Is Red (2001), and Snow (2004). His work has been translated into more than
twenty languages.
Though Pamuk’s views have been condemned by various circles in Turkey,
Turkish
historian Hilal Berktay, praised Pamuk as an honest and decent intellectual
for
having the courage to address an issue many avoid.
Berktay recalls similar criticism when he expressed his views on the Armenian
genocide, in 2001.
“I think that we must get rid of the taboos that surround the events of
1915,”
Berktay had written in the French weekly L’Express, adding, “For decades
Turkish public opinion has been lulled to sleep by the same lullaby. And yet
there are tons of documents proving the sad reality.”
“As more and more honest and sincere historians and public intellectuals of
integrity keep speaking up, this dam will be breached, this dam of silence
will
be breached…this will be a fundamental dimension of internal democratization
of Turkish society,” Berktay said.

3) Turkey Ignores Armenian Calls for Joint Renovation of Historical Monuments

YEREVAN (Armenpress)–Armenia’s Culture Ministry revealed on Wednesday that
Turkey has not responded to Armenian initiatives to create a cultural corridor
between the medieval Armenian city of Ani (now in Eastern Turkey, close to the
Armenian border) and Armenia.
Although the idea was put forth in 2001 by various international
organizations, including UNESCO, only a verbal agreement has been reached so
far.
Ani, the ancient, walled capital of the kings from the Bagradit dynasty who
ruled Armenia from the 9-11 centuries AD, was in its heyday a millennium ago
and a rival to Constantinople, Baghdad, and Cairo. Despite earthquakes and
Mongol raids, much of Ani’s immense, fortified walls, as well as the city’s
citadel, caravansary, cathedral, and six churches still stand well preserved,
their stone facades a testament to a well-developed level of craftsmanship.
Today, Ani is a ghost town, deserted except for the presence of Turkish border
guards and the occasional tourists.
“Making Ani a cultural center remains a focus of Armenia’s foreign policy, as
Armenia is firmly committed to improved relations with Turkey; cultural
dialogue is one of ways to do this,” deputy minister of culture Gagik Gurjian
said.
The ministry has forwarded to Turkey’s cultural ministry, proposals on joint
Armenian-American excavations in Akhtamar and Van, and a draft for continuing
research; however, both proposals have remained unanswered.
According to Gurjian, Turkey has appealed to the European Parliament to
provide funding for the restoration of several monuments in Eastern Anatolia,
including the ancient Armenian cities of Van and Igdir. If funding is
approved,
the Armenian ministry would attempt to include Armenian monuments in these
regions involved in the project.

4) Absenteeism in Armenian Parliament

YEREVAN (RFE/RL)–Widespread absenteeism among fellow lawmakers nearly
disrupted the start of the National Assembly’s spring session on Wednesday.
The 131-member assembly was forced to delay a planned debate by two hours
after failing to make a quorum in the morning. It was also largely deserted on
Tuesday, even though its electronic voting system indicated the presence of
more than 66 deputies.
Deputy parliament speaker Vahan Hovhannisian said, “Many deputies have had
their sense of responsibility weakened or simply lack it. They just don’t come
to work.”
The spring session began on Monday in the absence of parliament speaker Artur
Baghdasarian and several other deputies of the Orinats Yerkir Party, who are
currently accompanying Baghdasarian on an official visit to several Gulf Arab
states and will not be back until Friday.
Also contributing to poor attendance is the continuing boycott of parliament
sessions by 23 deputies representing the National Assembly’s two opposition
factions. The Artarutyun bloc and the National Unity Party (AMK) had earlier
indicated that they will end the year-long boycott if President Robert
Kocharian and his loyal parliament majority accept their proposals on
constitutional reform. The presidential camp effectively rejected those
conditions last week.
“The Artarutyun alliance, therefore, finds its participation in parliament
sessions pointless,” a spokeswoman for the bloc said.
Hovannisian, meanwhile, called for tougher sanctions against absenteeism. The
parliament’s existing regulations already stipulate that a deputy who fails to
take part in most parliament votes during a semi-annual session can be
stripped
of their mandate.
The provision could have been applied to the boycotting parliamentarians;
however, the majority has so far avoided enforcing it.

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and not Asbarez Online. ASBAREZ ONLINE does not transmit address changes and
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(c) 2005 ASBAREZ ONLINE. All Rights Reserved.

ASBAREZ provides this news service to ARMENIAN NEWS NETWORK members for
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–Boundary_(ID_e8477wF7mUdCxUAIGdlscA)–

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Armenia left without allies

Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
February 9, 2005, Wednesday

ARMENIA LEFT WITHOUT ALLIES

SOURCE: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 7, 2005, p. 11

by Viktoria Panfilova

RESOLUTION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY ON KARABAKH IS PUTTING
ARMENIA IN A TIGHT CORNER

Foreign ministers of Armenia (Vardan Oskanjan) and Azerbaijan (Elmar
Mamedjarov) will meet in Prague to discuss the Nagorno-Karabakh
problem on March 2. Most observers believe that the meeting of the
diplomats representing warring parties will take place in the
situation favoring Azerbaijan. Meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly
a week ago passed a resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh, putting official
Yerevan in a difficult position.

The Strasbourg Resolution based on the report made by David Atkinson
(Great Britain) upset Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh but elated
Azerbaijan. To quote President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, “Baku did
it, the report to the Parliamentary Assembly recognizes the fact of
occupation of a part of Azerbaijani lands by Armenia.” Indeed, this
is the first official international document to call Armenia an
aggressor. Moreover, Atkinson in his comments denied Nagorno-Karabakh
the right to self-determination. “If Azerbaijan agreed to give
Nagorno-Karabakh sovereignty, the European Union will not object,” he
said. “It is clear, however, that the authorities of Azerbaijan will
never give their consent to it.”

A better gift to Azerbaijan cannot be imagined. No wonder official
Yerevan immediately said that, “Atkinson’s report reeks of oil”,
clearly hinting at the interest of the West in the Caspian energy
resources.

Atkinson’s report gives Armenia something to ponder. The failure of
the Armenian diplomacy is clear even though official Yerevan is
speaking of “diplomatic triumph” to muffle it.

Armenian experts are convinced that the fiasco is a corollary of the
faulty concept defining Yerevan’s stand on the matter in the last
several years. Between 1988, when the confrontation began and the
late 1990’s, the problem of Karabakh was viewed on all levels as the
struggle of local Armenians for self-determination and the
self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh was a fully fledged
participant of all negotiations. Armenia was always an “involved
party” but not a warring party. This state of affairs was specified
by an OSCE document in 1992.

Everything changed when ex-leader of Karabakh Robert Kocharjan became
president of Armenia. Yerevan assumed the role of a participant in
the confrontation, and Karabakh was ousted from the process of
negotiations with Yerevan’s consent. As a result, the entire problem
shifted to the plane of a territorial dispute. Needless to say, all
of that weakened Armenia’s position in the international arena.
Restoration of this position is not going to be easy now.

A certain role was also played by official Baku’s dissatisfaction
with the OSCE Minsk Group, which in Azerbaijan’s opinion had not done
anything at all in its 10 years of existence. In fact, this is not
so. The OSCE Minsk Group and its chairmen (Russia, the United States,
and France) offered variants of settlement more than once, but either
Baku turned them down or other intermediaries objected to a too high
level of Karabakh’s involvement in the talks. It was precisely the
“pro-Armenian” bias of the OSCE Minsk Group that irked Azerbaijan and
fortified it in the conviction that the format of the talks should be
changed, and the intermediaries too.

In other words, the Parliamentary Assembly and its decision benefits
Azerbaijan enormously. With this backing, Baku will certainly try to
minimize the role of the OSCE Minsk Group and insist on the transfer
of the debates to the UN (where it can count on the unequivocal
support from most Arab countries) and to the International Court.
Moreover, some specialists fear that the latest diplomatic triumph
may provoke Azerbaijan into trying to settle the problem by sheer
strength of arms again. Atkinson said in his report that there were
three solutions to the problem, including a military solution where
Azerbaijan would send its army to liberate its own territories.

The chance of the use of force is slim, dealing the Karabakh and much
less the Armenian army will be difficult indeed, but official Yerevan
does not rule out this possibility all the same. In any case,
Armenian Defense Minister Serzh Sarkisjan warned Azerbaijan the other
day that should it decide to settle the matter by force, it would
have to lament “40% of the territory, not 20%.”

Resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly are essentially
recommendations but Baku, Yerevan, and Stepanakert understand the
moral significance of the document. That is probably why
Nagorno-Karabakh TV went to the trouble of finding an interview with
Atkinson dated 1993 when he was chairman of the commission for
non-CIS countries. Atkinson said after a visit to Nagorno-Karabakh
then that, “Azerbaijan began this war and the European Commission
will not accept it as a member unless the war is stopped.” He said in
the same interview that, “residents of Nagorno-Karabakh have the
right to decide their lot… Our Organization and I myself will do
everything possible to make sure that the Karabakh Armenians live on
their land without duress…” All of that shows that Atkinson’s view
has changed diametrically. Even Western experts ascribe the
Europeans’ eagerness to interfere with the longest conflict in Europe
to economic interests as well as political. The words of Bernard
Fasiet, the new French chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group, confirm it.
On a visit to Baku last week he said that, “the unresolved
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict affects stability of the region and
interferes with economic projects on a broader scale including
Central Asia.” It should be noted that Western representatives and
the Russian delegation backed the anti-Armenian resolution of the
Parliamentary Assembly. It means that Armenia does not have allies it
can rely on at this point. References to “oil”, “transport”, and
other interests do no apply. It will be much better to think why the
once unquestionable sympathies with Armenia in Europe and Russia are
gradually giving way to disinterest in the Armenian interests…

Translated by A. Ignatkin

Patrick Devedjian =?UNKNOWN?B?q2Nob3F16bs=?=

Libération, France
lundi 07 février 2005

Patrick Devedjian «choqué»

Par Didier HASSOUX

Ouverture ou provocation ? Hier, sur France Inter, le ministre
délégué à l’Industrie, Patrick Devedjian, s’est dit «très surpris par
la brutalité des propos du Premier ministre turc [sur la question
arménienne]. Je suis choqué car, d’une certaine manière, il semble
exprimer le regret qu’il y ait encore 400 000 Arméniens survivants en
France». Recevant jeudi Jean-Louis Debré et les quatre présidents de
groupe parlementaire, Tuyyep Erdogan s’était étonné que «400 000
Arméniens puissent faire échouer un référendum» en France, seul pays
où le Parlement a reconnu l’existence d’un «génocide arménien».
Erdogan avait ajouté que la communauté turque comptait, elle, 500 000
membres. Pourtant, selon les parlementaires français, le chef du
gouvernement turc «a évolué» sur le sujet. Jean-Marc Ayrault (PS) a
noté une «ouverture» du côté de l’exécutif turc qui a proposé la
constitution d’une «commission internationale d’historiens sous
l’égide des Nations unies» afin de faire la lumière sur les
«massacres» de 1915. Une proposition qui semble recevoir la
bénédiction du patriarche arménien Mesrob II. Recevant vendredi les
parlementaires français, il a estimé que la question du génocide
arménien devait «être réglée par les historiens» et n’était «pas une
affaire politique».

–Boundary_(ID_FbuEe9lVvzY7p8alx6Clqw)–

RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly – 02/04/2005

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
_________________________________________ ____________________
RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly
Vol. 5, No. 5, 4 February 2005

A Weekly Review of News and Analysis of Russian Domestic Politics

************************************************************
HEADLINES:
* RUSSIA ON THE VERGE OF A BREAKDOWN?
* DMITRII ROGOZIN: THE HUNGER ARTIST
* HOLDING PUTIN ACCOUNTABLE
* STRANGE DAYS FOR THE AUDIT CHAMBER
* POLITICAL CALENDAR
************************************************************

POLITICS

RUSSIA ON THE VERGE OF A BREAKDOWN?

By Victor Yasmann

Hard on the heels of a humiliating political defeat in the
presidential election in Ukraine, the Kremlin is now facing another
serious crisis, this one even closer to home. For weeks now, the
country has been wracked by growing social unrest in opposition to
the government’s reform to convert most in-kind social benefits
to cash payments, which has been widely criticized as ill considered
and poorly implemented.
According to media reports, more than two-thirds of the
subjects of the federation have seen protests and demonstrations by
pensioners, the disabled, public-sector workers, and other benefits
recipients. In some cases, protestors blocked highways and rail lines
or took over regional-administration buildings. In many cases, the
protests were apparently spontaneous, but the Communist Party has
claimed to be organizing the demonstrations.
In addition, speaking to journalists in Moscow on 27 January,
Communist Party leader Gennadii Zyuganov said that his party has
collected the 90 Duma deputy signatures required to force the
chamber’s leadership to include a motion of no confidence in the
government in the Duma’s agenda, gazeta.ru and other Russian
media reported. Zyuganov said that in addition to Communist deputies,
the Motherland faction is backing the initiative, as well as 15-18
independent deputies.
Although a no-confidence measure has no chance of passing
without the support of the pro-Kremlin Unified Russia party, which
controls a majority of the seats in the chamber, holding such a vote
would put Unified Russia in the awkward position of having openly to
support the unpopular benefits reform, gazeta.ru commented on 27
January.
At a recent meeting of the government’s Council on
Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship, participants concluded that the
main reason for the unrest and for the slowdown in economic growth
generally is a crisis of confidence, a loss of public trust in the
government, “Vremya novostei” reported on 28 January. A similar view
was expressed by Higher Economics School head and former Economy
Minister Yevgenii Yasin, who was quoted by the daily as saying, “We
are seeing a textbook example of how economic growth that seemed to
be working so well can be destroyed.”
Economist and Institute of Globalization Director Mikhail
Delyagin said he thinks the present situation, including the
widespread unrest, is the result of infighting between the so-called
siloviki, or people connected to the security apparatus, and such
liberal ministers as Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin and Economic
Development and Trade Minister German Gref. Delyagin called the
latter “liberal fundamentalists” in a 14 January interview with
RosBalt. Delyagin added that the dismantling of the social safety net
“is not only the result of liberal reforms, but also of the blind
aggression of the silovik oligarchy, an aggression that is spreading
from the business community to society as a whole.” “It is an open
secret that a considerable portion of those agencies that we more and
more often call ‘siloviki’ and less and less often call
‘law enforcement organs’ perceive the citizenry of Russia as
a legitimate target for looting,” Delyagin said.
Delyagin said that the Putin regime has declared war not only
on business and society, but also on the regional elites, which it
has stripped of political influence without giving them anything in
return. “I think the protests which are continuing all over the
country are partly generated by regional administrations, which feel
that they have been robbed by the benefits-reform process,” Delyagin
said. “Since they are afraid to confront Moscow openly, they pretend
that the protests are only the voice of the people and are in no
hurry to silence it.”
National Strategy Institute Director Stanislav Belkovskii
told APN on 27 January that the unrest is evidence of a systemic
crisis confronting the Putin regime. He said the protests demonstrate
how illusory and ephemeral the Russian system of power is, and prove
that the authorities can neither govern the people nor communicate
with them. He added that the regime has already demonstrated this
inability in the cases of the August 2000 sinking of the “Kursk”
nuclear submarine, the October 2003 hostage taking at a Moscow
theater, and the September 2004 hostage drama at a school in Beslan,
North Ossetia. However, he added, the current unrest even more
graphically demonstrates that the Putin regime is not unshakable.
Belkovskii added that the response to the protests proves
that the regime fears only direct actions of this sort. It is not
possible to outmaneuver the country’s oligarchic-bureaucratic
machine, but only to pressure it, Belkovskii said.
Belkovskii said that in October, a member of the Communist
Party of the Russian Federation told him that if Ukrainian
presidential hopeful Viktor Yushchenko could bring at least 100,000
people out onto the streets of Kyiv, the issue of power in Ukraine
would be settled regardless of other factors. Time has shown that he
was right, Belkovskii said, adding that anyone who can bring 300,000
people out onto the streets of Moscow can similarly take power in
Russia. Therefore, he concluded, the street will remain the main tool
of the political struggle in Russia for the next two years.
The government was unprepared for the protests and chose to
treat its own citizens like “cattle,” Belkovskii said. He quoted a
Unified Russia Duma deputy as saying that “the tougher the laws are
that the government adopts, the less people protest against them.”
Belkovskii said the regime placed its stake on public apathy and was
convinced that there would be no massive protests. For this reason,
the government is responsible for the crisis and should be dismissed.
Belkovskii added, though, that President Putin does not
consider the benefits reform itself a mistake. Therefore, Kudrin,
Gref, and Health and Social Development Minister Mikhail Zurabov will
remain in government in one capacity or another. However, the
president will most likely have to make some sort of gesture to quell
the unrest, and the most likely victim will be the cabinet of Prime
Minister Mikhail Fradkov.
Demonstrators have already been seen carrying signs calling
for Putin to resign and even bearing slogans such as “Putin Is Worse
Than Hitler.” Although Putin often tries to avoid tough personnel
decisions, Belkovskii said, he will need to do something to appease
the public. The most likely scapegoat will be Fradkov, Belkovskii
said, not because of the reform fiasco itself, but because he has
avoided taking public responsibility for the crisis and has thereby
exposed Putin to criticism.

PROFILE

DMITRII ROGOZIN: THE HUNGER ARTIST

By Julie A. Corwin

The hunger strike of five State Duma deputies from the
Motherland faction, which began on 21 January, came to end this week.
The five legislators, including Motherland leader Dmitrii Rogozin,
who were demanding a moratorium on implementation of the law on
converting in-kind benefits to cash payments and the dismissal of
Health and Social Development Minister Mikhail Zurabov, Finance
Minister Aleksei Kudrin, and Economic Development and Trade Minister
German Gref, decided to transform their struggle from “the passive to
the active stage,” “Izvestiya” reported on 2 February. Lawmaker
Andrei Savelev was hospitalized on 29 January with low blood sugar,
and the party’s presidium was expected to issue an order to the
strikers to give up their protest for the sake of their health at a
presidium session on 3 February.
Typically, hunger strikes attract sympathy for the
participants and their cause, but in the case of the Motherland party
action, a more common reaction – at least among the Russian political
elite — has been derision. State Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov labeled
the action “self-promotion.” And Lyudmila Alekseeva, chairwoman of
the Moscow Helsinki Group, found herself agreeing with Gryzlov. She
told politcom.ru on 24 January that public relations was likely at
least one of the motivations for the deputies’ action.
In an interview with Ekho Moskvy on 22 January, Garri
Kasparov, chess champion and Committee-2008 chairman, concluded that
“quite obviously” Rogozin got news from his patrons in the Kremlin —
that is, first deputy head of the presidential administration Igor
Sechin or deputy head of the administration Viktor Ivanov — that
resignations are forthcoming in the government. “One should not doubt
that Rogozin’s strike is a harbinger of changes in the Russian
government,” Kasparov said. “We’ll wait and we can thank Dmitrii
Olegovich [Rogozin] for imparting this information in such a bizarre
way to all those able to compare and contrast his action with the
information he usually receives from his Kremlin patrons.”
Kasparov added that he believes that Kremlin control over
Rogozin is “quite high,” but Rogozin “no doubt has his own game plan.
Sechin’s game is to bet on Rogozin and help him in every way, and
it’s Rogozin’s game, at this stage, to pretend and dream that
one day he will do to his patrons what Putin did to his.”
In an interview with politcom.ru on 24 January, Marat Gelman,
the art gallery owner and campaign consultant who worked on
Motherland’s surprisingly successful campaign during the December
2003 State Duma elections, agreed with Kasparov: “Rogozin has
information that he won’t be on a hunger strike long. But in my
opinion he or his informant is wrong,” Gelman said. Gelman also
commented that since Duma deputies are now devoid of real power, they
are reduced to making symbolic gestures such as hunger strikes. But
as gestures go, Gelman figures that Rogozin’s gambit is a
stronger one than the competition’s: Unified Russia is just
discussing the benefits reform among themselves, he says, while the
Communist party is trying to head spontaneous protests.
Part of the harsh reaction to Motherland’s hunger strike
could reflect the Russian political elite’s attitude toward
Motherland’s leader, Rogozin himself. Like many federal
politicians, Rogozin changes party and coalition membership on an
almost seasonal basis. Rogozin is only 41 years old, but he has
already either been a member of or aligned with a half a dozen
political organizations, including the Union of Revival, the Congress
of Russian Communities (KRO), the Fatherland party, the Yurii
Boldyrev Movement, the Inter-Ethnic Union, the People’s Deputy
Duma faction, and the Motherland-Patriotic Union bloc. And his
break-ups have often been publicly acrimonious.
Rogozin’s first big public fight was with former
presidential candidate Aleksandr Lebed. Lebed was No. 1, and Rogozin
No. 5 on the KRO’s party list for the December 1995 State Duma
election. But relations soured quickly after Lebed became Security
Council secretary in summer 1996, and especially after he negotiated
the Khasavyurt accords that ended the first military conflict in
Chechnya.
By the spring of 1998, Rogozin and the KRO were actively
campaigning against Lebed in the Krasnoyarsk Krai gubernatorial
election. In 1999, Rogozin’s KRO was initially aligned with
Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov’s Fatherland party, but when Luzhkov
chose to join forces with the All-Russia movement, headed by
Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev and Bashkortostan President
Murtaza Rakhimov, Rogozin dropped out of the alliance. Rogozin made a
number of unflattering remarks to Luzhkov at the time, and Luzhkov
has been unable to forgive him, according to “Profile” on 7 April
2003.
In 2003, Rogozin’s name was proposed during a Unified
Russia party congress, but Luzhkov blocked his membership of the
party, because he “could not forget old offenses,” according to
“Yezhenedelnyi zhurnal” on 15 December 2003. In December 2003,
Rogozin was No. 2 on the party list for the unexpectedly successful
Motherland bloc. However, that alliance began to unravel unusually
quickly. By January 2004, Rogozin and candidate No. 1 on the party
list, Sergei Glazev, were exchanging brick bats in the press, and by
March, Glazev was removed as the bloc’s faction leader.
Rogozin, a native Muscovite, is the son of Oleg
Konstantinovich Rogozin, a military general. Rogozin resisted
following in his father’s footsteps. According to “Profil” and
“Yezhnedelnyi zhurnal,” Rogozin almost entered the acting faculty of
the All-Russia State Institute of Cinematography, having successfully
completely all stages of the application and competition process.
However, at the last minute, he rethought his career plans and
instead joined the international department of the journalism faculty
at Moscow State University (MGU). At MGU, Rogozin participated in
student theater.
Now as a mid-career professional, he finds himself
participating in a theatre of a more modern variety, reality
television. The Motherland deputies’ hunger strike was webcast on
the party’s website (). Computer hackers shut
the site down temporarily, but as of evening of 31 January Moscow
time, the show was back on the air. Rogozin was shown conversing with
his colleagues, hands tucked in his jean pockets, his once-splendid
paunch noticeably less visible underneath his black sweatshirt.
According to “Izvestiya” on 2 February, Rogozin lost 8 kilos. But he
may have gained much more than a slimmer figure: In a monthly ranking
of influential politicians published by “Nezavisimaya gazeta,”
Rogozin jumped from 57th place to 30th.

RFE/RL RUSSIAN SERVICE

HOLDING PUTIN ACCOUNTABLE On 28 January, RFE/RL’s Russian Service
broadcast an exclusive interview with Motherland leader Dmitrii
Rogozin, who spoke by telephone from his office in the State Duma
building where he is participating in a hunger strike against the
government’s benefits-reform plan. The complete interview in
Russian can be seen at

During the interview, Rogozin defended the decision to stage
a hunger strike and said that the current Duma has become “a sort of
farce, in which simply by the command of some director from the
majority faction, plus the well-known Russian hooligan [Liberal
Democratic Party of Russia leader Vladimir] Zhirinovskii who has
stuck himself on to them, [deputies] come and pass whatever decisions
are deemed necessary without any discussion and with the most blatant
violations of the Duma’s regulations.” He specifically criticized
deputies’ rejection of a Motherland-sponsored proposal to give
the floor to human rights ombudsman Vladimir Lukin to discuss the
benefits crisis.
Rogozin also criticized the “officious” state media, “even
the formerly independent NTV television,” for waging a conspiracy of
silence about the Motherland hunger strike. He said that false
statements purportedly from the hunger strikers have been circulated
in the Duma and posted on the Internet, and he accused Unified Russia
of complicity in this campaign.
Rogozin also categorically denounced a letter that was
recently sent by 20 Duma deputies, including several from the
Motherland faction, that urged the Prosecutor-General’s Office to
investigate Jewish organizations on suspicion that they foment ethnic
and religious strife.
Although Motherland has always marketed itself as a
pro-presidential, nationalist-leaning party, Rogozin called on
President Vladimir Putin to take responsibility for the benefits
crisis. “We demand that the president make his deeds match his words
and, finally, become a governmental leader,” Rogozin said, “instead
of just appearing on television and saying what people expect.” “We
believe that [the president] bears total responsibility for
everything that is happening in the country,” he added. (Robert
Coalson)

POLITICS

STRANGE DAYS FOR THE AUDIT CHAMBER

By Robert Coalson

Although President Vladimir Putin re-nominated Sergei
Stepashin to his post as Audit Chamber chairman on 27 January, the
political elites in Russia were caught off-guard when Stepashin told
a meeting of the Duma’s Motherland faction on 18 January that he
had submitted his resignation.
Stepashin, whose term was scheduled to end in April 2006,
said that he considered it his duty to tender his resignation in
keeping with the spirit of a new law on the formation of the Audit
Chamber, which stipulates that the president nominates that
body’s chairman and that the Duma confirm the nomination.
Until Putin reaffirmed his support for Stepashin, there was a
frenzy of discussion about what Stepashin’s move might mean. Most
analysts saw it as a clear appeal for a vote of confidence from
Putin, although some doubted whether that nod would come. Dmitrii
Oreshkin of the Merkator analytical group told “Novye izvestiya” on
19 January that some within the administration might try to take
advantage of Stepashin’s move because the chief auditor “is a man
with unsatisfied political ambitions who is not caught up in any
compromising games.”
The announcement of Stepashin’s resignation was given
additional political gravitas by the fact that the Duma has now three
times postponed hearing his potentially scandalous report on his
chamber’s review of 1990s-era privatizations. On 12 January, Duma
Speaker Boris Gryzlov announced that the report would not be put on
the Duma’s agenda because changes in the legislature’s rules
had made it unclear what “format” was appropriate for Stepashin’s
appearance. “Tribuna” noted on 12 January that Stepashin had already
appeared in the Duma chamber on 8 December 2004 to present the report
but deputies refused to give him the floor. A few analysts, including
Lydia Andrusenko, writing in “Politicheskii zhurnal,” No. 2,
speculated that Stepashin’s resignation was a protest to the
Kremlin against possible moves to quash the report.
However, at the 18 January Motherland faction meeting,
Stepashin told deputies that the Duma’s leadership had scheduled
his report for sometime “in March or April in the context of a report
on the work of the Audit Chamber.” He added that he has already
submitted the report to both legislative chambers, Putin, and the
Prosecutor-General’s Office.
“Kommersant-Daily” on 17 January reported that it had
obtained a copy of Stepashin’s report and that it was
characterized mostly by ambiguous conclusions and statements that
could be variously interpreted. However, the daily, which is owned by
avowed Kremlin foe and former oligarch Boris Berezovskii, wrote that
the document could serve “as the basis for the mass reexamination of
privatization results” and that “the authorities don’t seem to be
in any hurry to play this card.” Some analysts have raised the
concern that the report could signal a qualitative change in the
state’s assault of private enterprise, inasmuch as the Yukos
affair and other high-profile cases to date have centered on the
issue of minimizing tax obligations rather than on the core issue of
property ownership.
The daily reported that the report repeats longstanding
general criticisms of privatization, including that it was conducted
without a complete legal foundation; that the State Property
Committee frequently failed to register its instructions with the
Justice Ministry, making them technically void; and that most tenders
were insufficiently competitive and transparent. The report also
reportedly includes general conclusions such as that privatization
failed to achieve such stated goals as boosting industrial production
and economic growth. The report concludes vaguely but menacingly that
“it is essential to establish through the courts the violated rights
of the legal property owner, that is, the state,” the daily reported.
The “Kommersant-Daily” article reports that the main
ambiguity in the possible repercussions of the report lies in the
fact that it does not really examine specific privatization cases in
detail. It surveys the oil and energy sectors, according to the
daily, and lingers on Chukotka Autonomous Okrug Governor Roman
Abramovich’s Sibneft. It also covers the tobacco industry and
other sectors, but mostly in order to demonstrate various
privatization-related schemes that allegedly harmed the state’s
interests rather than to point fingers at particular companies or
individuals.
KM.ru speculated on 21 January that the Kremlin is benefiting
from the uncertainty over Stepashin’s report, which the news
agency described as “a bomb hanging over” the oligarchs. On the other
hand, National Strategy Council General Director Valerii Khomyakov
told “Nezavisimaya gazeta” on 20 January that “clearly, some points
in the report may not have pleased the Kremlin-linked oligarchs very
much.” Despite Stepashin’s renomination, the fate of the
privatization report remains unclear.
Putin met with Stepashin on 24 January and listened to his
report on the Audit Chamber’s plans for 2005. At that meeting,
Stepashin announced that the chamber would “move away from petty
topics” and instead study larger matters such as the overall
effectiveness of government spending. On 21 January, Federation
Council Chairman Sergei Mironov told ABN that Stepashin deserves to
keep his post, noting that Stepashin is a “gosudarstvennik,” or a
person who believes in a strong state, and “that is very important.”
Stepashin told reporters on 27 January, the day of his renomination,
that the government will not pursue a policy of “deprivatization,”
and he shifted the focus of his criticisms from privatization issues
to concerns about the management of state property.
Former Duma Deputy Yurii Boldyrev, who helped write the
original law on the Audit Chamber, told derrick.ru, the official
website of the Union of Oil and Gas Equipment Producers, on 25
January that the most important thing is neither Stepashin nor even
the privatization report, but the fate of the Audit Chamber itself,
which has gone largely unremarked. He said that the new law that
allows the president to nominate the Audit Chamber’s chairman
spells the end of its independence and turns it into “a fifth wheel”
in the structure of the government. “The Audit Chamber made sense
when it operated independently of the president and made public
things he wanted to cover up,” Boldyrev said.

POLITICAL CALENDAR

2-3 February: Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to visit Azerbaijan
to discuss visit to Moscow of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev
later the same month

4-11 February: 60th anniversary of the Yalta Conference, at which
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, U.S. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, and Soviet dictator Josef Stalin discussed plans for post-
war Europe

6 February: Second round of voting in the gubernatorial election
in Nenets Autonomous Okrug

12 February: Communist Party to organize a day of national protest
against the government’s benefits reform

16 February: Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement intended
to curb the emissions of gases widely believed to contribute
to global warming, comes into effect following its ratification by
the Russian Federation

18 February: Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to travel to Tbilisi

20 February: New patriotic television channel organized by the
Russian Defense Ministry to begin broadcasting

24 February: President Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush to
hold a summit in Bratislava, Slovakia

March: Terms of Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug Governor Yurii
Neelov, Khanty-Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug Governor Aleksandr
Filipenko, Jewish Autonomous Okrug Governor Nikolai Volkov, and
Primorskii Krai Governor Sergei Darkin to expire

March: Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to visit Japan to discuss
Russian-Japanese summit scheduled to be held in Tokyo in April,
according to many media reports

March: EU external relations commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner to
visit Moscow

6 March: Parliamentary elections in Moldova

20 March: Legislative elections in Voronezh Oblast

April: Terms of Tula Oblast Governor Vasilii Starodubtsev, Saratov
Oblast Governor Dmitrii Ayatskov, and Amur Oblast Governor Leonid
Korotkov to expire

April: Russian Soyuz spacecraft to bring new crew to the
International Space Station

17 April: Krasnoyarsk Krai to hold a referendum on the question of
merging the krai with the Taimyr and Evenk autonomous okrugs

9 May: Commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the end of World
War II

2006: Russia to host a G-8 summit

1 January 2006: Date by which all political parties must conform to
law on political parties, which requires at least 50,000 members and
branches in one-half of all federation subjects, or either reregister
as public organizations or be dissolved.

*********************************************************
Copyright (c) 2005. RFE/RL, Inc. All rights reserved.

The “RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly” is prepared by Robert Coalson
on the basis of a variety of sources. It is distributed every
Wednesday.

Direct comments to Robert Coalson at [email protected].
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No gas leak found in flat where Georgian PM died – Russian agency

No gas leak found in flat where Georgian PM died – Russian agency

RIA news agency, Moscow
3 Feb 05

TBILISI

Experts have not found a gas leak in the flat where Georgian Prime
Minister Zurab Zhvaniya died, general director of Tbilgaz [gas
distributor] David Morchiladze told reporters.

“There was no leakage of natural gas,” he said.

The gas heater was installed two days ago and the flat has apparently
not been ventilated since then, he added.

[Passage omitted: the scene of the accident is cordoned off by police;
doctors in a hospital to which Zhvaniya’s body has been taken refuse
to talk to the press.]

[In a separate report at 0706 gmt 3 Feb 05 Russian news agency RIA
quoted (?Petre Mamradze), the chief of staff of the Georgian State
Chancellery, as saying that gas poisoning is so far the only version
of Zhvaniya’s death.]