Trans-Caucasus chamber orchestra to aim at better regional relations

Trans-Caucasus chamber orchestra to aim at better regional relations

.c The Associated Press

TBILISI, Georgia (AP) – A German conductor has announced plans to form
a chamber orchestra consisting of musicians from Georgia, Armenia and
Azerbaijan as an initiative to promote better relations in the
fractious Caucasus region.

“We hope that this unique collective will become a symbol of
stabilization in the Caucasus,” Uwe Berkhemer said Monday. “Music
will be an ambassador of peace and mutual understanding.”

The Caucasus region is fraught with tension between Armenia and
Azerbaijan centering on the unresolved conflict over the
Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, and Georgia is troubled by two separatist
regions that seek either independence or union with Russia.

Berkhemer said the orchestra’s first planned performance will be in
August in Batumi, the capital of the Adzharia region which had balked
at Georgian central government control until its strongman leader
Aslan Abashidze fled amid mass protests last year.

01/11/05 11:51 EST

Putin pledges Russian role as mediator only in post-Soviet conflicts

Putin pledges Russian role as mediator only in post-Soviet conflicts

Channel One TV, Moscow
11 Jan 05

[Presenter] At a joint news conference after meeting representatives
of [Russian and Turkish] business circles, Vladimir Putin and Recep
Erdogan took questions from journalists about relations between Turkey
and Armenia and the settlement of the Cyprus and Karabakh problems.

[Putin] Russia, for its part, will do all it can to settle the
conflicts that remained in the post-Soviet space after the Soviet
Union but will do so exclusively as a mediator, as a guarantor of
potential accords, on the understanding that these accords must be
reached, above all, between the conflict sides, in this instance
between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Average Monthly Rent of Tenements in Yerevan up 2% Jan-Nov 2004

IN JANUARY-NOVEMBER, 2004, AVERAGE NONTHLY PRICE INCREASE OF
TENEMENT-HOUSES IN YEREVAN MADE 2%

YEREVAN, January 5 (Noyan Tapan). In January-November, 2004, 9,165
transactions with respect to real estate were implemented in Armenia,
which exceeds by 30.4% the index for the same period in 2003.

According to the information provided to NT by Information Service of
the Real Estate Land-Survey State Committee, sales and purchases made
89.3%, donations – 10.4%, and exchanges – 0.3% of the 3,729 alienation
transactions with respect to real estate. In January-November, 2004,
the number of real estate alienation transactions grew by 18.9% as
compared to the same period of 2003. 42.7% of real estate alienation
transactions was implemented in Yerevan, 43.7% of which – with respect
to tenement-houses’ apartments. In November, 2004, 62.9% of the 1.332
real estate sale and purchase transactions registered in Yerevan were
those implemented with respect to tenement-houses, which decreased by
4.1% as compared with the same period of 2003 and by 5.4% as compared
with October, 2004. In January-November, 2004, the minimum and maximum
prices of 1 square meter of tenement-houses’ apartments in Yerevan
communities made: in the center (except for the Northern Avenue) –
$350-970, in Arabkir – $250-560, in Kanaker-Zeytun – $130-330, in
New-Nork – $115-250, in Avan – $120-230, in Erebuni – $120-300, in
Shengavit – $120-270, in Davidashen – $130-350, in Ajapniak – $120-300
and in Nubarashen – $70-120. In January-November, 2004, the monthly
increase in an average market price of 1 square meter of
tenement-houses’ apartments in Yerevan made 2%.

OSCE MG cochairman calls for Azeri concession

ArmenPress
Jan 7 2005

OSCE MINSK GROUP COCHAIRMAN CALLS FOR AZERI CONCESSION

BAKU, JANUARY 7, ARMENPRESS: Yury Merzlyakov, the Russian
co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group, has revealed in an interview
with an Azeri daily Ekspress that Armenian and Azerbaijani officials
are negotiating a peace agreement known as “state-by-stage” conflict
regulation option. The Russian diplomat also called on Azerbaijan to
make concessions at the forthcoming talks (between Azeri and Armenian
foreign ministers Elmar Mamedyarov and Vartan Oskanian in Prague on
January 11) in order to reach a solution to the Nagorno Karabagh
conflict.
Yury Merzlyakov described the Prague talks as “decisive” and said:
“Armenia has agreed to some concessions. Now, it is Azerbaijan’s
turn”.
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev told a recent meeting of the
country’s Security Council that a new stage started in the Karabagh
settlement. He said the Prague process envisages a stage-by-stage
solution to the conflict and the discussions are proceeding in a way
favorable to Azerbaijan.
“We do not rule out agreement on some options proposed by Baku.
But for this purpose mutual steps should be taken, desire should be
demonstrated and coordinated,” Merzlyakov said.
“The dialogue can be continued towards a final end should the
Prague meeting produce any specific results ,” the Russian
co-chairman stressed. He said the meeting of the ministers “will cast
some light on many questions about the evaluation of the situation,
specific solution proposals and prospects of holding more talks:
Armenia has agreed to some concessions. Now, it is Azerbaijan’s
turn,” he said.

ANKARA: Armenia Armenians, Diaspora Armenians Have Contrary Interest

Journal of Turkish Weekly
Jan 4 2005

Armenia Armenians and Diaspora Armenians Have Contrary Interests

Jan SOYKOK (JTW), ANKARA, 4 January 2005

Dr. Nilgun Gulcan, political scientist and an expert on Caucasus
politics, told the JTW that Armenians in Armenia and Armenians in the
Diaspora had different and sometimes contrary interests.

Gulcan said `If Turkey accepts Armenian allegations Diaspora
Armenians will benefit from this, but Republic of Armenia will pay
for it.’

Gulcan further continued:

`If Turkey accepts Armenian genocide allegations, Armenian Diaspora
would benefit from this in three ways:

First they expect legal compensation. Even some of the Armenian
diaspora organizations expect billion of dollars from Turkey as
compensation.

Secondly, they expect right of relocation to Eastern towns of Turkey.
However, they did not return to Armenia, and they do not return to
Turkey or any country in the region. They are used to comfortable
Western style life.

The last and the most importantly they use so called `Turkish threat’
as an instrument for their unity and identity in Diaspora. If Turkish
threat vanishes from the Armenian agenda assimilation of Armenian
identity of Armenian diaspora will escalate. If Turkey recognizes
Armenian allegations, Armenian diaspora organizations will radically
deepen their anti-Turkey campaigns. This is an open-ended process,
and no one in Armenian Republic can benefit. Turkey’s possible
recognition of Armenian allegations will not help reconciliation and
will not help Armenian people in Armenia.’

Dr. Nilgun Gulcan argued Republic of Armenia need Turkey and the
Turks while Diaspora Armenians need a Turkish threat:

`Armenia Armenians have different interests. They do not live in
California, New York or Paris. They live in a different geography.
They live in a land-locked country. They do not live with Americans,
French or Italians but mainly with the Turks. There are more than 100
million Turkish peoples around Armenia: Turkey, Azerbaijan and
Iranian Azerbaijan. The Diaspora Armenians can insult Turkish people,
diaspora can sacrifice Turkey’s friendship for the historical
debates, because they do not need Turkey and Turkish friendship. As a
matter of fact that they need a Turkish threat to survive as an
Armenian in a foreign environment. They need a legacy to prevent
assimilation and they created the 1915. It is understandable that two
nations could see the past events in different ways. Armenians could
accuse Turks and Turkish people could accuse Armenians for the
killings of 1915. Turkish historians say more than 500,000 Muslims
were killed by the Armenian armed groups while the Armenian
historians accuse Turks of killing thousands of Armenian civilians.
All these differences could be discussed. Differences between two
sides are quite normal and understandable. However Armenians should
not sacrifice today for the past issues. Armenian politicians should
not make politics over the dead people. Armenian diaspora should not
sacrifice Armenia for their own diaspora interests. Now there is a
very enthusiastic government in Turkey to normalize relations with
Armenia. If Armenia cannot normalize relations with AK Party
Government, it will have no more chance. Armenian politicians hope a
European or American pressure over the Turkish government. All these
options were applied. And both, the EU and the US understand that
Turkey will not open its territorial borders without Armenia takes a
step in occupied territories issue. Moreover Armenia’s `strange’
special relations with Russia disturb the Americans and Europeans.
Armenia’s Russia policy obstructs the West to implement its Caucasian
policies. While Georgia and Azerbaijan develop close relations with
EU, NATO, USA, Israel and Turkey, Republic of Armenia forge its links
with Moscow. Now Russia has monopoly on energy and many other
sectors. Armenia is a sui generic case in its relations with Russia.’

Gulcan said European or American pressure over Turkey did not work
and will not work: `The only way to normalize relations between
Turkey and Armenia is normalization of Armenia-Diaspora relations. If
diaspora manipulations and misdirection end, Turkey and Armenia could
solve their problems in time’ added Gulcan.

Gulcan also argued that there was a Karabakh lobby in Armenia:

`Not only the Western Armenian Diaspora but also the Karabakh
Armenians manipulate Armenian policies. They are Karabakh-obsessed
and cannot see the regional realities. Armenia must think again the
cost of Karabakh occupation. First, Karabakh problem hinders
democratization in Armenia. Hawkish President Kocharian does trust
only those came from Karabakh. Karabakh Armenians are used to
militarize the country. There is a vivid economic catastrophe,
however the Karabakh problem and so-called Turkish threat are used to
curtail all these problems. There is a bitter demography problem.
Armenia’s population is not sufficient for survival of Armenia, and
dramatic migration to abroad continues, but extreme nationalists are
talking about conquering new territories: Karabakh, Naxcivan, Eastern
Turkey, some parts of Georgia and Russia. They are not realistic.
Armenia need population and financial aid, not advise or new
territories. Armenia needs regional friends. Armenia needs to put an
end to historical hostilities, not to create new ones. Armenia needs
a diaspora which sincerely considers Armenia’s interests.’

BAKU: Azeri Min, British officials discuss fight against terrorism

Azeri minister, British officials discuss fight against global terrorism

Azarbaycan, Baku
26 Dec 04 p 1

Text of Azartac report by Azerbaijani newspaper Azarbaycan on 26
December headlined “Azerbaijani national security minister has paid a
working visit to Britain”

Azerbaijani National Security Minister Eldar Mahmudov was on a working
visit to Britain by official invitation between 20 and 23 December.

Minister Mahmudov met numerous high-ranking officials of this
country’s intelligence services and discussed the development of
cooperation in the security sphere between our states.

Minister Mahmudov comprehensively spoke about the problems caused by
the Armenian-Azerbaijani, Nagornyy Karabakh conflict, the military
aggression which our country has been subjected to, terrorist and
sabotage actions, and also resolute actions taken by our state and its
intelligence services to fight international terrorism.

British representatives expressed their satisfaction with the dynamic
and productive development of cooperation links between the security
bodies of our countries and highly assessed the important experience
of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the fight against international
terrorism.

The visit passed off in an atmosphere of sincere and mutual
understanding. The sides noted that the meetings were useful and that
they were satisfied with their results.

Another year gone, although not without leaving impressions

Providence Journal , RI
Dec 26 2004

Bill Reynolds: Another year gone, although not without leaving
impressions

The Pats won another Super Bowl, and the Sox won their first World
Series title in 86 years. But sometimes you remember the little
things the most.

Here are four:

One night in May I was one of several former basketball players who
went back to Worcester Academy to honor our old coach, Dee Rowe, then
75 and recuperating from serious cancer surgery.

It was a night full of memory, and later I kept thinking of how some
lessons always stay with us, while so many others disappear through
the mists of time.

I had been 18 the year I spent at Worcester Academy, and it hadn’t
been a particularly easy time for me. I was homesick, lovesick, and
viewed the world through the myopia of someone who thought he was
going to be 18 forever. Suffice it to say I often clashed with Rowe,
an intense coach who talked about things like sacrifice and
commitment, dedication and tradition, words that often seemed to
float by my head like missed shots.

But for the past 40 years he’s made me feel like the most special
person in the world, even though I only played one year for him and
wasn’t the easiest kid in the world to coach back then. And I have
come to know he’s done that for so many who once played for him, and
how that is his special gift.

It’s not the easiest time to be a coach, not in an age where
entitlement and instant gratification always are on the roster. What
used to be called coaching is now to often thought of as criticism.

But I have come to know that I still carry Rowe’s voice around in my
head, know how much influence he had on all of us, even if I didn’t
always realize it at the time. It’s now 40 years later, and I can’t
remember one thing any teacher taught me at Worcester Academy, but I
remember lessons he taught me, even when I didn’t think I was
listening.

For good coaches matter.

Trust me.

It was an early morning in June and I was at the Veterans Memorial
Auditorium with a 26 year old named Sam Hajinyan.

He had first come to this country 13 years earlier, leaving his
native Armenia and all that was familiar, to be here in this new
country with its new dreams. What were the odds that day that five
years later he would be an All-State basketball player, his life
changed by a game he knew nothing about?

All he knew that first day at Park View Junior High School was that
other kids were laughing at him.

Nor did he like this new country. He had no friends. No real life he
cared about here. He was 13 years old, and he felt lost and alone, a
stranger in a strange land.

Then he found basketball.

It gave him something to do. It gave him something to care about. It
gave him friends. It gave him an identity. In short, it did all the
the things we like to think sports do. No small thing in a family
trying to survive in a new country. More important, basketball became
his language, his way of communicating, his passport to acceptance.

“I never would have made it without basketball,” he said.

Sports can have no better epitath.

For he has made it, has come so far from the scared, lonely kid who
first went to a junior high where kids laughed at him.

He went to junior college for two years, works two jobs, is planning
to open a restaurant with his brother, and on that bright and
beautiful morning in June he was one of of 600 people sworn in as
United States citizens. The ceremony was a testimony to the enduring
promise of America, this country that allows for people to dream of a
better life, something that’s often so easy for the rest of us to
take for granted.

“This is bigger than anything I can do,” Hajinyan said. “This is a
lovely day. This makes me complete.”

In truth, the Red Sox winning the pennant in 1967 was bigger for me
than their winning the World Series this past October. I was more of
a fan then. And that season had come out of nowhere, where this year
didn’t surprise me in the same way. Going into the the season I had
thought this Red Sox team had the best pitching I had seen in my
lifetime, and since I always had believed their longtime frustration
title had more to do with lack of pitching and managerial blunders
than curses, when they finally won it simply seemed it was about
time. Call me jaded.

Then a funny thing happened.

In the weeks that followed there were innumerable stories about what
it meant to the fans, all those reports of people going to cemetaries
and leaving mementos on the graves of departed family members.
Innumerable stories of how cathartic it was to so many people, an
emotional journey that transcended baseball. People of all ages, all
walks of life, all united by a baseball team that gave a region an
incredible moment.

So in the weeks since I’ve come to be reminded of the power of sports
to bring people together, give them a shared experience, no small
thing in a fractious society that too often seems disconnected by age
and income, race and political beliefs. Have come to be reminded
that, at their best, sports are always more important than what
happens on the field. That, at their best, sports always are
transformative, take us out of ourselves.

Reason enough to keep watching them.

The letter came in November from a woman whose son played on the
South Kingstown High School football team. It said how there were
only six seniors on the team and one of them was hurt. It said how
the team was 1-8, but that every Monday the seniors would come to
practice and start preparing for the next game, continuing to pour
their hearts into what had become a dismal season, and she wanted to
know why.

It was a legitimate question.

Why did these kids still care when so many kids these days have no
stomach for any kind of failure, no patience for anything less than
success? Why did they keep keeping on?

I discovered there were two main reasons: a bunch of kids who liked
each other, and had come to realize it’s a privilege just to be able
to play. And a coach who convinced them they all were going to do
whatever they could to do the best they could, regardless of what the
scoreboard said.

“There are no guarantees that you’re going to be successful,” said
Bruce Tardiff, the longtime South Kingstown coach. “It’s a lot like
life. No guarantees. The only guarantee is, can you look yourself in
the mirror and like what you see? These kids can.”

Can you learn any better lesson playing high school football?

I don’t think so.

Even if it came on the wrong end of the scoreboard.

Why is it that Turkey had those Brussels pouts?

Why is it that Turkey had those Brussels pouts?
By Philip Robins, Special to The Daily Star

The Daily Star, Lebanon
Dec 24 2004

When is a diplomatic triumph not a triumph? When the negotiations
involve Turkey and the European Union.

Commentators and participants are still scratching their heads trying
to understand why Turkey is not celebrating the outcome of the
European summit last Friday. At that meeting the EU took the
momentous decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey on
October 3, 2005. By doing so, it paved the way for a converging
relationship between the EU and Turkey, one that is most likely to
end in Turkey becoming a member of the union.

In one move, the European Council dispatched all the idle chatter in
the run-up to the Brussels summit. The meeting confirmed that there
was no place for further discussions about whether Turkey was
technically part of the geography of Europe, or whether its
religious, cultural or national character barred it from membership.
Thus, Brussels 2004 is set to take its place alongside the other
historic thresholds in bilateral relations – notably the 1963 Ankara
Agreement, the 1995 Customs Union decision, and Helsinki 1999, which
recognized Turkey as a candidate for EU membership.

The key issue in the Brussels meeting was always the date. A detailed
progress report on Turkey had been prepared by the European
Commission just two months before which had recommended the opening
of accession talks. Its only failing had been to leave blank the
space for the precise date. While Ankara had optimistically appealed
for an April 2005 start, it had let it be known that what it really
opposed was any attempt to delay a decision, the so-called “date for
a date.” With the more Turco-skeptic of Europeans talking about 2006,
any date in 2005 must be seen as a success. Moreover, October 2005
allows Turkey to commence negotiations under the collaborative
oversight of the U.K. presidency.

Not only did Turkey get the date it wanted, but also the cost of
progressing to the next stage of the game was, in the end, remarkably
modest. Only Cyprus featured in the 11th hour discussions on Turkey.
That means that a load of other potentially problematic issues, from
human rights to women’s rights, from Armenian massacres to the Kurds,
did not intrude. Instead, they were all subsumed under the European
Council’s important blandishment that “Turkey sufficiently fulfils
the Copenhagen political criteria” for membership. All that the EU
wanted on these issues was the modest requirement that the liberal
legislation recently adopted should actually be implemented.

Even on Cyprus, Turkey was aided by its friends in the EU. It was
recognized that if Turkey is to negotiate with the EU in October, it
must for practical purposes recognize its 25 constituent members.
However, Ankara remains wary of formally recognizing the Greek
government in Nicosia as representing the whole island while the
Turkish Cypriots of the North are disadvantaged by the absence of a
political settlement. The compromise was a diplomatic sleight of
hand, whereby a protocol extending Turkey’s Customs Union to include
the 10 new members of the EU, Cyprus among them, would be added to
the Ankara Agreement prior to Oct. 3. This amounted to political
recognition without legal recognition.

If these, then, are the realities of the Brussels summit concerning
EU-Turkey relations why all the long faces? Why did Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan come so close to leaving Brussels in a
huff before agreeing to the deal? Why did the parliamentary
opposition in Ankara, on the right and the left, attack the outcome?
Why has Erdogan found himself on the defensive over the deal?

The key to answering these important but puzzling questions may be
found in the following two statements. One, in international
diplomacy style is often the equal of substance in its impact. Two,
it is virtually impossible to over-estimate the importance ascribed
to the Cyprus issue on the part of the Turkish establishment.
Together, they betray an absence of trust that is arguably the single
most serious deficiency in the EU-Turkish relationship, even at such
a time of progress.

For the Turks, with the thinnest of skins, the atmospherics of the
Brussels summit were always of disproportionate importance. This was
doubly unfortunate. First, because a belated public debate in key
member states about the proper long-term relationship between Turkey
and the EU had resulted in some blunt talking by domestic
politicians.

The Turks had, for example, allowed themselves to become rattled by
such meaningless gestures as Austrian and French leaders promising a
national referendum on Turkish membership, that is to say probably
sometime between 2015 and 2020.

Second, because at EU gatherings the continental European tradition
of last-minute, grubby, back room deal-making has become the modus
operandi of collective decision-making, and Nicosia now sits on the
inside. So, when the Cyprus issue re-emerged to eclipse the more
orthodox issues of the political criteria, Erdogan smelled a rat.
Only the hurried reassurances of Turkey’s friends kept the prime
minister in town and helped him to refocus on the big picture.

But the audience in Turkey had already picked up on the misgivings of
their delegation. The opportunism of ambition and vested interest
then kicked in. The leader of the opposition, Deniz Baykal, attacked
Erdogan for a sell-out on Cyprus, reflecting his closeness to the old
political establishment in Turkey. The rising “big man” on the
conservative right, Mehmet Agar, also voiced his criticism, as it
served his objective of rallying the secular right behind his
aspirant leadership. Mainstream Islamists, too, dissed the deal,
reflecting their ambivalence toward the growing relationship with the
EU. This may in part explain why Erdogan scampered off to Damascus
soon after his return from Brussels.

In some respects all of this counts for little. The EU-Turkish
agreement is a done deal. Erdogan knows that his interests are best
served by the opening of accession talks next October. The political
opposition in Turkey remains fractured and ineffectual. While he may
not achieve a bounce in the opinion polls on the back of the Brussels
accord, Erdogan remains the dominant force in Turkish politics. His
supporters make reassuring noises about Turkey’s eventually coming
round, even on the Cyprus issue, in time for the autumn’s opening
ceremonies.

Yet the absence of a joint celebration following the Dec. 17 decision
was not without cost. What is beyond denial is that the road to EU
membership for Turkey will be long and at times difficult. Turks and
Europeans will need the cherished memories of earlier triumphs to
keep themselves positive and working toward the shared goal of full
membership in the years to come.

Philip Robins is a lecturer in politics and international relations
at the University of Oxford and a Fellow of St Antony’s College. His
“Suits and Uniforms. Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War”
(Hurst & University of Washington Press) was published last year. He
wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR

Karabakh slip

Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
December 22, 2004, Wednesday

KARABAKH SLIP

SOURCE: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 20, 2004, p. 12

by Vladimir Kazimirov

Between 1992 and 1996, Ambassador Vladimir Nikolayevich Kazimirov was
the head of the Russian intermediary mission, presidential envoy to
Karabakh, and Russian chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group.

All expectations notwithstanding, 2004 failed to become a
breakthrough year in the Karabakh conflict settlement. Contours of
the peace process remain indistinct. Moreover, there is nothing
anymore to which to ascribe the failure of slack negotiations,
neither elections in Azerbaijan and Armenia, nor the complexity of
domestic political situations in these countries.

There were 9 Armenian-Azerbaijani meetings this year, 3 between the
presidents and 6 between foreign ministers. Baku, Yerevan, and
Stepanakert claim to view settlement as the ultimate priority, but
these are only words. In fact, interims between the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict are filled with a Cold War attitude,
information warfare, and frequently disinformation. Azerbaijan and
Armenia’s stands remain mutually exclusive, the situation is worse
than it was even under Heidar Aliyev. Heidar Aliyev only demanded
liberation of the territories beyond Karabakh, which the Armenians
occupied during the war. His son, Ilham Aliyev, calls Karabakh itself
an occupied territory. Propaganda breeds tension in the Azerbaijani
and Armenian society. Anything goes, even calls for another war.
Instead of preparing their respective societies for mutual
concessions, ruling elites cultivate intolerance towards compromises
as such. All of that leaves the impression that Baku and Yerevan
merely feign negotiations.

To a certain extent, Baku diplomacy succeeded in the last several
months to switch attention from the matter of Karabakh’s status to
the problem of occupation of Azerbaijani lands. Satisfied with the
status quo dating back to the end of the war of 1992-1994, Yerevan
missed the fact that after a decade of peaceful occupation of
Azerbaijan, the territories beyond Karabakh look like an anomaly,
particularly to whoever does not know its history. Another anomaly,
absence of the status of Karabakh, is not that irritating anymore. In
short, Azerbaijan managed to have the UN General Assembly discuss the
situation in the occupied lands. It even succeeded in prodding the
Parliamentary Assembly into action. They will listen to a report on
Karabakh in January 2005.

Official Baku constantly refers to four resolutions of the UN
Security Council passed in 1993. The documents demand an immediate
cease-fire and withdrawal of the Armenians from the occupied
territories. It is not without risk, however, because the
international community remembers how Azerbaijan was the first to
kill fulfillment of resolutions of the UN Security Council.
Azerbaijan then was bent on settling the conflict by sheer strength
of arms. Ducking all and any peace initiatives, Baku ignored
resolutions of the UN Security Council for over a year. The truce is
not a result of these resolutions; it is a consequence of
Azerbaijan’s military failures.

These days, Yerevan is making use of Azerbaijan’s past neglect of UN
resolutions and refuses to withdraw, demanding a comprehensive
solution to the problem of Karabakh. The Armenians also use the fact
that the demand of unconditional withdrawal disappeared from the last
two UN resolutions (resolutions 874 and 884 – and Baku has only
itself to blame). This too has been a subject of numerous
Armenian-Azerbaijani consultations and talks.

There are different opinions on Azerbaijan’s latest tactical moves.
Aliyev hails them as masterful, the Armenians argue among themselves,
and official Yerevan threatens that should the UN General Assembly
pass a pro-Baku resolution, it will terminate all bilateral contacts,
and begins insisting on Stepanakert’s return to negotiations as a
third party. In the meantime, the words of both sides certainly
differ from deeds. Baku no longer insists on adoption of the UN
resolution as soon as possible. Yerevan already agreed to meetings of
two ministers in Sofia and Brussels.

Sure, diplomatic activeness is better than saber-rattling, but the
activities in question should be used for the purpose of searching
for compromises and not the purpose of aggravating confrontation.
Chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group find it counterproductive. Instead
of making progress, it complicated the situation and makes transition
to efficient negotiations all the more difficult. It is the height of
naivete to believe that Baku and Yerevan will honor recommendations
from the UN General Assembly or Parliamentary Assembly when they
disregard demands from the UN Security Council.

Does it help to involve in the Karabakh affair the structures that do
not know the first thing about the problem? It is common knowledge
that every involved party will use any deviation from the previous
approach to promote its own interests. Deployment of new structures
merely indicates who finds political-propagandistic exercises more
important than conflict management. Take the draft report of the
Parliamentary Assembly, for example. It is clearly biased and full of
factual errors. The cease-fire in Karabakh accomplished with Russia’s
help is mentioned as an accomplishment of the OSCE.

There is no saying even now if 2005 is going to bring peace in
Karabakh any closer. It is only clear that this is a sheer
impossibility without abandonment of mutual sincerity, and a mutual
search for compromises. It will not hurt for international
intermediaries to become more active, instead of restricting their
activities to arrangement of meetings between presidents and
ministers. After all, a new meeting on the level of presidents or
ministers cannot be regarded as a smashing success.

The Karabakh slips we are witnessing leave the impression that
intermediaries should demand from both parties that they honor
decisions of the Budapest OSCE summit and resume negotiations in all
earnest.

Viktor Dallakian: Ardarutiun Bloc Is Ready To Cooperate With Coaliti

VIKTOR DALLAKIAN: ARDARUTIUN BLOC IS READY TO COOPERATE WITH COALITION FORCES
IN ISSUE OF RETURNING DEPOSITS

YEREVAN, December 21 (Noyan Tapan). The Ardarutiun faction boycotting
NA sittings took part in the signature collection on the issue of
calling a special session dedicated to returning of deposits and the
session attaching importance to this issue. The session was boycotted
by the order of some forces representing the coalition and by RA
President. Viktor Dallakian, Secretary of Ardarutiun (Justice) faction,
made this statement during the December 20 press conference. “The
opposition had come to work and where were the others?” the MP
mentioned reminding the appeals to work together addressed to the
opposition. According to him, the failure to hold the special session
also shows presence of serious problems within the power. Dallakian
assured that at the press conference held during the President’s
visit to Lori marz the President, in fact, ordered to fail the special
session. According to the MP, the goal of the President was to show
to the Prime Minister that he has no majority in the parliament, to
show to the NA Speaker that he has 44 supporters in this issue (44
out of 66 MPs participating in the signature collection registered
for participation in the session: NT) and to make the Dashnaktsutiun
understand that though there was the issue of returning the deposits
in their pre-electoral program everything will be done in accordance
with the will of the President. Declaring that he doesn’t want to give
advice to anybody the speaker mentioned that in a civilized country the
head of the parliament attaching importance to the solution of such
issue would either vote against the draft budget not stipulating the
deposits or would come out of the political coalition. Speaking about
the statement of RA President that no issue of returning the deposits
was touched upon in his pre-electoral programs, Dallakian referred to
the part of 1998 pre-electoral program of the President envisaging
“elaboration of opportunities solving the issue of compensation of
the deposits the people had with the former Savingsbank.” As for the
President’s proposal to establish a commission attending to this issue,
according to Dallakian, establishment of a commission is the best way
of “burying” any issue. The MP also mentioned that his legislative
initiative connected with returning of the deposits is the only
one put to the agenda of the NA large session in 2003 October. The
draft for the first time suggested to stipulate by the law that the
state is indebted to the population, declared that the debt should be
paid off and this should be done through a program approach. If the
government possessing the whole information submits such a program
that will be approved by the parliament and signed by the President
the legislative and executive bodies will assume the responsibility of
returning the deposits, so a political consensus will be made and no
political force may speculate the issue connected with returning of
the deposits any longer. According to the author of the initiative,
the draft suggested establishment of a fund accumulating the sums
necessary for returning of the deposits. Dallakian qualified the
variant of returning the deposits from the state budget as a “deceit
in relation to depositors” as the budget revenues almost completely
are recieved from taxes. According to him, the resources of the
above-mentioned fund may be received from the privatization sums, sums
of concession agreements, proift tax and so on. Dallakian mentioned
that appearance of a large money mass on the market in a short term
will lead to inflation and fall of economy, so the issue of sums and
terms should be solved by the government with participation of the
Central Bank. As for the equivalent, the former exchange of rouble
against dram at 200:1 correlation was a result of artificial approach
and the US dollar had no real exchange rate in the Soviet Union. So,
the correlation of cost of gold in 1991 and in the year of repayment
of the deposit may be considered as a criterion of the exchange
rate. These are the reasons compelling the draft author not to fix
any figures and reserve the calculations for the government. The bill
on returning of the deposits also suggested giving not sums but notes
of hand to the depositors fixing the concrete sums ans the terms of
their returning. A depositor may sell the note of hand or keep it for
his legatees. Dallakian assured that there will be no accusations
of deceiving people in case of following to these principles and
the issue may be solved as a result of a political consensus. He
considered it possible that these approaches will be admissible for
the ARF Dashnaktsutiun and Republican Party of Armenia making part of
the coalition. As for the Ardarutiun faction, it is ready to cooperate
with the coalition forces in the issue of returning of the deposits.