Author: Christine Harutyunian
Turkish press: Dawn of great power competition in South Caucasus
The pace of geopolitical change in the South Caucasus is staggering, with the recent Karabakh war only underlining several major geopolitical trends in the region.
The first noticeable trend being the undercutting of democratic ideals and achievements of the region's states. Take Armenia, its young democracy had high hopes following the 2018 revolution, but now it will be more even more dependent on Russia.
It is not a matter of whether a democratic model is better or not, the matter lies in the incompatibility of an aspiring democracy with a powerful nondemocracy such as Russia.
The Armenian leadership will now have to make extensive concessions to Moscow to shore up its military, backtracking on its democratic values. Building a fair political system cannot go hand in hand with the Russian political model.
The war also put an end to any hopes of Armenia implementing a multivector foreign policy, an already highly scrutinized issue. Mistakes were made continuously along the way, the biggest being an overreliance on Russia.
In the buildup to 2020, Armenia's multiaxial foreign policy efforts gradually deteriorated, with the 2016 fighting showing the limits. Armenian politicians attempted to develop ties with other regional powers in the aftermath, but Russian influence had already begun to incrementally increase.
Tipping the scales in a no longer balanced alliance culminated in the 2020 war with Azerbaijan thanks to Yerevan's maneuvering. More crucially, the war has obliterated Yerevan's multiaxial policy efforts for years to come.
Now, Armenia's dependence on Russia would be even more pronounced with no viable geopolitical alternatives.
With no more foreign policy diversification, the three South Caucasus states are divided by larger regional powers, further fracturing the region.
The return of Turkey and the growth of the Russian military could resurrect the great power competition, in which a nation's military power, infrastructure projects and economic might are directly translated into their geopolitical influence over the region, ultimately deterring long-term conflict resolution.
The Western stance
The Karabakh war highlighted a regression in Western peacekeeping standards. The Western approach to conflict resolution based on equality rather than geopolitical interests has been trumped by the Russian alternative.
Moscow is not looking to resolve the conflict (it never does in territorial conflicts); instead, it is seeking to prolong it under its close watch in a bid to increase its influence.
Looking at the situation from the Russian perspective, it is clear the country will continue to influence Armenia and Azerbaijan, only now to a far greater extent than before.
The West's inability to accommodate fluid geopolitical realities in the South Caucasus also raises questions about its commitment to resolving the issues at hand. The second Karabakh war was more the result of the West's negligence to come up with a clear approach to the issue over the years.
The West can no longer treat the South Caucasus as a monolithic entity, and a diversified foreign policy should be applied in line with realities on the ground.
Policies should reflect each individual state, and the West should, perhaps, be more geopolitical in its approach.
Turkey's recent suggestion to create a six-nation pact bringing together the South Caucasus states, Russia, Turkey and Iran, shows the regression of Western influence in the region. But the geopolitical vacuum is never empty for long, and Turkey and Russia approach.
Georgia’s position
Georgia could act as the last bastion of dominant Western influence, but even there, the West should be cautious. The country is on the cusp of Europe, making it susceptible to foreign influence.
Bordered by Russia and Turkey, two powers often discerning of Europe, Georgia also feels the pressure to adapt to the changing circumstances on the ground.
The lack of Western resolve in the region and the Black Sea could propel Tbilisi if not toward a total reconsideration of its foreign policy, toward diversifying its foreign ties – one could call a "rebalancing."
The war also solidified that the Caspian basin and South Caucasus are inextricably linked to the greater Middle East.
Russia and Turkey are basing their strategies in the region on developments in the Middle East and the Black Sea region. Not since the end of the Soviet Union has the South Caucasus been such a critical point for the West, especially the incoming Biden administration.
But time is critical and any further delay in active U.S. policy could spell disaster for Georgia, which serves as a door to the Caspian and on to Central Asia.
The West has been in regression in the region for quite some time now; the Karabakh war only brought it to the light, and it must be proactive if things are to change.
Much will depend on the U.S. and its new administration, but the West will have to come to an understanding with Turkey, even if it be limited, to salvage its deteriorating position in the region.
After all, the South Caucasus has always been the only theater where Turkish and Western interests have always coincided. Considering its limited presence in the region, the West could consider backing Turkey.
Not only would it serve as a reconciliatory gesture pleasing Ankara, but it would also limit Russia's movement in the region. With the ink about to dry on who will influence the region, the West must immediately adapt its approach if it wishes to have any input in the rapidly changing geopolitics of the South Caucasus.
*Professor at European University, Tbilisi, Georgia
Nagorno-Karabakh: Russia’s Putin hosts Azeri, Armenian leaders
Writers Union of Armenia calls for Nikol Pashinyan’s resignation
Pashinyan says complete exchange of PoWs, unblocking all regional connections is priority of Armenia
11:17, 8 January, 2021
YEREVAN, JANUARY 8, ARMENPRESS. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has presented what he described as Armenia’s priority in the further implementation of the terms of the Karabakh armistice – the 2020 November 10 truce officially known as the Statement by President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and President of the Russian Federation which ended the 2020 war in Nagorno Karabakh.
“Our priority in further implementing the November 10 trilateral statement is the following:
- A complete implementation of the 8th clause of the statement: Therefore a complete exchange of prisoners of war, hostages and other detained persons, and the bodies of the dead must take place. The implementation of extensive search and rescue operations where combat operations took place is also important for us.
- Unblocking of all economic and transport infrastructures of the region, which means both cargo shipments and transport connection from Armenia through Azerbaijan’s territory to Russia and Iran, as well as cargo shipments and transport connection from Azerbaijan to Nakhijevan through the territory of Armenia.
I am once again drawing attention on the fact that the [2020] November 10 statement does not include neither the “Meghri” nor the “corridor” terms related to any territory of the Republic of Armenia.
The selection of the connection routes from Armenia to Russia and from Azerbaijan to Nakhijevan is a separate topic of discussion, the efficiency of which depends on increasing the efficiency and volumes of the exchange of prisoners of war, hostages and other detained persons, and the bodies of the dead, as well as the search operations for those missing,” Pashinyan said in a statement on social media.
Editing and Translating by Stepan Kocharyan
Lawyer urges Armenian authorities to make public new document presumably planned to be signed in Moscow
A group of people staged a protest in front of Armenia’s Ministry of Justice on Friday, demanding that the authorities make public the treaty presumably planned to be signed between Armenia and Azerbaijani at the upcoming trilateral meeting in Moscow.
Citing its sources, the channel MediaPort on Telegram said on Thursday that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is going to “make new concessions” in Moscow. "The document was secretly sent to the Ministry of Justice today in order to conform it with the Constitution," it said.
However, Ministry of Justice spokeswoman Lusine Martirosyan dismissed the reports as “fake news” on Friday.
Speaking to reporters, lawyer Elinar Vardanyan, a member of the Alternative Projects Group, stated the reports on the discussion of the document by the ministry may be true. According to her, it can be a preliminary step in case of submitting the document to be signed to the Constitutional Court in order to prevent its constitutional controversy.
"If actually such a document exists, it should be made public so that it doesn’t come as a surprise to the people as it was the case on November 10. They told lies to the people for 44 days, signing a document in a single day. And even today I am not satisfied with the short response of the Ministry of Justice spokeswoman on Facebook. I am not happy with the denial, because I am afraid that after 44 days of lying, another lie will be imposed on us," she said.
The lawyer urged authorities to publish the treaty if it really exists, instead of issuing a denial.
"If someone persuades me that Nikol Pashinyan is heading to Moscow unprepared on 11 January, I will be convinced once again that the authorities have completely failed. If the authorities are going to take part in such a crucial meeting unprepared, there are no authorities in the country,” she said.
According to Vardanyan, now people are carrying out their struggle on social media, because either they do not realize the threats facing the country, or it is just convenient for them.
The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Answering Some Intriguing Questions
By Dr. Sitakanta Mishra
Associate Professor of International Relations, Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University, Gujarat, India
Q.1: Armenia signed an agreement on a ceasefire and the withdrawal of its occupation forces from the territory of Azerbaijan. The problem is that she took this step after the military defeat. From the point of view of international law, what are the responsibilities of the party that lost the war?
The ‘realist’ paradigm suggests that one should not waste time arguing over the morality of the situation, because in practice “might makes right” or “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”. It would be futile to expect that the defeated party in a war will assume the onus and meet its responsibilities voluntarily. This is not to suggest that the winning party should be harsh. In an interdependent world of today, it would not be possible to impose unilateral decisions in the post-war period as multiple players get involved normally in any conflict. Therefore, first, the concerned parties can amicably negotiate to settle the score. Or, second, the concerned parties can knock on the doors of the International Criminal Court (ICC), established in 2003 as a treaty arrangement between member states to provide a neutral international court. The ‘war guilt’ can be fixed following the above-mentioned ways. One can draw lessons from WWII and the Treaty of Versailles (under clause 231 – the ‘War Guilt Clause’) where Germany had to accept complete responsibility for the war.
Q.2: The Azerbaijani authorities announced that they would demand from Armenia $ 50 billion for the damage caused. But, as we know, Armenia does not have that kind of money. How does international law regulate the recovery of compensation funds from a party that does not have enough funds?
Though the WWII situation and Germany’s case cannot be extrapolated to the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, significant inferences can be drawn from WWII history. The demand for reparations by Azerbaijan from Armenia through sound logical, the conflict between them is yet to end fully. It would be prudent to form a coalition of states concerned to ponder how to root out the causes of the conflict. Whether both conflicting parties should seek arbitration or adjudication method as bilateral negotiation seems unproductive to settle the competing claims and grievances.
As far as the extraction of reparation is concerned, Azerbaijan with support from its supporters can approach the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), a claims reparation program created by the United Nations Security Council in May 1991, located in Geneva, Switzerland. The UNCC was established with the objectives to receive and decide claims against Iraq submitted on behalf of individuals, corporations, and governments (including mass claims on behalf of similarly situated individuals), and to pay compensation for such claims.
Q.3: As everyone knows, the signing of a ceasefire agreement, which is essentially a camouflaged form of Armenia's surrender, became possible with the direct participation of Moscow. If the Armenian side, overthrowing the Pashinyan government, brings radicals to power and resumes hostilities, how will the Russian leadership react to this? Suspicions are not taken from the ceiling, it is enough to look at what moods prevail in Yerevan …!
Conflict and the end result of conflict has a direct repercussion on the domestic politics of every country. It would be safe to assume that there might be political upheaval in Armenia which might culminate in a radical takeover of power. This would derail the temporary peace process in vogue. However, Russia, being a regional big-brother may not allow the situation to further deteriorate as this would invite critical questions on its ability as a global leader. Russia seems to have sufficient hold and ground on the conflict situation at the moment and it would not allow things to slip from its grip. On the other hand, Armenian leaders, be the moderates or radicals, will not be able to afford Russia’s wrath or loss of Moscow’s backing.
Q.4: The President of Azerbaijan has said that during the negotiations after the withdrawal of the Armenian forces, the issue of the status will not be discussed. Karabakh will not have any autonomy. Moreover, this statement did not receive any objections from Russia. Why?
It is not prudent to draw any conclusion on the outcome of this protracted conflict or the ongoing negotiation process at this moment. Which way the conflict or its resolution will unfold is too early to predict. However, Azerbaijan having the upper hand in the current situation must bargain hard and explore all options to settle the conflict forever. Azerbaijan must channel aggressively the dominant presence of Russia and its influential role to its advantage.
Q.5: Suspicions were expressed that the Armenian side could carry out provocations against the Russian peacekeepers in order to provoke them to return fire. Everything in order to bring the program of Armenia's drift towards NATO to its logical end. Are there mechanisms to prevent provocations against Russian peacekeepers?
I think Armenian leaders are matured enough and aware of the consequences of confronting Russian peacekeeping efforts. The fear rather emanates from non-state entities/mercenaries thriving in the region, any vested interest groups who would derail the peace process by resorting to violence to muddy the situation. The stakes of America and NATO in settling the conflict cannot be side-lined. Armenia would lean towards the US and NATO if the peace process does not address its grievances to its satisfaction. As the US is going through a political leadership transition amidst the COVID-19 health crisis and the President-elect will take some time to settle, Washington DC would not overlook Russia’s presence and role at once before putting its finger into the muddy waters.
Q.6: During the hostilities, Armenia launched missile strikes on civil and strategic targets on the territory of Azerbaijan outside the conflict zone. President Ilham Aliyev has repeatedly said that those responsible for this will be brought to justice. How does this procedure go? Is the Hague Tribunal the only institution with the function of an international judicial and penitentiary body?
The civilian casualty in any conflict is unwarranted and cannot be justified. The Armenian missile strikes on civil zones beyond the conflict zone in Azerbaijan tantamount to a war crime. This atrocity can be brought to the UN forum for global condemnation and swift action by the comity of nations. Beside the Hague Tribunal, UN Security Council, and International Court of Justice (ICJ), the issue can be raised at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as well which prohibits “Attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population” (Rule 54).
Q.7: India, as an active participant and a serious player in the Eurasian space, is extremely interested in the stability in the South Caucasus. And the Karabakh conflict was one of the main dangers. Can we say that the resolution of the Karabakh issue is a pleasant event for India?
India has not publicly articulated its policy on South Caucasus yet, but the conflict in Eurasian theatre is undoubtedly a sensitive issue for New Delhi. Indian diplomacy has to walk a tight rope between the conflicting parties and outside powers. As far as Armenia is concerned, India has signed a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty (1995), which prohibits India from providing military or any other assistance to Azerbaijan. More importantly, India has received Armenia’s unequivocal support on the Kashmir issue whereas Azerbaijan, says Achal Malhotra, “not only supports but also promotes Pakistan’s narrative on this issue.” in 2008, India had gone to the extent of voting against Azerbaijan’s resolution in UNGA which demanded “the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all occupied territories of Azerbaijan”. Meanwhile, it would be difficult for India to endorse the Armenian demand for Nagorno-Karabakh’s right for self-determination, as it might prove to be a double standard when it comes to the Kashmir issue.
However, Azerbaijan is equally important a partner for India in the energy sector and connectivity projects. Though bilateral trade and investment between the two is low at present, the ONGC/OVL has made relatively small investments in an oilfield project and LNG supply in Azerbaijan. Moreover, Azerbaijan falls on India’s dream project – the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) route, connecting India with Russia through central Asia; it can also connect India with Turkey and beyond through Baku-Tbilisi-Kars passenger and freight rail link. Given India’s competition with China in operationalizing connectivity-corridor projects, Azerbaijan is having strategic significance for India.
Therefore, India does not fancy a dichotomous diplomatic situation; rather it would project its non-aligned posture arguing for a negotiated settlement of the conflict regionally, as regional conflicts are better resolved through a regional approach. Ideally, India would not favor the involvement of any outside entity, including Turkey. But, given the inevitable presence of multiple players in the conflict, India has expressed its support for the efforts by the OSCE Minsk Group (co-chaired by France, the Russian Federation, and the United States) to find a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
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DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this insight piece are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of IndraStra Global.
Turkish Press: Azerbaijani civilian killed by Armenian landmine blast
BAKU, Azerbaijan
An Azerbaijani civilian has succumbed to wounds he sustained from an explosion caused by an Armenian landmine, according to a local authority on Friday.
The Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office said in a statement that Zabil Babayev stepped on a mine in Fuzuli province which was liberated from Armenian occupation.
An investigation has been launched into the incident and the public has been warned against entering liberated areas until the region is cleared of mines.
Mines planted by Armenian forces have claimed the lives of numerous Azerbaijani civilians and soldiers.
Liberation of Karabakh
Relations between the former Soviet republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan have been tense since 1991, when the Armenian military occupied Nagorno-Karabakh, internationally recognized as an Azerbaijani territory, and seven adjacent regions.
When new clashes erupted on Sept. 27, the Armenian army launched attacks on civilians and Azerbaijani forces and violated several humanitarian cease-fire agreements.
During the 44-day conflict, Azerbaijan liberated several cities and nearly 300 settlements and villages from the nearly three-decade-long occupation.
Despite the deal ending the conflict, the Armenian army several times violated the agreement and martyred several Azerbaijani soldiers and a civilian, as well as wounded few people, according to the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry.
*Writing by Sena Guler
Russia reports 26,513 new cases of COVID-19 in one day
12:27,
YEREVAN, DECEMBER 30, ARMENPRESS. Russia confirmed 26,513 new coronavirus cases in the past day and the total case tally hit 3,131,550, TASS reports citing the anti-coronavirus crisis center.
In the past two days, the growth rate did not exceed 0.9%.
Moscow confirmed 5,105 new coronavirus cases. Some 3,764 COVID-19 cases were registered in St. Petersburg, 1,608 in the Moscow Region, 503 in the Nizhny Novgorod Region, 406 in the Sverldovsk Region and 395 in the Pskov Region.
Currently, 549,706 people are ill in Russia.
As many as 29,235 coronavirus recoveries were recorded in Russia in the past day. New recoveries exceeded daily cases for the first time since December 9.
The total number of coronavirus recoveries has reached 2,525,418. According to the crisis center, 80.6% of coronavirus patients have recovered in Russia.
The number of coronavirus-related fatalities in Russia went up by 599 in the past 24 hours, compared to 562 on the previous day, taking the total to 56,426.