Author: Emil Karabekian

New report details violations of the rights of the people of Artsakh by Azerbaijan in August 2022

Emil Karabekian
Public Radio of Armenia
Armenia – Aug 31 2022
, 16:49

 2 minutes read

The Human Rights Ombudsman Published an Ad Hoc Trilingual Report on the Violations of the Rights of the People of Artsakh by Azerbaijan in August 2022

Artsakh Human Rights Ombudsman’s office has published an ad hoc trilingual report (Armenian, Russian, English) on the violations of the rights of the people of Artsakh by Azerbaijan in August 2022, which has been sent to the Co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, organizations with a primary mandate of human rights protection and other human rights institutions.

The first section of the report presents details on the systematic and continuous crimes committed by Azerbaijan against the people of Artsakh after the November 9, 2020 Statement. After the establishment of the ceasefire, Azerbaijan committed more than 112 crimes that caused human casualties and significant material damage. As a result of those crimes 3 civilians and 15 military servicemen were killed, 126 persons were subjected to attempted murders (48 civilians, 78 militaries), and 65 people (14 civilians, 51 militaries) were wounded in various degrees. The section also made a reference to the Azerbaijani aggression launched against the people of Artsakh in August 2022 and its consequences.

The second section provides details on the existential importance of the Corridor connecting the Republic of Artsakh to the Republic of Armenia (Lachin Corridor) for the people of Artsakh, the inadmissibility of changing its legal regime, and Azerbaijan’s illegal demand of changing the route of the Corridor much earlier than was agreed under the November 9, 2020 Statement. It has been stated in the section that to advance its illegal demands, Azerbaijan continuously uses or threats to use force, grossly violating international law.

The third section introduces details on the depopulation of Berdzor, Aghavno, and Nerkin Sus communities of the Kashatagh region of Artsakh, resulting in gross violations of fundamental human rights, also referring to the European Court of Human Rights’ interim measures issued on August 19, 2022, and expanded on November 3 of the same year, which call on the parties “to refrain from such actions that could lead to a violation of the rights of civilians protected by the Convention.”

The fourth section provides some proof of the drastic increase in hate speech and other manifestations of Armenophobia by the state officials and public figures of Azerbaijan, parallel to the August escalation. It has been stated that Azerbaijan is clearly violating the order of the International Court of Justice issued on December 7, 2021, particularly paragraph 2, according to which Azerbaijan must “refrain from engaging in or tolerating hate speech against Armenians… punishing all acts of racial discrimination, both public and private, against Armenians, including those taken by public officials.”

The fifth section makes a reference to the necessity of clarifying the mandate of the Russian peacekeeping mission, which will provide effective mechanisms for properly countering the ceasefire violations and for ensuring stable and lasting peace.

The report was prepared on the basis of studies conducted by the Human Rights Defender’s Office, on the visits to various communities, citizens’ houses, on private conversations with citizens, and information received from state-authorized bodies. The aim is to document the cases of violation of the rights of the people of Artsakh by Azerbaijan and their various manifestations and to draw the attention of international institutions and human rights organizations to the situation in Artsakh.

Armenian-Azerbaijani talks in Moscow and Brussels: more contradictions than connections

Emil Karabekian
Aug 30 2022


  • Armine Martirosyan
  • Yerevan

Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations

Quickened Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations by the end of August have caused alarm in Armenia, citizens fearing another concessions to Azerbaijan. A meeting of the national commissions of Armenia and Azerbaijan on the issue of demarcation and delimitation of borders is scheduled in Moscow for August 30, and on August 31, a meeting of the heads of state in Brussels.

Opinions of Armenian analysts about what can be expected from Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations.

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  • Note from Russian Embassy to Armenian Foreign Ministry: Armenians react and analyst comment

Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations in Moscow and Brussels were preceded by a portentous series of events. In early August another escalation took place in Karabakh. Thanks to military pressure, Azerbaijan managed to ensure that the corridor connecting Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia was changed. In a related development, two more towns and the city of Lachin, through which the former corridor passed, came under the control of Azerbaijan.

Political observer Tatul Hakobyan talks about Armenia’s proposal to replace the Zangezur corridor.

At the same time, relations between Azerbaijan and the United States deteriorated. Baku reacted critically to the appointment of a new American co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group. Baku is against the resumption of the Minsk process to resolve the Karabakh conflict, as it considers it to have been resolved militarily.

Philip Reeker was simultaneously appointed US representative in the Geneva International Discussions – thus he will coordinate all conflicts in the South Caucasus

The refusal of the US and French ambassadors to visit the city of Shushi (Shusha in Azerbaijan) caused a scandal in Baku, being seen as disrespect for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

According to Azerbaijani political scientist Elkhan Shahinoglu, sooner or later the ambassadors of both countries will have to visit both Shusha and Lachin. Former US Ambassador to Baku thinks otherwise

In Brussels, the creation of a working group to prepare the text of a peace agreement with Armenia will be agreed upon, Hikmet Hajiyev, adviser to the President of Azerbaijan, said prior to the Pashinyan–Aliyev meeting.

Armenian experts believe that fundamental contradictions between the parties on key issues will prevent this.

“It is unlikely that the August meetings of heads of state in Brussels and heads of border demarcation commissions in Moscow will lead to a significant breakthrough. There are too many radically opposed approaches in the positions of the parties. It is hard to imagine that a couple of meetings will not only smooth them over, but also lead to a peace agreement. Moreover, in addition to the positions of the parties themselves, there are also conflicts of interests between major intermediary actors. This is not only Brussels and Moscow, but also Washington and Moscow.

“The latest US statements on the appointment of an American co-chair indicate that Washington has its own proposals and the main message is directed towards Baku. This suggests that substantive work on a peace agreement is not to be expected in the near future.”

The political landscape Armenia is becoming more acute and dangerous. Commentary by political scientist Alexander Iskandaryan on how adequately the country is responding to the crisis

“There are many contradictions between the positions of Armenia and Azerbaijan, above all the unblocking of transport routes, in which there are Azerbaijani “corridor” ambitions. There are complex discussions here, as evinced by the reaction of Iran.

The November 9 tripartite statement ending the 2020 Karabakh war says Armenia guarantees the security of transport routes between the western regions of Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. Azerbaijan interprets this paragraph as unhindered movement with no control by Armenia. Accordingly, Baku demands a road through the Armenian city of Meghri, calling it the “Zangezur corridor.”

The Armenian authorities say they are ready to unblock roads, but are not ready to lose sovereignty over the provided roads. The term “corridor” suggests a loss of sovereign control, but is not mentioned in the tripartite statement.

Iran has already stated several times that it will not allow changes in its borders with Armenia. This further complicates the matter of Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations.

“There are also contradictions in the issue of demarcation and delimitation of borders. The most acute is the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh. In particular, the issues of the status of Artsakh, management of the situation, defense, the army itself. The contradictions of the parties here are fundamental.

“At the same time there are contradictions between major players fighting for influence in the region. Moscow is trying to maintain its influence, the US is trying to limit and weaken Moscow’s influence. In the actions of the United States there is a certain pressure on Iran in order to dictate its terms on the nuclear deal. Turkey is trying to play both sides, navigating the contradictions between Washington and Moscow.”

Iran scholar Emma Begijanyan believes that the strategic and national security interests of Armenia and Iran coincide

“The key and painful issues for Armenia underlie the strategic struggle of major players. For example in the Karabakh issue, if it were beneficial for Russia to resolve the status of Artsakh today, the United States would do the opposite. America itself would suggest leaving the issue of status for later and addressing only humanitarian issues.

“The Russians see postponing the status problem as an opportunity to maintain their influence. Russia wants to leave these things behind, as it is busy with Ukraine and prefers to pay less attention to the Caucasus.

“The United States suggests to Baku only those solutions which will rid the region of the Russians, since with their solution it will be easier to withdraw Russian troops. Naturally, for this, America must make Baku a more attractive offer than the Russians.

“On the same issue of the “corridor” through Meghri. We know more or less what the Russians are proposing – according to point 9 of the tripartite statement on Karabakh, Armenia provides the road and the Russians control the transport of Azerbaijani and Turkish goods. Obviously, Russia does not want to give this corridor to Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Armenian experts talk about another concession made under pressure by Azerbaijan. But no changes are expected and by the end of August the Lachin corridor will be replaced by another road

“What the US proposes in this matter is unclear. It is reported that the West is offering assistance that will facilitate the unblocking of roads and provide technical support. What that means is hard to say. But apparently the approaches are again different, since Iran speaks of “the unacceptability of closing the Armenian-Iranian border.”

“Whether the West is offering an abrogation of the 9th paragraph of the statement, that is from Russian control in exchange for some kind of international mechanism, is unknown.

“Under such conditions it is difficult to imagine any work on a peace agreement. But if the meetings in Brussels and Moscow help maintain stability in the region and prevent the situation from escalating, then we can already talk about a positive result.”

Armenian authorities say that the alternative road “will not be inferior to the Lachin corridor in any respect”

“I am far from thinking that Baku is so naive that they decided to go on an adventure, allowing themselves a daring tone in a conversation with the United States. At the same time, I am far from thinking that Baku was unduly frightened by the announcement of a new American co-chair and the restoration of the OSCE Minsk Group. Russians will not work in this format, the MG cannot be restored.

“It’s most likely a trade. There are subtexts in the American responses; the US wants to lure Baku to its side. Washington says – accept our proposals, in three years we will withdraw Russian troops from the region.

“Washington now does not particularly need to revive the MG, especially since they understand that this is not entirely realistic. All statements are made for bargaining, and Baku, knowing this very well, allows itself free statements.”

At the end of August, Armenia will transfer the Lachin corridor to Azerbaijan, which connects NK with Armenia, and the surrounding towns.

“Obviously, Russia is not at all interested in a resolution in Karabakh. In this its approach coincides with Azerbaijan, but partly. Baku generally refuses to recognize the existence of the Karabakh issue, stating that the problem has been resolved, it is the territory of Azerbaijan; and the population may accept that or leave.

“Russia’s position is as follows: it admits that there is a problem, but it is not going to discuss it now and plans to postpone it until better times. The Russian Federation is trying to keep its place in the region, leaving a lever of influence on both Baku and Yerevan. Therefore, Russia is in no way interested in changing the favorable status quo for it with the presence of its troops here.”

Protests in Yerevan demanding the protection of NK, the Kremlin’s reaction to Pashinyan’s statements on peacekeepers, an explanation from the ruling party of Armenia about what it meant, and an expert’s comments

“Europeans and Americans understand this and therefore believe that the problem needs to be solved radically and the sooner the better. In this regard, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, through his press secretary, says that “we need to go back to the root of the problem and solve it.”

“The Americans say the same thing, saying that the problem has not been solved, and it needs to be thoroughly, globally and comprehensively addressed. The change of the American co-chairman to a fairly high-ranking and influential diplomat speaks to this.

“This is a sign of US interest in this issue and it plans to put pressure on Azerbaijan in order to bring it to the negotiating table regarding Karabakh in a new round of Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations. The regular refusal of the American and French ambassadors to attend an event organized by the Azerbaijani authorities in Shushi is also significant.

“The West declares that a political solution to the Karabakh issue is needed, referring to the status of NK. Everything depends on the approaches and readiness of Azerbaijan for peaceful coexistence with the Armenians in Artsakh. But today such total xenophobia, Armenophobia, racism and the desire for ethnic cleansing of the Armenian population are widespread in Azerbaijan, that I don’t think the Europeans will consider it possible to leave Nagorno-Karabakh entirely to Azerbaijan.”

Commentary by political commentator Hakob Badalyan on the regional situation, the interests of major players and their expectations from Armenia, the risks of starting a war, and relations with the West and Russia

“The West suggests Azerbaijan take the path of democracy: in this case, the problem of Artsakh is automatically attached to democratic processes and becomes a lever of pressure in the hands of the West on Baku. Otherwise, Azerbaijan loses NK.

“With a democratization of Azerbaijan, Baku will not be able to carry out ethnic cleansing of Armenians, because it will automatically agree to the presence of international forces, as well as to the status of Artsakh, providing a full guarantee of the security of Armenians. In principle, this was stipulated in the 1997 package agreement.

“If Azerbaijan does not follow a democratic path, I am sure that the international community and the West will force it into the Kosovo scenario, the legal and political packages for which are already being prepared by the European Parliament, the European Court of Human Rights and the International Court of Justice in The Hague.”

https://jam-news.net/armenian-azerbaijani-talks-in-moscow-and-brussels-more-contradictions-than-connections/



Moscow to continue to help Yerevan in strengthening its defense capabilities and border security – Russian MFA

Emil Karabekian

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 12:32,

YEREVAN, AUGUST 29, ARMENPRESS. Russian Foreign Ministry has issued a statement on the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Armenia and Russia.

In its statement the Russian MFA said that the Treaty has greatly defined the principles and priorities of the Armenia-Russia inter-state relations. It added that this document has become an important milestone on the path of raising the bilateral partnership to a real allied level.

“The past period has convincingly demonstrated that the further strengthening of historical ties between Moscow and Yerevan is in full accordance with the vital interests of our nations, serves to the socio-economic development of the two countries and the goals to strengthen stability in the South Caucasus. We successfully move forward with the broad cooperation framework, fill it with a concrete content and raise the efficiency of the mutual partnership.

The regular contacts between the leaderships of Russia and Armenia based on trust are of decisive importance for the formation of the bilateral potential, and these contacts enable not only to solve the urgent issues, but also to coordinate the positions on key regional and international matters”, the Russian Foreign Ministry said.

It reminded that the joint statement signed by President of Russia Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan during Pashinyan’s April 19-20, 2022 official visit in Moscow, has affirmed the intention to comprehensively deepen and expand the inter-state relations based on the principles set in the 1997 Treaty.

“We are inclined to help Yerevan in the future as well from the positions of a key ally in strengthening its defense capabilities and border security, normalizing relations with its neighbors.

We are convinced that the strict observance of the 2020 November 9, 2021 January 11 and November 26 trilateral agreements is the path to stability in the region. The Russian peacekeeping contingent remains a key factor in ensuring security in Nagorno Karabakh.

We sincerely value the friendship with brotherly Armenia and are inclined to further strengthen the Russian-Armenian allied relations for the prosperity of our countries and peoples”, the Russian MFA stated.

PM Pashinyan congratulates President of Uruguay on Independence Day

Emil Karabekian

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 11:13, 25 August 2022

YEREVAN, AUGUST 25, ARMENPRESS. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan sent a congratulatory message to the President of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Luis Lacalle Pou on the occasion of the Independence Day, the Prime Minister’s Office said.

"Your Excellency,

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Armenia, the Armenian people and personally myself, I warmly congratulate you on the Independence Day of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay.

I am confident that the historically friendly relations between our states and peoples will continue to develop and strengthen for the benefit of our peoples and our states.

I wish you productive working activity and energy, and peace and well-being to the friendly people of Uruguay.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration,” the Armenian PM said in the message.

PM Pashinyan offers condolences to the President of Kyrgyzstan regarding the tragic traffic accident in Ulyanovsk region

Emil Karabekian

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 17:18,

YEREVAN, AUGUST 24, ARMENPRESS. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan sent a condolence message to the President of the Kyrgyz Republic Sadyr Japarov in connection with the tragic traffic accident in Ulyanovsk region, ARMENPRESS was informed from the Office of the Prime Minister.

The message reads as follows, "It is with deep sadness that I learned about the tragic traffic accident that took place in the Ulyanovsk Oblast of Russia, as a result of which Kyrgyz citizens were killed and injured.

In this regard, I offer my sincere condolences to you, the relatives of the victims and the entire people of Kyrgyzstan. I wish the injured a speedy recovery."

Georgian, Armenian PMs Open New Bridge, Discuss Cooperation

Emil Karabekian
 
CIVIL Georgia
Aug 19 2022

19/08/2022 – 15:15

Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili met with his Armenian counterpart, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on 19 August to discuss bilateral cooperation.

The two met after taking part in a joint ceremony to open a new bridge connecting Armenia and Georgia at the Sadakhlo crossing point. Both countries worked together on the project with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) also contributing EUR 7 million to the project. The bridge crosses the Debeda river and spans 160 meters with 4 traffic lanes.

According to the Georgian Government, the discussion focused on existing cooperation in the fields of trade, the economy, transport, logistics, and culture with emphasis placed on “deepening the existing close partnership and friendly relations.”

The pair underscored Georgia’s role in promoting peace and stability in the region, especially in light of the meeting held in Tbilisi between the Armenian and Azeri Foreign Ministers in July.

  • Tbilisi Hosts Meeting Between Azerbaijani, Armenian Foreign Ministers

PM Garibashvili also reiterated his condolences for the tragedy in Yerevan, in which more than a dozen people lost their lives, with many more injured, after a fireworks storage facility exploded.

Also Read:

  • Georgian PM Meet’s Armenian PM’s Chief of Staff

Yerevan explosion: Seismic specialists consult rescuers amid danger of structure collapse

Emil Karabekian

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 10:42,

YEREVAN, AUGUST 17, ARMENPRESS. Uninterrupted search-and-rescue operations continued overnight at the Surmalu market, the Deputy Minister of Emergency Situations Artyush Grigoryan told reporters.

“The work continues. We are now carrying out some cooling processes. As you know, two people are still unaccounted for, but one of the 16 dead persons is unidentified. If one of the two missing persons is the unidentified dead person then we have one missing person. We have information that the said missing person was near the first-floor entrance of the building, therefore we will carry out the search-and-rescue operation near the three-storey structure. This causes additional difficulties because there is a risk of collapse,” Grigoryan said.

Experts from the seismic service and a private company were asked to assist in determining the best option to continue working without causing any additional damage.

Perspectives | In Armenia-Turkey normalization, where is civil society?

Emil Karabekian
Aug 16 2022
Philip Gamaghelyan , Pınar Sayan Aug 16, 2022

Since 2021, Turkey and Armenia have been engaged in direct talks, in yet another attempt to restore the diplomatic relations that have been severed for nearly three decades.

Unlike previous efforts, which saw official diplomacy accompanied by civil society exchanges and third-party mediation in a multi-track approach, the current talks are taking place for the most part solely between official Ankara and Yerevan.

So what changed? Where is civil society now? Is this single-track process viable? And how can non-state actors, both domestic and international, support this process and make sure that it reflects the interests of Armenian and Turkish societies and not only power players?

A first attempt at normalization was halted in 1993 by the escalation of the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, a Turkey ally. Another attempt was made in the late 2000s, an effort supported by the United States and Europe that became known as “football diplomacy”: Turkish President Abdullah Gül visited Yerevan to watch a football match in 2008, and Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan followed suit at a 2009 match in Bursa.

Those negotiations ultimately collapsed under pressure from Azerbaijan, which objected to Turkey-Armenia normalization while there was little progress in resolving its own conflict with Armenia.

Now, following Azerbaijan’s decisive victory in the 2020 Second Karabakh War, Baku has retracted its objections to Turkey-Armenia normalization. But now there is a new obstacle.

The normalization attempts of the 1990s, and especially the 2000s, took place in the era when liberal democracy appeared to have triumphed and within the context of what is known as a liberal peace approach. That approach, which links conflict resolution with democratization and respect for human rights norms, relies heavily on the institutionalization of civil society and its robust engagement in the peace process.

NGOs and other networks led academic, cultural, media, and dialogue initiatives that helped build trust and supported the official normalization process. These activities served as a means of checking the “pulse” of Armenian and Turkish societies, allowing for an assessment of which official steps would be accepted by the broader public and which would not.

In those years, Armenian genocide commemorations were held in Turkey; the number of books and articles published on the topic was increasing. Turkish tourists, academics, and journalists were regular fixtures in Yerevan’s streets and hallways. And crucially, NGO efforts persisted even when official contacts were suspended, helping to create a continuity of contact between the two societies.

Today, however, genocide commemorations are restricted in Turkey, mutual visits are not as common as before – even following the easing of pandemic travel restrictions and reopening of direct flights between Yerevan and Istanbul – and the number of joint NGO initiatives is very small.

In the absence of civil society or grassroots support, the official talks run the risk of stumbling over public resistance by societies who may see the process as illegitimate. Moreover, should the talks collapse as they did in the past, there would no longer be the safety net that civil society has provided in the past, enabling dialogue to continue moving forward.

Why isn’t the current process being accompanied by visible civil society engagement? Where is the institutional infrastructure built through decades of collaboration?  

We surveyed peace activists and peacebuilders in Armenia and Turkey in 2021 and 2022, conducting 24 in-depth interviews and four focus group discussions, to try to answer these questions.

One reason we found: mistrust between Armenian and Turkish NGOs due to Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan during the Second Karabakh War. Another was the securitization of the negotiation process, where the national security interests far outweigh considerations of human security and the needs of the populations.

Another commonly mentioned factor was democratic backsliding and the shrinking of civil space. This would seem to not apply as much to Armenia, which has generally been rising in international democracy indices in recent years. But there, just as in Turkey, NGO involvement in peacebuilding also has been shrinking significantly. Even during the more authoritarian Kocharyan and Sargsyan eras, NGO peacebuilding activities were far more widespread than they are today.

The key factor appears not to be the level of democratization of any particular country, but the global slide away from liberal democracy, the dominant framework within which previous Armenia-Turkey negotiations were conceived and implemented.

The peace processes pursued from the late 1990s to the mid-2010s were supported by the U.S. or the EU in the context of EU-integration aspirations by both Armenia and Turkey. The vision and strategies of local and international NGOs had been based on liberal democratic ideology and norms including the respect for universal human rights, economic interdependence, transitional justice, strengthening participation in international organizations, and similar issues.

With all their faults, these approaches had clear conceptual roots and relied on well-established financial streams, educational institutions, international organizations, and other liberal democratic structures. In that context, institutional civil society had been widely accepted as a normal part of a functional – even if semi-authoritarian – state.

The global crisis of liberal democracy and its impact on these countries has contributed to anxieties about safety – and perhaps even more importantly a loss of vision and direction – for some of the institutional peacebuilding actors.

This is the case not only in increasingly authoritarian Turkey with shrinking civil space, but also in Armenia, which has seen the rise of narratives denouncing peacebuilding as harmful to Armenia and serving a foreign agenda.

In the face of these developments, and Turkey’s military support for Azerbaijan, our research found that NGOs previously engaged in peacebuilding in Armenia have largely sought to distance themselves from the normalization process until a time when the liberal democratic vision in the wider region, or at least in Turkey, might again prevail.

The diminished role of the NGO sector, however, does not need to be the end of peacebuilding. Informal transnational networks have long served as viable alternatives.

Since the 2020 war we have seen the emergence of new online informal networks in the Armenia and Azerbaijan context – most prominent among these being the Caucasus Talks, Bright Garden Voices, and Caucasus Crossroads initiatives – and they look poised to enter the Armenia-Turkey reconciliation process as well.

Our research found that, far from giving up, many non-institutional actors see the current crisis as an opportunity to rethink their own goals and methods, to redefine peacebuilding, and adapt to new modes of work in non-democratic environments. In a context like this, democratization – an important goal in itself – should be pursued separately from peacebuilding. The international donor community should diversify its support to include more flexible and creative networks – informal academic networks, feminist and environmentalist collectives, online groups of anti-war activists, and diaspora dialogue projects – not only bureaucratic NGOs.

Donors often express concern about the difficulty of establishing robust accountability and sustainability mechanisms when funding non-institutional actors. Indeed, some of these organizations are bound to fail or prove ineffective – but then, so can better-established peacebuilding NGOs.

Rethinking mechanisms of accountability and measures of effectiveness, and factoring in a probability of failure into an otherwise promising endeavor of investing in informal peace networks that remain active even in face of extreme adversity, would be a small price to pay for the prospect of sustaining this peace process. Support for such networks is particularly important in countries like Turkey and Russia where NGO activities are restricted.

Networks complementing traditional peacebuilding NGOs can help sustain peacebuilding efforts in the short-term and pave the way for the emergence of genuine local, regional, and global peace movements in the long-term.

Dr. Philip Gamaghelyan is assistant professor at the Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies at the University of San Diego. He is also a conflict resolution scholar-practitioner, the co-founder and board member of the Imagine Center for Conflict Transformation, and the managing editor of Caucasus Edition: Journal of Conflict Transformation. 

Dr. Pınar Sayan is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Beykoz University and Scholar at Istanbul Political Research Institute. Previously, she was a visiting researcher at the University of Cambridge; Turkey director of Imagine Center for Conflict Transformation; and co-editor of Caucasus Edition. 

The research that resulted in this paper has been funded by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.

https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-in-armenia-turkey-normalization-where-is-civil-society




Turkish press: FM Çavuşoğlu urges Armenia to refrain from provocations

Emil Karabekian
 ISTANBUL AUG 08, 2022 – 8:06 PM GMT+3

Trucks of the Russian peacekeeping forces drive along a road near Lachin in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, Nov. 13, 2020. (Reuters File Photo)

Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu called on Armenia to refrain from provocations in the Karabakh region, as he underlined that Azerbaijan and Türkiye are sincere about stability and peace in the region.

“I am calling on Armenia once again to refrain from provocations,” Çavuşoğlu said Monday, as he urged Yerevan to take concrete action and honor the terms of agreements rather than just words.

Çavuşoğlu's statements came as Azerbaijan accused Armenia of failing to abide by the terms of the 2020 agreement by attacking positions near Karabakh, previously referred to as Nagorno-Karabakh.

Attending the 13th Ambassadors Conference in the Turkish capital Ankara, Çavuşoğlu said the normalization of relations with Armenia would benefit Yerevan and the region. He continued by saying that Türkiye and Azerbaijan have been simultaneously trying to normalize ties with Armenia and have been exchanging views during the process and constantly keeping in touch with each other.

The foreign minister also said Türkiye is against the removal of Russia from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), as he highlighted the necessity for dialogue in the region.

The first round of normalization talks was held in Moscow on Jan. 14, where both parties agreed to continue negotiations without any preconditions, according to a statement released after that meeting.

The Turkish and Armenian envoys met for the second time in Vienna on Feb. 24, and the third meeting was held on May 3, also in the Austrian capital.

Also, a historic bilateral meeting took place between the foreign ministers of Türkiye and Armenia on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum on March 12.

The two countries have never established formal diplomatic relations and their shared border has been closed since the 1990s.

But in December, the two countries appointed special envoys to help normalize relations, a year after Armenia lost to Türkiye's ally Azerbaijan in a war for control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

Azerbaijan used the help of Turkish combat drones to recapture most of the contested territory that had been under Armenian forces' control since the 1990s.

Azerbaijan's victory that ended the occupation of its Karabakh region also helped pave the way for the normalization between Türkiye and Armenia.

Relations between the two former Soviet countries of Azerbaijan and Armenia have been tense since 1991 when the Armenian military illegally occupied Karabakh, a territory internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, and seven adjacent regions.

New clashes erupted on Sept. 27, 2020, and the 44-day conflict saw Azerbaijan liberate several cities and over 300 settlements and villages that were occupied by Armenia for almost three decades.

In February, Türkiye and Armenia resumed their first commercial flights in two years.

The land border between the two countries has remained closed since 1993 however, forcing trucks to transit through Georgia or Iran.

Ankara has been mending ties with several regional countries and has emphasized the need for enhanced cooperation, within this scope steps were also taken with Armenia, particularly following the latest Karabakh war between Baku and Yerevan.

Since then, both Russia and Azerbaijan have voiced support for closer ties between Türkiye and Armenia, which is seen within the sphere of regional normalization.