The opposition Homeland Salvation Movement has announced that it will hold a rally outside the Armenian parliament building on Wednesday, February 3.
"The [ruling] My Step bloc of the National Assembly, led by the government and its traitor leader, continues its anti-national and anti-state activities.
“A special sitting of the National Assembly will be convened on February 3 at the initiative of the government, with anti-state bills on the agenda,” the coalition of 17 opposition parties said in a statement on Tuesday.
"We call on citizens to gather at the entrance to the National Assembly on Karen Demirchyan Street on February 3, at 10am, to raise our voices in protest against the anti-national activities of the ruling bloc," the statement reads.
Human Rights Defender (Ombudsman) Arman Tatoyan has provided further evidence of deeply-rooted hatred and enmity towards Armenians in Azerbaijan.
In a Facebook post on Sunday, he presented the following posts of real Azerbaijani users of social media:
1) "Armenian women and Armenian children should be killed," says a member of the Bar Association of Azerbaijan.
2) I do not feel sorry for the Armenian child. The best Armenian is a dead Armenian.
3) The surviving Armenians must be killed and tortured before killing.
4) I want Armenians who have been stripped naked and raped.
5) Rogue Armenians must be killed and eliminated from this planet and all those who are on their side must be killed in the same way.
6) There should be no place for Armenians in this world. I hate them. All ruthless Armenians must be killed.
7) I just fell in love with the words of Ilham Aliyev that we are driving them away like dogs.
8) Not a single Armenian should remain alive in Karabakh.
9) Publication of the results of the survey of his children by an Azerbaijani parent:
Q. – Who is our enemy?
A. – Armenia.
Q. – How do we feel about them?
A. – Hate.
Q. – Raise your hands and repeat, we will drive you away from Karabakh like dogs.
A. – We will drive you away from Karabakh like dogs.
10) Mocking announcements with polls depicting a picture of a beheaded Armenian soldier on the Turkish-Azerbaijani special channel of Telergam, describing how users feel when they see a beheaded Armenian.
11) Other manifestations of hostility.
“The main issue here is that the same words are used in the mentioned publications as the Azerbaijani authorities and cultural figures. Moreover, both Azerbaijani and Turkish sources are in these publications.
“The same words are used by the Azerbaijani military in videos of torture and inhumane treatment of Armenians,” Tatoyan wrote.
The details are reflected in the 2020 Special Report of the ombudspersons of Armenia and Artsakh in accordance with the results of the monitoring carried out during the autumn war.
The 44-day Second Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan, its Russian-mediated outcome, the launch of Russia’s own peacekeeping operation, and Turkey’s rise as a regional power have all exposed the Minsk Group’s irrelevance. Mandated by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) back in 1992 to mediate a political solution to the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and oversee a multinational peacekeeping operation, the Minsk Group forfeited its chance after 2009, vegetated for another decade, and found itself sidelined by the aforementioned events, which it neither anticipated nor managed to affect. The Minsk Group’s own obscurity in the last ten years served to conceal its failings from public view; but the recent war and its aftermath have made it impossible for the Minsk Group to survive with its pre-existing mandate, structure and ideology.
The Group’s three co-chairing countries—Russia, the United States and France—have each contributed to wrecking the Minsk Group in their own ways and to various degrees: Russia by commission, the other two co-chairs mainly by omission. Russia appropriated the driver’s seat in the ostensibly collective Group from 2010 onward, distorted the previously agreed Basic Principles for a political settlement through Russian amendments, and ultimately bypassed the Minsk Group unceremoniously in 2020, shaping the war’s outcome by unilateral Russian action. Washington’s disengagement from 2009 onward facilitated Russia’s manipulation and circumvention of the Minsk Group. During the 44-day war, Washington and Paris (both stunned by the unanticipated events) abandoned the mediators’ impartiality by favoring Armenia—vocally so in Paris. Both Washington and Paris decided to view this war through the prism of their own strained relations with Turkey, therefore acting to Azerbaijan’s detriment and compromising the mediators’ impartiality (see EDM, November 25, December 1, 3, 7, 2020).
Nevertheless, the Minsk Group’s Western co-chairs are now attempting to reactivate this forum. For the time being, Paris is leading this attempt, seconded by Washington. Both governments hope to recoup at least some of their lost influence by using the Minsk Group, the only avenue still open to them. Their access to this avenue, however, depends largely on Moscow. The latter looks at this attempt from a wait-and-see standpoint, with plenty of time and leverage to play. Armenia is eagerly embracing France’s and the US’s initiative; Azerbaijan displays a skepticism born of experience; while Turkey is being left out entirely by Paris and Washington, to Baku’s detriment and Moscow’s advantage.
On January 14, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko received the US and French ambassadors, John Sullivan and Pierre Lévy, respectively, in Moscow. He informed them about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s telephone calls with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian regarding the possible continuation of the Minsk Group co-chairmanship’s work (TASS, January 14, 2021). The impression conveyed was that Washington and Paris hoped for Russia’s leverage with Baku and Yerevan to reactivate the Minsk Group’s co-chairmanship forum.
The Minsk Group’s Russian, US, and French co-chairs convened at the ambassadors’ level on January 25, planning for a possible visit to Baku and Yerevan. Unusually—probably unprecedentedly—the meeting took place in Poland, without explanation as to the choice of venue (Arminfo, January 27).
On January 26–27, the French foreign ministry’s State Secretary Jean-Baptiste Lemoine visited Baku and Yerevan in that order. Meeting with President Ilham Aliyev and Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov, the French dignitary practically offered apologies over his government’s vocal pro-Armenia stance during the Second Karabakh War: “The French government found itself in a complicated situation during the war,” Lemoine explained. “Admittedly, some misunderstandings occurred; but we need to look ahead now” (APA, January 27, 2021). While at it, Lemoine pitched a railroad construction project on behalf of the French company Alstom. Lemoine pointedly refrained from mentioning the matter of “Nagorno” (Upper) Karabakh’s future political status, which Armenia insists upon but Azerbaijan currently rules out (Azertag, January 26, 2021).
In Yerevan, Lemoine apparently stopped short of endorsing Pashinian’s and Foreign Minister Ara Aivazian’s calls for a political status on behalf of the unrecognized Karabakh “republic.” Aivazian had claimed such a status, based on the “people’s right of self-determination,” when meeting with the Russian, US, and French ambassadors in Yerevan on January 20. Armenia wants the Minsk Group to reactivate its work toward Karabakh’s status on that new, narrower basis, now omitting the countervailing principle of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity (Armenpress, January 20, 2021).
January 29, 2020
U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan Earle Litzenberger meets with Azerbaijan’s Economy Minister Mikayil Jabbarov
ANCA Rebukes Ambassador in Baku for ‘Celebrating Azerbaijani Aggression.’
The United States Ambassador to Azerbaijan Earle Litzenberger has reportedly congratulated Azerbaijan for “restoring its territorial integrity” and has expressed the U.S.’s readiness to take part in rebuilding lands that came under Baku’s control after the war, reported Azernews.az on Thursday.
Litzenberger made the remarks during a meeting with Azerbaijan’s Economy Minister Mikayil Jabbarov, according to a press statement issued by the ministry on Wednesday.
According to Azernews, Litzenberger also said that American companies are ready to participate in reconstruction efforts, especially in management of water resources, road and other infrastructure efforts, as well as cooperation in the fields of digital and information technologies.
“We are troubled by unconfirmed reports that our Ambassador in Baku is celebrating Azerbaijani aggression and – even worse – enlisting Americans in the commercial exploitation of indigenous Armenian lands,” said Armenian National Committee of America Executive Director Aram Hamparian.
“In light of published accounts characterizing his comments in this regard, Ambassador Litzenberger should set the record straight – explaining whether he is in fact pushing U.S. investments in areas of Artsakh seized by Azerbaijan,” added Hamparian.
Azernews reported that Jabarov told Litzenberger that his ministry is developing programs to attract foreign investors in Baku’s reconstruction efforts.
Latvia's foreign ministry refers to solution of NK status in its annual report
19:37,
YEREVAN, JANUARY 29, ARMENPRESS. The main political document of Latvia, the annual report of the Foreign Ministry, referred to Nagorno Karabakh conflict, emphasizing that Armenia and Azerbaijan, in cooperation with the international community should continue seeking a solution to the question of the status of Nagorno Karabakh.
ARMENPRESS reports the document released by the Foreign Ministry of Latvia reads, ''The South Caucasus region saw an escalation of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian and Azerbaijani forces engaged in intense fighting that also resulted in civilian casualties. Following a trilateral agreement between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia, and Turkey’s involvement, a ceasefire is presently in effect and further escalation of the conflict has been halted. At the same time, the conflict has considerably changed the balance of power in the South Caucasus. Armenia and Azerbaijan, in cooperation with the international community should continue seeking a solution to the question of the status of Nagorno Karabakh. The European Union underlines the need for the parties to the conflict to seek a solution concerning the status of Nagorno-Karabakh in the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group’'.
14:10,
YEREVAN, JANUARY 26, ARMENPRESS. President Armen Sarkissian continues home treatment for COVID-19, his office said on Tuesday, adding that the president is feeling comparably better and that “positive dynamics” is observed in his health condition.
“However he is still under the supervision of doctors.”
Sarkissian was hospitalized with COVID-19 induced double-pneumonia on January 13 in London, where he was on a medical visit for an unrelated condition.
Sarkissian’s Office said he would return to Yerevan “immediately after receiving the doctors’ permission [to do so]”. “The President continues working remotely, fulfilling his constitutional functions. The President and Mrs. Nune Sarkissian once again thank everyone for the words of support and good wishes.”
Editing and Translating by Stepan Kocharyan
By Michaël Tanchum
January 19, 2021
Turkey's decision to provide an unprecedented level of military assistance to Azerbaijan empowered Baku to achieve a resounding victory in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, changing the geopolitical rules of the game in the South Caucasus. Moreover, the war has enhanced Ankara's ability to project its influence in Central Asia. Benefiting from its inclusion in the Chinese-led BRI network of connectivity across Central Asia, Turkey may have outfoxed China in Azerbaijan to become a rising Eurasian power. Although Russia now has to tolerate the presence of Turkish troops on Azerbaijani soil, China may be the big strategic loser in the war's outcome.
BACKGROUND: The November 10, 2020 ceasefire agreement created a corridor through Armenia connecting the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan to the rest of Azerbaijan – providing Turkey, which shares a border with Nakhichevan, with direct connectivity with Azerbaijan and access across the Caspian to all of Turkic Central Asia. China has been wary of Turkey and apprehensive of its ability to spearhead a movement of Pan-Turkic solidarity that would include the Turkic Uighur minority of China’s Xinjiang province. Turkey is home to the Turkic Council (Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States, Türk Keneşi) and a highly active Uighur expatriate community. As mayor of Istanbul in 1995, now Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan built a memorial monument to Isa Yusuf Alptekin, leader of the short-lived East Turkestan Republic, defying Chinese protests. As Prime Minister, Erdoğan harshly condemned China's suppression of the July 2009 'riots' in Xinjiang's capital Urumqi and publicly declared China's actions to be "a kind of genocide."
As China’s gateway to Central Asia, Xinjiang is a critical launching point for Beijing's effort to create its Silk Road Economic Belt, an overland transit corridor for China-to-Europe trade (the "Belt" of China's massive Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI). Beijing seeks to secure the integration of the vast Xinjiang province within China and to project Chinese commercial hegemony westward across Central Asia. Turkic Uighurs, formerly a majority in Xinjiang, also known as East Turkestan, now constitute only about 45 percent of Xinjiang's population due to the heavy migration of ethnic Han Chinese as part of Beijing's Sinification program. To eradicate Uighur opposition to Beijing's agenda, upwards of one million Uighurs have been held in detention camps to undergo 'reeducation programs' to erase the Turkic Uighur Muslim identity of the population.
Nonetheless, Turkey shifted its earlier position and managed to assuage Beijing's concerns that it might pose a challenge to its agenda in Xinjiang and its larger BRI strategy in Central Asia. Aside from a momentary diplomatic flare-up provoked by the prison death of the revered Uighur poet and traditional music performer Abdurehim Heyit, a popular figure in Turkey who bridged Uighur and Turkish Cultures, Ankara has refrained from any sustained criticism of China over its Uighur policy.
In 2014, China completed the construction of an Ankara-to-Istanbul, high-speed rail link. The high-speed link was constructed in anticipation of the completion of the Baku-Tblisi-Kars (BTK) railway connecting Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia to provide the final link in a China-to-Europe overland transport route, via Kazakhstan, that entirely bypasses Russian territory. Utilizing container transshipment from Kazakhstan’s main Caspian port Aktau to the specially-constructed port of Baku at Alat, the 826 km BTK rail line breaks Moscow’s stranglehold over China's Eurasian commercial transport by carrying Chinese goods through Azerbaijan for further transport across Georgia and Turkey to European markets. This Trans-Caspian Corridor is expected to transport 75,000-100,000 containers per year.
In 2015, President Erdoğan traveled to Beijing to meet with his Chinese counter-part to further solidify Sino-Turkish cooperation. In China, Turkey's president pledged his support for China's territorial integrity. In May 2016, Ankara demonstrated its increasing willingness to accommodate Beijing when, contrary to its usual practices concerning Uighur refugees, Turkey arrested 98 Uighurs en route overseas with forged passports. In the wake of the failed July 2016 coup attempt during which the U.S. and Turkey's other Western allies refrained from providing robust support for President Erdoğan and his government, Turkey drew even closer to Beijing. On October 30, 2017 the BTK line was inaugurated, the same month that Beijing adopted its "Sinification of All Religions and Beliefs" program targeting the Uighurs.
Previously cautious about inviting Turkey to play a larger role in the BRI, Beijing became more amenable to utilizing Turkey's key geographical position as a land bridge between Asia and Europe. China's $3.6 billion loan package in 2018 seemed to indicate that Ankara's multi-year accommodation of China's policies in Xinjiang had paid off: Beijing relaxed the limits it had imposed on Sino-Turkish cooperation. Beijing's confidence in Ankara seemed to be well-placed. In late 2018, Erdoğan's government rejected a parliamentary motion brought by the right-wing opposition İyi (Good) party to investigate human rights violation allegedly perpetrated by China against the Uighurs.
In 2019, China extended its currency swap agreement with Turkey, providing an additional $1 billion cash transfer to Ankara. By the end of 2019, the number of Chinese containers transported across the Caspian Sea via the Trans-Caspian Corridor totaled 5,369 TEU, representing a 111% increase over the previous year. On December 19, 2020, the first freight train carrying cargo from Turkey to China via the Trans-Caspian Corridor completed its historic trip.
IMPLICATIONS: China's acquiescence to Turkey playing a larger role as a transit state in its BRI commercial transport network was predicated upon two inherent constraints inhibiting Turkey from projecting its influence in Central Asia via Azerbaijan: the threat of a Russian backlash if Turkey intervened heavily in Azerbaijan, and second, the lack of Turkey's direct connectivity with Azerbaijan and its Caspian Sea access to Central Asia. Both of these constraints evaporated with the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.
Moscow has acceded to the presence of Turkish military personnel on Azerbaijani soil and the creation of a commercial transportation corridor across Armenia connecting the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic and the western regions of Azerbaijan. For the first time since the Soviet army's conquest of Azerbaijan one hundred years ago, Turkey has direct connectivity with Azerbaijan and, via the Caspian Sea, to all of Turkic Central Asia. Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev hailed the corridor as a "historic achievement" and government-aligned media in Turkey acclaimed the opening of a strategic Turkish corridor through Central Asia to the shores of the Pacific.
The Turkic Council, headquartered in Istanbul, is poised to be an important instrument through which Turkey could reorient Eurasian connectivity. Established in 2009 with the signing of its founding charter in Nakhichevan, the Turkic Council's full members now are Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan, while not an official member, participates in several of the council's activities. These six nations collectively comprise approximately 150 million people and have total GDP of about $1.5 trillion. The trade volume among them is approximately $16 billion with room for growth. On May 17, 2019, the members of Turkic Council created the Turkic Chamber of Commerce and Industry (TCCI) as a subsidiary organization, to facilitate the unfettered flow of trade and economic cooperation.
Turkey has been engaged in a long term project to upgrade its domestic rail system, having committed total of $45 billion to the program through 2023. The BTK railway's initial capacity 6.5 million tons of freight and 1 million passengers per year is slated to increase to 17 million tons of freight and 3 million passengers with the line's future capacity expansion. A new all Turkic rail corridor via Nakhchivan providing a second trans-Caspian route would increase commercial flows and provide Turkey greater leverage over Eurasian connectivity.
In April 2019, two container ships, Turkestan and Beket Ata, began service on the Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan route. Azerbaijan maintains commercial connectivity with Turkmenistan, thanks in no small part to Turkey's mediating role in facilitating a rapprochement between Baku and Ashgabat that enhanced economic and security cooperation between the two countries. In 2018, Turkey completed the construction of a new $2 billion port in Turkmenbashı. In 2019, 23,802 railway wagons traversed the Caspian between Turkmenistan's Turkmenbashı port and Baku, representing 54 percent of the Trans-Caspian railway wagon traffic passing through Baku port.
In addition to its enhanced ability to influence commercial flows in the south Caucasus and Central Asia, Turkey's empowerment of Azerbaijan to regain lost territory has increased Turkey's clout and bolstered its capacity to deploy pan-Turkic, soft power cultural instruments.
Immediately upon Azerbaijan's recapture of the city of Shusha, a historical center of Azerbaijani culture, Turkvision announced it would hold Turkvision 2021 in the recaptured city. Inspired by the Eurovision song contest, Turkvision was created by the Turkic Council's cultural arm TÜRKSOY (International Organization of Turkic Culture) in cooperation with the Turkish music channel TMB TV.
Turkey's contribution to Azerbaijan's battlefield victory has also boosted Ankara's hard power outreach in Central Asia. In late October 2020 in the midst of the Karabakh war, Uzbekistan signed a military cooperation agreement with Turkey. Two weeks after the November 10 ceasefire, a delegation from Kazakhstan's Ministry of Defense visited Turkey's 14th Unmanned Aircraft Systems Base to examine Turkey's Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles and its facilities,” according to Turkey’s Ministry of Defense. Kazakhstan reportedly expressed interest in purchasing the Bayraktar TB2, following the Turkish-built drone's battlefield success against Armenia's Russian-made air defense systems.
CONCLUSIONS: Beyond changing the map of the southern Caucasus, the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war has cemented Turkey's presence in Azerbaijan and enhanced Ankara's ability to project its influence in Central Asia. By changing the rules of the game in the South Caucasus, Turkey has also upended the geopolitics of connectivity in Central Asia, elevating itself from a transit state to one of the principal agenda-setters of Eurasian connectivity.
Ankara is likely to capitalize on its new position and prestige by rededicating more of its efforts to deepening its level of economic and security cooperation with the Turkic states of Central Asia. As it does so, Turkey could increasingly hold the balance of power between Russia and China in the Eurasian architecture. From such a position of greater geopolitical strength, Turkey could conceivably elect to reverse its current acquiescence to China's Xinjiang policy and pressure Beijing as a power player within the emerging Eurasian architecture.
The manner and extent to which Turkey succeeds in parlaying its soft and hard power gains from the Nagorno-Karabakh War to deepen its strategic partnerships in Central Asia will determine the scope of its power as a Eurasian actor. The outlook is promising. Benefiting from its inclusion in the Chinese-led BRI network of connectivity across Central Asia, Turkey may have outfoxed China in Azerbaijan to become a rising Eurasian power.
AUTHOR’S BIO:
Professor Michaël Tanchum teaches international relations of the Middle East and North Africa at the University of Navarra, Spain and is a Senior Fellow at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Studies (AIES). He also holds fellow positions at the Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, the Hebrew University, Israel, and at the Centre for Strategic Policy Implementation at Başkent University in Ankara, Turkey (Başkent-SAM). @michaeltanchum
14:02, 21.01.2021
YEREVAN. – Prosperous Armenia Party [(PAP)] MPs Shake Isayan, Iveta Tonoyan, Artem Tsarukyan, and I visited Syunik Province. Opposition PAP MP Mikayel Melkumyan said this during Thursday’s traditional briefings in the National Assembly.
"We have been to all the cities of the province, visited Vorotan and Shurnukh villages, which are facing serious problems. We took social assistance to those people," said the parliamentarian, explaining the purpose of their visit.
The MP assured that the PAP will always be attentive to the problems of Syunik residents. Moreover, according to him, at present, Syunik is under threat, and most of that threat comes from neighboring Azerbaijan. "The Azerbaijani military in the direction of Shurnukh is located only five meters away from the houses of local residents. Part of the village completely passed to the Azerbaijanis. Delineation by way of GPS has led to serious problems and risks. Nevertheless, they must be overcome somehow," the MP concluded.