Author: Emil Lazarian

While all eyes have strayed from the conflict in Ukraine to the conflict on Gaza, no one has been noticing what is happening in Nagorno-Karabakh.

In September, the Turkish-backed state of Azerbaijan conducted a lightning incursion into the landlocked island of Nagorno-Karabakh, which Russian-backed ethnic Armenians had held since capturing it after the USSR broke up in the early 1990s.

In what remains one of the most astonishing political events of modern times, the Armenians stood down instead of fighting back. In doing so, they avoided the violence and bloodshed that have marked previous encounters between the two groups. Then, rather than risk the persecution they feared that the Azerbaijanis might mete out on them, the Armenians—some 120,000 of them—simply packed up their possessions and retreated across Azerbaijan to Armenia proper. 

There were tears and recriminations but the community took the view that a safe life in its homeland was better than an uncertain life in contested territory. 

A week ago, the story became even more miraculous. Armenia announced its intention to recognise Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory and the two sides agreed to normalise their relations, exchange prisoners and, by the end of this year, sign a peace treaty based on mutual respect.

These two sides have, in the past, been locked in deadly war, with some 38,000 killings between 1988 and 1994, and another 3,000 in the following 25 years. And yet, in late 2023, pragmatism finally overcame rhetoric and the two countries can now look forward to a future in which both can bloom and prosper side-by-side. 

It’s hard to know why this happened but it may have had to do with the Armenians’ growing loathing of Putin (in return for which the Kremlin banned residents of Nagorno-Karabakh from flying Ukrainian flags) and even—we do not know—the receipt of tangible incentives to realign themselves alongside Azerbaijan within Turkey’s more welcome sphere of influence.

Had something similar happened in Gaza, I wonder what the world’s reaction would have been. Would those who carry banners in support of the Palestinians and who casually accuse Israel of apartheid and genocide have berated Gaza’s leaders and accused them of an unprincipled climb-down? Would there have been protests that the people of Gaza City and Khan Yunis, not to mention the Strip’s 1.7 million “refugees”, had been betrayed by spineless apparatchiks without a grain of commitment to the Palestinian cause?

The only answer can be yes: that is exactly what the world would have said, because the world evidently wants the Palestinian people to be locked into permanent enmity with Israel, and to act as a lightning rod for the world’s hatred of its bullying neighbour. 

How do we know this? Because that is what we hear from the overwhelming majority of United Nations members, who last week voted for a ceasefire that would prevent Israel from defeating Hamas—in the name of “peace”. It is what we see, also, from the massive United Nations apparatus that keeps Palestinians in an enduring state of dependence, funding their complaints about the Zionist entity on its doorstep, and burnishing their sacred sense of victimisation. 

Unembarrassed by this, UNRWA boasts that it is the largest agency of the United Nations, employing over 30,000 staff, 99 per cent of whom are locally recruited Palestinians, and registering nearly 6 million people as eligible for its services, compared with the 700,000 who took up residence in Gaza after the Arab attack on Israel at the founding of the state in 1948. And UNRWA is evidently adored by other arms of the UN, including UNICEF.

Had Hamas acted as the ethnic Armenians did in Nagorno-Karabakh, the world would have branded them as traitors. Or so one has to assume because no one has suggested that Hamas has behaved in anything other than an appropriate way in the face of Israeli rockets. Rather than backing down, and saving thousands of lives, Hamas has happily defied the IDF, sacrificing the Palestinian masses and goading Israel further by launching missiles of its own and threatening to replay October 7 again and again in the future, given the opportunity.

How can it be that less than a thousand miles away, one ruling faction—that of State President Samvel Shahramanyan—decided it was better to save lives and accommodate itself to reality while another ruling faction—that of Yahyar Sinwar (or possibly Ismail Haniyeh)—decided it was better for its people to hold out against reality and get slaughtered, and in the greatest possible numbers?

Yahya Sinwar (or possibly Ismail Haniyeh) has not been excoriated by the world. The world has not called for him to be captured, put on trial and punished for abusing those charged to his care, whether during this war or before it. Far from it. He is seen as heroic, a freedom fighter, and even—in a crass distortion of logic—a peace campaigner. His face flies on flags and his name is chanted in public gatherings, not only among the two billion Muslims who make up a quarter of the world but in the West among reasonable people and on campuses at respected universities. 

How shocked the world would be if he were to say, “I was wrong to take my people down this disastrous path. If only I had seen, as President Samvel Shahramanyan has seen, the potential that exists in forging an accord with those we have fought against so wastefully for so long.”     

Why do I think the world would have been outraged had Yahyar Sinwar (or possibly Ismail Haniyeh) fallen on his knees and begged the Palestinian people to forgive him? Because of the obduracy with which those who are paid to know better still cling to their hateful prejudices.

I used to admire the way that Sarah Montague handled interviewees on the BBC’s highly regarded weekday lunchtime news show, The World at One, and on the World Service programme HardTalk. She is cool, composed and persistent and her questions are to the point. Her tone changes, however, when she gets Israel in the sight of her gun. In a sequence of interviews on radio yesterday she was especially egregious—not only in the words she used but in her tone of voice, exposing a bias inappropriate to someone representing the UK’s foremost public broadcasting channel.

Here, her repeated questioning of Ehud Olmert about how long he thought the war in Gaza should go on was provocative, because the idea of waging war by calendar is preposterous. Her quoting of a phrase used by former UK Secretary of State for Defence Ben Wallace—that Israel’s attack was a “killing rage”—was provocative because it is self-evidently something quite different. Her asking Olmert whether he thought too many innocent Palestinians had died was provocative because it implies that he has a favoured death tally. Her suggesting that a one-off accident (the killing of the three hostages) was indicative of something more general about Israel is provocative because it promotes a judgement based on no knowledge of battlefield conditions. 

In all these cases, Montague acted exactly as a cheerleader for Hamas might have done, letting the listener know not just where she stood but where they should stand too. Instead of questioning a string of very objectionable value judgements, she endorsed them. 

In the same way, she appeared to accept, because she offered no challenge, the idea that Hamas could not be destroyed “because it’s an ideology”, that Israel has lost its moral authority, and that what is most urgently needed now is a rapid humanitarian truce, a set of notions which also serves to protect Hamas, which the BBC (like the three American university heads quizzed in Congressional hearings recently) still refuses, to its shame, to call a terrorist, genocidal, racist, repressive organisation that has totally failed to protect the wretched people it claims to represent.

Has this war gone on too long, as Montague asked? Absolutely. Have too many been killed? Absolutely. Could the war have been shortened and the number of deaths diminished? Yes, easily—by Hamas resigning, just as the Armenian authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh did in September, within 24 hours of Azerbaijani forces moving in. That was an honourable surrender, and the ethnic Armenians are greatly to be praised for it. There was a cost but the cost was face, not lives, and face is a trifle. By the end of December, Samvel Shahramanyan’s presidency will have been wound up and, with it, the post itself. He accepts this, in the name of the greater good. Now that’s real heroics. 

Exactly the same could have happened at any time in Gaza. And yet Sarah Montague and all the bien-pensants of the BBC and the liberal establishment of which I consider myself a member have done nothing to push for it. Instead, they ally themselves with the accusation that Israel is the shameful party. It is deplorable. 

In the most recent issue of the magazine I edit—Booklaunch—the cultural critic Keith Kahn-Harris has mused on the question of how those who have no skin in a game choose sides. Why do they find it so easy to cry with the Palestinians but not, say, with the Tamils (or the Sinhalese)? It’s a very good question and not one I know the answer to. But Sarah Montague, a supposedly impartial news host who adjudges that Israel has lost its moral authority, evidently knows better than me. She must do, because she represents precisely that inexplicable taking of sides. 

Defense News December 2023 Global Security army industry

Armenia is presently in the process of modernizing its military, partly due to the conflict it experienced with Azerbaijan in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. For instance, Armenia has acquired from France Bastion 4×4 APCs, three Thales Ground Master 200 radars, a Mistral short-range air defense system, and night vision goggles from Safran. Armenia's other acquisitions from India encompass MArG 155 wheeled self-propelled howitzers, Pinaka MLRS, ATAGS 155mm towed guns, anti-tank missiles, and ZADS anti-drone systems. Furthermore, there have been sightings of a Chinese WM-80 MLRS within the Armenian Armed Forces.

The Akash air defense system, developed by the Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), is a short-range surface-to-air missile system primarily designed to safeguard vulnerable areas and critical installations against potential aerial threats. It is currently in active service with the Indian Armed Forces, with a total of 48 systems deployed as of 2022.

One of its notable features is its capability to engage multiple targets simultaneously in either Group Mode or Autonomous Mode. The system is equipped with Electronic Counter-Counter Measures (ECCM) capabilities, enabling it to counteract electronic deception systems that adversaries might employ.

The Akash missile system comprises various components, including launchers, missiles, a control center, an integrated mission guidance system, and C4I (command, control, communication, and intelligence) centers. Each missile battery is accompanied by a radar system known as Rajendra. The system is reported to be 96 percent indigenized, with an enhanced version offering a smaller footprint, 360° engagement capability, and advanced seekers.

In terms of specifications, the Akash Weapon System (AWS) has an operational range spanning from 4.5 kilometers to 25 kilometers and can engage targets at altitudes ranging from 100 meters up to 20 kilometers. It is designed for swift response, from target detection to neutralization.

The Akash Weapon System is characterized by its open system architecture, which allows for adaptability to various Air Defense environments. It is also known for its resistance to active and passive jamming, ensuring its effectiveness in challenging conditions. Additionally, the system features a secure mode of communication between combat elements and is self-sufficient in terms of electrical power, thanks to its built-in power sources. Its transportability by road and rail allows for rapid mobilization and deployment, further enhancing its operational flexibility. The system incorporates built-in safety features, including an Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system, contributing to its overall reliability and effectiveness in air defense.

https://www.armyrecognition.com/defense_news_december_2023_global_security_army_industry/armenia_to_purchase_indian_akash_air_defense_systems_in_$720_mn_deal.html

Armenia lost Nagorno-Karabakh, but the regional ambitions of Azerbaijan supported by Turkey may mean that the worst is not over for Yerevan.

Following the one-day war fought between Armenia and Azerbaijan on September 19, Turkey and Azerbaijan are now in full control of geopolitics in the South Caucasus. The focus of the emerging axis between Ankara and Baku had been to once and for all resolve the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Following 35 years of intermittent warfare, that objective has now been achieved, at the great expense of Armenia – and of Russia.

The self-styled Republic of Artsakh will soon cease to exist. Unilaterally established by ethnic Armenians in the autonomous Azeri province of Nagorno-Karabakh, it was the linchpin of Russian hegemony in the region. Playing both sides, the Kremlin ensured that it had the final say in regional developments. The one-day war produced two important results: all ethnic Armenians residing in Artsakh were forced to flee, and Azerbaijan is now in full control of its own, internationally recognized territory.

This fundamentally alters the security architecture in the geopolitically important South Caucasus region. As the scope for outside mediation will now be defined by Ankara and Baku, there will be no more outside “peace plans.”

Following the cease-fire agreement in 1994, Armenia assumed the role of protector for the Republic of Artsakh, and it retained control of those Azeri territories between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia proper that it had seized by military force. Although Artsakh was not formally recognized even by Yerevan, it represented a substantial de facto enlargement of the territory of Armenia.

Backed by Turkey, Azerbaijan executed its counteroffensive in three stages. The 44-day war in the fall of 2020 resulted in Baku regaining control over a large part of Nagorno-Karabakh and in a rout of the bulk of the Armenian forces from the surrounding areas. Russian intervention prevented a total collapse of the Armenian side, and 2,000 Russian peacekeepers were deployed to ensure continued free passage between Artsakh and Armenia. The second stage was a blockade that made life for the remaining Armenians inside Artsakh very difficult. The third and final stage was the assault on September 19, which ended in swift capitulation by the Armenian forces.

Turkey and Azerbaijan are the unequivocal winners. They will now be able to dictate the conditions for what will follow. The biggest loser in the short term is Armenia. With a population of 2.8 million, it has been forced to accept 100,000 refugees and it lives under the threat of an Azeri invasion. Although both sides have offered to recognize the territorial integrity of the other side, Baku maintains strategic ambiguity by referring to remaining Azeri exclaves inside Armenia as “Western Azerbaijan.”

Having long believed it was protected by Russia, Armenia has started currying favor with the West. It has not only reneged on a pledge to host drills of the Russian-led Common Security Treaty Organization. On October 3, it crossed the Rubicon by opting to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. That means that if President Vladimir Putin were to visit Armenia, he would risk being arrested. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov branded this move as “extremely hostile” and threatened there would be the “most negative consequences.” But the only consequence to date has been that Russian customs is making trouble for imports of Armenian brandy.

These moves indicate how much Russia has lost. Its peacekeepers are getting ready to leave Azerbaijan. They were subjected to intermittent shelling of their bases that destroyed equipment and the killing of several Russian soldiers, including a senior Russian commander. No escalation followed. The Kremlin is so dependent on its transport route to Iran that it was forced to accept this humiliation, or risk antagonizing Azerbaijan.

Russia has been informed that once its peacekeepers have left Azeri territory, they will not be welcome in Armenia, and it is likely that in addition it will be asked to vacate its remaining bases on Armenian territory.

Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Armenia was home to around 10,000 Russian troops. About half were stationed at the 102nd military base at Gyumri, the second-largest city in Armenia. Located near Turkey, it was the largest Russian military base abroad. Additional garrisons have been at Zvartnots airport and at Erebuni military base. Russian border guards have also patrolled the borders with Turkey and Iran. Given that many of these troops have been sent to the “meat grinder” in Ukraine, it is not clear how many are left. Yet, being called on to leave completely would be a major setback.

The immediate future will be marked by efforts to finalize a formal peace treaty. This process has long been pursued along two tracks, one with Russia and the other with the European Union and the United States. Now it is up to Azerbaijan to decide both the terms of a treaty and where it is to be signed. Given that the Armenian population has been displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh, and that both sides have offered to recognize the territorial integrity of the other, there is not much left to talk about. Yet, the outcome is shrouded in uncertainty.

On October 5, the two sides were to meet at Granada, Spain, together with French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and European Council President Charles Michel. Although Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan did show up, Azeri President Ilham Aliyev did not. In a clear snub to France, and to aspiring Western mediators, he hinted at dissatisfaction with President Macron’s pro-Armenian statements and talk about French arms sales.

A few days later, the two sides were to meet at a summit meeting of the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), held in Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan. This time President Aliyev showed up, but in a clear snub to Russia, Prime Minister Pashinyan did not.

The likely venue is Georgia. In late 2021, it refused to take part in a 3+3 format, where the three regional powers Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were to meet with the three outside powers Iran, Russia and Turkey. Tbilisi argued that negotiations should be left to the three regional powers. On October 8, 2023, President Aliyev held a meeting in Tbilisi with Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili. On October 26, 2023, at the 4th Tbilisi Silk Road Forum in Tbilisi, prime ministers from regional powers Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, also in Tbilisi, met and Prime Minister Pashinyan proclaimed a peace deal would be signed “in the coming months.”

Given that Turkey is now emerging as a regional hegemon, the future will be shaped by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s strategic priorities in positioning Turkey as a regional energy hub and in securing its access to markets in Central Asia without passing through Iran. Both highlight relations with Azerbaijan, which in turn means that opening the Zangezur corridor to link Azerbaijan proper with its Nakhichevan exclave, crossing Armenian territory, becomes a Turkish priority.

President Erdogan has played a deliberately opaque game. First, he wanted a seamless corridor that would be beyond Armenian sovereignty. Next, he suggested that Armenian checkpoints would be accepted, and the latest is that a corridor may be drawn to Nakhchivan via Iran (pandering to Tehran’s strong objections to a pan-Turkic corridor). In mid-October, he suggested that “If Armenia honors its commitments, especially the opening of the Zangezur corridor, then Turkey will step-by-step normalize relations.”

What is quite clear is that Russia will have no further role to play. According to the trilateral agreement that was signed in 2020, envisioning an opening of Zangezur, it was stipulated that Russian border guards would be in control. In a recent statement, however, Prime Minister Pashinyan stated that “no third power should have control over any territory of Armenia.”

Georgia in contrast will play a vital role. Apart from being a possible venue for peace talks, it is of great strategic relevance to Russia. As the Ukrainian armed forces are pushing the Russian Black Sea Fleet out of its bases on Crimea, the Kremlin needs to find an alternative. Given that its port at Novorossiysk is too small, it is looking at a port in Abkhazia, which is a de facto Russian vassal state. While Georgia cries foul in public, the current government may play along.

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The Armenian Genocide monument in Cologne was removed under pressure from racist organisations affiliated with the Turkish state.

Having been the target of constant attacks for years, the Armenian Genocide monument in Cologne, Germany, was finally removed. While a small number of Armenians live in Cologne, the city has turned into the headquarters of the National Vision organisation affiliated to the Turkish state.

French journalist Guillaume Perrier wrote on his X account: "The city of Cologne is finally dismantling a monument commemorating the Armenian genocide. Cologne has a small Armenian community, but above all a large Turkish community".

Journalist Perrier added: "This is above all the result of pressure from the Turkish government and concessions from the German right (the CDU used, encouraged and supported the Grey Wolves and Milli Görüs against the influence of the left on Turkish immigrants)."

French senator Valerie Boyer wrote on her X account that "Cologne has bowed to the Turkish National Visionists who impose the denial of the 1915 Armenian genocide". Boyer said, "This is a direct consequence of Turkish immigration to Germany… It is a harbinger of bitter days in Europe".

The monument in Cologne symbolising the Armenian genocide, which Turkey does not recognise, has been erected and dismantled several times over the years following protests by Turkish nationalists.

The city had the statue removed, sometimes on the grounds of the construction of a cycle path and sometimes out of fear of "social unrest".

After a march in late October by Turkish nationalists, including supporters of the racist, far-right “Ülkü Ocakları” and DITIB associations, the city's final decision was "the monument must be removed".

Armenia's possible exit from the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is being discussed more and more actively as differences grow between Yerevan and Moscow.

Many in Armenia are wondering what the point is of remaining in a military alliance that has demonstrated its unwillingness to protect the country. 

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has repeatedly denied claims, including by Russian officials, of an imminent change in Armenia's foreign policy vector, but that has not stopped speculation as to how the country might leave the CSTO and what would come next. Representatives of the authorities are themselves musing about this prospect. 

 "There is of course the idea of Euro-integration in Armenia, but there is also the idea of becoming a country with non-bloc status, so there's a wide range of options. We are listening to civil society and trying to figure out what the best tools are for ensuring Armenia's security and development," Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan said at a forum in Brussels on November 10 titled, The Strategic Future of Armenia: Armenia-Europe.

Fifteen Armenian public organizations recently released a statement criticizing Russia for, as they put it, interfering in Armenia's internal affairs. The statement demands that the Armenian government expel Russia's 102nd military base, ban Russian broadcast media, and begin the process of ending the country's membership in the CSTO. 

Growing dissatisfaction with Russia

The CSTO, which also includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus, is one of the main causes of the growing Armenian resentment toward Russia. 

The bloc, which is, theoretically, bound to come to the aid of a member state when it is attacked, took practically no action in September last year when Azerbaijani troops invaded border areas and took up positions on strategic heights inside Armenia.   

Since then, Armenia's approach to the CSTO, and to Russia, has been increasingly confrontational. Yerevan has reduced its participation in the bloc to an absolute minimum. Over the past year, it has snubbed CSTO meetings at practically every level and has reassigned its representative in the organization to other work and left his post vacant.

At the same time, Armenia has welcomed more intensive cooperation with the EU, which at the start of this year deployed a civilian monitoring mission to the Azerbaijani border with the aim of supporting stability there. 

This step elicited a sharply negative reaction from the Russian authorities, who claimed the mission's purpose was to "confront Russia geopolitically" in the South Caucasus region.

Such rhetoric from Moscow has done nothing to stop the growing cooperation between Yerevan and Brussels, including in the military sphere. 

At the summit of EU foreign ministers on December 11, it was announced that the EU would review the possibility of rendering military aid to Armenia through the European Peace Fund.

It was also announced that the EU mission in Armenia would increase the number of its monitors from 138 to 209. 

Another sore spot for Armenia is Russia's alleged failure to deliver weapons that Yerevan says it paid millions of dollars for.  

The Armenian authorities have no plans to sue Russia and instead seek to solve the matter in an "atmosphere of partnership," Deputy Defence Minister Hrachya Sargsyan told a briefing on December 4. 

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan recently proposed resolving the dispute through Russia canceling part of Yerevan's overall debt to Moscow. That total debt amounts to about $280 million, according to the Armenian Finance Ministry's latest calculations. (Armenia has not released precise figures on how much money Russia owes it for undelivered weapons.) 

Scenarios for leaving the CSTO

Most of the analysts Eurasianet spoke to see Armenia exiting the CSTO as a logical possible outcome of the current strained relations between Armenia and Russia. 

The head of the Research Center on Security Policy in Yerevan, Areg Kochinyan, says that Armenia could withdraw from the CSTO after approving a national security strategy that stipulates "non-bloc status" for the country. A new national security strategy is currently being drafted, and it's unknown now whether it will contain such a provision. 

If the national security strategy were amended so, "It would mean that Armenia has decided not to participate in any military bloc or alliance and therefore it would have to leave the CSTO. But at the same time it would mean that the country would not seek to become part of any other collective defense bloc," Kochinyan told Eurasianet. "I think this position would be more acceptable for Russia and the other regional powers, Iran and Turkey."

Yerevan-based political analyst David Arutyunov doesn't find it difficult to imagine Armenia leaving the CSTO.  

"In the context of the whole scope of Armenia's close relations with Russia, including in the economic sphere and the presence of the Russian military base here, leaving the CSTO is a relatively easy matter," Arutyunov told Eurasianet, adding that another crisis could provide the final impetus for quitting the bloc. 

He said the Armenian authorities have deftly managed to achieve domestic political aims by directing public discontent over the country's security problems towards Russia and the CSTO. 

"If something like the crisis of September 2022 happens again and causes internal political ructions in Armenia, it's possible that the Armenian government will resort to leaving the CSTO" in a bid to deflect criticism. 

What might Armenia's "non-bloc status" mean?  

Areg Kochinyan, of the Research Center on Security Policy, believes that a "non-bloc status" could open up opportunities for expanding Armenia's defense and military-industrial cooperation with various countries.

"We're talking not just about the West, but also other countries like India, that produce weapons. Armenia can enhance its relations with them even to the level of strategic partnership," he said. 

David Arutyunov believes that it's too early to speak about any real prospect of Armenia being outside of any military-political alliances.

"For now all this talk is theoretical. There are no real discussions on realizing this in practice. And even so, the talk pertains to the CSTO specifically, while bilateral relations with Russia will remain in any case – alongside contacts with the West," Arutyunov said.

The head of the Armenian Institute for Resilience and Statecraft, Gevorg Melikyan, is doubtful that the Armenian authorities really intend to leave the CSTO and declare non-bloc status.

"I don't see any such clear policy or strategy. For now, it's a matter of the Armenian government's desire to make an impression on Western partners to extract some kind of security guarantees. Since there are none [such guarantees], the Armenian government will try to convince Western partners to treat Armenia like they would treat any other anti-Russian country and not accuse it of maintaining contacts with Russia in the security sphere because it remains in the CSTO," Melikyan told Eurasianet.