Politcom.ru, Russia
July 11 2017
Hot July in Nagornyy Karabakh
by Sergey Markedonov
[Armenian News note: the below is translated from Russian]
Things are once again unsettled in Nagornyy Karabakh. The latest armed
flare-up has occurred on the line of contact of the parties to the
conflict. Against a background of numerous violations of the
cease-fire regime, the events of 4 and 7 July 2017 stood out
particularly. As usual, Yerevan and Baku give their own version of the
events, and the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group are eager to avoid
unambiguous assessments, stressing the impermissibility of military
incidents and the need for negotiations in point of substance.
The July outbreak of the Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation was not
the first of its kind and will most likely not be the last. Military
flareups intermixed with negotiations and diplomatic summits long
since firmly became an important element of the peace process. This
point appears paradoxical only at first sight. Both Armenia and
Azerbaijan derive certain benefits from the armed flareups.
Baku is attempting with strong-arm pressure to alter in its favour the
position of the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group. The balancing on the
brink of a big war and permanent military alert is to prompt in
Russia, the United States, and France and also Iran, which is outside
of the Minsk Group, the thought that all-around pressure on Armenia to
coerce it into concessions should be intensified to prevent great
bloodshed and regional instability. And Baku is attempting to
represent Yerevan's readiness for negotiations, despite the regular
violations of the truce, as visible proof that the Armenians intend to
give up their maximalist dispositions. How far this representation
corresponds to reality is another question. Exactly the other way
about, no solid evidence in support of the Azerbaijani version has
been presented as of this time. But it is being vigorously promoted in
the information space not only within the Caspian republic but also in
Russia, the European Union countries, and the United States, hereby
becoming an additional political and diplomatic instrument.
Yerevan, though, is attempting to demonstrate the intractability of
the Azerbaijanis and their exclusive commitment to force instead of
dialogue. Following last year's "four-day war," comparison of
Azerbaijan with the Islamic State terrorist outfit, which is banned in
Russia and a number of other countries, has become a commonplace in
the speeches of Armenian politicians and diplomats. Eduard Nalbandyan,
head of the Armenian Foreign Ministry, employed this metaphor at a
briefing on 10 July 2017 at the outcome of the Chisinau meeting of
foreign ministers of Eastern Partnership states. Neither Baku nor
Yerevan are abandoning the negotiating process in principle here even
after the new outbreaks of violence and casualties on the line of
contact.
To what extent does the July flareup stand out against the background
of previous clashes which have occurred this year? Does it testify to
some new trends in the development of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
or, on the contrary, confirm the old trends? For an answer to these
questions we shall consider briefly the events context. In 2017 we
have observed several outbreaks of armed confrontation on the line of
the contact of the parties to the conflict. The incidents in the early
hours of 25 February, 15-17 May, and 16-17 June were of the largest
scale. It should be noted also that the February flareup occurred a
week after the negotiations with the participation of the heads of the
foreign ministries of Armenia and Azerbaijan on the sidelines of the
Munich Security Conference. The May flareup occurred shortly after of
the working visit of the foreign ministers of Russia, Azerbaijan, and
Armenia in Moscow. The June flareup is a special case. It occurred not
before and not after the traditional regional visit of the co-chairmen
of the OSCE Minsk Group but during a short break in their tour. I
would point out that the Caucasus visit of the mediator diplomats
began on 10, continued on 12, and concluded on 19 June. The clashes,
though, occurred 16-17 June, following the visit to Yerevan and
Stepanakert and just prior to the visit of the Minsk Group co-chairmen
to Baku.
The July flareup developed largely per a similar algorithm. On 3 July
2017 the mediator diplomats in Vienna held a meeting (effectually a
presentation of the results of their regional visit) with members of
the Group. The report of the Minsk Group co-chairmen took place
against the background of the preparation of an unofficial ministerial
meeting of the heads of the foreign ministries of the OSCE members n
Austria's Mayerbach. This event was planned for 11 June, "the building
of trust through dialogue and cooperation," primarily in the process
of a settlement of ethno-political conflicts, was declared its main
slogan. You can criticize the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group and the
Minsk Group as a whole for its low level of effectiveness as much as
you like. But the proposition that a stimulation of "negotiations in
point of substance" (not imitation meetings, that is, but a format
which could culminate in the achievement of practical compromise
solutions) should become the attainment of a certain level of trust
between the antagonists sounds as the recurrent theme in its
statements. The mediators may help achieve this goal, but they cannot
substitute for the parties to the conflict themselves.
Meanwhile, all that we had already seen in February, May, and June has
been repeated in July also. Incidents outside the village of Alxanli
of Fizuli District, as a result of which there were casualties among
the peaceful citizens also, occurred literally the day after the
presentation of the results of the regional tour of the OSCE Minsk
Group co-chairman. The Azerbaijanis represented the subsequent actions
of 7 July as revenge for the victims of Alxanli, the Armenian
military, in turn, spoke of the other side's employment of the
civilian population as a "living shield". The week between the Vienna
report and the ministerial meeting in Mayerbach (at which negotiations
of the heads of the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan,
Eduard Nalbandyan and Elmar Mamedyarov, had been anticipated) thus
took in a new flareup. It should be noted here that the
representatives of both Baku and Yerevan were in no hurry to
dissociate themselves either from participation in the informal
meeting in the Eastern Partnership format in Moldova or from the OSCE
ministerial meeting in Austria. The books are not being closed on the
negotiating process. But a no less important storyline, aside from the
mere fact of diplomatic dialogue, is the substance of the
negotiations. Yet on the fundamental points of a settlement no
progress has been observed. The status of Nagornyy, the de-occupation
of the adjacent areas, and the refugee problem remain
stumbling-blocks. There are no hints of a possible compromise on these
issues. We are thus observing a "flight from substance". And this
policy is entirely rational and consistent. Both parties fear a
withdrawal into isolation, with which a total renunciation of peace
negotiations is fraught. But they are no less (if not more) afraid of
a solution of the core issues. Putting them on the current agenda is
practically impossible if each time the latest round of meetings and
diplomatic consultations is followed by a violation of the truce and
accusations against the other side of perfidy and an unwillingness to
make concessions. Simply because after new armed exacerbations the
peace process would need to be "salvaged". And this "salvage" would
take some time. Both other provocations and casualties in this time
are not ruled out.
Once again, as in February, May, and June, there has been talk in July
of the need to comply with the accords arrived at during last year's
negotiations in Vienna and Saint Petersburg and last year's
ministerial meeting in Moscow. Their common spirit is the proposition
concerning stabilization of the situation in the conflict zone as the
base prerequisite for passage to substantive negotiations. But without
effective mechanisms of the prevention of military incidents, progress
in this direction is practically impossible. But there are many
obstacles to the creation of an effective set of instruments for
preventing new flareups. Naming each time the party guilty of having
incited the confrontation? A certain disbalance in this case is not
ruled out, and with this the mediators' negative perception of one
party to the conflict would grow. This is fraught with alienation from
the negotiations as such and, in consequence, the de-legitimization of
the present format, even an "unfreezing" of the confrontation.
Increasing the political will? But without a fundamental improvement
in relations between Russia and the West this is hardly possible,
considering that the significance of Karabakh for Moscow and
Washington today cannot be compared with Syria or Ukraine.
The Karabakh trends in July 2017 also thus remain as before:
maintenance of the peace process for the prevention of a large-scale
war and the incitement of regular flareups for pressure on the
opponent and the mediators at the negotiating table.