This article appeared in Armenian in the Yerevan newspaper 168 Zham, on
Tuesday, September 8, 2009.
GETTING THIS WRONG WILL BE UNFORGIVEABLE
by VARTAN OSKANIAN
We are at a crossroads in our history. We have on the table the first
bilateral document that the independent sovereign Republic of Armenia
intends to sign with the Republic of Turkey. This is an unprecedented
process that is far-reaching and irreversible.
Yet, the debate on the issue is going in the wrong direction. It is hugely
insulting that high-level government officials can be this dismissive and
trivializing on a matter that is so critical for our people.
There is no sense whatsoever in telling us that what we see is not what we
get. It is not reasonable to spell out a set of specifics and then defend an
incongruous but desirable interpretation. That is not how political
documents work. It is indeed possible to write flexibly and loosely in order
to allow both sides to interpret things differently. But this is not that
document. This document, perhaps good intentioned, is formulated badly.
When the Armenian side says that although the protocol specifies recognition
of today’s borders, that does not mean that we are renouncing past borders,
that is absurd. That would be commensurate to the Turks saying, for example,
that although there is reference to the border opening, that does not mean
that Armenians will necessarily receive visas.
Or when the Armenian side says that the formulation about a sub-commission’s
`examination of historical records and archives’ does not mean they will
study the genocide, this is like the Turkish side saying they will open the
border, but not at Margara, but some 10-meter space somewhere near the
40thlatitude and 45th longitude. Again, this is absurd.
The reality is that a good idea, a needed policy, a necessary move toward
rapprochement has been negotiated poorly and framed dangerously. It is
irresponsible of our government to force our people to make such choices
about our present and our future.
The history of our relations (and non-relations) with Turkey has a
pre-history and begins before Turkey’s closing of the Turkey-Armenia border
in 1993.
After Turkey recognized Armenia as an independent republic in 1991, it laid
down two clear conditions that had to be met by Armenia before it would
establish diplomatic relations: Armenia was expected to renounce territorial
claims on Turkey. And Armenia was to set aside or dismiss the genocide
recognition process. (Turkey’s later proposal of a historic commission was
the modification of this last condition.) In 1993, with the border closure
in support of its brethren in Azerbaijan, Turkey added a new condition to
the other two already existing, that Armenia renounce Nagorno Karabakh’s
struggle for security and self-determination by conceding to an
Azerbaijani-favorable solution.
To forget this pre-history, or to expect us to forget, or – worse – to
pretend that Turkey has forgotten, is not serious. In the context of
Turkey’s consistent policies about territorial issues, genocide recognition
and Karabakh concessions, our public debate must revolve on the substance of
what this protocol gives Armenians and what it takes away.
Even when signed, these protocols merely tell us Turkey’s willingness to
enter into diplomatic relations and to open the border. The open border will
become reality only after eventual parliament ratification.
But whether ratified or not, Turkey will still have received what it wanted.
When signed, this protocol gives Turkey the opportunity to tell the world
that Armenians have in fact conceptually relinquished territorial claims and
are also ready to offer the genocide for bilateral study, therefore no
third-party involvement, recognition or condemnation is in order.
As someone who has worked for such normalization both with Turkey and
Azerbaijan, I would want nothing more than to see agreements, knowing full
well they must come with difficult concessions. The negotiations about these
concessions however should not endanger our future security nor violate our
integrity and values.
We can and should, as the protocol says, `implement a dialogue on the
historical dimension’ with `the aim of restoring mutual confidence’ but the
way to do that is not by mandating an `impartial scientific examination of
historical records’ as if all other examinations thus far have been neither
impartial nor scientific. In earlier negotiations, we focused on creating an
intergovernmental commission with the aim of overcoming the consequences of
our tragic past.
Alternate, more dignified, wording is also possible on the border issue. We
can and should, as the protocol says, `respect and ensure respect for the
principles of equality, sovereignty, non-intervention in internal affairs of
other states, territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers.’ The
focus on territorial integrity is the international formulation that
protects concerns about frontiers, while not diminishing the right to pursue
historical injustices. The current formulation about `the mutual
recognition of the existing border’ should have been avoided.
However, an equal risk in this document is the unwritten one. The link to
Nagorno Karabakh. Unwritten perhaps, but clearly spoken at every turn are
the repeated, continuing, unabated, undiminished affirmations of the highest
Turkish and Azerbaijani officials who insist that Turkey will continue to
defend the interests of Azerbaijan and nothing will be done, no border will
open, until the Nagorno Karabakh settlement process begins to move in a
direction that suits Azerbaijan.
In fact, expecting Turkey to move without considering Azerbaijan’s interests
would be similar to expecting Armenia to move without considering Karabakh’s
interests. This is not and was not a reasonable expectation.
In which case, if ratification is to take place, and if it’s to take place
before the next Obama-April 24 deadline facing Turkey, then we can expect
that Azerbaijan has received sufficient guarantees on the return of
territories and on the status of Nagorno Karabakh.
These are the worrisome elements – both in the content of these documents,
and in the hasty process that accompanies it – that cast doubt on the intent
of the document. It also makes clear the readiness to lower the bar to reach
an agreement, at questionable cost.
If this implies distrust on our part, that should be eminently
understandable. On the Armenian side, those who crafted this document are
insisting that it really means something other than what it says. On the
other side, Turkey is to `refrain from pursuing any policy incompatible with
the spirit of good neighborly relations,’ yet it continues to side with one
neighbor Azerbaijan, against their other neighbor Armenia.
In other words, on the ground, nothing seems to have changed. Yet, the
Armenian bar has clearly moved lower in the Armenia-Turkey negotiations, and
therefore it is natural to assume that the same thing may be happening in
the Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations.
This is the situation today, as we are presented documents not for and by
third parties, as with the countless historical documents of the past where
Armenia is a subject and not a party, but for the first time in history, a
document in which Armenia is signing on to its own perceived place in
history.
This document with such formulations should not be signed. Indeed, no one is
authorized to sign this document with such formulations.