There Are Prerequsites But No Convenient Moment For Revolution

THERE ARE PREREQUSITES BUT NO CONVENIENT MOMENT FOR REVOLUTION IN ARMENIA

YEREVAN, MAY 27. ARMINFO. There are prerequisites but no convenient
moment for revolution in Armenia, says the leader of the New Times
party Aram Karapetyan.

The industry is not working, economic and social crisis is
aggravating, emigration is looming large. But no elections are planned
for the near future to trigger the revolution. People do not know when
they are to go into the streets. Besides the opposition is not
consolidated even though it has been showing signs of uniting over the
idea of government change.

Karapetyan says that his next rally will take place in Yerevan June 2.

Asked if the Armenian authorities may act like their counterparts did
in Uzbekistan Karapetyan says that if Pres Kocharyan goes against his
people he may face the destiny of Romanian dictator Ceausescu.

He says that revolutions are inevitable in Uzbekistan (in the next few
months), then in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Armenia. Belarus is the
only exception – Lukashenko is very popular there despite all.

Massis Weekly Online =?UNKNOWN?B?lg==?= Vol. 25, No. 20

Massis Weekly Online
MassisWeekly.com –
Vol. 25, No. 20 – May 28, 2005

– Aram Sarkisian To Visit United States
– Armenian Civic Groups Slam Election Law Reform
– Antonio Villaraigosa’s Landslide Victory In Los Angeles
– Back To Yerevan And Reflections On The Armenian Genocide

– Invited By Social Democratic Hunchakian Party, Aram Sarkisian To Visit
United States

YEREVAN — Aram Sarkisian, the leader of Armenia’s `Hanrapetutyun’
opposition party, is scheduled to travel to the U.S. on June 7, at the
invitation of Social Democratic Hunchakian Party.
He will be the keynote speaker at an event dedicated to the 90th
anniversary of the hanging of 20 Hunchak party leaders by the Ottoman
Turks in 1915. The event will be held in Glendale on June 11th.
During his visit to the US, Sarkisian will meet with community leaders,
government officials, as well as members of the U.S. Congress both in
California and Washington DC. Sarkisian, who briefly served as Armenia’s
prime minister in 1999-2000, after the assassination of his brother
Vasken Sarkisian, would not say if meetings with officials from the
White House or the State Department are also planned. But he did put his
visit in the context of recent U.S. calls for democratization in the
South Caucasus and elsewhere in the world. `Why not. It will be within
that framework as well,’ he said. `Western governments are always
elected by the people and that is called democracy,’ he said. `The
Russians, on the other hand, support the likes of Saddam Hussein,
[Belarus President Aleksandr] Lukashenko, [Armenian President Robert]
Kocharian who is totally rejected by our people. That is why Russia is
losing.
`Russia is offering us nothing, while the West is urging us not to rig
elections and to form legitimate judicial, legislative and executive
bodies.’ Sarkisian and other prominent oppositionists have been buoyed
by U.S. support for a series of anti-government revolts across the
former Soviet Union. Visiting Tbilisi earlier this month, President
George W. Bush made an emphatic endorsement of Georgia’s 2003 `rose
revolution,’ saying that it should serve as an example for other, less
democratic nations.
Speaking at the International Republican Institute in Washington on May
18, Bush declared that the revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and
Kyrgyzstan are `just the beginnings.’ `Across the Caucasus and Central
Asia, hope is stirring at the prospect of change – and change will
come,’he said. `Democratic change can arrive suddenly – and that means
our government must be able to move quickly to provide needed
assistance,’ Bush added, announcing the creation of an `active response
corps’ within the State Department that will deal with such situations.
Sarkisian said his Hanrapetutyun (Republic) party, which is a key member
of Armenia’s largest opposition alliance, will continue to fight for
`regime change through a popular revolt.’ But he would not say when and
how it plans to launch it.

– Armenian Civic Groups Slam Election Law Reform

YEREVAN — Armenia’s leading nongovernmental organizations advocating
political reform described on Tuesday the latest amendments to the
Armenian electoral legislation as a sham, saying that the authorities
will continue to fully control the conduct of all elections.
The Partnership for Open Society, a grouping of some three dozen NGOs,
said the amendments approved by the Armenian parliament last week will
in no way complicate chronic vote rigging in the country. It also
slammed European experts for welcoming the changes as a step forward.
`The Partnership for Open Society is calling on the country’s
authorities to reconsider the adopted law and bring it into full
conformity with international standards for free and fair elections,’ it
said in a statement. The statement singled out legal provisions
regulating the formation of various-level commissions holding elections.
The current Central Election Commission and its territorial divisions
each have nine members, three of whom were appointed by Robert
Kocharian. The other commission seats are controlled by the six Armenian
parties and blocs represented in the National Assembly. Only two of them
are in opposition to Kocharian. Kocharian will now be able to name only
one member of each commission, the two other seats being given to
Armenia’s Court of Appeals and a nonpartisan group of lawmakers loyal to
the head of state.
`The mechanism for the formation of the commission set by the law does
not make the electoral bodies impartial and balanced,’ read the
statement by the Partnership for Open Society.
`Given that the judiciary is still directly dependent on the executive
branch, it is obvious that the president of the republic and the
authorities as a whole will continue to control the entire electoral
process,’ one of the leaders of the NGO coalition, Hrair Tovmasian, told
journalists.
He said Kocharian, whose disputed reelection in 2003 was strongly
criticized by Western monitors, will control at least two thirds of all
commission members. Tovmasian and another coalition leader, Vartan
Poghosian, also argued that giving Armenia’s highest court
representation in the electoral commissions contradicts a constitutional
clause that bans judges from holding any other `state position.’ The two
men further criticized experts from the Council of Europe’s Venice
Commission and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
for reportedly concluding that the amended election is an improvement
over its previous version.
Poghosian complained that the Venice Commission has itself admitted in
its reports that Armenian courts are not independent. `We don’t see any
logic here and we intend to convey our concerns and our statement to the
Council of Europe so that they reconsider their approach and correctly
assess the new mechanism for commission formation,’he said.
This is not the first time that the Partnership for Open Society
criticizes the Council of Europe for its perceived leniency toward the
Armenian authorities. Last year, for example, the NGOs criticized
a resolution by the council’s Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) which made a
largely positive assessment of Yerevan’s human rights record.

– Antonio Villaraigosa’s Landslide Victory In Los Angeles Mayor’s Race
ACA Congratulates The New Mayor

Antonio Villaraigosa romped past incumbent James K. Hahn to make history
last Tuesday, winning election as the first Latino mayor of Los Angeles
since the city’s pioneer days. Riding a huge wave of voter discontent,
the challenger avenged his 2001 loss to Hahn, who possessed an iconic
family name but never connected strongly with voters during a rocky
four-year term.
Villaraigosa’s landslide represented a crowning symbol of Latinos’
growing clout in California, with 25 percent turnout, but his decisive
victory over Mayor James Hahn saw him claim significant
support across a wide range of demographic and geographic groups, an
exit poll found.
Shortly before midnight, a beaming Villaraigosa greeted chanting
supporters to claim victory and restate his campaign’s theme of unity.
`It doesn’t matter whether you grew up on the Eastside or the Westside,
whether you’re from South Los Angeles or Sylmar,’ he said. `It doesn’t
matter whether you go to work in a fancy car or on a bus, or whether you
worship in a cathedral or a synagogue or a mosque.
We are all Angelenos, and we all have a difference to make.’ Antonio
Villaraigosa had received the endorsement of Armenian Council of America
prior to the run-off elections based on his strong commitment to issues
of interest to Armenian-Americans.
Villaraigosa has acknowledged the important role of the community
stating, `the [Armenian] community is playing an increasingly pivotal
role in Los Angeles politics.’
He has promised, if elected, he `will establish regular ties and
communication between the Mayor’s office and the Armenian American
community through town hall meetings, one-on-one sessions,
and appointments to boards and commissions, as well as staff that
includes Armenian-American representation.’
On the occasion of his election the ACA has sent a letter congratulating
the Mayor elect. ACA representatives also attended Antonio
Villaraigosa’s victory party on election night and personally
congratulated him.

– E-mail From The Homeland
“Back To Yerevan And Reflections On The Armenian Genocide”

I am finally back in Yerevan after a two week adventure through Syria,
Western Armenia (Present day Turkey), and Georgia. What can I say… It
has been a great trip. A little emotional at times, but totally worth it.
Our trip started symbolically on April 24th 2005, which was the 90th
anniversary of the Armenian Genocide. We had spent that evening walking
up Tsitsernakaberd Hill to the Armenian Genocide memorial monument. This
year a million people visited the monument on the 24th, that’s not too
shabby considering that Yerevan has a population of about a million
people. All day long on the Armenian television station thousands and
thousands of people could be seen making the trek to the monument. It is
a tradition for the commemorators to take flowers to the monument and
place them around the eternal flame that burns in the center. We went to
the monument in the evening at about 7 o’clock and a wall of flowers had
been built up so high that the flame was barely visible.
Later that evening at about 11 o’clock we boarded a plane to Haleb
(Aleppo), Syria. Haleb is an important city to Armenians because it was
a starting point for many Genocide survivors that had been on the death
marches through the Syrian Desert. On our second day in Syria, we
visited Der Zor, which is a couple of hundred Kilometers east of Haleb
in the Syrian Desert. This is like the Armenian Genocide’s version of
Auschwitz, where hundreds of thousands of Armenians were housed in
concentration camps and later taken further into the dessert to be
killed. We spent a total of 14 long silent hours driving for only about
an hour of time visiting the sites, but it was well worth the drive. We
went to a place called Mrcada where a small church has been erected in
front of the site where one of the largest massacres took place. Mrcada
is well known as a large burial place where Armenian bones can be dug up
without moving more than a few inches of gravel. We dug up a hand full
of shattered long bones and decided to not dig much further.
Our trip through Eastern Anatolia, which is historic Western Armenia,
was equally moving.
We started the trip by visiting a village called Vakif, which is the
only remaining Armenian Village in Turkey. The village is the home to 11
Armenian families and most of the remaining population is well into
their retirement age. The lack of opportunities in this remote area has
led much of the youth to move either to Istanbul or abroad. This cozy
little village is located just east of Musa Dagh, which is the famous
hill from Franz Warfel’s novel Forty Days of Musa Dagh.
During the 1915 Armenian Genocide 5 thousand Armenians camped at the top
of this hill in order to fight off invading Turks until a passing
French ship rescued them all with the exception of 18 casualties. A
90-year-old Vakif resident, Avedis Demerjian, was born on Musa Dagh
during those forty days. We sat and listened as he told us stories and
sang a few Hunchag (Armenian political party) songs for us. Our tour
guide, who has been doing this for 16 years, told us that he had not
heard of any tourists climbing to the top of Musa Dagh, where Armenians
who had returned during the French occupation after WWI had erected a
monument.
So of coarse, we decided that we had to be the first group to make the
historic hike. It took us seven hours to reach the top of Musa Dagh and
when we got to the top we discovered a mess of concrete blocks, where
once stood a monument in the shape of a ship. It wasn’t much of a
mystery that the Turks had destroyed the monument, much like many other
important Armenian historic sites.Next we visited the village of Antep
where my Vartouhi Nene (grandmother) was from. I think it was in Antep
that it really sunk in that this place was once home to my family. I
noticed that all the food that we saw in the restaurant and bakery
windows were all too familiar. We stopped at one bakery and we ate
subureg, which was one of those dishes famous to Antep. It was weird
because I have eaten subureg at so many Thanksgiving dinners, but I
don’t think that one can buy subureg at a bakery anywhere else in the
world. I found myself asking our Antepsy Turkish bus driver Jemal about
other dishes well known to Antep. His reply was Monte. Monte is a soup
that was my late grandmothers’ famous dish.
At that moment, I was overwhelmed with memories of my grandmother’s
dinner table. Yes, this was definitely the place my family came from.
In Antep we visited a very large Armenian church that has since been
turned into a mosque. In the surrounding neighborhood, which was
predominantly Armenian before 1915, we visited the home of a wealthy
Armenian named Nazaretian. It was once a beautiful two story hotel and
house with a central patio. Since then it has been converted into a
coffee shop. The owner of the shop knows of its Armenian history and
showed us some Armenian writing on the walls. The owner then gave us his
card, which in large letters states `this is the historic place where
Ataturk once stayed’. Ataturk means the father of all Turks and was the
nickname for Mustafa Kemal, the founder of present day Turkey. Ataturk
was also famous for finishing the Armenian Genocide that his
predecessors had started.
>From 1918- 1923 Ataturk went house to house killing the remaining
Armenians in Turkey with the rest of the world looking the other way.
Anyways, I thought it was really ironic how this coffee shop that was
obviously in a beautiful Armenian home made no mention of Armenians.
Instead it made light of the fact that one of the key players in the
Armenian Genocide and Turkey’s current denial campaign of the Genocide
had stayed at this place.
Next we went to the village of Marash, where my Manuel Dede(grandfather)
came from. We went straight to Kuyoujagh, the street where my
grandfather’s house once stood. We had no problem finding the street and
we attracted lots of attention from local Kurds who were now living in
Armenian homes or had destroyed Armenian homes to build newer brick houses.
A group of four of five local residents walked us around and showed us
the unique Armenian homes, which were made of a combination of clay
bricks and wood. Most of the homes were very run down, but some still
had there classic wooden balconies.
We were unable to find my grandfathers house, but we instead visited the
home of the Gherlakians, who where the richest Armenians in Marash at
one time. A Kurdish man now rents the home and he was very proud of its
history. He gave us a tour of the home, which included its own outdoor
oven to bake lavash bread, and a large stepping stone to help mount a
horse.
On our way to the tour bus on Kuyoujagh Street we randomly walked into a
photo print shop to ask about transferring some pictures from a camera
to my friend Shant’s laptop. The place was nothing special, but one
thing stuck out to us in that small shop. On the wall behind the store
clerk was a picture of a group of Turkish chetes with turbans on their
heads and rifles and swords in hand. The chetes were a group consisting
mainly of ex-cons released from prison in order to perform most of the
killing during the genocide. The Turkish military, which is called the
Gendarme, first would go around the villages and search and remove any
weapons from Armenian homes.
Next the Gendarme would round up all unarmed Armenian males and shoot
them all outside the village. Later the women and children would be
rounded up and forced on deportation marches. The chetes would be
waiting along the route to brutally beat, rape, and kill innocent
Armenian women and children. Pregnant women would have their abdomens
ripped open and the fetuses would be killed to ensure completion. It was
the picture of a group of chetes on the wall of this photo shop that was
very disturbing to me. The picture was obviously displayed to show pride
for these individuals and their actions.
The clerk at the shop said he did not know anything about the picture
and that it was not his. During the rest of our trip we visited many
historic Armenian sites, some in better condition than others. But the
one site that left a lasting impression was the Surp Garabed Monastery,
which has a history that dates back to the fourth century ad. But, I
will not remember this place for its beauty. I will remember it because
it’s destruction within the last 90 years was so pronounced. The
monastery is in the middle of a Kurdish hot bed near the city of Mush.
When we approached the village at a security check point we were told
that we would need to have the Turkish Gendarme (Military) escort us to
the village because of Kurdish aggression.
After that point, we had a military vehicle following us to the village
fully armed with automatic weapons and magazines filled with so much
ammunition that they could have wiped out the entire village. Anyways,
we got to the village and we were greeted by large groups of Kurdish
children who were all very excited about getting their pictures taken.
It was a rainy day and the village streets were extremely muddy, that is
how the villagers explained why these village children were not in
school. When we approached the first couple of stone shacks, our tour
guide pointed out that some of the bricks used to build the villagers
houses had Armenian inscriptions on them. It was kind of confusing at
first, but then it all made a lot more sense as we walked through the
village. We saw that these villagers had used bricks from a famous
historic Armenian monastery to build their homes. Some of these bricks
were katchkars, which are carved stone crosses that are unique to
Armenian religious artwork. In some homes large katchkars that probably
date back to 1000 ad were broken into pieces and placed upside down or
sideways in the walls of this shacks. We all went walking from shack to
shack taking pictures of these ancient stone carvings and then we
approached the monastery or what was left of it. There was one 15 foot
long stonewall that looked nothing religious and at the opposite end was
what our tour guide said might have been the main alter because it was
facing east. The rest of the building was gone.
Our entire tour group huddled around the remains of theater and listened
to a sermon given by a couple of deacons from an Armenian church in
Racine, Wisconsin that were on the tour with us. After the service,
Shant began digging up some soil from around the alter to take home as
he had done from most of the important cities and religious sites. At
that point, one of the Gendarme solders told Shant to stop digging and
that he could not take anything out of this area because it was an
official Turkish historic site. Later in the bus, we all got a laugh
about how well the Turks preserve their historic sites.
The last stop on our trip was the Armenian city of Ani, which was the
historic capital of Armenia. Ani was probably the most beautiful place I
have ever seen. It is the city of a thousand and one churches. Today
only a handful of these churches and structures remain and collectively
they are breathtaking. Imagine green rolling hills with scattered
ancient building that seem to be damaged in an almost artistic way.
Perched on the highest peak is a Fortress. Behind the fortress lies a
deep ravine that houses the Arax River. The Arax River is the natural
boarder between Turkey and Armenia and guess what? Ani is on the Turkish
side.
I don’t think that the fact that Turkey has taken the most significant
Armenian historic site right on the border of Armenia upsets me, as much
as, the fact that Turkey tries to pretend that Ani has nothing to do
with Armenia. As you walk through the city all the structures have
placards with information about each, but not a single placard in the
entire place mentions the word Armenia. It is like Turkey wants to erase
anything Armenian from its country. Well I guess that would go well with
the whole genocide thing.

Mano.

—————–
MassisWeekly.com – Massis Weekly Online – Organ Of the Social Democrat
Hunchak Party – Western USA – All rights reserved. Republication and
redistribution of Massis Weekly Online content is expressly prohibited
without the prior written consent of Massis Weekly Online. Massis Weekly
Online shall not be liable for any errors or delays in the content, or
for any actions taken in reliance thereon.

A letter to Aliev

A1plus

| 18:32:46 | 25-05-2005 | Official |

A LETTER TO ALIEV

The international organization `Human Rights Watch’ has sent a letter to the
Azeri President Ilham Aliev expressing concern about the detentions of the
opposition party members on May 21. The letter reads, `We are writing to
express our deep concern over the recent detentions of opposition party
members and the use of police brutality to stop a peaceful opposition rally
from taking place on May 21, 2005.

These incidents recall the patterns of human rights violations that preceded
the October 2003 Presidential elections and that compromised the integrity
of that process. They highlight the urgent need to take decisive action to
ensure that such abuses are not repeated in the run-up to the November 2005
Parliamentary elections.

Baku city authorities denied the Ugur (Success) opposition election block
permission to hold a rally on May 21 on the grounds that it was to be held
too soon before the May 25 event planned for the opening of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, to which international dignitaries are
invited. The timing of which denial is especially regrettable. Azerbaijan
has shown that it can take a leading role internationally by committing
itself to transparency principles in the extractive industries. But the
events of May 21 underscore that it has yet to take significant steps to
open up its political processes to ensure that a plurality of groups can
voice their opinions on political and social issues.

You have acknowledged that freedom of assembly and expression are important
elements in a framework for a free and fair elections. The current
restrictions in practice on these freedoms could jeopardize the integrity of
the November elections. Accordingly, we urge you to take further steps to
create an environment in which free and fair elections can take place. In
particular, we urge you to implement the recommendations from the
Presidential Election 15 October 2003 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation
Mission Report, and the Joint Recommendations on the Electoral Law and the
Electoral Administration in Azerbaijan by the Venice Commission and the
OSCE/ODIHR, 12-13 March 2004.

We thank you for your attention and look forward to a continued dialogue on
these issues.’

Call for major amendments to criminal code that threatens press fr.

Reporters without borders, France
May 25 2005

Call for major amendments to new criminal code that threatens press
freedom

Reporters Without Borders said it shared the concerns of Turkish
journalists over threats to press freedom from a new criminal law
that still needed major amendments before coming into force on 1st
June. . Despite revisions voted by parliament after it was adjourned
on 31 March 2005 following strong media protests, the organisation
repeated its call for the removal of prison sentences for press
offences.

“Far from bringing Turkish law into line with European law on freedom
of expression, some articles of the code on the contrary would
facilitate arbitrary legal action against journalists and entailing a
climate of self-censorship damaging to press freedom”, it said.

Several articles of the new code are particularly perilous. Article
305 which punishes acts that go against “fundamental national
interests” by prison sentences of three to ten years, threatens
journalists and the right of the public to be informed. Any claim to
do with the “Armenian genocide” or “withdrawal of Turkish armed
forces in Cyprus” would be considered as against “fundamental
national interests”.

Dozens of journalists have been imprisoned in the past for having
simply expressed their opinion on this type of subject. Turkish
deputies did nevertheless agree to remove paragraph 2 of the article
which set out a 50 % increase in sentences if the offence was
committed via the press.

Article 301 that is to replace 159 has been used in the past to
severely punish any criticism of parliament, the justice system or
the security forces. It will be termed in future “Humiliation of
Turkish identity, the Republic, state institutions and bodies”. It
will allow wide scope for interpretation and threaten anyone
criticising Turkish identity, the state or parliament with a prison
sentence of six months to three years. Any person who attacks the
government, justice system or the security forces moreover faces six
months to two years in prison.

Article 285 threatens with four and half years in prison anyone
“violating the confidentiality of an investigation”. This could be a
serious threat to the right of journalists to protect their sources.

Article 277 punishes anyone trying to “sway the justice system” with
two to four years in prison and potentially puts in danger
journalists covering court proceedings.

Under Article 267 of the new code, defamation in the press with the
aim of exposing someone to a judicial investigation is liable to a
one to four-year prison sentence.

Article 216, formerly 312, punishes with one to three years in prison
“deliberate incitement of a section of the population to hatred and
hostility through discrimination on the basis of race, region or
membership of a religious group, against another section of the
population” that causes “a clear and direct danger to the public”
(paragraph 1).

“Humiliation of a section of the population due to social, religious,
sexual or regional differences” is liable to a sentence of six months
to one year in prison (paragraph 2). “Overt humiliation of a person
because of their religious principles is liable to six months to one
year in prison if the offence threatens social peace” (Paragraph 3).
This “humiliation”, a very vague legal concept, capable of being
interpreted very widely by jurisprudence, directly threatens freedom
of expression both for journalists and for the general public.

This is not an exhaustive list. Turkish journalists and press freedom
organisations see parliamentary amendments drawn up ahead of 1st June
to the version of the code as it was to have been applied on 1st
April, as very inadequate. They consider that only six of the 20
problematic points have been revised Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s
government.

The Concept of Eurasia and Turkey’s Regional Strategies

Global Politician, NY
May 23 2005

The Concept of Eurasia and Turkey’s Regional Strategies

Prof. Ruben Safrastyan, Ph.D. – 5/24/2005

The concept of Eurasia has occupied an important place in political
discussions in Turkey since the beginning of the 90s of the last
century. It is perceived as one of the main concepts reflecting
Turkey’s geopolitical strategy, international relations and national
security. The regional policy of Turkey is also partly influenced by
this concept.

Definitions of Eurasia

The term Eurasia in the political and ideological discourse of
contemporary Turkey has rather a politicized interpretation than a
scientific definition. Some political scholars and researchers
consider Eurasia as a region settled mainly with Turkic peoples,
including Turkey, the Balkans and part of the Caucasus, the former
Soviet republics of Central Asia, the region of Volga in Russia, and
Northern Afghanistan. Such approaches, which are nothing but
“modernized” editions of the pan-Turkist ideology, were widely spread
in various circles of Turkish elite, especially in the beginning of
1990s.

However, the definition based on this ethnic-and-linguistic
principle, lost its priority in the middle of 1990s, and at present
it is less disseminated than the other versions of “Eurasia”, based
exclusively on geographical or political conceptions. For example,
the web site of Turkish Foreign Ministry presents a geographical
definition of Eurasia as “a large landscape, stretching from Europe
to Central Asia.”1 The current Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul
describes Eurasia as a “continent consisting of Europe and Asia.”2 In
fact, it is an attempt to avoid possible accusations in politicizing
the concept.

The definitions given by the representatives of various wings of
Turkish political elite are more detailed and politicized. For
instance, former president Suleyman Demirel considers the Balkans,
Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq as
parts of this region.3 Former Vice-Premier Minister and Chairmen of
pan-Turkist Party of Nationalist Action (PNA) Devlet Bahceli includes
the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East into Eurasia.4

Nevertheless, our numerous meetings with Turkish diplomats for more
then ten years allow us to conclude that in its everyday activity the
Turkish diplomacy prefers not to rely on the official conception of
Ministry of Foreign Affairs or statements of some politicians or
scientists, but uses the very pragmatic, from their point of view,
version limiting Eurasia with the eight newly independent states of
the South Caucasus and Central Asia. It is worth mentioning that
Suleyman Demirel, during his tenure as Prime Minister, had the same
opinion. For instance, in November of 1992 he stated: “With the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, Eurasia was born…”5 Many Turkish
politicians share the same approach.

The problem of definition of Eurasian borders in the Turkish
discourse, which raises just an abstract interest at first sight, has
great importance for revealing the motives of Turkish foreign policy
nowadays.

Eurasian Geopolitical Theories in Turkey

The concept of Eurasia, which is one of the central concepts of
geopolitics, has been studied in Turkey quite recently as a result of
tangible changes in the regional geopolitical environment. Using the
Western classical geopolitical approaches regarding Eurasia (from H.
J. Mackinder and N. J. Spykman up to Z. Brzezinski), Turkish
theorists tried to work out their own concepts. They are operating
with such core notions of classical geopolitics, as Heartland, Inner
Crescent or Outer Crescent.6 But in the meantime, their conclusions
are very different from the Western ones.

The most remarkable and complete geopolitical concept in this sense
was recently worked out by Ramazan Ozey (Professor of Marmara
University). It is entitled “The Theory of Center Domination by
Turks.” The main elements of Ozey’s concept can be summarized in the
following way: Anatolia is the “World Fortress” (Dunya kalesi in
Turkish, or the Heartland in classical sense), and the ruler-country
in Anatolia, Turkey, possessing this acropolis, has an opportunity to
take control over the regions of the “Internal circle” (Ic Cember in
Turkish, compare with Mackinder’s Inner Crescent). According to the
Turkish scientist, they are the Balkans and Eurasia. Turkey will
govern the world (Dis Cember in Turkish, meaning Outer Crescent in
Mackinder’s concept) sooner or later, the author says in conclusion.
7

Thus, Ozey legalizes Turkey’s domination in Balkans and Eurasia
considering it a natural result of that country’s geography. Then, he
considers Turkey’s domination in Eurasia not an end in itself, but a
method of achieving a bigger result – the World Domination.

Other publications by Turkish experts in geopolitics are not so frank
and far-reaching, though majority of them support the ideas of
Turkey’s domination or priority in Eurasia applying “softer”
wordings. Thus, for example, Mustafa Yilmaz (Professor of Hacettepe
University) also describes Turkey as a “natural acropolis” situated
in the middle of the Balkans, Caucuses and the Middle East, which
allows it to apply a number of alternative economic, political and
military approaches.8

To emphasize the priority of Turkey proceeding from the “natural”
geopolitical conditions, another idea of “Central Empire” was put
into scientific and political circulation in 1990s. According to one
of supporters of this approach, Oral Sander, Turkey, yielding to a
number of other countries by its power and being influenced by “world
developments,” at the same time, influences these developments due to
its position of a “Central Empire.”9

Eurasia in Political Discourse

In 1990s the Turkish left wing and right-wing thinkers and
politicians, as well as representatives of a number of pro-Islamic
and pan-Turkist political forces, elaborated a model of Turkey’s
Eurasian policy, to become a complete alternative to the
“traditionally” pro-Western foreign political strategy. This approach
is based on the idea of cooperation of the most important powers of
Eurasia, Turkey, Iran and Russia, against the “Western imperialism.”
Its authors condemn Turkey’s foreign policy for its subordination to
the West and ignoration of the country’s basic interests.

In particular, it has become known recently that one of the country’s
prominent right-wing political figures, Husnu Dogan, even makes steps
towards establishment of “Avrasya” (Eurasia) party.10 Another
supporter of the above view, veteran of the Turkish Socialist
Movement Dogu Perincek, gave one of his books a very symbolic title:
“Eurasia’s choice – independent foreign policy for Turkey”.11

Nowadays, the political and intellectual elite of Turkey remains
mainly adherent to the strategic preference of Ataturk. The
representatives of this wing are pragmatic and well aware that Turkey
is not ready to become the politically dominating power in Eurasia
without the support of the West, either economically or politically.
That is why, they consider the Eurasian direction of Turkey’s foreign
policy subordinated to Turkey-West relations and try to coordinate
their policy with the goals of the West, and, in particular, of the
USA. At the same time, they consider the extension of Turkey’s
influence in the Eurasian region as an important trump card in
bargaining with the West on such issues as Turkey’ admission to the
European Union or the Cyprus problem.

The study of geopolitical and geostrategical opinions of the modern
Turkish high-ranking influential military concerning Eurasia shows
that their approaches are shifting from hard-line Kemalist
pro-Western orientation to diversified ones. They have much in common
with the views of the aforementioned Western-orientated political
elite. Even official military documents now speak of Turkey as a
“country of Eurasia”, committed “to retain and enhance the ties with
both the West and the East.”12 In 1998, Minister of Defense Hikmet
Sami Turk, making his speech at the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, stressed the following: “Turkey has not only turned its
face to the West, but also enjoys traditional ties with the Islamic
World. She takes her roots from Central Asia, The Middle East,
Anatolia and Europe. In short, Turkey is a Eurasian country.”13

The military traditionally consider Eurasia and, first of all, the
South Caucasus, as an unstable region threatening Turkey’s security.
They are convinced that Russia’s influence and military presence in
that region is the main source of danger. Thus, it is obvious, that
the attention of the military is mainly focused on the three
countries of the South Caucasus. 14 At the same time, they, alongside
with many Turkish politicians, think, that “Turkey is in the middle
of the world.” 15

Within the last two-three years, among the Turkish high-ranking
military appeared a group protesting against integration into
European Union. Its members consider Eurasia as an important
geopolitical privilege for Turkey and not as a source of instability.
Despite their pro-Western orientation, in that region they predict a
strong competition with the European countries, especially with
Germany. 16

In 1999-2002, the period of the previous coalition government headed
by Bulent Ecevit, the Foreign Ministry was controlled by the
Democratic Left-wing Party (DLP), so the views of the party’s leaders
require a special attention. On the whole, they supported the
pro-Western strategy of the Turkish foreign policy, though with some
reservations. For example, in 1995, DLP leader Bulent Ecevit insisted
on the “region-oriented foreign policy.” He thought that the use of
the European and Asian elements would enable setting up the integrity
of the countries situated in the Eurasian super-region, certainly
headed by Turkey. He even uses the term “Eurasiation” (Avrupalasma in
Turkish) – to signify the process of integration between Europe and
Asia. According to him, Turkey is occupying the central place in this
process.17

Foreign Minister of that period Ismail Cem, also the DLP
representative, did not avoid rather openly speaking about
prospective Eurasian plans in public. Thus, once he stated: “We
shall, undoubtedly, join the European Union, but our perspective of
vision is broader. Our goal is to become the decision-making center
in Eurasia.”18

The program of the Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) Government,
which replaced Ecevit’s coalition, points out that the goal of
expanding relations with Russia is based on the aspiration for
“cautiously expanding Eurasia’s prospect.” Meanwhile, before coming
to power, this pro-Islamic party noted in its program that it would
try to expand the “Eurasian direction” of the Turkish foreign
policy19. The latest steps of the JDP Government display the trend of
strengthening the impact of the Eurasian concept on the Turkish
foreign policy. The Foreign Ministry acts within the new framework
redefining the priorities of the Turkish foreign policy in accordance
with the Eurasian concept, which is indicated in the JDP’s program
and considered to be more suitable to the changing regional and
global realities. The Ministry is establishing a new balance between
national interests and those realities and is trying to improve
relations with the neighboring countries.

Different interpretations of Eurasian concept are also present in
official documents of other Turkish political parties. In particular,
the Program of the Social-Democratic People Party (SPP), which had
been playing an important role in the Turkish politics in the first
half of 1990s, describes the “Wide Eurasian” region as a “territory
of our life, our power, apple of the eye” for Turkey.20 Recently
founded Party of New Turkey (PNT) considers Turkey as “The Power
Center” of emerging “Eurasian Entirety”.21

The concept of Eurasia is widely spread also among different circles
of contemporary Turkish society. There are many research centers,
think tanks, NGO’s, foundations, and periodicals, the titles of which
include the word “Avrasya” (Eurasia). Most of them are interested in
advocating Eurasian trend in Turkish political, economical and
cultural life. Only one example: a non-governmental Association of
Cultural and Societal Development of Eurasia stands for strengthening
various relations between Europe, Turkey and other Eurasian
countries, especially, with the Central European ones. Its leaders
are supporters of using the Eurasian direction of Turkey’s foreign
policy as a trump card in the EU accession negotiations. According to
this NGO’s program documents, Turkey has to play “major role” in
Eurasia.22

Conclusion

The above examined theoretical approaches and opinions concerning
Eurasia and the place and role of Turkey, that are widely spread in
the modern Turkey’s public and political life, testify that not only
political elite of the country, but also military and scientific
ones, as well as the segments of emerging civic society share the
idea of Turkey’s domination in that region, bringing different
reasons and bases.

These concepts come from both – left and right wings of the political
spectrum are serving as a theoretical substantiation for the Turkish
foreign policy, one of the most important long-term objectives of
which is becoming a dominating power in the region of Eurasia.

——————————————————————————–

SOURCES

1 See Turkish Foreign Policy. – In:

2 Abdullah Gul. Walking the Tight Rope: Managing Turkey’s Foreign
Relations. Talk given to the Eurasia Summit 2003 “Energy, Economic
Development and Regional Security”, New York, September 24, 2003. –
In:

3 Turkish Daily News, July 8 2003.

4 MHP’nin 6. Kongresi… Bahçeli’nin konu_mas1.  In: Arsiv Belgeler,
BelgeNet ().

5 Prime Minister Suleyman Demirels 12th press conference, Ankara. 
In: Turkish Review, 1992, Vol.: 6, August, p. 89.

6 On these notions in the western interpretation see the brilliant
article of Donald W. Meinig from the University of Utah (US):
Heartland and Rimland in Eurasian History. The Western Political
Quarterly, 1956, Vol.: 9, No.: 3, p. 553-569.

7 See in his book: Ramazan Ozey. Jeopolitik ve Jeostratejik Acidan
Turkiye. Istanbul: Marifet Yayinlari, 1998, p. 57-59.

8 Mustafa Yilmaz. Turkiyenin Jeo-Stratejisi Ac1s1ndan Gunumuz
Olaylar1n1n Degerlendirilmesi.  Ucuncu 1000E Girerken Turkiye:
Kutlu Dogum Sempozyumu  1999. Yayina Hazirlayan: Omer Turan. Ankara,
2000, s. 72.

9 Oral Sander. Turkish Foreign Policy: Forces of Continuity and
Change. – Turkish Review, 1993, Vol.: 7, winter, p. 45-46.

10 Turkish Probe, 12 May 2002.

11 Dogu Perincek. Avrasya Secenegi: Turkiye Icin Bagimsiz Dis
Politika. Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari, 1996.

12 Ministry of National Defense: White Paper-Defense 1998. Ankara:
Ministry of National Defense, 1998, p. 5.

13 Hikmet Sami Turk. Turkish Defense Policy. – In: The Washington
Institute For Near East Policy, Wednesday, March 3, 1999
().

14 For the “traditional” approaches of top Turkish military
officials, see Degisen Stratejilerin Odaginda Turkiye. Istanbul: AD
Yayincilik, 1996, written by Necip Torumtay, retired Chief of the
General Staff.

15 Sadi Erguvenc. Turkey’s Strategic Importance in Military
Dimension: A Regional Balance Holder. – In: Turkey at the Threshold
of the 21st Century: Global Encounters and/vs Regional Alternatives.
Ed. By: Mustafa Aydin. Ankara, 1998, p.63.

16 See Kaan Ogut. Avraysa Stratejileri Uzerine. – In: Aydinlanma
1923, Sayi: 21 (). These conclusions were
confirmed by Colonel Nazmi Cizmeci in a lecture during the 1998
workshop entitled “The Importance of Turkey vis-à-vis the Caucasus,
Middle Asia, and Eurasia.”

17 Avrasya Dergisi, II ().

18 See Kaan Ogut, Avraysa Stratejileri Üzerine, in: Aydinlanma 1923,
Sayi: 21 (on-line version). Cem means, surely, the official
definition of Eurasia.

19 See the Section 6 (Foreign Policy) of the Party Program of AKP in:
(in Turkish).

20 Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi’nin (SHP) program1, 2002.  In:
Partiler ve Programlar, BelgeNet ().

21 Yeni Türkiye Partisi’nin (YTP) program1.  In: Ibid.

22 See the WWW site of above mentioned NGO:

Prof. Ruben Safrastyan, Ph.D. is a Professor of International
Relations at Acharyan University in Yerevan, Armenia. He’s also the
Director of the Department of Turkish Studies at Institute of
Oriental Studies, Armenian National Academy of Sciences. In the past,
he served as a Counselor of the Armenian Embassy in Germany and was
the Deputy Director of the Department of Political Analysis for the
Office of the President of Armenia.

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ai/SpeechEURASIASUMMIT2003.htm.
http://www.belgenet.com
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/samiturk.htm
http://www.avrasya-tr.org
http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/dosya/secim/akp_dis.asp
http://www.belgenet.com
http://www.avrasya-tr.org.
www.aydinlanma1923.org

Guarantee of legality on defender’s conscience

A1plus

| 13:16:05 | 21-05-2005 | Politics |

GUARANTEE OF LEGALITY ON DEFENDER’S CONSCIENCE

The RA law “On Advocacy” can undergo changes in future. Today some
amendments to the Criminal Code connected with the law are being
worked out.

On the whole the law “On Advocacy does not need being reformed, head
of the reformation department of the Armenian Justice Ministry Nikolay
Arustamyan considers. According to him, there is another reason for
the discrepancies on the formation of the Chamber of Lawyers and the
election of its chairman. “It would be incorrect to motivate it by
the shortcomings of the law. I am tended to suppose that the chaos
was caused by some organizational issues. Perhaps on the new stage
of the system formation the emotions of the lawyers exceeded certain
boundaries”, he said.

What aim was pursued when adopting the law “On Advocacy”? The
law had to keep high the role and importance of a lawyer in the
society. However the situation is quite the contrary. A dispute
emerged on the position on the chairman of the Chamber of Lawyers. 420
Armenian lawyers divided into two camps; they can’t settle their
problems by themselves and appeal to courts. “All this can arouse
negative emotions. The lawyers themselves create their structure,
image and importance within the society”, N. Arustamyan says.

With the help of the law they try to settle the problem of lawyer-legal
structure-state relations basing on the idea that advocacy is a
body of public right, which is independent of the state and secures
guarantees of independence and self-sufficiency. “Certainly absolute
independence of lawyers is impossible under any circumstances. A
suppose that there is nothing to be afraid about of the lawyer is
subordinated to the Chamber of Lawyers”, he says.

He doesn’t share the opinion that the layers themselves can cause
violations. “The mechanisms fixed in the law regulate the process
of providing the free juridical assistance. I do not think it will
help to conceal violations, Everything depends of the lawyer and his
interpersonal skills.

Lena Badeyan

Kocharian met with Russian Territorial Development Minister

KOCHARIAN MET WITH RUSSIAN TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT MINISTER

Pan Armenian News
21.05.2005 03:22

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ Today Armenian President Robert Kocharian met
with Russian Minister of Territorial Development Vladimir Yakovlev,
reported the Press Service of the Armenian leader. In the course of
the meeting the parties discussed the reform process in territorial
governance and local self-governance in the countries, as well as
town-planning, housing and communal reforms. The interlocutors also
noted that the solution of similar problems in former soviet states
will be more efficient if they search for mutually favorable methods.

Watertown : Armenian dance troupe looking for new members

TAB & Press, MA
May 20 2005

Armenian dance troupe looking for new members
Friday, May 20, 2005

As the Sayat Nova Dance Company of Boston gears up for another busy
year of rehearsals, activities, socials and performances, the troupe
is looking for Armenian youth to join into the family-like, energetic
environment of dance and camaraderie.

Interested individuals should not feel intimidated to join the company,
because no dance experience is necessary.

Since over 60 percent of dancers currently are women, there’s plenty
of room for male dancers to join. The atmosphere is comfortable and
the dress code is casual (sweats and sneakers) for beginners’ classes.

Dance classes for beginners are free and have already begun.

They are held at the Abaka Armenian School for Performing Arts,
101 Bigelow Ave., from 5:30 to 7 p.m. Classes are held every Sunday
and are designed to teach inexperienced dancers the basic steps of
Armenian dance, along with correct posture and stance. Once they
master these basic steps, they will be ready to join in the regular
group rehearsals of Sayat Nova, held on Sundays from 7 to 9:30 p.m.,
at the Armenian Cultural and Educational Center, 47 Nichols Ave.

(next to Abaka). Interested individuals must be over the age of 16
or a junior in high school.

For more information, log on to

www.sayatnova.com.

Canada-Tibet Committee:Vigil for the Panchen Lama,youngest political

CMAQ, Canada
May 20 2005

Canada-Tibet Committee:Vigil for the Panchen Lama, the youngest
political prisoner in the world!

Anonyme, mardi, 17/05/2005 – 22:00

Heure:
Début:vendredi, 20/05/2005 – 18:00
Fin:vendredi, 20/05/2005 – 20:00

Lieu:
Montreal ( Plateau )
This Friday, May 20th
>>From 6 to 8 pm
In front of Metro Mont-Royal
( 470 Mont Royal Est, corner of Berri )

Take part in a worldwide movement dedicated to freeing the young
Panchen Lama and promoting religious freedom and human rights in
Tibet!

Wear your Tibetan colours: Traditional dress, flags, etc.
We will provide the candles.

Also present:

– Kalsang Dolma, from the film ” What remains of us ” will perform a
traditional Tibetan song.

– Lousnak, eclectic artist and founder of cultural event ~S Let’s Talk
Genocides ” will perform an Armenian song .

Gedhun Choekyi Nyima was recognized at age six by His Holiness the
Dalai Lama as one of Tibet’s most important religious leaders.
Determined to control religion in Tibet, the Chinese authorities
kidnapped this young boy and his family on May 17, 1995 just days
after he was recognised as the 11th Panchen Lama.

Despite repeated appeals to gain access to him, no international
agency or human rights organization has been granted contact with the
young Panchen Lama or his family. To date, their well-being and
whereabouts remain unconfirmed.

–Boundary_(ID_n9/1R1MRBhNpeHifxBOZYg)–

TABLE-MIG risk ratings for investors in Europe

TABLE-MIG risk ratings for investors in Europe

LONDON, May 19 (Reuters) – The following table gives a rating of the
risk factors that cause businesses investing in the markets of Europe
and the former Soviet Union to underperform or fail, as devised by
strategic risk consultancy, Merchant International Group.

MIG’s Grey Area Dynamics (GAD) concept was created in 1994 as
an alternative to traditional forms of country risk analysis.
GAD indicators cover 10 risk factors, with up to 10 marks awarded to
each category which cover a range of political, trade and business
risks. The higher the score, the higher the risk to investment.

The ratings are compiled quarterly from intelligence gathered and
analysed by MIG.

Detailed figures on the underlying data analysed by MIG is available
from the firm at

Armenia 72.5
Austria 51.5
Azerbaijan 75.5
Belarus 83
Belgium 39.5
Bosnia – Herzegovina 74.5
Bulgaria 65
Croatia 66.5
Czech Republic 62
Denmark 35.5
Estonia 41
Finland 29.5
France 58
Georgia 79
Germany 52
Greece 59.5
Hungary 58.5
Iceland 31
Ireland 49
Italy 61
Kazakhstan 73
Kyrgyzstan 67.5
Latvia 54
Lithuania 50.5
Luxembourg 31.5
Macedonia 69.5
Malta 38.5
Moldova 77
Netherlands 47.5
Norway 35
Poland 66
Portugal 51
Romania 67
Russia 80
Serbia and Montenegro 72
Slovakia 59.5
Slovenia 46
Spain 59.5
Sweden 35
Switzerland 41.5
Tajikistan 75
Turkmenistan 75.5
UK 50
Ukraine 75.5
Uzbekistan 81

05/19/05 18:41 ET

www.merchantinternational.com