Central Asia: 10 Major Developments in 2010
en.fondsk.ruEurasia
17.01.2010
Aleksandr SHUSTOV
In a number of regards, 2009 was a watershed year for the Central
Asian republics which gained independence 18 years ago as the result
of the disintegration of the USSR. No doubt, the key 2009 developments
will be affecting the situation in the region in 2010 and beyond. Some
of the political and economic decisions made last year are going to
define the future of the Central Asian republics both in the nearest
and more distant future.
1. Escalation in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.
The return of some of the armed formations of the former united Tajic
opposition, which were forced to leave Pakistan due to the
intensification of fighting in the Swat valley, to Tajikistan’s
Tavildara Province became a prologue to a series of armed conflicts
and terrorist outbreaks in Central Asian republics. The formations
clashed with the government forces in July and the insurgents were
largely routed by the end of August. An Uzbek border checkpoint came
under fire in Hanabad in late May, and later several kamikaze attacks
took place in Andijon. Two groups of insurgents were eliminated in the
southern part of Kyrgyzstan in July. Several attempts on clerics and
officers of law-enforcement agencies were reported in Uzbekistan, and
a number of armed groups were eliminated in Tashkent in September. In
October a group of 8 guerrillas managed to fight its way from
Tajikistan to Kyrgyzstan but was subsequently suppressed in the Vorukh
enclave. The above range of events highlights the threat of further
destabilization in Central Asia.
2. The Creation of the Collective Rapid Reaction Force in the
Framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
The decision to create the Collective Rapid Reaction Force in the
framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was
made at the urgent session of the CSTO Council in February, 2009. The
measure largely followed as a response to the growing instability in
Central Asia. The agreement was signed in Moscow on June 14, 2009.
Initially, Uzbekistan and Belarus refrained from joining, but Belarus
eventually signed the deal in October. The Collective Rapid Reaction
Force will comprise 20,000 troops including an air-born division and
an air-born storm brigade from Russia, two air-born brigades from
Kazakhstan and Belarus, and three battalions from Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Armenia. The first exercises of the Collective Rapid
Reaction Force involving Russian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Armenian troops
were carried out in Kazakhstan in October.
3. June, 2009 Presidential Elections in Kyrgyzstan
The incumbent K. Bakiyev’s landslide victory crowned the June, 2009
presidential race in Kyrgyzstan. As the result, southern clans
dominating the republic’s authority system are sure to retain their
positions at least for the coming five years. The resignation of
Kyrgyzstan’s government led by I. Chudinov, the only ethnic Russian to
serve as prime minister in Central Asia, was another consequence of
the elections. Daniar Usenov was appointed as the new prime minister.
The entire authority system was subjected to an overhaul: the
president’s administration was replaced with the presidency institute
comprising the president’s staff and secretariat, the central agency
for development, investments, and innovations (with the president’s
son M. Bakiyev as its head), the presidential conference, the
development council, the foreign minister, and the security adviser.
An array of functions formerly exercised by the government have been
transferred to the presidency institute.
4. Kyrgyzstan’s Decision to Let the US Keep the Military Base in Manas Airport.
The decision was made on the eve of the presidential elections and
proved to be a successful campaign move for the incumbent Bakiyev, who
thus secured the US support for his candidacy. In March, 2009
Kyrgyzstan was going to close the base. The plan was widely attributed
to the pressure from Russia which promised Kyrgyzstan a credit in the
amount of 41.5 bn – of which $300 mln had already been transferred –
as the reward. However, on June 22 the US and Kyrgyzstan did renew the
deal under new terms: the price to be paid by the US increased from
$17.4 mln to $60 mln annually. At the same time, France and Spain,
which also maintained contingents in Manas, had to withdraw them due
to the failure to reach an agreement with Kyrgyzstan.
5. The normalization of Uzbekistan’s Relations with the US and the EU
The process started to gain momentum in 2008 and took its final shape
in 2009. In late 2008, Uzbekistan suspended its membership in the
Eurasian Economic Community, which it criticized for inefficiency and
functional overlaps with the Collective Security Treaty Organization.
In June, 2009 Uzbekistan refused to sign the agreement on the creation
of the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force and said it would limit
its involvement to the operations in which it would be interested. In
late October the EU lifted the sanctions (related to armaments import)
imposed on Uzbekistan after the suppression of the 2005 coup attempt
in Andijon. The key reason behind the normalization was the West’s
interest in Uzbekistan’s transit potential, which could be used to
supply the coalition forces in Afghanistan. Besides, Uzbekistan is
Afghanistan’s main energy supplier and provider of Internet access.
6. Opening the Northern Supply Network for the Coalition Forces in Afghanistan
The opening of the Northern Supply Network intended to serve the
coalition forces in Afghanistan affected a number of countries in the
region. The network spans parts of the territories of Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. The involvement of Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan is not as extensive despite the opportunities opened by
their geographic locations. The coalition’s need for a northern supply
route is due to the growing insecurity of the southern one traversing
Pakistan. The northern network opened in the summer of 2009, and its
throughput is raising steadily. The transit across Central Asia,
however, is also exposed to serious risks posed by terrorist activity
and armed conflicts in the region.
7. Gas Conflict Between Russia and Turkmenistan
The conflict broke out in April, 2009 when a blast destroyed one of
the Central Asia-Center pipeline legs and lingered almost till the end
of the year. The contentious issues were the price and volumes of
Russia’s gas import from Turkmenistan. The contraction of gas demand
in Europe rendered the terms of the corresponding import contract
unprofitable from Russia’s standpoint, but the idea of lower tariffs
or import volumes predictably met with opposition from Turkmenistan.
Settlement was achieved only during Russian President D. Medvedev’s
visit to Ashgabat in December, 2009. The new contract set the import
volume at 50 bcm of natural gas annually vs. the former 30 bcm and the
price – at the European level. Natural gas supplies from Turkmenistan
to Russia resumed on January 9, 2010.
8. Opening the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China Gas Pipeline
The December, 2009 inauguration of the pipeline was attended by the
leaders of the four countries, which highlighted the strengthening of
China’s political and economic positions in Central Asia. The pipeline
target capacity of 40 bcm annually will be reached only by 2013, but
it has already integrated the gas transit networks of Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan with those of not only Russia, but also
of China. For the countries of the region, the latter is evolving into
the second-largest partner in the energy sphere while the former found
itself stripped of the status of a practically exclusive buyer of
Central Asian gas.
9. Uzbekistan’s Decision to Withdraw from the Central Asian Unified
Energy System
The plan was announced in September, 2009. Its implementation is
likely to stress the energy supply to the southern part of Kazakhstan,
as well as to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The latter two republics
already face painful electric power shortages every winter while their
own generating capacities based on hydro-power are clearly
insufficient. Efforts aimed at constructing additional power plants
upstream the rivers traversing the borders between Central Asian
republics strained Uzbekistan’s relations with Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan due to Tashkent’s concern that water flow manipulation
would be used as an instrument of political pressure against it. At
the same time, Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from the common grid would be
tantamount to its disablement as – since the Soviet era – Tashkent
hosts the unified energy system’s control center.
10. The establishment of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
The Customs Union bracketing Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan is the
first integration project in the post-Soviet space to reach the
practical phase. The package of the corresponding agreements was
endorsed by the Presidents of the three countries at the meeting of
the Eurasian Economic Community’s Inter-State Council in Mensk. A
common customs tariff came into effect on January 2010. Starting on
July 1, the Union will have a common customs territory with customs
clearance shifted to its perimeter and no checkpoints on internal
borders. Common economic space and currency are planned for 2012.
Kyrgyzstan is the likeliest Central Asian candidate to integrate into
the Union, while Tajikistan already has the observer status. The main
risks confronting the project stem from the members’ internal
political dynamics which can translate into reorientations of their
integration plans. If successfully implemented, the project would
contribute 15% to the GDP growth of the member countries by 2015.