Author: Jane Topchian

World Politics Review



By Sinan Ciddi
Tuesday, Jan. 5, 2021

As President-elect Joe Biden prepares to take office later this month,
many U.S. allies and partners are eyeing an opportunity for better
relations with Washington. But Turkey, under the leadership of
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, will face an uphill battle to settle
its ongoing disputes with the United States, not to mention its other
NATO allies.

There are three major impediments to a reset in Turkey’s ties with the
West. First, the U.S. remains at loggerheads with Turkey over
Erdogan’s decision to purchase an advanced missile defense system from
Russia. Second, the European Union is considering tough sanctions
against Ankara over its drilling activities in the Eastern
Mediterranean, in waters that are also claimed by Greece and Cyprus.
And third, even independent of those external pressures, Erdogan’s
government will likely continue to undermine the U.S. and the EU as
part of his domestic campaign to keep Turkish voters on his side by
galvanizing nationalist sentiments.

Earlier this month, the Trump administration imposed narrowly targeted
but nonetheless stinging sanctions against Turkey in response to its
acquisition of the Russian-manufactured S-400 missile defense system
in 2019. The sanctions, which targeted Turkey’s defense industry, were
required by the 2017 Countering American Adversaries Through Sanctions
Act, known as CAATSA. Congress, angered by the delay, included a
provision requiring the sanctions be imposed within 30 days in the
annual defense bill that it overwhelmingly passed last month.

Erdogan’s decision to purchase the S-400 platform has long faced
fierce resistance from the U.S. and NATO, as the system is
incompatible with the alliance’s existing defense infrastructure. Its
advanced radar could also collect sensitive information about NATO
capabilities—most notably, the newly deployed F-35 stealth fighter
jets. Erdogan has paid a steep price for his insistence on keeping the
S-400. Following delivery of the first Russian missile batteries to
Turkey in mid-2019, the U.S. took the unprecedented step of removing
Turkey from the F-35 program and canceling its planned shipment of
around 100 of the jets.

Compared to that move, the recent sanctions under CAATSA were much
more limited in scope, to prevent broader damage to the Turkish
economy. They will mainly curtail the Turkish armed forces’ access to
American military hardware. Still, they reflect mounting animosity
toward Turkey among U.S. lawmakers. Unless Turkey dramatically alters
its course under the Biden administration, it is unlikely that the
U.S. government will lift these sanctions, isolating Turkey within
NATO.

The incoming Biden administration is also likely to more aggressively
pursue outstanding criminal cases against Turkish entities that had
stalled or slowed under President Donald Trump, which could further
embitter bilateral relations. In October 2019, U.S. federal
prosecutors indicted Halkbank, a major Turkish state-owned lender, for
its alleged involvement in “a multibillion-dollar scheme to evade U.S.
sanctions on Iran.” But prior to the indictment, Trump had apparently
yielded to pressure from Erdogan to hold off on pursuing the case, and
his Justice Department only granted permission to press charges
against Halkbank after Erdogan ordered Turkish troops into Syria,
provoking a backlash from the U.S. In June, the top federal prosecutor
in Manhattan, Geoffrey Berman, was fired, reportedly for his refusal
to grant a favorable settlement to Halkbank that involved immunity for
individuals suspected of involvement in the case.

Without significant policy and behavioral changes from Erdogan, Turkey
is likely to encounter further punitive measures from the U.S. and the
EU.

Berman’s successor, who will be appointed by Biden’s attorney general,
will certainly see this case through to its conclusion. If Halkbank is
convicted, it could face dire financial consequences, with fines in
the billions of dollars, and the ripple effects would be felt
throughout the Turkish economy. U.S. prosecutors could also indict
Halkbank executives and other individuals involved in facilitating the
suspect transactions.

Erdogan has lobbied hard to deter such moves, and is reported to
already be reaching out to the Biden team. But it is unlikely that
Biden would intervene in the Halkbank case, given his desire to
restore the Justice Department’s independence after Trump. Biden has
also pledged to rebuild America’s reputation among its allies and
partners as a champion of robust democratic institutions and the rule
of law. This means that in both the Halkbank case and the S-400
dispute, the onus will be on Erdogan to improve relations with the
U.S. Bold gestures, such as terminating the S-400 acquisition and
offering to settle the Halkbank case on terms that are agreeable to
career prosecutors in Biden’s Justice Department, would go a long way.

However, Erdogan is unlikely to do so given his persistently negative
attitude toward the U.S. and the West, often blaming them for Turkey’s
problems. Partly due to this history of harsh rhetoric, 48 percent of
Turks now identify the U.S. as the biggest threat to their country,
according to a recent survey.

A similar view prevails toward the EU, which is threatening to hit
Turkey with sanctions due to its aggressive moves in the disputed
waters of the Mediterranean Sea. Throughout 2020, Erdogan’s government
has expanded and acted upon its expansive claims over drilling rights
for oil and gas deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean seabed. Turkey
is particularly hostile toward Greece and Cyprus, accusing the former
of trying to transform the Aegean Sea into a “Greek Lake,” owing to
the multiplicity of Greek islands that Athens claims each have their
own exclusive economic zone extending 200 nautical miles outward.

Erdogan has pushed back hard against Greece’s claims by deploying
deep-sea exploration vessels to disputed waters, escorted by elements
of the Turkish navy. Other European countries, particularly France,
have responded by sending their own naval vessels to aid Greece and
Cyprus, raising tensions and even sparking fears of a military
altercation at sea. While Erdogan knows the standoff is damaging his
relations with both the EU and the U.S., he prefers to keep Turkish
public opinion focused against the West. Although this appears to be a
shortsighted strategy, it is of vital interest to Erdogan, who needs
to shore up his support at home if he hopes to maintain his grip on
power.

The Turkish government remains deeply worried at the prospect of a
Biden administration that has pledged to restore America’s position on
the world stage by working closely with its European allies. For
Turkey to be included under this umbrella, significant policy and
behavioral changes would be required from Erdogan, unlikely as that
prospect may be. Without such changes, Ankara is likely to encounter
further punitive measures in the form of sanctions, resulting in
further economic, diplomatic and military isolation.

Sinan Ciddi is an associate professor of national security studies at
the Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, in Quantico,
Virginia.