Author: Jirair Kafian

By Orkhan Amashov         

Perhaps at no point over the past 30 years, since the recognition of the newly-independent Republic of Armenia by Turkey in 1991, have the circumstances been so auspicious as to begin a lasting and sustainable normalisation of the relations between the two nations.

The present situation is a qualitatively new one, for it has been largely engendered by Azerbaijan’s military victory in last year’s war, by virtue of which, the Karabakh obstacle to the rapprochement seems to have been considerably curtailed, if not completely removed.  

Many would argue that the early 90s and the period from 2007 to 2009 were the two historic junctures at which the hopes for a diplomatic thaw were high. Although there have been, and still are, numerous thorny issues exclusively on the Turkish-Armenian front that exert ponderous complexity upon the normalisation attempts, at the end of the day, it was the Karabakh subject, or to be more precise, the then-ongoing Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani territories by Armenia, that rendered the very onset of the rapprochement impossible in the past.           

As a sign of goodwill, Ankara recurrently opened its land border with the Soviet Union from 1988, enabling EU shipments of grain to reach the earthquake-shaken Armenia. Turkey was the second country after the U.S. to recognise the newly-independent Armenia. There were some informal contacts between the governments of the two countries, and the sides were close to agreeing on some framework agreement. Despite this, Armenia’s illegal occupation of Azerbaijani territories rendered normalisation impossible and Turkey closed its eastern borders in a move of support for Baku in 1993.

The process that took place from 2007-09, facilitated by Switzerland, resulted in the signing of “Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations” and “Protocol on the Development of Bilateral Relations”. In Armenia, these protocols were submitted to the Constitutional Court so as to ascertain their constitutionality. The court issued its interpretation in such a way that made the Turkish side declare that the published grounds of the decision “had preconditions and restrictive provisions impairing the letter and spirit of the Protocols”. In addition, Ankara maintained that the normalisation was to be tied with a breakthrough in the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Neither side ratified the protocols, with Armenia officially annulling them in 2018.          

At present, however, the facts on the ground are different. The sides have already appointed special representatives (envoys). This means that there may be no need for third parties in negotiations. Turkey has appointed Serdar Kilic, top-notch and high-calibre diplomat, who previously served as a Turkish ambassador in the U.S. as its special representative, whereas deputy speaker of the National Assembly of Armenia, Ruben Rubinyan, will be the special representative of Yerevan.

Although the post-war resolution between Baku and Yerevan is still underway and has not reached its logical conclusion, there is no longer a necessity of linking the normalisation with a breakthrough in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict which, as Azerbaijan has consistently and emphatically declared, is over. Furthermore, some of the basic defects of the Zurich process are not applicable to today’s situation. The impression given is that during 2007-09, Baku was not duly consulted from the very beginning, which caused some considerable consternation both in Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Now Ankara has officially declared that it will be consulting its strategic ally at each single stage, and all future steps will be mutually agreed upon with Baku. This creates a tripartite construct within which Turkey and Armenia are direct players, whereas Azerbaijan is a semi-direct actor. This, coupled with the prospects offered by the 3+3 (or 3+2, given Georgia’s reluctance) platform, could lay the foundations for a stable peace and connectivity in the wider region, which would ensure that, on this occasion, the normalisation efforts could transform into a future reconciliation.                                        

The Zangazur corridor plan, the realisation of which is key to both Ankara and Baku's vision of the region, is a new dimension of the process. The corridor is a term that still sends shivers down the spines of most Armenians, some of whom view a sinister motive behind the project. For instance, Alexander Iskandaryan, director of the Yerevan-based Caucasian Institute, believes the whole corridor concept is an ingenious scheme to take the Syunik province away from Armenia. In the same vein, Ruben Safrastyan, a former Armenian diplomat and scholar of Turkish studies, thinks that behind the joint Azerbaijani-Turkish proposal is a long-term objective of "Turkifying Syunik". Given the extent of the Armenian paranoia, it is vital that both Ankara and Baku exercise their powers of persuasion to the utmost, so as to convince the other side of the economic benefits of the Zangazur corridor.

The political will of the sides will be of immense importance. This is particularly important in the case of Armenia, which has long been hostage to the interests of its expatriate diaspora, and the toxic ambitions of the Kocharyan-Sargsyan tandem. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has survived the massive domestic political test and won the June elections, defeating the revenge-driven opposition. This new situation has provided him with tangible resources to change Yerevan’s official discourse and seek rapprochement on new grounds.

Pashinyan will need to revisit the normalisation policy pursued by the previous Armenian administrations, based on the requirement that the process should start without preconditions. Such an approach was calculated on the possibility of reopening joint borders and breaking free of the shackles imposed by this economically devastating isolation, and then pushing for certain conditions at a later stage.                                                  

Firstly, there is the issue of the mutual acceptance of internationally recognised borders and the territorial integrity of each side. Article 11 of the Armenian Declaration of Independence, adopted in 1990, refers to the Turkish province of Eastern Anatolia as "Western Armenia" and, as such, holds that the area is part of Armenia. Yerevan wants to open its borders and re-establish diplomatic ties without renouncing its claims on Turkish territory.                                    

Secondly, Armenia does not want to relinquish its state policy of achieving worldwide recognition of the events of 1915 by everybody, including Turkey. Ankara has repeatedly proposed the creation of a joint commission comprising historians from Turkey and Armenia and international experts. Yerevan believes the so-called "Armenian genocide" is a historic fact, the validity of which is not subject to verification.                                     

The existing Armenian view is that the Zurich protocols were not satisfactory, in light of the aforementioned subjects, and it is unclear to what extent Yerevan is ready to compromise on those two grounds in the context of the new effort.

The success of the new rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia will depend on a myriad of considerations. The present geopolitical conjecture is favourable to this normalisation, and therefore it is vital that momentum is efficiently utilised via drastic and quick measures. It is important that all those stakeholders, which extend beyond the negotiating sides and include a range of external actors, expedite the acceleration by supporting what is undoubtedly going to be a fragile and arduous process. The results achieved on the Baku-Yerevan front will have their own impact too.

The path to Turkish-Armenian rapprochement is not going to be a bed of roses. A challenging road lies ahead, replete with potholes and landslides. Pashinyan will need to resist the unhealthy influence and pressure of the Armenian diaspora and the Karabakh clan, which preach the “apocalyptic consequences" of the normalisation. A lot will also depend on Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev, who will be required to exert pressure on Yerevan, which should be considerable and effective, yet ultimately constructive in nature. 

Eastern Partnership (EaP) Foreign Ministers recently met in Brussels to advance the partnership with a strong focus on governance and investment, and to give an impetus to the implementation of the new and ambitious EU-EaP agenda.

While this meeting will set the ground for the upcoming Eastern Partnership Summit in December, recent deadly skirmishes between Armenia and Azerbaijan seem to put peace and stability in the EU’s eastern borders once again in jeopardy.

A year on from the end of the so-called 44-day “Second Nagorno-Karabakh War” between Armenia and Azerbaijan, tensions continue to rise along the border, with the latest clash in Kaljabar and Lachin regions having resulted in reportedly 15 deaths from the Armenian side and 7 deaths from the Azerbaijani side in addition to tens of wounded. These were the deadliest clashes since a trilateral statement was signed among Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia in November 2020.

Until the above-mentioned trilateral statement, Azerbaijan de-occupied half of its internationally recognised territory militarily. The statement further obliged Armenia to return the remaining occupied territories, such as Aghdam, Kalbajar and Lachin districts to Azerbaijan by December 2020. After regaining access to and restoring control over the border, Azerbaijan put in place border protection measures in accordance with the map agreed among Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia, and called on Armenia to start working on delimitation and demarcation procedures.

While Azerbaijan has engaged in demining and reconstruction, has initiated new highways and airports, and has contemplated smart cities projects in the de-occupied territories, Armenia’s lack of commitment to fulfil its obligations under the deal risks destabilising the region once again. This became evident when Armenia engaged in military operations to capture strategic positions, refused to return several villages and Armenian Foreign Minister Ara Ayvazyan paid an unauthorised visit to parts of Nagorno-Karabakh region, where a Russian peacekeeping mission is currently deployed to oversee the truce.

But this month, Yerevan continued to enact fresh provocations with yet another ministerial visit to Azerbaijani territories and an attempt of the Armenian forces to block the road between Azerbaijani army positions in Lachin. This followed a bombing incident, resulting in the injury of three Azerbaijani soldiers in Shusha.

These moves demonstrate a weak commitment to the ceasefire provisions and a lack of goodwill to address the unresolved issues in the trilateral statement while sowing mistrust among its parties. Importantly, they overshadow the peacekeeping efforts of Russia in the region.

Moreover, Armenia is clearly seeking to internationalise the problem by repeatedly appealing for foreign help with unfounded claims about aggressive military actions on the Armenian territories, which it hopes could trigger, inter alia, a Russian intervention under the Collective Security Treaty Organisation.

Even after accusing the Azerbaijani forces of border breaches, the Armenian leadership sacked Defence Minister Arshak Karapetyan on 15 November, which implies internal divisions, political instability, and chaos in Yerevan. Alarmingly, the entire region seems to be succumbing to chaos as tensions came to a high point when Iran organised military exercises near the Azerbaijani border and Armenia recalled its envoy from Israel in the last few weeks.

Considering these concerning developments, restoring peace and security in the region in a timely manner is now more paramount than ever. But lasting peace and prosperity cannot be achieved without a comprehensive peace treaty, a clear delineation of borders, and a fertile ground for the connectivity projects foreseen in the ceasefire agreement.

The rail and road connections between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan via southern Armenian territories, could potentially unblock larger transportation projects in the region. This will not only provide a link between mainland Azerbaijan, Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, Turkey, and the EU but could also lead to new land connection and transportation lines between Asia and Europe.

This is a unique occasion to revive the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood economically for the first time since the Soviet era while providing an opportunity for the EU to engage in post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation in the region, including support for demining, border delimitation and demarcation and the unblocking of all trade, energy, and transport links. The upcoming Eastern Partnership summit shall seize this opportunity without delay.

Dr.Ceyhun Osmanlı is Leader of Azerbaijan Greens, former MP and analyst on international relations and political economy.