RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
_________________________________________ ____________________
RFE/RL Iran Report
Vol. 7, No. 32, 20 September 2004
A Review of Developments in Iran Prepared by the Regional Specialists
of RFE/RL’s Newsline Team.
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HEADLINES:
* THEOLOGICAL COMMUNITY CONTENDS WITH CHANGING WORLD
* RELIGIOUS MINORITIES FACE PERSECUTION…
* …AS DO SUFI MUSLIMS
* PARTIES HINT AT PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES
* IRAN VIEWS HERAT PROVINCE DEVELOPMENTS POSITIVELY
* KHATAMI HOPES TAJIK VISIT WILL LEAD TO BETTER TIES
* IRANIAN MILITARY SITE INTERESTS IAEA
* IAEA CRITICAL OF IRANIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION
* IS WEAPONIZATION NEAR?
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IRAN’S THEOLOGICAL COMMUNITY CONTENDS WITH CHANGING WORLD. The
1979 Islamic revolution struck Iran’s religious community as the
dawn of a new and promising era for the country and its faithful. A
quarter of a century later things don’t look so rosy for the
clerics — many Iranians view them with disdain, and Al-Najaf, the
center of Shi’a learning in Iraq, seems set to eclipse the
Iranian theocratic center of Qom.
The major Shi’a cities in Iran are Qom and Mashhad. There
are almost 60 seminaries in Qom, the most prominent of which are
Fayzieh, Dar ul-Shafa, Hojjatieh, Sayteh, and Golpayegani. Qom also
has 10 libraries, and several Islamic periodicals are published
there. Mashhad is the site of the tomb of Imam Reza and 20
seminaries, including Khairat Khan, Mirza Jafar, and Navvah. There
are also seminaries in Isfahan (ex: Chahar Bagh, Mullah Abdullah),
Shiraz, Tabriz, Tehran, and Yazd.
Fifteen years ago, Nikola B. Schahgaldian wrote in “The
Clerical Establishment in Iran,” (RAND Publication Series prepared
for the Office of the U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy,
[June 1989]), that the estimated number of Iranian clergymen ranged
from 90,000 (media observers), to 200,000 (Iranian clerics
themselves), to 300,000 (European sources). Another 50,000-60,000
Iranians had some religious training. There were about 40,000
theology students at Iranian seminaries. Finally, there were some
60,000 people with no formal training or qualifications who acted as
urban preachers, rural-prayer leaders, and procession organizers.
In early September 2004, a prominent theologian told a
reporter that Iran remains very attractive to religious scholars.
Hojatoleslam Husseini-Bushehri, who is either director of the Qom
Theological Seminaries (Howzeh-yi Elmieh-yi Qom) or the Qom
Theological Lecturers Association (Jameh-yi Mudarresin-i Howzeh-yi
Elmieh-yi Qom), announced that there are hundreds of scholars from
around the world studying at religious institutions in Isfahan,
Mashhad, Qom, Tehran, and other cities, “Resalat” reported on 5
September. In Qom alone, Husseini-Bushehri said, there are 50,000
students from 70 countries. There are 300 religious research centers
in Qom, he added, and 3,000 seminaries in the entire country.
Other major Shi’a centers are in the Iraqi cities of
Al-Najaf and Karbala, and the Baghdad neighborhood of Khazimiyah.
“Najaf has been the revered center of Shiite Islam for 1,000 years;
it is the most respected shrine,” Iranian scholar Abdolkarim Soroush
said in an interview (“Rise of Iraqi Shiites Threatens Iranian
Theocrats,” “New Perspectives Quarterly” vol. 21, no. 2 March 2004).
The seminary in Qom, Soroush added, “is barely 100 years old.” With
the demise of Saddam Hussein’s regime, therefore, Al-Najaf is
likely to become a center of apolitical and quietist Shi’a Islam.
Lebanon’s importance as a site of Shi’a learning is
growing, particularly in terms of teaching Lebanese ulama (see Rula
Jurdi Abisaab, “The Lebanese Hawza of al-Rasul al-Akram: Toward a
Redefinition of the Shi’ite ‘Alim,” in “Distant Relations:
Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years,” Houchang Chehabi and Hassan
Mniemnieh, eds., [London: IB Tauris, 2004]).
The number of religious students and seminary instructors in
Iran appears to remain high even if the exuberance of the early
revolutionary years has worn off. There is a practical explanation:
clerics have a “head start” in seeking government jobs, and their
children get into the best schools (Christopher de Bellaigue, “Who
Rules Iran?” “The New York Review of Books,” vol. 49, no. 11, 27 June
2002). Moreover, students who study under popular clerics receive a
stipend, which is important given the difficulty of finding real
jobs. A visitor to Qom told the “RFE/RL Iran Report” that one
encounters individuals who have spent many years in the seminary
without completing their studies.
Some seminarians’ lack of purpose or identity or sense of
rootlessness is furthered by the disdain many people have for the
lower echelons of the clerical classes. In fact, such disdain is not
a new phenomenon. During the 1960s and 1970s the “clergy were often
described in unflattering terms as venal, greedy, and hypocritical,”
whereas leading clerics “were generally described as pious and
learned” (Eric Hooglund, “Social Origins of the Revolutionary
Clergy,” “The Iranian Revolution and The Islamic Republic,” Nikki R.
Keddie & Eric Hooglund, eds., Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
1986, p. 80).
The 1979 revolution not only affected the nature of the
Iranian government but it changed the relationship between religion
and politics. The traditional criteria for judging a clergyman’s
stature (such as theological learning, writing, jurisprudence,
knowledge of canon law, and the opinion of other top clerics) became
less relevant, and political factors now play a greater role.
Three incidents illustrate this point. The 1989 succession to
the supreme leadership by Ali Khamenei and his hasty promotion to the
rank of ayatollah was one such case. Khamenei was only a hojatoleslam
but had served as president; the constitution was amended so the
supreme leader no longer had to be a source of emulation (see article
109). With the deaths of Grand Ayatollah Abolqasem Khoi (1992), Grand
Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Golpayegani (1993), and Grand Ayatollah Ali
Araki (died 1994), there was an attempt to promote Khamenei to the
rank of source of emulation. Khamenei himself withdrew from
consideration. (See “RFE/RL Iran Report,” 23 November 1998.)
The third incident illustrating the impact of politics on the
religious system relates to the 1997 presidential campaign. Thirty
members of the Qom Theological Lecturers Association were invited to
a meeting at which they were advised to declare their support for the
leading conservative candidate. Several clerics avoided the meeting,
but 14 of those in attendance informed the press that the seminary
backed the conservative candidate. The clerics who did not attend the
meeting subsequently expressed their dissent: “Those who pretend that
none of the 30 members was against [conservative candidate Ali Akbar]
Nateq-Nuri forget that Ayatollahs Mohammad Fazel [-Lankarani], Nasser
Makarem [-Shirazi], [Ebrahim] Amini [-Najafabadi], [Ali Akbar] Masudi
[-Khomeini], myself [Karimi] and a few others are also members of
that association.” (Azadeh Kian-Thiebaut, “Time for reform of the
Islamic revolution,” “Le Monde Diplomatique,” January 1998.)
Some clerics’ rejection of political involvement or a
theocratic state was not completely unexpected. In the mid-1980s
scholars were writing that some of the leading clergymen prefer “the
looser visayat-i fuqaha, which they interpret as general supervision
by the clergy over affairs…. At the most, these clerics are willing
to concede the principle of vilayat-i faqih in times of exceptional
turmoil but contend that it lapses when a government is installed, a
parliament is elected and a new state order comes into being.”
(Sharough Akhavi, “The Revolutionary Clergy,” “The Iranian Revolution
and The Islamic Republic,” Nikki R. Keddie & Eric Hooglund, eds.,
[Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986], p. 61.)
By the mid-1990s, withdrawal was, in some cases, becoming
opposition to the Khomeini interpretation of the Islamic state in
which clerics hold executive power. “Already, the higher-ranking
ulama, under the banner of the institution of marja’iyat, are
moving to their traditional role of opposing the state with seemingly
traditional reasoning, i.e. the illegitimacy of the state in the
absence of the Lord of the Age.” (Maziar Behrooz, “The Islamic State
and the Crisis of Marja’iyat in Iran,” Comparative Studies of
South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, Vol. XVI, No. 2 [1996].)
The leading clerics’ unhappiness with the country’s
politics is illustrated by the point that eight of the top 12
ayatollahs reportedly refused to vote in the February 2004
parliamentary elections (Grand Ayatollah Yusef Sanei, cited by the
“Chicago Tribune,” 2 May 2004).
Nevertheless, there still are many clerics in Iranian
governmental institutions. In this case, it is the middle-ranking
clerics who dominate and they are not likely to want the system to
change because of its benefits to them.
“First, those mollas [sic] who have gained political power
can be expected to be reluctant to return to the mosques to become
once again simply preachers. Second, the fact that so many
politically active mollas [sic] come from lower-class backgrounds,
and also that so many of the tullab [religious students] have similar
origins, means that their support of the concept of clerical
political activism is tantamount to having an assured means of upward
mobility. Third, clerical control of the government has meant
clerical control of government revenues, and thus financial
independence form the traditional support of private, lay persons.”
(Eric Hooglund, “Social Origins of the Revolutionary Clergy,” “The
Iranian Revolution and The Islamic Republic,” Nikki R. Keddie & Eric
Hooglund, eds., [Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986], p. 82.)
Developments in Iraq, combined with the 25 years of
mismanagement by the Iranian theocracy, indicate that the Shi’a
community will undergo major changes in the coming decade. The
Iranian theocracy is faced with two choices: complying with public
sentiments and basing its legitimacy more on popular support than on
religion, or continuing to impose itself on the Iranian people. (Bill
Samii)
RELIGIOUS MINORITIES FACE PERSECUTION… The U.S. State Department
renamed Iran as a Country of Particular Concern in its sixth Annual
Report on International Religious Freedom, which was released on 15
September (). Other
countries of concern are Burma, China, Eritrea, North Korea, Saudi
Arabia, Sudan, and Vietnam.
Iran’s religious minorities — Baha’is, Christians,
Jews, and Sunni Muslims — report “imprisonment, harassment,
intimidation, and discrimination based on their religious beliefs,”
and all the minorities suffer some “officially sanctioned
discrimination.” Jews feel threatened because of the government’s
anti-Israel policies and Baha’i sites have been destroyed (see
“RFE/RL Iran Report,” 13 September 2004).
According to the State Department report, evangelical
Christians are not allowed to proselytize. Security personnel monitor
churches and demands worshippers’ identity papers.
Indeed, approximately 80 evangelical Christians were arrested
on 9 September when police raided the Assemblies of God annual
conference in Karaj, BosNewsLife reported, citing Compass news
agency. Radio Farda reported on 12 September that most of those
arrested were released, and that many who spoke to the station had
requested anonymity for fear of retribution.
Michael Kolahdozan is one of two Catholics in Shiraz, “The
Daily Star” reported on 17 September, and he finds it difficult to
practice his religion. “I go to an Anglican church here as there is
no Catholic service. There is in Isfahan and Tehran, but they are
Armenian Catholic churches, and I don’t speak Armenian,” he
explained. Kolahdozan added that he sometimes goes to a synagogue.
His parents live in Australia and his sister lives in England, and
Kolahdozan finds it difficult to find a compatible partner. “I cannot
find a wife and do not want a Muslim girl. The only woman I could
marry would be in Tehran, but they are mainly foreigners. I want
somebody who can speak my language,” he said. (Bill Samii)
…AS DO SUFI MUSLIMS. The State Department’s Annual Report on
International Religious Freedom, which was released on 15 September
(), refers to
“government repression of Sufi religious practices, including the
constant harassment and intimidation of prominent Sufi leaders by the
intelligence and security services.” The size of the Sufi population
is unknown.
There are four major Shi’a Sufi orders in Iran, according
to Moojan Momen’s “An Introduction to Shi’i Islam” (New
Haven, 1985). The Nimatullahi order is the largest and is divided
into five branches. The Kawthar Ali Shahi branch is centered in
Hamedan, Maragheh, and Tehran. The Shamsieh or Shamsul Urafa branch
has a “khanagah” (meeting place) in Tehran. The Dhur-Riyasatayn
branch expanded in the 1980s, with branches being built throughout
Iran and even in the United States and England. The Gunabadi branch
is headquartered in Bidukht. The Safi Ali Shahi branch has at least
10 khanagahs throughout Iran.
The Dhahabi order is based in Shiraz, where, as of 1985, it
maintained a khanagah. It also has meeting places in Tehran and
Tabriz. The Nurbakhshi order was influential in the Safavid era
(1501-1722), and it was important in the spread of the Shi’a
faith in India. Having been suppressed near the end of the Safavid
era, it never re-established itself in Iran, although a few
practitioners remain. The Khaksar order appears to have little real
organization, many members claim to be sheikhs, and among its members
are many wandering dervishes. This order has several different
branches and meeting places in different cities. (Bill Samii)
KHAMENEI WARNS THAT ISLAMIC WORLD IN DANGER. Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei said at the 16 September closing ceremony of a Koran
recitation contest in Tehran that there is a war against the Islamic
community, state radio reported. “This war has economic, political,
cultural, military and security aspects,” Khamenei continued, “And
today, it has the greatest propaganda tools at its disposal.” Events
in Palestine, Iraq, or Afghanistan are not part of a war against
individual countries but are part of a bigger war against the
existence of Islam in the region. Khamenei said the Islamic
community’s survival is ensured by “a new Islamic spirit,
movement, and awakening,” and he warned, “they want to destroy this.”
Khamenei said the Islamic community can survive “through the Koran.
The Koran taught us everything. We should learn and understand the
Koran.”
Khamenei struck a similar chord in a 13 September speech to
state officials — on the occasion of Mab’ath, the anniversary of
Mohammad’s appointment as prophet. He said that there is a war
against the Islamic world because of its resources, state radio
reported. The global arrogance proclaims democracy and freedom, he
said, but it is trying to destroy the Islamic nation. In case there
were any questions about who he was discussing, Khamenei spelled it
out: “The arrogant power of America, this absolute manifestation of
depravity, is spreading wickedness from all its fingers in the
Islamic region today.” “The Islamic world should unanimously stand
against America’s arrogant aggression anywhere and in whatever
form. They should know that apart from resistance, there is no way to
repel the wicked nature of the evil that has manifested in the
arrogant America,” Khamenei advised. He continued: “No leniency,
flexibility, or retreat will reduce the unquenchable thirst of the
arrogant. They will not accept anything less than absolute domination
over the Islamic world, especially the Middle East region.” (Bill
Samii)
PARTIES HINT AT PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. Though Iran’s next
presidential election is still nine months away, there is a great
deal of speculation about the likely candidates.
“I would rather someone else enter the presidential race, but
if the society as well as prominent pundits conclude that I can
fulfill this task better, I will announce my readiness,” Expediency
Council Chairman Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani told
reporters in Mashhad on 16 September, IRNA reported. Rafsanjani added
that there is plenty of time for other candidates to come forward.
The reformist Islamic Labor Party’s Abbas Ahmadi told
Fars News Agency on 10 September that Hashemi-Rafsanjani has met with
leaders of his organization and announced that he would run as a
candidate under certain conditions. Rafsanjani said his decision
would depend on the country’s political climate, and he would do
it for the sake of the revolution and the system.
Former Prime Minister Mir Hussein Musavi is the
reformists’ favorite, but he is being coy about his intentions
(see “RFE/RL Iran Report,” 6 September 2004). Given the difficulties
President Hojatoleslam Mohammad Khatami has had in accomplishing
anything substantive since being elected in May 1997, Musavi’s
hesitation is understandable.
“Election of an informed, experienced, faithful, and capable
manager will expedite [Iran’s] development,” Majid Ansari of the
pro-reform Militant Clerics Association (Majma-yi Ruhaniyun-i
Mubarez) said in the 23 August “Aftab-i Yazd.” He added that a strong
democracy with public support through elections will neutralize
foreign threats. Musavi, therefore, is the only candidate for the 2nd
of Khordad Front, Ansari said, adding, “We are still talking to
Musavi.”
Another prominent member of the Militant Clerics Association,
Hojatoleslam Ali-Akbar Mohtashami-Pur, also weighed in on
Musavi’s behalf, “Aftab-i Yazd” reported on 11 September.
Mohtashami-Pur described Musavi’s “main qualifications” as “his
trustworthiness, truthfulness, and honesty.” He added that Musavi
managed the country during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq and said that
the country’s infrastructure is under attack. “We need
individuals such as Engineer Musavi, whose main concern day and night
is the people.”
Ansari said on 12 September that efforts to persuade Musavi
to run as a presidential candidate are continuing, IRNA reported.
Addressing the annual meeting of the Office for Strengthening Unity
student organization, Ansari added, “The president is representing
the republican aspect of the system and the presidential election
will represent the religious democracy in Iran.”
An anonymous “informed source” said in the 8 September
“Resalat” that Musavi definitely will not be a candidate. Quoting an
anonymous “prominent theoretician of the 2nd of Khordad Front,” the
source said: “the 2nd of Khordad Front groups are now going to select
another person as their candidate in the presidential elections. This
is because Mir Hussein Musavi has announced explicitly and clearly
that he is definitely not going to stand as a candidate.” Musavi
reportedly gave many reasons for not running, but the source refused
to share them.
Hamid Reza Taraqi, a member of the conservative Islamic
Coalition Party’s central council, said its strategy is to
encourage high public participation in the election by supporting the
candidate most likely to unite the voters and gather the highest
number of votes, ISNA reported on 7 September. Taraqi said Ali Akbar
Velayati — former foreign minister and current adviser to the
supreme leader — might be a candidate but the Islamic Coalition
Party has not started considering candidates. Taraqi concluded that
the party has not made a decision on Velayati or anybody else.
Another Islamic Coalition Party member, Hassan Ghafurifard,
said in the 4 September “Sharq” that Velayati has decided to run for
president. “As far as I know, he has decided to stand for the
elections and he has even made the arrangements for his campaigning.”
Urumiyeh parliamentary representative Abed Fatahi has
mentioned Expediency Council secretary and former Islamic Revolution
Guards Corps commander Mohsen Rezai as a possible candidate for
president, the reformist “Aftab-i Yazd” reported on 9 September.
“Channels and sources close to Mohsen Rezai are propounding the
likelihood of his presence in the presidential election, which in
some respects is a source of delight.” Among Rezai’s advantages
over other possible candidates, Fatahi mentioned “his youth and the
fact that he was a fighter and an expert in economic, political, and
military affairs.” (Bill Samii)
ARREST OF IRANIAN JOURNALISTS ANGERS RSF. Radio Farda reported on 9
September that Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has expressed outrage
over the recent arrest of three journalists — Hanif Mazrui, Babak
Ghafuri-Azar, and Shahram Rafizadeh — and called on the Iranian
government to release them promptly
(
4-8ff04fd38b71.html; see also
62).
The arrests are part of a recent crackdown on pro-reform
Internet sites, and according to Radio Farda, many Iranian weblogs
have expressed concern about this issue. Radio Farda’s
correspondent noted that the government blocked access to three
websites — baamdad.com, emrooz.ws, and rouydad.info — in late
August.
The sites later reappeared, albeit with different addresses
and formats, the BBC reported
(). The
government also closed three Internet cafes in Bushehr, RSF reported
(). Moreover, Hamid
Motaghi, the head of the Naqshineh website ()
in Qom, which has been blocked since March, was summoned to court on
21 August and freed after posting bail of 100 million rials
($11,437).
RSF on 14 September called for the immediate release of
Mazrui, Ghafuri-Azar, and Rafizadeh and referred to their “unfair
detention,” according to the RSF website
(). The journalists
are connected with the rouydad.com website, which is run from the
Netherlands by exiled journalist Sina Motallebi. RSF expressed
concern that they have been transferred to a “special wing” of Evin
prison that is reputedly a place of torture and to which only
intelligence service interrogators commanded by Judge Said Mortazavi
have access.
RSF also noted that Said Motallebi, the father of Sina
Motallebi, has been arrested in an effort to gag his son, and it
added, “We call on the Iranian judicial authorities to halt this vile
blackmail.” Said Motallebi was arrested on 8 September, and the
authorities reportedly threatened to make him “another Purzand” — a
reference to the 75-year old Siamak Purzand, who has been imprisoned
since 30 March 2003. (Bill Samii)
IRAN VIEWS HERAT PROVINCE DEVELOPMENTS POSITIVELY. Iranian Ambassador
to Kabul Mohammad Reza Bahrami told reporters on 13 September that it
is natural for his government to be concerned about the situation
along Iran’s eastern border, Iranian state radio reported on 14
September. Bahrami said that former Herat Province Governor Ismail
Khan had important roles in the struggles against the Soviet invaders
and then the Taliban, but now there is an Afghan central government
that is responsible for the entire country. Bahrami added that Iran
supports the Afghan government’s promotion of domestic security.
Iran has traditionally had a close relationship with Ismail
Khan, who spent time in Iran after fleeing a Taliban jail. A U.S.
intelligence officer once described him as an Iranian intelligence
asset, and after 2001 he traveled to Iran several times and
reportedly was the beneficiary of Iranian arms and money (see “RFE/RL
Iran Report,” 17 December 2001; 28 January, 11 February 2002; 10
March, 15 December 2003; and 6 September 2004).
Tehran is, however, familiar with Ismail Khan’s
replacement. New Herat Province Governor Seyyed Mohammad Khairkhwah
served as an ambassador to Iran until March 2002.
Khairkhwah met with the Iranian consul in Herat, Ali
Najafimanesh, on 15 September, Herat TV reported. Khairkhwah
described the government’s objectives and stressed the importance
of bilateral ties, while Najafimanesh discussed Iranian
reconstruction projects in the province and hoped that stability
would be established soon. Also in attendance were security commander
Brigadier General Ziaudin Mahmudi, the National Security
Department’s General Mayel, and Mohammadullah Afzali, the head of
the Foreign Ministry’s office in Herat. (Bill Samii)
IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN SIGN POLICE COOPERATION AGREEMENT. Afghan
Interior Minister Ali Ahmad Jalali and Iranian Ambassador to Kabul
Mohammad Reza Bahrami signed an agreement on cooperation in police
affairs on 13 September, Afghan Radio Kelid reported on 14 September.
Under the agreement, Iran will build and equip 25 border posts, train
180 Afghan police officers in Iran, and donate 125 motorcycles to the
Afghan police. (Bill Samii)
IRAN-AFGHANISTAN WATER DISCUSSIONS TAKE PLACE IN TEHRAN. Iranian and
Afghan officials met in Tehran on 8 September in what IRNA described
as their first joint meeting within the framework of the 1973 Helmand
(Hirmand) River treaty. The river flows from Afghanistan to Lake
Hamun, and its waters are then used in Iran’s Sistan va
Baluchistan Province. Availability of water has been hampered in
recent decades by Soviet tactics during the war in Afghanistan,
drought, and poor relations between the former Taliban regime and the
Iranian government. The situation has improved since 2002, but
Iranians still complain of water shortages (see “RFE/RL Iran Report,”
29 May 2000; 10 and 23 September, 4, 11, and 25 November, 9 December
2002; 6 January and 20 October 2003, and 6 September 2004). Deputy
Energy Minister Reza Ardakanaian told IRNA that they are preparing
the grounds for implementing the treaty. He said that under normal
circumstances, Iran’s annual share is 820 million cubic meters.
Ardakanian added that decisions made at the meeting will go into
effect on 22 September, when the “water year” begins. (Bill Samii)
IRANIANS, TAJIKS INK PRELIMINARY AGREEMENTS. President Hojatoleslam
Mohammad Khatami and a delegation of Iranian officials arrived in
Dushanbe on 11 September on the third leg of a trip that had already
taken them to Yerevan and Minsk, international news agencies
reported. The Iranians and their Tajik hosts met with President
Khatami and his Tajik counterpart, Imamali Rahmonov, and signed seven
memorandums of understanding, including one on “bilateral cooperation
based on mutual respect and protection of both countries’
interests.” Other agreements addressed the operation of the
hydroelectric power plant at Sangtudeh, “herbal quarantine,” and the
establishment of an Iranian trade center. Yet another agreement
allowed for land in Tehran for the construction of a Tajik Embassy.
Khatami and Rahmonov flew to the Sangtudeh construction site in
southern Tajikistan on 13 September, the Avesta website reported.
According to the agreements, Iran will invest $250 million in the
project and will own 51 percent of it. (Bill Samii)
KHATAMI HOPES TAJIK VISIT WILL LEAD TO BETTER TIES. Iran was the
first country to recognize Tajikistan’s independence in the early
1990s, RFE/RL’s Antoine Blua reports. Since then, expectations
were that the two countries — which share a common language — would
develop close ties. That hasn’t happened. Iranian President
Mohammad Khatami visited Tajikistan from 11-14 September to try to
change the situation.
Khatami’s three-day trip started 11 September and
featured talks with Tajik President Imamali Rakhmonov. The two
considered a broad range of issues related to bilateral cooperation
in the fields of economy, trade, and industry. Khatami said on 12
September that Iran would do what it could to help the Tajik economy
to develop. “And be sure that our policy and our strategy is to
cooperate with Tajikistan in vast areas. We consider Tajikistan’s
[development] as [part of our own] development,” Khatami said. He
added that Iran will invest more than $700 million in the Tajik
economy in the coming five years.
Davood Hermidas Bavand, who teaches international law in
Tehran, says Khatami’s trip is part of Iran’s effort to
develop closer economic relations with Central Asia: “Iran’s
[original] expectation to develop an extremely close relationship
with Tajikistan gradually caved into insignificance — once Iran and
Turkey engaged in a kind of rivalry. [Neither country] has been able
to fulfill the expectations of Central Asia in economic terms. In
light of past experience we learned to engage in commercial and
economic terms where there is a need for the people of Tajikistan and
Central Asia as well as for Iran.”
Khatami said Iran will allocate money to finish work on
Tajikistan’s Sangtudeh hydroelectric plant on the Vakhsh River.
President Rakhmonov said the Iranian side will assume 51 percent of
the total construction cost, estimated at about $500 million.
“Fifty-one percent of the Sangtudeh hydroelectric plant is the
Islamic Republic of Iran’s. Forty-nine percent is Tajik and other
countries, including Russia. To complete the construction of this
power station in four years, Iran has promised $250 million and the
Russian Federation $100 million,” he said.
A planned highway linking landlocked Tajikistan and Iran via
northern Afghanistan was also high on the agenda of the talks.
Iran’s ambassador to Tajikistan, Nasser Sarmadi Parsa,
earlier expressed dissatisfaction about the current level of
bilateral trade, which totaled $100 million last year. He stressed
that a highway linking Tajikistan and Iran would greatly promote
economic cooperation. He noted the 110-kilometer road from Iran to
Herat has already been built.
Iran is hoping a series of road projects in Central Asia will
spur economic development.
Mohammad-Reza Djalili, a professor at the Graduate Institute
of International Studies in Geneva, points out a road link to Central
Asia would serve Iran’s strategic purposes. “Iran also has a
strategic interest. The reconstruction of communication
infrastructure — roads, bridges, etc. — in Tajikistan and linking
them to the Iranian border through Afghanistan, would create a
tremendous inter-Asiatic communication route. Land transportation
could then be done from China to Europe through Tajikistan,
Afghanistan, and Iran,” he said. (Antoine Blua of RFE/RL’s News
and Current Affairs department, Farangiz Najibullah of RFE/RL’s
Tajik Service)
IRANIAN PRESIDENT ASSESSES THREE NATION TOUR POSITIVELY. Hojatoleslam
Mohammad Khatami told reporters at Mehrabad Airport on 14 September
that his trip to Armenia, Belarus, and Tajikistan went well, IRNA
reported the next day. He referred to the signing of agreements in
all three countries but allowed that bilateral trade with Tajikistan
could be better. Khatami said, “Iran’s trade exchanges with
Tajikistan have been increased during recent years by three times but
there still exist some potentials for further promotion of ties.” The
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) summit took place in Dushanbe
on 14 September, and Khatami cited approval of Iranian proposals on
reforming the organization’s decision-making process and on
establishing a free trade zone (FTZ). Khatami said the FTZ would be
set up by 2015. The Iranian president said he met with counterparts
from Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, as well as prime
ministers from Pakistan and Turkey. (Bill Samii)
IRANIAN MILITARY SITE INTERESTS IAEA. The International Atomic Energy
Agency’s (IAEA) board of governors began discussions on the
Iranian nuclear program on 13 September in Vienna, and unidentified
diplomats said on 10 September that the IAEA has asked to inspect the
military site at Parchin, located about 30 kilometers southwest of
Tehran, AFP reported. Among the activities that reportedly take place
there is research on chemical explosives by the Defense Industries
Organization. Parchin is not mentioned in an IAEA report currently
under consideration in Vienna.
Hussein Musavian, spokesman for the Iranian delegation at the
Board of Governors meeting, rejected on 13 September news reports
that the IAEA has asked to visit the Parchin military site, IRNA
reported.
David Albright of the Institute for Science and International
Security on 15 September released satellite imagery of the site and
told Reuters that UN inspectors should determine what is going on
there (for the ISIS imagery and analysis, see
). According
to the analysis, the site is “a logical candidate for a nuclear
weapons-related site, particularly one involved in researching and
developing high explosive components for an implosion-type nuclear
weapon.”
Musavian on 16 September again dismissed the allegations,
Reuters reported. “This is a new lie, like the last 13 lies based on
news reports that have been proved to be lies,” he said.
An anonymous “senior U.S. official” told Reuters on 17
September that satellite imagery of the Parchin military site
“clearly shows the intention to develop weapons.” Another senior U.S.
official was less sanguine, and according to an anonymous “Western
diplomat” cited by Reuters, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency is
unsure about the Parchin site’s possible nuclear function.
Anonymous diplomats said in the 17 September “Washington
Post” that the UN has been negotiating with Iran since June for
access to not just one but four military sites that have possible
dual-use equipment. This is considered a sensitive issue because it
affects the security of Iranian conventional military programs,
according to “The Washington Post.” The IAEA has been gathering
information on the Parchin site for almost two years.
IAEA Director-General Mohammad el-Baradei’s comments at a
17 September news conference in Vienna were more diplomatic. “We are
aware of this new site that has been referred to,” he said according
to Radio Farda. “We do not have any indication that this site has any
nuclear-related activities. However, we will continue to investigate
this and other sites, we’ll continue to have a dialogue with
Iran.” (Bill Samii)
IAEA CRITICAL OF IRANIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION. The relatively tough
wording of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 18 September
resolution on Iran has prompted an angry reaction from Tehran. Press
reports that preceded the resolution’s publication indicated that
Iranian behavior is frustrating some members of the international
community.
IAEA Director-General el-Baradei discussed implementation of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement in Iran on 13
September, the opening day of the Board of Governors meeting,
according to the agency’s website
(
n). He said understanding of the Iranian nuclear program is
increasing, Iran has fulfilled all requests for access, and it has
responded to IAEA information requests, “although in certain
instances the process needs to be accelerated.”
El-Baradei said there are two issues that need to be
resolved. The first is the source of and reason for uranium
contamination found at certain locations and on some domestically
produced equipment. Investigations of Iranian statements regarding
the absence of P2 centrifuge-related activities between 1995 and 2002
are necessary, he added. El-Baradei expressed concern about
Tehran’s reversal of its decision to suspend some
enrichment-related activities, and he urged Iran “to continue to
accelerate its cooperation, pursuing a policy of maximum transparency
and confidence building, so that we can bring the remaining
outstanding issues to resolution within the next few months and
provide assurance to the international community.”
France, Germany, and Great Britain warned Iran on 13
September that its reversal of its pledge to suspend uranium
enrichment is undermining their confidence, international news
agencies reported. Foreign Minister Jack Straw warned, “What Iran has
to understand is that it cannot turn the issue of confidence on and
off like a tap,” the “Financial Times” reported on 14 September.
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said, “There is the risk of
Tehran making a miscalculation. I hope that it sees and understands
that. If not, we could be in a serious situation,” Reuters reported
on 14 September. French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier said that
negotiations with the Iranians remain difficult almost a year after
their promise to suspend enrichment activities, Radio France
International reported on 13 September.
Hussein Musavian, spokesman for the Iranian delegation at the
current IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, stressed on 13
September that the suspension of uranium enrichment would last “just
for a short, temporary period,” Reuters reported. Iran reportedly is
growing frustrated by continuing inspections of its nuclear
facilities.
In a critique of the situation in which Iran finds itself,
Tabriz parliamentary representative Akbar Alami told ISNA on 13
September that some Iranian officials were complacent and
inordinately optimistic about Europe. Rather than dealing with
European states, Alami said, the issue should have been handled
normally, through the legislature, the Foreign Ministry, the Iranian
Atomic Energy Organization, and the IAEA. The nuclear issue is
secondary to the Europeans’ and America’s real concern, Alami
said, which is the nature and power of a state that has interests
that conflict with their own. As long as this situation prevails, he
said, they will not allow Iran to become an independent nuclear
power.
Representatives to the IAEA board of governors met behind
closed doors on 15 September in order to discuss the wording of a
resolution on the Iranian nuclear program, csmonitor.com reported.
U.S. officials reportedly seek tough language and a 31 October
deadline to “remedy all failures identified to date” by the IAEA,
according to the website, and they also want the removal of any
references to a state’s right to peacefully pursue nuclear
energy.
Iranian official Hussein Musavian described the U.S. draft
resolution by saying, “The Americans have put forward a draft, which
is, relative to the one put forward by the Europeans, extraordinarily
harsher against Iran,” Iranian state television reported. The next
day he said that the draft resolution is unacceptable, Mehr News
Agency reported on 16 September. China rejects the resolution and
amendments proposed by Russia are not included, he said, adding that
Tehran seeks major changes to the draft resolution.
The resolution adopted by the board of governors on 18
September notes “with serious concern” that Iran has not suspended
“all” activities relating to the enrichment and reprocessing of
uranium, and it also expresses concern about Iran’s plan to
introduce 37 tons of yellowcake uranium at its conversion facility
(
). Yellowcake can be converted into uranium hexafluoride, which in
turn can be enriched in centrifuges. The resolution also “strongly
urges” Iran to comply with IAEA requests for information and access
to individuals and locations, citing a date of 25 November, which is
when the next board of governors meeting takes place. The resolution
“deeply regrets” Iran’s reversal of stated intentions of
suspending enrichment and reprocessing activities.
Hojatoleslam Hassan Rohani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme
National Security Council, said on 19 September that “Today, all
ambiguities of Iran’s nuclear case have been cleared for the
agency,” IRNA reported. He criticized the three European powers for
failing to comply with commitments to help the Iranian nuclear
program. “In regard to the suspension of uranium enrichment, the
resolution has asked us to suspend this process immediately,” he
added, according to Radio Farda. “For the time being, the Islamic
Republic of Iran has not decided to prolong the suspension.” (Bill
Samii)
IS WEAPONIZATION NEAR? International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Director-General el-Baradei said on 14 September that there is no
firm evidence that Iran is trying to develop a nuclear weapons
capability, but it is not clear if its activities are entirely
peaceful, Reuters reported. “Have we seen any proof of a weapons
program? Have we seen undeclared [uranium] enrichment? Obviously
until today there is none of that,” el-Baradei said. “But are we in a
position to say that everything is peaceful? Obviously we are not at
this stage,” he added.
Iran is no “more than 12 to 48 months from acquiring a
nuclear bomb, lacks for nothing technologically or materially to
produce it, and seems dead set on securing an option to do so,”
according to a draft report from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy
Education Center (NPEC) released on 13 September
().
The study — which is partly funded by the Pentagon and includes
input from leading experts on Iran, the Middle East, and
proliferation issues — warns that after Iranian acquisition of a
nuclear -weapons option regional proliferation could increase, Iran
might manipulate oil prices upward, and Iran could increase its
support for terrorist organizations.
A day earlier, Israeli Defense Forces intelligence chief
Major General Aharon Farkash-Ze’evi said that at the current rate
Iran will be able to independently achieve nuclear-weapons capability
by the spring of 2005, “Haaretz” reported on 13 September. “”This
does not mean that it will have a bomb in 2005. It means that it will
have all the means at its disposal to build a bomb,” he added. (Bill
Samii)
CORRECTION. The 13 September “RFE/RL Iran Report” asserted that
Tehran military governor Teimour Bakhtiar wielded the first pickax to
strike the dome of the Baha’i center in Tehran in May 1955. New
York University’s professor Farhad Kazemi wrote in to say that
armed forces chief Nader Batmanghelidj struck the first blow while
Bakhtiar looked on, and afterwards military governorship personnel
completed the destruction. (Bill Samii)
*********************************************************
Copyright (c) 2004. RFE/RL, Inc. All rights reserved.
The “RFE/RL Iran Report” is a weekly prepared by A. William Samii on
the basis of materials from RFE/RL broadcast services, RFE/RL
Newsline, and other news services. It is distributed every Monday.
Direct comments to A. William Samii at [email protected].
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