AKCAM: BEYOND ROADMAPS AND PROTOCOLS: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN TURKEY’S PATH TO PEACE WITH ARMENIANS
By Taner Akcam
Armenian Weekly
December 21, 2009
This article was written explicitly for an American audience in late
spring 2009. When I penned it, there was no sign on the horizon of a
rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey. I haven’t changed anything
in the article, since recent developments are only a confirmation of
what I had suggested last spring.
A huge poster of Ataturk hanging from a building. (Photo by Mujgan
Arpat) The purpose of this article was to give a general overview of
the Armenian-Turkish conflict and to show where the opportunities lay
for a chance. In order to do this, I followed two different objectives:
(1) to establish a framework for conceiving the recent developments in
Turkey and (2) to explain to an American audience that the U.S. is one
of the major powers-if not the only one-that can change the parameters
of this frozen conflict. My hope is that this article will contribute
to our understanding and evaluation of ongoing developments in Turkey.
>From the outset, I would like to clearly state my argument: It is a
good thing for the Turkish-Armenian problem to be solved. We have to
present convincing arguments that show why allowing this conflict to
fester is in no one’s interest.
I would like to emphasize this point because I know that another
position on this says, "There might be a problem out there but we
can live with this problem. Solving this conflict is not crucial for
us, and we even can get some benefits by its being dragged out." The
argument goes this way: We know the position of all the parties and we
know the difficulties lying in front of a solution. For us [the U.S.],
Turkey is an important ally and strategic partner in the Middle East.
U.S. national security interests forbid making Turkey angry or pushing
it on any issue it refuses to make concessions on. For the sake of
our national interest, therefore, we cannot make any changes and we
have to live with this problem unless Turkey changes its policy. If
Turkey moves ahead for a solution on this issue, we will salute this,
but as long as Turkey doesn’t change its policy, we cannot do much
and we have to accept living with this problem.
So, knowing this argument, my starting assumption is that it is
important for Turkey, Armenia, and for the region that this problem be
solved. It should be in nobody’s interest that this problem continues
to be dragged out. The Turkish-Armenian conflict is an important
stumbling block for peace, democracy, and therefore security in the
region. There is a strong interrelation between solving this problem
and establishing stabile, tranquil relations in the Middle East. If
this is so, we have to see what has to be changed. The parameters
of the conflict are known; the position of the parties is also well
known. Let’s look more closely at where there is something we can
change.
Akcam: Unfortunately, I have observed that the following mindset is
still prevalent in the U.S.: "There is an Islamic threat in Turkey, a
threat of Shariat rule of law. The Islamists have taken over in Turkey
and it is their administration that is in power. This government is
foreign to the modern and secularist values of the West and wants to
push Turkey away from the West. The republic and western values that
Ataturk established are under attack. The Turkish Army is the true
and trustworthy friend of the West, and by protecting secularism and
Western values, it is trying to keep Turkey a part of the West…"
I will discuss the issue by putting Turkey in the center. I will lay
out some points that show what should or can change in Turkey to make
a solution possible.
There are four major actors that can change the parameters and
contribute to the solution directly: Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
the international community, most of all the United States. Assessing
all these actors and their positions from a short-term perspective,
I cannot say I am very optimistic. I am not expecting any positive
short-term development in the conflict. A change towards a solution
can only be introduced if the parties (or at least one of the parties)
are ready to change their conventional policy on the issue.
On the other hand, we are now experiencing a fortunate conjuncture of
domestic and international conditions that can be characterized as
"historic." These conditions include the democratization process
in Turkey; recent developments in the Caucasus, and especially
the convergence of Russian and American interests in opening the
Turkish-Armenian border; the Nabucco pipeline agreements; and
finally, the new American administration and its policy toward
Iraq and especially the Kurds. If the actors who wish to resolve
the Turkish-Armenian conflict carry out their responsibilities with
seriousness and courage, many of the obstacles to a resolution will
be removed.
Up until now, we have had the following picture: Turkey denies the
fact of the genocide and rejects any acknowledgment and responsibility
for it. At the same time, Turkey is an important ally and strategic
partner of the U.S., and the U.S. has come to believe that Turkey’s
confronting its history and the United States’ national security were
mutually exclusive propositions. In order to promote regional security
and maintain good relations with Turkey’s ruling military and civil
bureaucracy, the U.S. followed the latter’s wishes and backed off of
the Armenian issue. U.S. policy is based on the premise that unless
Turkey moves ahead on this policy on its own, the U.S. has to accept
the fact of denial and live with this problem.
The Turkish military and civil bureaucracy, meanwhile, rest upon the
mindset that views honestly confronting history as something that
is not compatible with maintaining its national security. Turning
the events of 1915 into a taboo was directly a result of viewing
them as a national security problem. In 2007, for example, a Turkish
court sentenced the Istanbul Armenian publisher Arat Dink, the son
of murdered journalist Hrant Dink, to a year in prison for calling
the events of 1915 genocide. "Talk about genocide," said the court,
is not protected speech, as it "unfavorably affects national security
and national interest."
The same justification underlies extrajudicial acts of terror, such
as the political assassinations planned and partly implemented by the
anti-Armenian criminal enterprise known as Ergenekon. In January 2009,
a government probe of an Ergenekon suspect turned up a hit list of five
so-called "traitors to national security." The individuals targeted
for assassination included Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk and Hrant Dink,
who was shot down in January 2007. My name was also on that list.
The same mentality is what fed their treatment of the Kurdish problem.
Any steps towards a solution that gave civil and democratic rights
to the Kurds were viewed as a threat to security and therefore avoided.
Kurdish demonstrators. (Photo by Mujgan Arpat) I refer to this mind
set above as "conventional" thinking, and as long as the U.S. and
Turkey consider "facing history" and "national security" as mutually
exclusive. or consider facing history as a threat to national
security, there will be no solution possible in the Turkish-Armenian
conflict. This policy is a product of a Cold War mentality.
Here is the counter-argument: Facing history cannot solely be the
"moral" argument. Pitting national interest against facing history
is just plain wrong. In fact, any security policy in the Middle East
that excludes morality cannot ultimately be a policy that will work;
eventually it will undermine national security.
We have to understand that one of the main problems in the region
is the insecurity felt by different groups towards each other as a
result of events that have occurred in history. When you make the
persistent denial of these pain-filled acts a part of your security
policy, this brings with it insecurity for the other. This is what we
call the security dilemma: What one does to enhance one’s own security
causes a reaction that, in the end, can make one even less secure.
The existing sense of mistrust engendered by the denial is one of
the main causes of instability and is an obstacle to the creation
of security in the region. For this reason, any security concept,
any policies of realpolitik in and for Turkey and the Middle East,
that ignores morality and forgets to address historic wrongdoings is
doomed to fail in the end.
If one knows Turkey and the Middle East, one would easily recognize
that history and historical injustices are not dead issues, divorced
from the past; the past is the present in the Middle East. Therefore,
facing history is a very real issue, and for realpolitik to be
successful in the region, acknowledging historic wrongdoings must be
integrated into a policy of national security.
In order to be able to make some suggestions for solving this conflict,
we first have to create a model that can help us understand the main
political problems in Turkey. My central concept in this regard is
confined to the term "continuity." The underlying problem is that
there is a basic conflict in Turkey, a power struggle between the
military and civil bureaucracy on the one side, and the majority of
Turkish society on the other. The conflict has been going on for a
long time and is related to the character of the regime in Turkey. The
foundation of this conflict was formed during the late Ottoman Empire
and transferred to the newly created Turkish Republic.
Since its inception, Turkey has been administered not by its
elected government representatives but by a military and civilian
bureaucracy, which was not elected, rather self-appointed. This came
about because Turkey was established after the dissolution of the
Ottoman Empire after World War I through the efforts of the armed
forces and bureaucracy. Therefore, the military and the bureaucracy
in Ankara consider themselves the true inheritors and owners of Turkey.
At its inception in 1923, the Turkish Republic was governed through
a one-party system. This changed in 1946, when multi-party elections
were allowed; however, elected officials in Turkey have never been
free to govern. By enacting coups d’etat every 10 years or so, the
military created the systemic conditions that gave them control over
the legal, political, and administrative bodies of government.
Today, Turkey’s governmental system is filled with institutions whose
role is to ensure the permanence of military control. In particular,
as a result of the constitution that was drafted after the 1980 coup,
the system guarantees the military’s control over every organ of
government, while making the military itself completely immune from
outside control.
Today, the military exerts a patriarchal control over the
administrative, political, and legal system, while no aspect of
the military, including military expenses, is subject to civilian
oversight. The regime of military control in Turkey exists in no other
democratic country. I have to add that until the 1990’s, the U.S. and
the European Union were the main supporters of these military coups
and military democracy in Turkey.
Akcam: Today, the military exerts a patriarchal control over the
administrative, political, and legal system, while no aspect of
the military, including military expenses, is subject to civilian
oversight. (Photo by Mujgan Arpat) For reasons that I will not go into
here, the founding members of the Turkish Republic, the military and
civil bureaucracy, formed the country as if in opposition to the rich
ethnic and cultural mosaic of Turkish society. The founders perceived
the plurality of society at that time as a problem for the continuity
and security of the state.
The founding philosophy of the state rested on the existence of
a state-society axis, and was based on difference and the belief
that the state needed to be protected from society. In this way,
founding legends were created, and these legends turned into very
strong taboos. Questioning these taboos was made punishable under
the criminal code. There were five very important taboo subjects that
made up the main principles in the formation of the Turkish Republic:
(1) There are no Kurds in Turkey. Those people called Kurds are
actually Turks who happen to live in the mountains. In order to punish
anyone who might question this taboo, Articles 125 and 175 of the
Turkish Criminal Code were enacted.
(2) Turks are a blended nation, and Turkish society does not contain
different classes. Anyone who discusses different classes or speaks
of class warfare is a communist and should therefore be punished.
Articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish Criminal Code were enacted to
punish anyone guilty of this.
(3) Turkey is a secular society where Western values are supreme.
Islamic values and lifestyle cannot be praised and are indefensible.
Article 13 of the Turkish Criminal Code was enacted to punish anyone
who disputed this.
(4) The Armenian Genocide never happened. It is a complete lie. Until
the year 2000 there were no specific articles in the criminal code to
punish anyone questioning this because, frankly, no one ever seriously
did question it.
(5) The Turkish Armed Forces constitute the guardianship of these
five taboos, and no one may ever question their position and control
over the regime.
Not only did the armed forces and bureaucracy shape the republic
around these founding principles, but they also created a system that
would not allow the elected parties even the appearance of running
the country. They created a national security concept constructed on
these principles. This national security concept, in which no elected
government had any say, was nevertheless placed before each and every
elected official as "the real constitution" or "red book," if you
will. And it was made explicitly clear that the country was going to
be administered according to the principles contained within it. In
line with this security concept, anyone that put forth a point of view
questioning the subjects of the five taboos was defined as a threat
to national security. This is the origin of the national security
concept related to the Armenian Genocide that I mentioned above.
The concept of continuity also explains the roots of the
Armenian-Turkish conflict and how the genocide became a taboo in
Turkey. Most of the cadres who founded the republic were members
of the Union and Progress Party (CUP), which was behind the 1915
genocide. After organizing several congresses in Anatolia, these cadres
formed the People’s Party in 1923. They then announced the formation of
the republic in the same year and later, as the Republican People’s
Party (CHP), ruled the country as a single party until 1945. The
so-called multi-party regime that came into being after 1945 was a
continuation of what had prevailed before. During this period, the
parties that ruled Turkey were groups that had spun off from the CHP,
the sole party in power from 1923-45. With the victory of the Justice
and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, we saw for the first time a crack
in this control of the regime, and the crumbling of the dominance of
the military-civilian bureaucratic elite.
We could approach the history of the Turkish Republic as a series of
rebellions against the state by those segments of society targeted and
defined in the five taboos. The coups of 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997
were all examples of the military interfering with the state in order
to suppress opposition and the advances made by those segments. All
of the issues that are considered problematic in Turkey today-the
Kurds, Cyprus, the conflict between religion and secularism, the
Armenian Genocide-arise from nothing other than the questioning of
the fundamental pillars of the state as defined by the military.
When the targets of these taboo subjects began confronting the
military-bureaucratic regime, those taboos began to fade. One would
think that the various targets of these taboos would join together and
try to force the state to lift these prohibitions, thereby expanding
their social and political liberties. On the contrary, all throughout
the history of the republic, the military-bureaucratic elite followed
a set strategy of making sure that when it fought to defend one taboo,
it persuaded the targets of the other taboos to join their side. This
strategy has been successful for the most part, and today in Turkey
there is a serious sense of insecurity amongst different groups
within society. Today, many groups are struggling with the issue of
confronting and trusting one another. These bases of mistrust include:
the confrontation between religion and secularism and its subsets;
the confrontation between the Alewite and Sunni sects; the ethnic
confrontation between the Turks and Kurds; and a general confrontati
on of society with its history.
In each and every one of these areas of confrontation there is a very
deep well of suspicion. Alewites and secularists see the freedom to
"live according to religious values," as expressed in the freedom
to veil, as a threat of religious rule under the Shariat. There
is both a very serious cultural confrontation going on, as well
as a process of defining those who do not share your values as the
"other." The main argument used in defining this other states that
not only are the beliefs of the other wrong, but the other harbors
a secret agenda. The other can jump up and down yelling, "No I don’t
have any ulterior motives," but it does not matter: Society remains
unconvinced and instead believes that it sees through the other and
understands the other’s true motives. This is what I define as the
sense of suspicion and insecurity that pervades relationships.
The same issue occurs in the other confrontations. In each and every
one of these cases, one side remains highly skeptical of the other
and is convinced of secret agendas and undeclared motivations. An
increasing sense of insecurity characterizes what has descended upon
the militarist elite. This is why the Ergenekon investigations carry
so much historical importance. An example of this can be seen in the
new knowledge that apparently all of the organizations and actions
that were depicted as threats of pending Islamic Shariat rule in the
1990’s in Turkey was organized by the military elite. The existing
suspicion and mistrust between the different social groups was fed by
another reality-that each of these group were not only victims but also
supporters of the military when it came to suppressing the other taboo
groups. This has made an honest dealing with history very difficult.
The electoral success of the AKP constitutes an historic opportunity:
Now, maybe for the first time in Turkish history, an elected government
with strong support from the people is trying to push the military and
bureaucracy out of the political sphere and diminish their political
power over the judicial-administrative system.
After the AKP’s coming to power, the continuity which was an
essential component of the ruling elite is changing and headed
towards a breakdown. This breakdown translates into the possibility
for new answers, new resolutions to Turkish-Armenian tensions. In
other words, the answers will come in direct ratio to the breakdown
of this continuity.
We could hold long discussions about the significance of the AKP but,
in a nutshell, this party is a product of Turkish modernization. The
AKP is like the closing of a pair of scissors on the modernization
process of Turkey. For many historical reasons, the engine of Turkish
modernization was the military and bureaucracy, and the process was
based on keeping out Islamic cultural and political values. Islam
and modernization were like the blades of a pair of scissors that
separated as the scissors opened.
Turkish modernization did not just banish Islamic cultural and legal
codes and Islam’s political representatives from the administration
(the Ulema class being first and foremost), but it also rid the country
of the Christian bourgeoisie (already excluded from the military and
bureaucracy). Both during the era of the Union and Progress Party
and the republic, a new Turkish bourgeoisie class was created for
whom the military-bureaucracy operated as a central core.
For this reason, the bourgeois class feels a direct connection with the
military and bureaucracy, and has always supported it. This is one of
the main reasons why Turkey hasn’t experienced strong democratization
moves in the in the decades leading up to the 1990’s.
In contrast, the AKP represents a whole new middle and upper middle
class that developed and thrived without relying on state resources.
It is a class that represents a different kind of modernization,
a modernization that is quite outside what the military-bureaucracy
envisioned. It is a new modern class that has conservative Islamic
values at its core. The AKP tried very hard to compromise with the
military-bureaucracy, a group that sees itself as the true standard
bearer for the regime and its real foundation, but it did not happen.
For this reason, the AKP understood that a policy of compromise with
the military-bureaucracy under an existing constitutional-legal and
institutional framework could not work and would necessitate the
loss of power for the AKP. After some experience in this regard,
the AKP has understood that the only way to remain in power, the
only security they have, is to engage in a process of reform and the
expansion of civil liberties, targeted towards EU membership. This,
in summary, d escribes the power play that is currently ongoing.
The dominant perception in certain circles in the West and also in
the U.S. regarding the character of the AKP must fundamentally change.
Unfortunately, I have observed that the following mindset is still
prevalent in the U.S.: "There is an Islamic threat in Turkey, a
threat of Shariat rule of law. The Islamists have taken over in Turkey
and it is their administration that is in power. This government is
foreign to the modern and secularist values of the West and wants to
push Turkey away from the West. The republic and western values that
Ataturk established are under attack. The Turkish Army is the true
and trustworthy friend of the West, and by protecting secularism and
Western values, it is trying to keep Turkey a part of the West…" Such
arguments are unfortunately much too common. The Middle East Forum
think-thank, and the individuals Frank Gaffney Jr., Michael Rubin,
Soner Cagaptay, and Zeyno Baran [these names were not included in my
original version], have been disseminating these views in the U.S.
These are the "Turkish militarists" in the U.S. and are an enemy to
democracy in Turkey. They simply want the militaristic democracy that
was established during the Cold War period to continue.
The AKP as a governing party has been involved in a very powerful
struggle with the military and bureaucratic elite on the founding
legend of the republic. We are seeing a fundamental change in this
area, as each of the taboos are gradually being lifted, one after
the other.
The points of contention between the AKP and the military and
bureaucratic elites are well known. Cyprus is one; seeking a solution
to the Kurdish conflict is another; and a third is to push the
military outside of civilian politics. The investigation against a
criminal network within the military and bureaucracy, which is known
as Ergenekon, is the symbol of this power struggle. For the sake of
argument, I am describing the parties in a very simplistic way. Of
course, as in every power struggle, other actors also play a role.
Continuous compromises have been made between these parties, and
their positions change. For example, there are certain circles within
the military and bureaucracy that generally agree for a change and
support the governing party in its fight against the traditional role
of military and bureaucracy within the society.
The AKP may have a different position than the military and bureaucracy
on the Armenian-Turkish conflict, particularly on the question of
opening the border between Turkey and Armenia, and recognizing a
historic wrongdoing. Of the many examples I could present to support
this statement, I will focus on two: (1) Mazlum-Der, the Association of
Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People, is an organization
with very close ties to the AKP administration. Mazlum-Der has pushed
for an official apology to the Armenians for what happened in 1915,
as well as to Kurds for all that has occurred during the Republican
era. (2) In May 2009, Prime Minister Erdogan broke a huge taboo when
he said, "This mindset has seemingly not changed. It has been the same
for many years in this country. They have chased members of different
ethnicities out of this country. What have we gained? This was the
result of a fascist mentality."
Potentially, the AKP is in the best position to make progress in this
area. It has the potential to open the door for confronting history,
if it feels that civil liberties are strengthened enough and positive
steps have been taken towards resolving the Kurdish issue.
The Ergenekon investigations and arrests are a major blow against
those who were working towards a non-solution in the Turkish-Armenian
conflict. One could say that Ergenekon was an extension of the Union
and Progress Party to the present day. It represents the political
mindset that made genocide possible in the past, the mindset that
organized the deportation of the Christians from Anatolia, a mindset
that Erdogan referred to as fascist. For this reason, it is fair to
say that the judicial strikes against Ergenekon have dealt a serious
blow to the political forces that would have attempted to prevent a
softening of relations between Turks and Armenians.
With the Ergenekon investigations and the steps being taken towards
strengthening civil liberties in Turkey, the country is moving towards
shaking off the guardianship and control of political life by the
military and bureaucracy, and moving towards normal democracy. These
steps truly carry the potential for opening a door to a detente in
the Turkish-Armenian relationship.
It is important to note that the political position in Turkey, which
is focused on an anti-Armenian and anti-genocide recognition platform
and which gained momentum after 2000, has been instigated primarily by
the Ergenekon organization. Ergenekon revolved around Turkish-Armenian
tensions and hostility towards Armenians, and the subject of the
events of 1915 constituted its political core. In order to grow as a
movement and gather public support, it did so by inciting the Turkish
population and nourishing anti-Armenian sentiments. Ergenekon was
behind the Article 301 criminal prosecutions of Orhan Pamuk, Hrant
Dink, myself, and other intellectuals. They were the ones who tried to
stop the 2005 conference of historians in Istanbul; who formed Talat
Pasha committees and organized marches in Talat Pasha’s name in Europe;
and memorialized other Unionists executed for murder in 1919.
In other words, Turkish-Armenian tensions formed the basis for the
political work of Ergenekon. Imprisoning this group would not only
eliminate serious opposition to detente with the Armenians, it will
allow detente to gather support. I argue that the obstacle to the
solution of the Turkish-Armenian problem is not resistance from
Turkish society.
In the United States, neither the Armenian Diaspora nor other
interested groups have appreciated the significance of the
investigations and the steps being taken to expand civil liberties;
they do not seem to have caught on to the direct relationship between
the Ergenekon investigations and the expanding of civil liberties
and improvement in Turkish-Armenian relations. If you want to find a
resolution to the tensions between Turks and Armenians, you need to
have a thorough understanding of the Ergenekon investigations, and the
actions being taken to create a stronger civil society. The future of
Turkish-Armenian relations will be directly affected by the Ergenekon
prosecutions and their aftermath, along with the steps being taken to
expand civil liberties, and particularly the amount of support given by
the U.S. and Europe. Simply put, there is a direct connection between
ending the military’s domination of civil politics in Turkey and the
improvement of Turkish-Armenian relations. Until Turkey moves away
from a militaristic democracy and towards a civil and normal democratic
regime, we will not see any improvement in Turkish-Armenian relations.
Nevertheless, the AKP faces challenges to solving the conflict. While
it is tackling the issues of the Kurds, Cyprus, Ergenekon
investigations, and civil liberties, the party is unlikely to add the
Armenian issue on top of everything else, and it is much more reluctant
regarding the Armenian issue. It will be just one battle too many. In
order to gain ground on the other issues, the AKP has not hesitated
to compromise with the military on the Armenian issue. The AKP is
unlikely to take on the Armenian issue without very firm support
from the outside. Unless pressure is exerted from the outside, the
AKP cannot engage the military and bureaucracy in a separate battle
on the Turkish-Armenian issue. It is just one battle too many.
In addition:
(1) The AKP gains much of its support, particularly in central and
western Anatolia, from a conservative-nationalist base. A radical
move on the issue of the Armenians would most definitely elicit a
strong negative response from this base, whose roots extend back to
the high-ranking notables of the 1910’s and 1920’s in Anatolia. That
class may or may not have directly engaged in the genocide, but the
tragedy translated into significant economic gains for them.
(2) There are some conservative-nationalists within the AKP. One should
not forget that the person who, in 2005, stated that intellectuals
like me are "traitors who stab the nation in the back" is none other
than the current assistant prime minister of Turkey. So, a radical
move on the Armenian issue could cause the AKP to lose some of its
base to the MHP (Turkish nationalistic party).
(3) Azerbaijan sits outside the country as a powerful source
of influence, and ties the hands of the administration. Emerging
from its war with Armenia from 1991-94 over Nagorno-Karabagh, which
remains unresolved, Azerbaijan demands Turkey’s influence in finding
a solution that is in its favor. This is an issue of regional politics
in the Caucasus.
We can understand the current position of the AKP from this background:
Despite being the party capable of softening Turkish-Armenian tensions
and compromising, the AKP has continued the traditional policies of
the military-bureaucracy. The AKP has always followed a strategy
that aimed to observe the historically significant date of April
24th as minimally as possible, and to stonewall-play for time. The
central core of this policy lies in sparing no effort to prevent
the U.S. from recognizing the genocide (as was done this past year)
and making promises that it does not intend to keep (like opening
the border). Likewise, it makes proposals, as in the formation of
a "historical commission," which they themselves have never taken
seriously. The central aim of both policies is to gain time, and under
these conditions, unless some external force comes in to push things
along, the Armenian issue will remain unresolved.
Conclusion
As I said at the beginning, many factors are currently at play
that offer an opportunity for historic change and the resolution of
Turkish-Armenian tensions: the democratization process in Turkey,
the new American administration, the new energy pipeline agreements
known as Nabucco, and Russia and America getting closer on the opening
of the Turkish-Armenian border.
In order to get past these tensions, the boundaries of the military
regime need to be narrowed, and those of political life expanded,
in a process of democratization. As long as the military continues
to maneuver beyond the barracks, maintaining their patriarchal
stranglehold over political, legal, and administrative areas,
continuity will prevail and conventional thinking (i.e., considering
the facing of history as a security threat) will continue to dominate
political life. In short, progress will not be made on Turkish-Armenian
issues.
In order to see this change in Turkey, the AKP must feel as if it has
some breathing room in its political fight with the military. This is
only possible if the AKP can get strong support from outside of the
country on those issues, and then feel comfortable in concentrating
its attention on the Armenian issue. So my central argument is that
only positive support and constructive pressure from the outside can
bring movement on this problem.
Steps towards solving the "Kurdish Question" may serve as a model
for the acknowledgment of the Armenian Genocide. My dear Friend Hrant
Dink called the genocide "a well 1,915 meters deep." It resembles the
"death wells" of the Kurds whose burial pits are now being unearthed.
In the Kurdish issue, the government has developed a "roadmap" that
can be summarized as the establishment (realization) of five major
steps of reconciliation. These are:
(1) Acknowledging the truth.
(2) Acknowledging any unjust actions toward others and showing
repentance.
(3) Apologizing; expressing and receiving forgiveness for those
unjust actions.
(4) Restitution; attempting to restore that which has been damaged
or destroyed, and seeking justice wherever we have the power to act
or to influence those in authority to act.
(5) The establishment of peace.
In our case, these steps means that all the nonsense about Kurds
being Mountain Turks has been dropped. The existence of Kurds is now
acknowledged. Restrictions on the Kurdish language have been lifted.
There is now a state television channel devoted to Kurdish broadcasts.
The prime minister recently visited Diyarbakir and acknowledged
the wrong actions of governments in the past. And the process of
retributive and restorative justice has been started. Those burial
pits, the death wells of Kurdish citizens, are being opened up one by
one; their remains are being removed and the security officers believed
to be responsible for the deaths are being arrested. The trials are
almost ready to begin. The government is planning an amnestia (without
calling it an amnesty) to get those fighters in the mountains to be
reintegrated into civil life. All these steps have helped to create
an atmosphere of trust which lays the ground for peace, stability,
and democracy in the region.
As we see, the government has been following the path of "acknowledging
the truth": facing history and acknowledging wrong doings in the
past, and rectifying historic injustices in the form of retributive
and restorative justice. Do we need anything else in the case of
the Armenians?
Recommendations: What the Turkish government should do
The following points are well known by all the parties, and we have
some other lists or roadmaps out there. (For example, the Turkish and
Armenian foreign ministers have developed several different lists and
roadmaps on how to normalize relations between the two countries. The
problem is not a lack of ideas or imagination, but rather one of will!
We need a government that has the will to change the existing policy.)
(1) Separation of history and current relations with Armenia. Turkey
must open the border without any conditions. The EU supports this
also. A candidate for EU membership cannot have closed borders. At the
same time, there should be no connection between the Nagorno-Karabagh
conflict and Turkey’s diplomatic relations with Armenia. There will
be great support for the opening of the border in Turkey. I am from
Kars and have personally spoken with all the political parties in
the region. Even the radical nationalists are in favor of opening the
border. Azerbaijan’s demands on Turkey have no real base of support
within Turkey. Keeping the border closed is not due to domestic
pressure, just the opposite.
(2) Article 301 of the Turkish Criminal Code must be rescinded, along
with some other restrictions in the code. Human rights organizations
and NGO’s have a detailed list of all the articles that should be
changed. This penal code is still a big problem for the freedom of
speech in Turkey, and has been used by the nationalist media and
justice system as a weapon against Turkish intellectuals.
(3) Confidence-building measures can be taken, and include changing
public perception of the "other" (i.e., the Armenians). Reviving
Armenian life and culture in Anatoli-by restoring Armenian churches
and buildings, for example-a can be an effective method of doing this.
(4) Using tourism as an effective method to overcome the barriers
between both societies. (Poland’s engagement with Jewish victims of
the Holocaust during the World War II can serve as a model.)
(5) Mobilizing the cultural dynamic of both religions in different
forms. Remembering the deaths and commemorating the victims by
organizing different religious ceremonies, such as Mevlut in Islam.
(6) Genocide recognition can be likened to a violently shaken Coca-Cola
can. The first thing is to develop a strategy that lets the gas escape
before fully opening the can. This means that Turkish society needs
to be prepared to accept the reality of the Armenian Genocide. You can
extend the solution over a period of time, and by utilizing different
steps. This does not mean temporizing or procrastinating. Instead,
allow public discussion in the media, make it easier for critical
intellectuals to address the subject.
(7) Regarding historians’ commissions: If two parties have problems
on certain issues, there is nothing wrong with establishing certain
commissions to work towards solving those problems. It is a common
experience that we have from similar conflicts around the world. It
would not be a bad idea to establish different commissions between
Turkey and Armenia to work to overcome certain problems and foster good
neighborly relations between the countries. However, I am ambivalent
regarding the idea of a historians’ commission. Even though there is
no serious proposal from the Turkish government, they want to have
a commission with a sort of legal, judicial power to decide whether
or not 1915 should be called a genocide. I would like to be clear
that any commission with the power to decide what we should call
the events of 1915 cannot work and has no chance of succeeding, for
the simple reason that the result is known beforehand. Historians
can verify the facts, but they cannot have the authority to give a
legal jud gment on the issue. The problem is not one of historians,
but rather of politicians. Secondly, what we are missing in this
conflict is not the lack of a legal decision.
(8) The term "genocide," in my opinion, is not the source of the
problem. It is a distraction, a complete red herring. I strongly
argue that the term "crime" is the source of the problem, because
in order to decide whether or not 1915 can be called a genocide, one
must first establish that what occurred in 1915 was a crime. Without
establishing a crime, you cannot discuss what sort of crime, which
label is adequate to apply to 1915. We are not yet at this point. The
conflict is not about which label to apply. The Turkish government
categorically declines to accept that what happened in 1915 is a
crime. There is no presupposition that what happened in 1915 was any
type of crime. Turkish denial maintains that the state had the right
to relocate its own people. If some of the deportees perished, that
was a tragedy, not a crime. Therefore, no moral or legal condemnation
is necessary. What we are missing in Turkey is the moral dimension.
(9) The available documents in the Ottoman archives in Istanbul, as
well as those in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Austria,
etc., which provide ample evidence of genocide, are well known. There
is no need for such a commission to look into these materials.
However, to allocate funds to make some new materials (which haven’t
been brought to light) available for scholars or to allow critical
scholars unimpeded access to certain archives, such as the Turkish
General Stuff Archive in Ankara or ATASE (which is still closed to
scholars), and to publish such materials is an important idea.
Similarly, allocating funds for the research and publication of
special topics, such as the population and demographic figures,
would also be very important. These special topics, however, can
be organized without a historians’ commission and can be solved by
cooperation between different universities and institutes. What we
are missing is the lack of funding.
(10) I would prefer that a special commission be established with
the aim of enlightening the Turkish public, rather than a judicial
or legal organ that decides on the question of whether or not it
is genocide. The main goal of such a commission would be to get
the public ready to learn the truth about the events of 1915. This
commission’s task could be formulated as the "normalization of the
discourse on 1915." Different public activities can be imagined, such
as publications, public meetings, conferences, live TV discussions,
etc. The main goal would be to prepare the public.
Recommendations: What the U.S. should do
In spite of the popularity of President Barack Obama, which has
slightly improved the image of the U.S. in Turkey, there is still very
strong resentment against the U.S. because of its policies during the
Cold War years. Right or wrong, the vast majority of people believe
that the U.S. was behind the military coup d’etats of 1960, 1971,
1980, and 1997. It is strongly believed that the U.S. supported
the anti-democratic, authoritarian military regimes in Turkey. The
2003 invasion of Iraq and the Bush Administration’s policies also
contributed tremendously to the already negative image of the U.S. in
Turkey.
The U.S. did indeed shape its policy in the region according to the
necessities of Cold War. The character of the regime in Turkey was not
important to the U.S. in the first place; to keep Turkey as a stable
partner and as NATO’s stronghold and bastion in the region against
the USSR was the key element of this policy. It policy entailed doing
whatever was necessary to keep the military-bureaucratic elite happy.
One of these policies related to the Armenian Genocide. The U.S.
accepted the policy of avoiding history due to security concerns
in the region. The U.S. was against the democratization process in
Turkey until recently.
(1) My suggestion is that the U.S. should make very clear that
it has abandoned this Cold War-era mentality and its support of
anti-democratic forces in Turkey. Furthermore, I would like to suggest
the idea of a general apology by the U.S. government to the people of
Turkey for its Cold War policies, as it would dramatically improve the
image of the U.S. in Turkey. The form and content of such an apology,
of course, can be discussed. It could be in the form of acknowledgment
that the U.S. was "not sensitive enough" to the democratic process in
Turkey and contributed to its image as a supporter of a dictatorial
regime, even if this was not the intention, etc.
(2) The U.S. should make clear in every instance that it is behind
the democratization of Turkey. This could be in the form of giving
unequivocal support to the AKP for narrowing the influence of the
military. This hasn’t been done clearly enough. For example, the EU
made it very clear in different instances that it saluted the attempt
to push the military out of the political life. But there has been
no clear political sign from the U.S.
(3) The U.S. should provide strong assistance to the acceleration
and deepening of the Ergenekon investigation by opening certain
files on Ergenekon activities in the U.S. There is a strong link
between the anti-Armenian campaigns here in the U.S. and certain
military-bureaucratic circles such as Ergenekon. If the U.S. reveals
the anti-Armenian network in the U.S. and their connection with
Ergenekon, it would change the atmosphere between Turks and Armenians
here tremendously because the public, including the Armenian Diaspora
and the Turks, would understand that there is a very strong relation
between Turkey’s democratization and eliminating anti-Armenianism. The
parties are not much aware of the strong link between anti-Armenian
campaigns (including the denial of the genocide) and Ergenekon.
(4) If information is available, the U.S. could reveal Ergenekon
activities in Azerbaijan, which could strengthen the hand of the
Turkish government against Azerbaijani pressure.
(5) The U.S. should change its policy towards the recognition of the
Armenian Genocide and the security concept towards Turkey. A good
analogy is the French concept of "Bon pour l’Orient!" translated
as "It is good enough for the East!" During the 19th century, this
concept legitimized French colonialism and provided justification for
the humiliating treatment of the eastern countries they colonized and
the acts committed there. The U.S. has to rid itself of this classic
colonial patronization that dominated the Cold War period. If democracy
is good for the U.S., then the same should be demanded of Turkey.
(6) The U.S. should support initiatives in both Turkish and Armenian
civil societies that encourage open and constructive dialogue. More
contacts, more meetings, more getting together, more knowing each
other, will all help the process.
(7) The U.S. can exert pressure on the Turkish government to open
the public sphere for more open discussion by critical scholars and
support projects that help enlighten and educate the Turkish public.
(8) Finally, and most importantly, the U.S. should stop imprisoning
itself and leave its own officials free to use the word genocide.
There is nothing wrong in acknowledging the truth.