PREVENTING TURKEY’S POPULAR SLIDE AWAY FROM THE WEST
By Soner Cagaptay
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, DC
April 12 2006
Iran’s nuclear program presents one more issue on which Washington sees
Middle East developments in a different light than does the Justice
and Development Party (AKP) government in Turkey. Since coming to
power in November 2002, AKP leaders have pursued rapprochement with
Damascus and enhanced dialogue with Iran. In March 2006, the AKP
welcomed Hamas leaders in Ankara. It is surprising that Turkey,
a traditional bastion of Western policies in the Middle East, is
promoting close ties with anti-Western actors that have hurt Turkey
for decades-Syria provided safe haven to the terrorist Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK) and Iran supported the PKK and radical Islamist
terrorists. Why do the Turkish people not resent such policies?
The Iraq war and the U.S. agenda for political transformation in the
Middle East have clashed with the Turkish people’s desire to preserve
the Middle Eastern political landscape. What is more, U.S. inaction
against the PKK’s Qandil enclave in Northern Iraq is angering most
Turks in the way Syrian and Iranian support for the PKK upset them
in the 1990s. Turkish confusion and anger toward the United States
stands in sharp contrast with the improved image of Syria and Iran
in Turkey. Meanwhile, with AKP discussing Middle Eastern politics
in terms of Islamic codes, some Turks now identify with the region
through Islam and not their national identity. The challenge for
Washington is to find a way to prevent Turkey’s popular slide away
from the United States.
Further Problems with the EU
Anti-Western sentiments in Turkey are exacerbated by problems with
the European Union (EU). Even though Turkey’s EU negotiations will
take up to a decade and do not promise membership, objections to
Turkey are already rising in the EU. In capitals such as Paris,
opinionmakers are opposing Turkey’s membership, describing the country
is “non-European.” With Cyprus, a Middle Eastern island in the EU,
Turks see this argument referring not to Turkey’s geography, but to
its dominant Muslim faith.
An important example of Turkey being treated differently than other
applicants is the EU’s embrace of a French plan to introduce references
to human rights, indicating Turkey’s combustive Kurdish question, into
the “Chapter on Education and Culture,” the first of the thirty-five
chapters of the Turkish-EU accession talks. While this chapter has
had a technical approach to educational and cultural issues in case
of previous accession countries, it is evolving into a political
one for Turkey, demanding more from Ankara than from previous EU
candidate states.
The problems in Turkish-EU relations will be exacerbated by the PKK’s
use of terror to coerce Turkey into talks. Over the past two weeks,
the PKK has launched violent demonstrations in Turkey, destroying
businesses that refuse its order for social strike, killing people,
and firebombing public buses in Istanbul. The PKK is able to operate
thanks to a vast financial, recruitment and propaganda base inside the
EU. For instance, on March 31, the Turkish daily Hurriyet reported
that the PKK’s current violent initiative is being carried out with
daily directives from Danish-based Roj TV. EU stipulations that
“Turkey should do more on the Kurdish issue” sound insincere to Turks
when PKK fronts are thriving inside Europe.
European pusillanimity against the PKK angers the wider Turkish
public, especially since the Kurdish nationalist view represents a
minority opinion among Turkey’s Kurds. In the twelve overwhelmingly
Kurdish-populated provinces in southeastern Turkey, Kurdish nationalist
Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP) received only 30 percent of the vote
in the last elections, while in western Turkey, home to over half of
Turkey’s Kurds, support for DEHAP barely exceeds one percent. Even
though it represents a minority opinion among Turkish Kurds, the
PKK dominates the Kurdish nationalist movement, including DEHAP (now
called Democratic Society Party DTP), through the elimination of any
peaceful alternatives.
U.S. Options
Even if Turkey manages the oncoming crisis with the EU, an anti-EU
and anti-Western backlash will nevertheless follow, with Turks blaming
the EU for treating them with religious bias. With even the best-case
scenario offering a bleak picture, Washington can take a number of
steps to counter the erosion of Turkey’s longstanding pro-Western
foreign policy orientation, and even the prospect of Turkey turning
into an anti-Western yet modern state, in the mold of Malaysia:
Convey to the Turkish public that Turkey’s interests lie in the
Western world. Through high-level meetings, the best way of getting
opinions across to the Turkish elite, and through public diplomacy,
Washington should tell Turks that Turkey belongs to the West and that
the United States and Turkey share secular democratic values and an
interest in fighting terrorism. In terms of public diplomacy efforts,
eliminating the Voice of America’s Turkish services, as proposed in the
2007 budget, would be dangerous at a time when al-Jazeera has plans
to start a Turkish broadcast. Washington should also identify areas
of common interest to convince Turkey’s public of the advantages
of cooperation with the United States. These include new energy
transportation projects from the Caspian basin; U.S. involvement in
ending Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani territory, a major concern
for the Turkish public; and a free trade agreement to build the
economic pillar of bilateral ties and to strengthen business lobbies
for better relations.
Deal with the PKK. U.S. action against the PKK is a must for winning
Turkish confidence. Turkish frustration with lack of U.S. action
against the PKK’s Qandil enclave in Iraq has mounted in the aftermath
of recent PKK violence. Even public officials and the liberal press
now suggest that Washington supports the PKK. If a full-scale battle
against the group is not possible before Iraq is more fully stabilized,
the detention or elimination of the group’s leadership in Iraq would
be the best way to pacify the PKK and gain Turkish trust.
As a hierarchical organization, the PKK loses its tactical abilities
when it loses its leadership. That was the case in 1999 when PKK
leader Abdullah Ocalan was captured with U.S assistance-and thanks
to Ankara giving credit to Washington for its efforts, Turkish public
opinion embraced the United States as a result.
Take steps on Cyprus. The Cyprus issue ought to be taken off the
table before it crashes Turkish-EU relations, damaging the anchor that
ties Turkey to the West. Washington might appoint a senior diplomat
with international visibility to build momentum toward a UN-supported
solution of the problem. Increased political, cultural, and commercial
contacts with Turkish Cypriots would undercut the confidence of the
uncompromising Greek Cypriot leadership that the current stalemate
can be prolonged indefinitely.
Move Turkey’s EU process. Washington should continue its closed-door
diplomacy to emphasize to European leaders the added value of Ankara’s
membership on issues such as demographics, energy, and strategic
concerns. Washington could also bring to fruition ongoing collaboration
with European intelligence bodies, lawmakers, and police forces
against PKK structures in Europe. This step would not only disarm a
vector of crisis in Turkish-EU relations, but also, when recognized
by the Turkish government, improve America’s standing in Turkey.
What Ankara Can Do
None of Washington’s steps will work unless the Turkish government
works to shape public opinion in favor of Turkey’s Western
orientation. Strange as it sounds, after four years of AKP rule,
Turkish public opinion worries that American foreign policy constitutes
a threat to Turkey; the AKP needs to forcefully counter this view. The
Turkish government should lead a public discussion on U.S moves in
the Middle East from the perspective of Turkish national interests,
and not the interests of the country’s Arab neighbors or the Muslim
world, an issue on which Turks are confused. Indeed, the AKP might
emphasize that by working with the United States, Turkey can shape
U.S. Middle East policy to its advantage. Only these steps can shape
public opinion in the long run and maintain Turkey’s historic Western
orientation, a path rooted in Ataturk’s vision.
Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy and chair of the Turkey Advanced Area Studies Program at
the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute.
plateC05.php?CID=2458
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/tem