Author: Karagyozian Lena

ARMENIA’S NEW YEAR RESOLUTION: CLOSER TIES WITH IRAN
Haroutiun Khachatrian

EurasiaNet
Jan 15 2009
NY

Plans for ambitious joint infrastructure projects between Armenia and
Iran may prove a key first test of President-Elect Barack Obama’s
policy intentions toward Tehran and Armenia’s own economic muscle
amidst the global economic crisis. Analysts note that international
reactions to the projects could prove a bane or blessing.

On the drawing board are a railroad between Iran and Armenia, an oil
pipeline from Iran’s Tabriz refinery to a special terminal to be built
in Armenia’s Ararat province, and a hydropower station on the Araks
river, which borders the two countries. Bringing Armenian-Iranian
trade relations into sync with World Trade Organization requirements
is also under consideration, Energy and Natural Resources Minister
Armen Movsisian Gevorgian, who co-chairs the Armenian-Iranian
intergovernmental commission, told reporters on December 26.

The Armenian government expects work on the railroad to begin by
late 2009, Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan told a group of reporters
in late December.

With its Turkish and Azerbaijani borders closed, the projects present
a critical chance for Armenia to create alternative routes for
supplies and shipping. Its only open land border — with Georgia —
is considered highly insecure following Georgia’s war with Russia
last August.

Potential financial and political difficulties, however, mean that
opinions vary about the projects’ feasibility.

For now, Armenia appears to be betting that President-Elect Barack
Obama’s administration will not attempt to obstruct the projects,
commented one Middle East expert in Yerevan. In her January 13
confirmation hearings, Sen. Hillary Clinton (Democrat-New York),
Obama’s proposed Secretary of State, told senators that the
administration is looking at "a range of possibilities" for a new
approach to relations with Tehran.

"A change in U.S. policy towards Iran was an expected event, and even
the outgoing administration of George W. Bush was reported last spring
to undertake some rapprochement with Iran . . . ," commented David
Hovhannisian, a professor at Yerevan State University and a former
Armenian ambassador to Syria.

"The need for such changes is dictated by the fact that Iran is an
important regional player, and many problems — such as the problems
of Iraq, the Middle East, and even the complicated relations of
the U.S with Turkey — make a dialogue between Washington and Iran
important," said Hovhannisian, who also is a member of the unofficial
Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission.

Analyst Sergei Shakariants, an expert on geopolitical issues with
the Institute of Political Problems, a Yerevan-based think tank,
expresses greater skepticism. In the end, he projected, the new
U.S. administration may simply opt to continue President George
W. Bush’s policy of isolating Iran.

The Armenian foreign ministry, meanwhile, is keeping its cards to
its chest. "Armenia has always been for solving all problems through
negotiation and for this reason it positively assesses dialogue
between Iran and the U.S," commented spokesperson Tigran Balaian.

Shakariants believes, however, that Iran’s interest in the projects,
and that of Russia and China, will override such concerns. Iran
already runs a gas pipeline from Tabriz to Armenia that can handle
2.5 billion cubic meters of gas annually.

"Iran is very interested in the railroad connecting it with Armenia,
and further with the Black Sea region, as this will give Tehran
an advantage against its competitor in the region, Turkey," he
commented. "These ambitions are supported by Russia, and most likely,
by China."

China was invited to take part in construction of the Iran-Armenia
railroad during a December 15-19, 2008, visit by an Armenian
parliamentary delegation to China. Beijing is reportedly considering
the proposal, according to parliament.

Finding such investors is critical to the projects, noted Noyan Tapan
news agency analyst David Petrosyan. The railroad, with a total
price tag of between $1.5 and $2 billion, would cut shortly into
Armenia’s budget amidst the global economic downturn. The entire
2009 budget is $2.38 billion, and the government faces difficulty
collecting even these revenues under the current economic crisis,
the analyst believed. The pipeline from Tabriz is estimated to run
another $200-$240 million, squeezing the budget still further.

Under the terms of the agreement, Iran and Armenia would split the
projects’ overall cost.

In a December 29 interview with local reporters, Prime Minister
Tigran Sargsyan stated that the Asian Development Bank has provided
a $1 million grant to perform feasibility studies for the railroad
project. Private investors, he claimed, have also expressed interest in
it. "The government is ready to allocate its money for this railroad,
and the participation of other governments and private investors is
also possible," Sargsyan said. He did not elaborate.

At the same time, the government is keeping a sharp eye on the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s January 29 vote on
whether or not Armenia has met two resolutions related to the March
2008 crackdown on opposition protestors. A decision that Armenia has
not met the requirements, which could cost Armenia its PACE voting
powers, may impact Yerevan’s ability to attract outside investors to
the Iranian projects, said analyst Petrosyan.

While many investors may find the PACE vote no serious obstacle,
such concerns now run common. In late December, National Assembly
Chairperson Hovik Abrahamian appealed to the parliamentary heads of
other Council of Europe member states about the vote, saying that a
vote against Armenia "will be an additional and serious pressure on
the country’s economy by decreasing [the] trust of foreign investors."

IMPRISONED OPPOSITIONISTS ACCUSE CO-RAPPORTEURS OF PACE MONITORING COMMITTEE

Noyan Tapan

Jan 14, 2008

YEREVAN, JANUARY 14, NOYAN TAPAN. A group of opposition activists
imprisoned in connection with the criminal cases on March 1 events in
Yerevan have sent an open letter to the co-rapporteurs of the PACE
Monitoring Committee John Prescott and Georges Colombier, pointing
out their personal responsibility in the issue of implementation of
PACE Resolutions 1906 and 1920 by the Armenian authorities.

They remind that prior to the summer session of the PACE the
co-rapporteurs declared that Armenian authorities had made great
progress in the implementation of the requirements of Resolution 1609,
as a result of which the term of implementation of the resolution’s
requirements was extended for another six months. Whereas, according to
the authors of the letter, no step had been taken in this direction by
the Armenian authorities, and the co-rapporteurs were aware of it. "You
are certainly fully aware that among other harms, you contributed
to the political prisoners’ being held in custody for another six
months. In this way you contributed to the Armenian authorities’
plan of not revealing the March 1 slaughter," the letter reads.

According to the authors of the letter, after the December 17 decision
of the Monitoring Committee, political prisoners were subjected to
violence in their cells, some applications for a personal pardon
were extracted under torture, as a result of which 9 persons
were "generously" granted a pardon just before the visit of the
co-rapporteurs. "Have you come this time as well in order to take this
"fact" to the upcoming session of PACE as a "proof of considerable
progress?" the authors of the letter ask, expressing their fears that
the co-rapporteurs’ task is to save the authorities from the expected
punishment and extend the imprisonment of the political prisoners. "In
this way you will only increase the amount of personal responsibility
you will undoubtedly take," is said in the letter signed by Myasnik
Malkhasian, Sasun Mikaelian, Shant Harutyunian, Hakob Hakobian,
Grigor Voskerchian, Suren Sirunian, Mushegh Saghatelian and some
thirty other persons who presented themselves as political prisoners.

REGULATOR MULLS MNP IN ARMENIA
Michael Lacquiere

World Markets Research Markets
Global Insight
Jan 12 2009

Armenia’s Public Services Regulatory Commission (PSRC) has indicated
that it is examining the possibility of introducing mobile number
portability (MNP), reports ARKA. The PSRC’s head of telecommunications,
Gevorg Gevorgyan, has said that experience of MNP in other European
countries is being studied and, once completed, the PSRC will present
proposals for MNP introduction in Armenia.

Significance:Mobile penetration in Armenia is approaching 80% and,
with three established GSM operators offering services, backed by
foreign investors, the market is in a fairly healthy condition. It is
likely that the introduction of MNP would give a further boost to the
market by allowing subscribers to retain their existing numbers when
they switch operators. While such a move is unlikely to be welcomed by
leading players K-Telcom and Armentel, the smallest operator, France
Telecom’s Orange, would probably welcome it as easing the means of
churning customers from its larger rivals. A similar study into the
feasibility of MNP is being undertaken in neighbouring Azerbaijan,
whose Communications and IT Ministry analysed MNP introduction in
Turkey in November 2008 (seeAzerbaijan: 31 October 2008:).

DURING 2008 ARMENIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT GETS 383 APPLICATIONS

ARMENPRESS
Jan 8, 2009

YEREVAN, JANUARY 8, ARMENPRESS: During 2008, the Armenian
Constitutional Court got 383 applications, 263 of which – through
the general department and 120 – in the electronic variant.

During 2008, 37 cases have been examined 10 of which have been
recognized anti-constitutional. 300 of applicants got consultation.

Head of the Letter and Application department of the Constitutional
Court Robert Chobanian told Armenpress that 36 applications have been
received from the Armenian president and mainly concerned whether
the examination of the obligations mentioned in the international
agreements correspond to the Armenian Constitution, one application
has been received from the Armenian Ombudsman and the Court of First
Instance etc.

During the whole year the Constitutional Court got no application
from the Armenian parliament, Government, Local self governmental
bodies, Courts and the Prosecutor General on the constitutionalism
of legal acts.

NK: FROZEN, BUT NOT STILL
By Richard Giragosian

ISN
-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?coguid=A647C846-E3 F9-CF68-A317-42373E9ED3FB&lng=en&id=95151
Jan 9 2009
Switzerland

With the ripple effect of the Russian-Georgian conflict still apparent
and Turkey inching closer to Armenia, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue
seems no closer to being resolved, writes Richard Giragosian for ISN
Security Watch.

Nearly five months after the August 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict that
culminated in Moscow’s recognition of the self-declared independence
of Georgia’s two separatists regions, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
remains as the last "frozen conflict" in the South Caucasus. While
international mediation of the Karabakh conflict continues to pressure
the rival Armenian and Azerbaijani sides to maintain the peace process,
the new post-August geopolitical landscape in the region suggests
that a resolution to this conflict remains a long way away.

The outlook for progress in mediating this conflict is only further
complicated by Russia’s newfound consolidation of power and influence
in the region, as well as by Azerbaijan’s threats to settle the
conflict by force, a militant rhetoric that has been only bolstered
by a massive increase in defense spending in recent years. But with
the EU now directly engaged in the region – with monitors deployed
in Georgia – and an incoming US administration eager to make its mark
on a new post-Bush foreign policy, this region may very well devolve
into an arena for strategic competition.

Conducted through the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe’s (OSCE) tri-partite Minsk Group, co-chaired by the US,
Russia and France, this ongoing mediation effort has only increased
in the wake of the Georgian war, even driving the three disparate
powers into a closer alignment on the Karabakh issue.

But commenting on the US view of the new post-August landscape in
an 29 December interview 29 December with Armenia’s Hetq Online, US
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza noted that "Russia’s
invasion of Georgia has had a major impact on regional developments,"
with Russia demonstrating that it was "willing to use overwhelming
force" and "take military actions that threaten the flow of Caspian
energy to global markets and of vital goods to Armenia via Georgia."

Yet Bryza also asserted that the war in Georgia also "showed that the
international community is willing and able to impose serious costs
on Russia for such belligerent behavior." Tracing Russia’s current
"constructive response to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict" as at least
in part due to those "costs," the US officials stressed that Russian
President Dmitri Medvedev’s November summit meeting in Moscow with
his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts "made an important and
positive contribution to the Minsk Group peace process."

Weighing volatility

Pointing to the need for even greater coordination between Moscow and
Washington, Bryza was optimistic, adding that the signing of a joint
statement by the three leaders during the Moscow summit reaffirmed
"the need for a political and, therefore, peaceful settlement of
the conflict."

Somewhat ironically, prior to August, the three so-called "frozen
conflicts" in the South Caucasus were commonly viewed as irrefutable
elements of the post-Soviet regional landscape. Although the unresolved
conflicts over South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh were the
subject of institutionalized international mediation, the lack of open
hostilities fostered a sense that despite the need for resolution,
none of these conflicts posed an insurmountable impediment to stability
or security in the region.

While such a view tended to promote a seemingly stable process
of conflict management over conflict resolution, one of the more
significant lessons from the conflict in Georgia this past August
was the demonstration of the inherent danger of underestimating the
volatility of such lingering and unresolved issues. And although
the Russian recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has effectively
imposed a one-sided resolution to those conflicts, Nagorno-Karabakh now
stands as not only the region’s sole remaining frozen conflict, but may
emerge as the most serious threat to regional stability and security.

Moreover, the potential for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to emerge
as a new threat to regional security stems from two key factors.

First, Russian policy toward the Karabakh issue is markedly different
from its approach to the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. For
Moscow, Nagorno-Karabakh is unique and reflects a very different
correlation of interests. Unlike the Georgian conflicts, Russia’s
ever-close relationship with Armenia, the only country in the region
to host a Russian military presence, prevents Moscow from seeking any
real resolution, maintaining the unresolved nature of the conflict
as a very effective means of leverage.

In this way, Russia favors the "status quo" of active mediation, but
always well short of the pressure needed to push the parties toward
a lasting solution. But at the same time, again unlike the Georgian
model, Russian preference for the status quo also necessitates close
cooperation with the US within the OSCE mediation process.

But Armenian journalist David Petrosyan, writing for the
English-language Noyan Tapan weekly, also argues that Russia is key
and cites Azerbaijani analyst Arif Yunus as seeing Moscow’s assent
as a prelude to "the realization" of any negotiated resolution. Yet
Yunus is also quoted as expressing doubt over Russia’s sincerity,
adding that "if the Kremlin has some plan, for sure it does not
envisage a complete and final settlement of the conflict." Moreover,
Yunus is cited as arguing that in the event of a settlement, Armenia’s
"dependence on Russia will weaken" and "the issue of withdrawal of
the Russian military base from Armenia will be on the agenda."

Second, the danger for renewed instability is rooted in a misreading
of the lessons from the Georgia. Specifically, Azerbaijan’s steady
stream of threats of military action to retake the Karabakh enclave
reflects a very different view of the August war. For some in Baku,
the Georgian decision to resort to military means to resolve its
frozen conflict was not necessarily wrong. Rather, in this view,
the Georgian mistake was to launch military operations before the
Georgian forces were ready, reflecting an error in preparation that
some in Azerbaijan assert will not be repeated in Baku.

Such militant rhetoric of Azerbaijan’s leadership was renewed in
President Ilham Aliyev’s nationally televised New Year address, in
which he laid claim to Nagorno-Karabakh as "an ancient Azerbaijani
land" and vowed to "make every effort to restore Azerbaijan’s
territorial integrity," adding that "we can use political, diplomatic
and, if necessary, military means." And unlike his past posturing,
Aliyev went further, saying that "only the first stage of the war
ended, and we must be prepared to free our lands of occupiers by
any means and at any moment." He then noted that Azerbaijan has
"demonstrated our military might to everyone."

The Azerbaijani leader’s threats coincided with a visit to the
frontline by his Armenian counterpart just days after the new
year, although President Serzh Sarkisian made little reference to
the conflict in his televised New Year’s message to the Armenian
people. For his part, Sarkisian argued that Georgia’s ill-fated attempt
to restore its control over South Ossetia by military means had a
"sobering impact" on Azerbaijan.

This has, in turn, fostered a reaction in both Armenia and Karabakh,
driving militancy over moderation. In an interview with Armenpress
conducted on 27 December in the Karabakh capital Stepanakert,
Nagorno-Karabakh President Bako Sahakian said that the "aggressive
and anti-Armenian policy waged by the authorities of Azerbaijani,
sharp drastic increases in military spending, frequent violations of
the cease-fire regime require us to be more vigilant and purposeful
in strengthening defense potential of the country."

Sahakian also warned that although the military posture of Karabakh
forces was essentially defensive in nature, the "high level of combat
readiness and fighting strength" meant that the Karabakh armed forces
could, "if necessary," launch "military operations deep into the
territory of an aggressor state."

Turkey warms to Armenia

On a broader level, Karabakh also represents an even greater obstacle
to new opportunities for regional stability. As former deputy foreign
minister of Nagorno-Karabakh Masis Mayilian asserted recently,
the "Karabakh conflict is the key to any substantial progress
in ensuring security and achieving agreement on cooperation in
the South Caucasus." He further argued that "ensuring security
of the Karabakh people is the key issue in the settlement of the
conflict with Azerbaijan," claiming that "Karabakh’s security can be
provided for only by recognition of the independent statehood of the
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic."

Such a stance seems to diminish the recent promise offered by the
breakthrough in Turkish-Armenian diplomacy, however. After launching
this new diplomatic initiative, Turkey confirmed that its opening
toward Armenia has reflected a realization that its prior policy of
linking the Karabakh issue to any normalization of relations with
Armenia has failed. And in September, Turkish President Abdullah
Gul became the first-ever Turkish head of state to visit Armenia,
in a bold reversal of Turkish policy.

Turkey has also worked hard to reassure Azerbaijan, most recently
demonstrated in a press conference on 1 December in Baku, where
Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan defended Turkey’s diplomatic
efforts to improve ties with Armenia, arguing that "the normalization
of Turkish-Armenian relations would have a positive impact on the
Azerbaijan-Armenia talks over Nagorno-Karabakh."

Regarding this Turkish-Armenian breakthrough, US official Bryza
stated that "Turkey and Armenia have a chance to make an historic
breakthrough by normalizing their relations" that "would mark a
dramatic and positive development for the entire region." Such a
breakthrough would also "accelerate the Karabakh peace process by
helping to change the psychology from one of pressure and threats to
one of compromise and mutual gain."

Yet is seems more realistic to anticipate yet another missed
opportunity, with the promise for regional security and stability
remaining as elusive as ever.

Richard Giragosian is a Washington-based analyst specializing in
international relations, with a focus on security, politics, and
economics.

RUSSIAN GAS TRANSIT TO ARMENIA HALTED OVER PIPELINE FAILURE

Azeri Press Agency
Jan 9 2009
Azerbaijan

Moscow – APA. The transit of Russian gas to Armenia was disrupted
over a failure of the pipeline in Georgia’s Gardaban district that
pumps gas to Armenia, APA reports .

According to preliminary information, "the fire broke out at the site
of pipeline rupture, measures are taken to put it out and restore
the operation of the pipeline."

Urgent measures will be taken to restore the transit of Russian gas
to Armenia, but this can take several days.

The failure will not create problems for Armenia’s gas supply as
this country has its own gas storage facility that can provide gas
for almost two months.

THE CRIMEAN TATARS FINALLY HAVE THEIR OWN ‘ANNE FRANK’
Paul Goble

Georgiandaily
Jan 7 2009
NY

Vienna, January 7 – More than most people suspect, memoirs, novels
and films about a nation’s struggles often play a defining, even
revolutionary role not only in uniting its members to achieve their
common goal but also and perhaps even more important in presenting
their case to the broader world more forcefully and effectively than
any academic or legal study could.

No one Jewish or not can think about the Holocaust without remembering
The Diary of Anne Frank. No one Armenian or not can think about 1915
without recalling the story of that terrible year as told in The
Forty Days of Musa Dagh. And no one Ukrainian or not can think about
the Terror Famine of the 1930s without recollecting The Yellow Prince.

But if many nations would benefit from having such a work, few
do. Consequently, it is always an occasion for wonder and excitement
when a book of this kind appears. That has now happened for the
Crimean Tatars, and with the publication of Lily Hyde’s Dream Land,*
that hard-pressed people now have their very own "Diary of Anne Frank."

Lily Hyde, a British freelance journalist based in Ukraine, tells
the story of the return of the Crimean Tatars to their homeland in
the early 1990s from the perspective of Safi, a 12-year-old girl who
comes back with her parents, brother, and grandfather to her family’s
now destroyed village in Crimea from their exile in Uzbekistan.

While Safi’s grandfather provides background on the tragedies
the Crimean Tatars have suffered over the last century, including
Stalin’s deportation of the entire nation to Central Asia on May 18,
1944, this novel is especially powerful because it considers their
situation now through the eyes of a girl who must wrestle with the
question of where is her real home is.

Like most young people, Safi is more focused on the challenges posed
by her immediate surroundings than on larger political questions. Will
she be able to make friends in a new place? Why do her new neighbors
dislike her family so much? What possessed her parents to move from
their sunny and large house in Samarkand to what is little more than
a hovel in Crimea?

Over the course of the book, she does make new friends, not only
among other Crimean Tatars but also among Ukrainians and Russians. She
discovers that none of these communities has had an easy time of it
in the last century. And she watches as her father and mother build
a house and open a teahouse to earn money to finish it.

After school – and going to school is so important for her that she
misleads her parents as to why the Russian bus driver won’t drop her
off where he is supposed to – Safi wanders in the mountains where
she discovers both places of beauty that remind her of what Crimea
could be and a Karaim cemetery that undercuts her conviction that
the Tatars were in Crimea first.

Each of her experiences is set off by a story from her beloved
grandfather, who was among those deported by Stalin more than half
a century earlier. He tells her both about the heroes and victims
among the Crimean Tatars and also about those among that nation who
were taken in by the Nazis or the Soviets and behaved badly.

One of Safi’s grandfather’s most disturbing stories concerns the
decision of the Soviet secret police to drown the residents of several
Crimean Tatars they had originally missed when carrying out Stalin’s
plan to exile all the Crimean Tatars from their homeland lest the
Kremlin dictator find out about this mistake and exile or execute
the NKVD men.

Hyde says in an afterward that she learned of this and other
details from conversations with Crimean Tatars and that there is no
documentation about the drowning. In fact, that is not quite so. The
Munich Institute for the Study of the USSR reported it in 1958,
and in 1992, the Moscow Institute of Ethnography documented it in a
volume on the Crimean Tatar movement.

In the course of the novel, tensions build between the Crimean Tatars
who are building houses without permits from the Ukrainian authorities,
on the one hand, and Ukrainian and Russian residents of the peninsula
who resent the return of these hardworking and totally committed
competitors, on the other.

Finally, in the climactic scene, an unruly mob brings up a bulldozer
to destroy the house Safi’s family has built. She throws herself in
front of the bulldozer, not in time to save the house or to prevent
herself from being seriously injured, but in a manner that forces the
local authorities to decide that they must give her family at least
permission to remain and build.

Safi thus becomes a hero, although she does not immediately understand
why that should be so, and she feels about herself, as she sometimes
feels about her grandfather and his stories, that they are "telling
him" rather than he is "telling them," a gain in self-knowledge that
both recognize is an indication that she and her people are growing up.

In the course of the book, her grandfather begins each of his
stories about the past of the Crimean Tatar nation with the words,
"Bir zamanda bar eken, bir zamanda yoke ken" – in English, "Sometime
it was and sometime it wasn’t at all." But at the end, he tells Safi
she must not focus on his stories of the past, however important,
but must write her own for the future.

Safi’s life as recounted in Lily Hyde’s remarkable novel beyond
any question means that the Crimean Tatars now are becoming more
conscious of the complexities of their own past and present and thus
well on their way to making her Dream Land ever more real for her,
her people, and for us.

WAM – Emirates News Agency, United Arab Emirates
Jan 6 2009

UAE Fm receives letter from Armenian counterpart

Jan 6, 2009 – 05:51 –

WAM ABU DHABI, Jan. 6th, 2008: UAE Foreign Minister H.H Sheikh Abdulla
Bin Zayed Al Nahyan today received a letter from Armenian Foreign
Minister Edward Nalbandian on the UAE-Armenia bilateral relations,
ways to further promote them in various areas as well as on the
exchange of views on issues of common concern.

The letter was delivered to Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Dr
Anwar Gargash by Armenian Ambassador to the UAE Vahagn Melikian at a
meeting today at Gergash’s office.

WAM/MMYS

news&cid=1226857953868&p=1135099400124&amp ;pagename=WAM%2FWamLocEnews%2FW-T-LEN-FullNews

WPS Agency, Russia
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
December 31, 2008 Wednesday

FOUR POST-WAR MONTHS

by Ivan Sukhov

RUSSIA’S POSITIONS IN THE CAUCASUS WEAKENED IN 2008; Positions of the
Russian Federation in the Caucasus weakened in 2008.

Russia began 2008 with quite enviable positions in the region. The
early election of the president of Georgia on January 5 disappointed
whatever experts had been predicting destabilization of Mikhail
Saakashvili’s government, but the statements made in both capitals
right after the election allowed the hope for certain improvement of
the bilateral relations rapidly approaching the freezing point. The
task Russia was facing was ambitious but not in the least
impossible. It was possible for Moscow to lift the transport blockade
off Armenia.

Armenia is traditionally regarded as Russia’s number one ally in the
southern part of the Caucasus. Neither Georgia salivating over what it
perceives as a chance to integrate into the European and Atlantic
community and licking the wounds made by conflicts in South Ossetia
and Abkhazia nor Azerbaijan aspiring to a more independent role in the
global framework of hydrocarbons production and export meet the
requirements. Armenia’s discord with Turkey and conflict with
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh all but boxed it in. Its two largest
borders with neighbors are closed for the movement of individuals,
shipments, and capitals.

Resolved to support the Armenian political elite in the presidential
election there on February 19, became concession manager of Armenian
Railroads. Had Moscow agreed to discuss a gradual weakening of the
border and customs regime on the Russian-Georgian border with
Saakashvili following his reelection, Armenia Railroads would have
been part of the Russian railroad framework by now.

Transport corridors north to south would have "opened" Armenia and
facilitated prosperity and stability in the southern part of the
Caucasus. Recognition of Kosovo and Metohia by the Western community
on February 17 (and election of the president of Russia on March 2
that distracted the political establishment) disrupted this political
solitaire.

Medvedev’s state visits t Baku in July and Yerevan in October and
diplomatic activeness in general (the Meyendorf Declaration)
notwithstanding, Russia’s clout with the southern part of the Caucasus
weakened.

What Russia ended up with are two repressive regions that block
transport arteries leading south. Their strategic value comes down to
deployment of Russian troops totalling 7,600 men on the way of NATO’s
eastward expansion (not that the Alliance has made the decision to
expand yet).

Political cost of the escapade more difficult to live down. The former
empire has done it once again and sent its army abroad for the first
time since Afghanistan. Neither are indirect costs to be
dismissed. All of the northern part of the Caucasus wonders why
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are permitted to bend the rules (the
territorial integrity principle, that is) but Chechnya and Ingushetia
are denied this privilege.

Unfortunately, Russia’s positions in the Caucasus weakened in
2008. They are no more precarious than they were when the year was
beginning.

Source: Vremya Novostei, December 29, 2008, p. 3

ENVOY SAYS TURKEY WANTS UPPER KARABAKH SOLUTION SOON

Dec 26 2008
Turkey

Turkey’s Ambassador also said Parliamentary Assembly meeting of Turkish
Speaking countries would hold its first meeting in September in Baku.

Turkey wants the problem about Upper Karabakh to be solved through
peaceful methods and within the scope of international law, Turkey’s
Ambassador said.

"Turkey has been waiting for the problem to be solved for 15 years. It
does not have the patience to wait for another 15 years," Turkey’s
Ambassador to Baku Hulusi Kilic said at a press conference at the
Turkish Embassy in Baku while assessing relations between Turkey and
Azerbaijan in 2008.

Kilic said Turkey advocated Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and
rightful stance of Azerbaijan on the matter, noting, "Upper Karabakh
problem should be solved soon and occupation should end."

Commenting on economic relations and various projects between Turkey
and Azerbaijan, Kilic said, "relations between the two parties are
at satisfactory level."

Kilic described "Baku-Tbilisi-Kars" project, which will enable direct
railway transportation with Turkey, as "the project of the era",
adding that construction would end in 2010.

Kilic also said Parliamentary Assembly meeting of Turkish Speaking
countries would hold its first meeting in September in Baku.