Author: Lara Antonian

Author : Vladimir Socor

Source : Jamestown Foundation

Following its victorious 44-day war (September 27–November 9), Azerbaijan controls approximately one third of the territory of its Upper (“Nagorno”) Karabakh region. The larger part remains under Armenia’s control via the unrecognized republic of Karabakh, although the territory is universally recognized as being a part of Azerbaijan. The Kremlin-brokered ceasefire of November 9 and its “peacekeeping” intervention have prevented Azerbaijan from regaining this larger part of Upper Karabakh with its administrative center, Stepanakert (Khankendi in Azerbaijani). The ceasefire stopped the Azerbaijani forces’ seemingly irresistible advance; and the swift insertion of Russian “peacekeeping“ troops has effectively sealed Armenia’s continuing hold onto a rump–Upper Karabakh. Strategically, however, thanks to its intervention, Russia has practically become a suzerain power in this enclave and seems to be laying the foundation for a Russian protectorate.

The November 9 armistice agreement makes no reference to Upper Karabakh’s legal or political status. Azerbaijan’s legal title to sovereignty is not in dispute, but is omitted. De facto, meanwhile, the armistice agreement complicates the situation even further than it already was. Upper Karabakh—hitherto a territorial unit—is now divided between an Azerbaijani-administered part, free from Russian troops (excepting the Lachin corridor—see below) and a larger part under an unrecognized local Armenian administration. The latter is equipped with state structures (including an “army”) but is practically governed from Yerevan; and it is now protected by Russian troops with a Russian civil-affairs presence on the ground (see EDM, November 12, 13).

Without making legal arrangements, Russia has become the security guarantor of this Armenian-inhabited territory of Azerbaijan against reincorporation by the same Azerbaijan. The case is analogous with those of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, which are protected by Russian troops vis-à-vis Georgia and Moldova, respectively. Akin to those cases, Russian “peacekeeping” troops in Upper Karabakh patrol the demarcation line between the enclave and the rest of Azerbaijan (see EDM, November 12, 13).

Unlike those other cases (or that of Ukraine’s Donbas), however, Russia has not dictated this armistice agreement. Rather, it has received Azerbaijan’s consent to the “peacekeeping” operation after serious negotiation and reciprocal give-and-take in the war’s final stage. Azerbaijan’s forces had, at that stage, regained four Armenian-occupied districts adjacent to Karabakh, in Azerbaijan’s interior. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev consented to Russia’s “peacekeeping” operation in Upper Karabakh in return for Russian President Vladimir Putin compelling Yerevan to yield three additional Armenian-occupied districts in inner Azerbaijan (Aghdam, Kelbajar, Lachin) back to Baku without further fighting. President Aliyev recounted the essence of this quid pro quo in several post-armistice addresses to the nation (Azertag, November 20, 25, December 1).

The November 9 armistice agreement (Kremlin.ru, November 10) declares a full ceasefire between Azerbaijan and Armenia as “the Sides” (Upper Karabakh’s authorities being unrecognized). It stipulates the stationing of Russian “peacekeeping” troops in the Armenian-controlled part of Karabakh as well as in the Azerbaijani-controlled Lachin corridor (the 20-kilometer-long, 5-kilometer-wide link between Armenia and the Armenian-controlled Karabakh). Thus, the Russian “peacekeepers’ ” areas of responsibility are situated entirely on Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized (also by Russia) sovereign territory.

The Kremlin seems intent on a permanent military presence in Upper Karabakh. The armistice (clause 4) sets the “peacekeeping” mission’s duration at five years initially, to be prolonged automatically at five-year intervals, unless one of “the Sides” (Azerbaijan or Armenia) “declares its intention to cease implementing this clause” with six months’ advance notice. This wording does not provide a basis for Azerbaijan to demand outright the withdrawal of Russian troops in the future. It simply allows one side to make a unilateral statement. Nor does this wording obligate Russia to withdraw its troops, were Azerbaijan unilaterally to “cease implementing.” Moscow could well, in that case, respond by calling for negotiations and procrastinate with impunity (as it has in all the analogous cases—see above). Given that Russian troops are stationed exclusively on Azerbaijani legally recognized territory, Armenia’s inclusion in the clause about the operation’s lifetime is unwarranted and a potential source of Russian mischief.

Russia’s troop contingent is set at 1,960 motorized-rifle troops with light weapons, 90 armored personnel carriers, and 380 motor vehicles (no mention of helicopters) by the armistice agreement. Moscow, however, is augmenting its military and quasi-military presence in Upper Karabakh beyond the armistice agreement’s limitations. Taking charge of humanitarian relief and post-conflict reconstruction in this territory, the Russian government is deploying the personnel of its militarized departments responsible for civilian affairs to Upper Karabakh.

On November 13, President Putin instituted, by decree, an Interdepartmental Center for Humanitarian Response of the Russian government in Upper Karabakh. The Center draws its personnel for the most part from Russia’s Ministry for Emergency Situations, a fully militarized institution, formerly headed by Russia’s current Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. The Ministry of Defense is, indeed, in charge of the Center’s “organizational matters,” according to Putin’s decree; while Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) also contributes personnel to the Center, as do civilian departments (Kremlin.ru, November 13).

Russia’s Humanitarian Response Center is instructed to work closely with the Russian “peacekeeping” troops. The Center has set up a “camp for long-term basing of Russia’s Emergency Situations Ministry’s personnel” outside Stepanakert. It is receiving supplies and additional personnel from Russia, including a new unit of more than 100 de-mining troops from Russia’s defense ministry (TASS, November 22, 23, 24, December 6). Supplies and reinforcements are delivered from Russia to the Yerevan airport and onward, overland, across Azerbaijani territory, to Karabakh. To simplify the logistics, the Russian and Armenian sides consider restoring and upgrading the disused Stepanakert airport.

Read the original text at The Jamestown Foundation.

Within the framework of the online discussion organized by the Public Journalism Club, I presented the current situation regarding the prisoners and the missing, the things to do by the authorized bodies, the work done by the ombudsmen of the Artsakh Republic and the Republic of Armenia, and the current problems. Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) ombudsman Artak Beglaryan noted this in a social media post.

He added as follows in particular:

“The main points of my speech were:

The authorized state bodies, first of all, the commissions of prisoners and missing persons of the MOD, are obliged to do their utmost to have the bodies of the fallen and the captives returned and to find out the fate of the missing.

The Human Rights Defender’s institution carries out a supporting function, and we do our best to collect data and assist the work of various bodies.

The Azerbaijani side deliberately and criminally delays the process, at the same time constantly publishing new videos attesting to the inhuman treatment of Armenian prisoners of war and civilians, aiming to deepen the internal tension and suffering of the Armenian society.

The bodies of more than 400 Armenian servicemen have already been retrieved or exchanged from various places, including from Shushi, Martuni, Karmir Shuka, Mataghis, Vank village of Hadrut.

The authorized state authorities are obliged to conduct communication, as effectively and as transparently as possible, about the current work and results of the captives and the missing, and the whole society.

The relatives of the captives and the missing, other persons and the media should be careful when publishing information about them, so as not to abruptly harm the search and rescue operations for them.”

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan hosted Artsakh Republic President Arayik Harutyunyan.

Welcoming the President of Artsakh, the Prime Minister noted. “Mr. President, I welcome you to Yerevan, this is our first meeting after the cessation of hostilities. Of course, we lived through quite difficult times together, we made difficult decisions; now, as we agreed, we must concentrate our efforts to restore normal life in Artsakh, to ensure the return of our compatriots, to create the necessary conditions.”

“The Armenian government has already made a number of decisions regarding the financial assistance to our compatriots in Artsakh. Of course, these actions will continue. I have published a “road map” that you are familiar with, we have discussed it, and here our main task is to restore the normal life of Artsakh, to provide social guarantees for the families of killed servicemen and citizens, to find out the fate of the missing as soon as possible and provide social guarantees to their families, disabled soldiers and implement social-psychological work in general,” the Prime Minister said.

He said after the war, both Armenia and Artsakh need big investments, and “we must work together to ensure those investments.”

In his speech, Arayik Harutyunyan noted. “Dear Mr. Prime Minister, thank you for the meeting. In fact, not only on a daily basis, but also during the war, we had the opportunity to present the situation in the post-war period. Today I want to note that the flow to Artsakh, the return of our compatriots is quite fast.

Arayik Harutyunyan noted, in turn, that 25,000 people have ruturned to Artsakh in the past five days, and the flow continues.

he thanked the Government of Armenia for responding to the social needs of the Artsakh Republic.

“In the coming days, several social programs will be implemented, in particular, financial assistance will be provided to each Artsakh citizen who has moved to the Republic of Armenia, and our compatriots who have lost an apartment will be allocated 300,000 drams per capita,” he said, adding that other programs will also be implemented to relieve the social tensions.

“I would like to express special thanks to the Armenians, to all our compatriots in the Republic of Armenia, who have hosted the people of Artsakh during this month and a half, they have not seen or felt any kind of problem. But taking into account the fact that the weather is getting colder and the utility costs will increase, we are trying to reimburse some utility costs through the operative headquarters established in Yerevan, also for our compatriots in Armenia who have provided their property, hotels or facilities. We have a lot to do here,” Harutyunyan said.

“In the first stage, we plan to relocate our compatriots to Artsakh. Those who have deprived of their homes will be relocated in stages so that we can accommodate and solve social problems in the process. I am sure that in the near future there will be no social problems as a result of the investments; we will be able to implement the planned socio-economic programs together,” the Artsakh Republic President said.