Remembering the Late Ottoman Genocides

May 20 2022
  1. Articles
Fri, 05/20/2022 – 2:54pm

 

By Michael Panfil Jr.

 

The act of genocide is often considered to be the most depraved method of political violence that can be imposed upon a group of people. Since the Holocaust, genocide has gained a reputation as an international taboo, as the methodical, systematic extermination of a group of people constituted a crime that has no equal. The international community, through the codification of prohibitionary laws, the creation of widely adopted committees, and with the cooperation of non-governmental watchdog organizations have made great strides to alert and minimize the effects of genocide. The keystone of these efforts is the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention)an international convention ratified in 1951 that highlights and outlaws the methods and act of genocide.

From 1894 to 1924, the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey committed acts of genocide against its ethnic minorities. The Late Ottoman Genocides were a series of systematic atrocities committed with the political objective of exterminating and expelling many of the ethnic and religious minorities of Anatolia. Although initiated under Padishah Abdülhamid II, expulsion efforts escalated into all-out genocide under the Committee of Union and Progress after Mahmut Şhevket Pasha was assassinated in 1913. The status of whether the Late Ottoman Genocides were truly acts of genocide has been hotly contested by academics for nearly a century; it should be obvious that such an episode constitutes genocide according to the definition set by the Genocide Convention which defines genocide as “acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group” (CPPCG 1951, Article 2). This episode originated from multiple sources which stem from the reign of Abdülhamid II and later the extraordinary ideology of the Committee of Union and Progress. According to Dr. Mary C. Winston in King Abdullah, Britain, and the Making of Jordan, such sources include the birth of pan-Islamic nationalism, radical racial policy, and the fear of a rising wealthy Helleno-Armenian elite (Wilson 1987, 19). These atrocities targeted a wide range of ethnic minorities. To cite the work of Dr. Benny Morris and Dr. Dror Ze’evi’s The Thirty-Year Genocide: Turkey’s Destruction of Christian Minorities (1894 – 1924), the Greek, Assyrian, and Armenian populations had lived peacefully under Ottoman rule for centuries and by 1894, were significantly integrated in the cultural, economic, and political processes of Ottoman society (Morris and Ze’evi 2019, 23). By 1913, this changed after the Committee of Union and Progress took power. The Committee of Union and Progress was, according to Dr. Taner Akçam in The Young Turks’ Crime Against Humanity, concerned not only with the homogenization of Anatolia, but also of the alleged existential threat posed by ethnic minorities such as the Armenians, Assyrians, the Greek (Akçam 2021, xviii). What resulted from this was thirty years of systematically organized massacres and other acts of state-sanctioned genocide upon the ethnic minorities of the Ottoman Empire.

            What makes the Late Ottoman Genocides so controversial among the episodes of political violence is the opacity that it is shrouded in. Many academics as well as the Turkish government remain in what Dr. Gregory Stanton’s The Eight Stages of Genocide describes as denial, preventing international investigations, distributing misinformation, and destroying evidence (Stanton 1998, 2). Many academics have actively sought to disprove that the genocide had ever occurred to begin with, despite unsurmountable evidence that points to the contrary. Such an effort in academia makes it crucial that people care for and take lessons from the Late Ottoman Genocides, as it is a text-book display of each stage of genocide and how the state can be shaped into a system predicated on political violence. Therefore, the Late Ottoman Genocides must be discussed in all spheres relating to the topic of political violence and genocide, as it not only accurately depicts each stage of genocide, but it also is at the risk of being reduced and fictionalized. This episode will be presented with qualitative work and historical analyses which document the context, causes, and consequences of the Late Ottoman Genocides. These analyses will span from statistics that measure the demographical consequences of genocide, primary historical documentation, and secondary thesis assertions surrounding the region of Anatolia; cases of massacre, evidence of ethnic cleansing, and acts of genocide will be sourced from. The areas of interest where most evidence will be sourced from are the effects on the Armenian population, as well as other ethno-religious minorities effected by the genocide. This evidence will be synthesized with standing laws which define genocide, which will deduce whether there is truth in the claim that the Late Ottoman Genocides were truly acts of genocide and a case of political violence.

            The turn of the twentieth century was preluded by a type of political violence that can clearly be identified as an act of genocide. As defined previously, acts of genocide are actions “committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group” (CPPCG 1951, Article 2). The methods of genocide include targeted killings, deliberate harm done upon the living conditions of a group, and any other action that is done to bring about their physical destruction. In the case of the episode of Late Ottoman Genocides in Anatolia, it is critical that the episode be contextualized with great depth as it is a case marked with controversy. The contextual details of the episode will help not only present the historical causes and consequences of the episode, but also how it constitutes an act of political violence.

            The historical origins of the Late Ottoman Genocides are remarkably political and can be traced along ethnic tensions of a uniquely diverse Ottoman Empire. For much of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was ruled by Sultan Abdülaziz, who had by 1876 westernized and consequently secularized the much of the empire under his reign. In the May of 1876, under the accusation that he was squandering the financial resources of the empire, Abdülaziz was deposed in a coup d’état. Abdülaziz was succeeded by his nephew, Sultan Murad V, who after three months was similarly deposed, this time on the grounds of mental instability. Finally, Murad V’s younger brother succeeded the throne, Abdülhamid II, a naïve reformist who inherited an empire on the brink of crisis. The empire, afflicted by drought, with high-interest loans now nearing their due dates, and a new ruler who was still transitioning into power, had the right conditions for insurrection.

            The April Uprising of 1876 occurred in the Bulgar Millet of the Ottoman Empire. Abdülhamid was quick to act. He marched on Bulgaria to reinstate imperial authority and stripped away many of the civil liberties afforded under the Millet System. Additionally, he suspended the constitution and dissolved parliament to further centralize his rule. These actions triggered intense outrage from the West, who now demanded that not just Bulgaria, but the Balkans as a whole be liberated from Ottoman rule. This was the justification that the Russian Empire needed to invade. In 1877, the Russo-Turkish War (1877 – 1878) began with the Russian invasion of the Balkans and Eastern Anatolia. The fighting persisted until the Russian advance threatened the balance of power of Europe, which forced Great Britain and the German Empire to coerce them to adopt a ceasefire. This ceasefire later developed into the Treaty of San Stefano, which on March 3, 1878, effectively ended the Russo-Turkish War. This treaty was not without its consequence however, and the Ottomans paid a steep price for peace. They were forced cede a sizable portion of their territorial possessions in the Balkans which granted the independence of Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria. They also lost their foothold in the Caucasus, having ceded a portion of eastern Anatolia to the Russian Empire. The loss of the war plunged the empire into a state of social depression with the Turkish majority looking for someone to blame.

            Conversely, many of the ethnic minorities discovered newfound nationalist sentiments during and after the Russo-Turkish War. These sentiments were founded on the precedent established by the Bulgarians during the April Uprising but were quickly realized as war spilled over the Danube. Many of the Ottoman Empire’s ethnic minorities, who were now outcast due to the rebellion in the Balkans, were forced to decide where their loyalties remained. While some fought for the Sultan, many others joined forces with Bulgarian and Russian combat units in the hopes that they too would be promised independence (Morris and Ze’evi 2019, 16). Thousands of ethnic minorities, primarily Armenians, volunteered to take up arms against the Ottoman Empire and soon, a nationalist fervor spread throughout the empire. In Dr. Davut Hut’s Armenians in 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War, he cites that “the Armenians had a significant majority in the commanding positions” of the Russian Caucasia army, who helped expedite the military invasion of Eastern Anatolia (Hut 2021, 1). They also committed espionage and exploited the dense financial systems of the empire, which at the time many ethnic minorities were deeply entrenched in. This trend was similar in the west, where according to Dr. A.B. Şikorad in 240 Years of Russo-Ottoman Wars in the Eyes of Russia, Ottoman Greeks, Romanians, and Serbs aided and logistically supported the Russians as they invaded the Balkans (Şikorad 2009). While there was a constant effort to subvert the military capacity of the Ottoman Empire, so to were there domestic efforts by ethnic minorities to secure independence. The efforts of Armenian Patriarch Nerses II Varzhapetian of the Armenian Apostolic Church are of particular note. As cited by Dr. Richard Hovannisian in Armenia on the Road to Independence, Nerses pleaded with the Russian Empire during and after the war for the promise of provisions meant to protect Ottoman Armenians in the Treaty of San Stefano; his efforts never came to fruition however, and he was forced to renounce these claims until his death in 1884 (Hovannisian 1969, 29). Abdülhamid II, humiliated by such a disaster, was infuriated by the subversive role that many members of the ethnic minority played in the war. The conflict itself precipitated a sense of solidarity among the ethnic minority groups of the empire (Morris and Ze’evi 2019, 20), which he understood to be an existential threat to imperial rule. He understood that his empire was in a state of decline and at the mercy of nationalist sentiments of his subjects. This motivated him and the Ottoman elite to paint the ethnic minority as traitors and abettors of the invasion. The reason for this was so they could appeal to the nationalist sentiments of the Ottoman Turks and alienate the Assyrians, Armenians, and Greek under his rule.

            Alienation soon developed into systematic neglect and by 1894, minority nationalist sentiments developed into all-out movements in response to an Ottoman elite that cared extraordinarily little for their minority subjects. The rise of nationalist movements, especially those regarding the Armenians who constituted 6.5% of the empire’s total population (Morris and Ze’evi 2019, 24), created the perfect conditions for Abdülhamid II to seek retribution. In 1894, under the pretext that the Armenian and Assyrian Christians posed an impending revolutionary threat, Abdülhamid II motivated his people to cleanse Anatolia. Abdülhamid II, asserted by Dr. Taner Akçam in A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibilityused pan-Islamism to initiate mass pogroms and targeted killings against the Armenians and Assyrians of eastern Anatolia (Akçam 2006, 44). Starting in Sasun, these killings (which would later be known as the “Hamidian Massacres”) would be the first of thirty years of ethnically driven genocide. Historical records cited in Paul Bartrop and Samuel Totten’s Dictionary of Genocide indicate that an estimated 100,000 Armenian and Assyrian Christians died during the killings (Batrop and Totten 2007, 23), although some estimate that as high as 300,000 were killed (Akçam 2006, 42). The attacks were indiscriminate and ruthless: the city of Diyarbekir alone being the scene to the deaths of approximately 25,000 Assyrian Christians. In addition to the killings, according to Dr. Heather Sharkey’s A History of Muslims, Christians, and Jews in the Middle East, many Armenian and Assyrian Christians were forcefully converted to Islam, having assimilated to escape the genocide (Sharkey 2017, 268). The massacres ended in 1897 and quickly the conditions of the empire’s minorities were eclipsed by the imposing threat of a bunch of political upstarts known as the Young Turks.

            In 1908, the Young Turks deposed Abdülhamid II in what is known as the “Young Turk Revolution.” With the revolution now over, the Committee of Union and Progress led by Mahmud Şhevket Pasha assumed complete control over the Ottoman Empire. They replaced Abdülhamid II with his half-brother, Mehmed V, who served as a political puppet until his death in 1918. Originally, the Committee of Union and Progress consisted of liberal reformists, but after Abdülhamid II’s countercoup in 1909, they began to adopt what Dr. David Gutman describes in Historiography and the End of the Genocide Taboo: Writing the Armenian Genocide into Late Ottoman History as “increasingly illiberal and chauvinistic policies” dedicated to the preservation of the empire (Gutman 2015, 171). They strengthened the power of the imperial state through radical political reforms which subverted the Millet System, a system of governance favored by the empire’s ethnic minority. Consequently, the relationship that the Committee of Union and Progress shared with their ethnic minorities deteriorated (Gutman 2015, 171) and soon nationalist sentiments began to resurface. Concurrently, the Committee of Union and Progress matched these sentiments with the ideological revival of Pan-Islamism, an idea that advocated for one, unified Islamic state (from hereon this will be adopted under the theory of Extraordinary Ideology). As a result, ethnic tensions between the government and minority communities began to soar.

            Another disastrous war in the Balkans (the First Balkan War, 1912-1913) against their previous subjects, the Romanians, Serbs, Bulgarians, Montenegrin, and Greek, stripped the Ottomans of their remaining territory in Europe. This war also afforded Ottoman Albanians their independence, further riling the nationalist sentiment of the empire’s remaining Armenians, Assyrians, and Greek. This, coupled with the assassination of Mahmud Şhevket Pasha in 1913 created the conditions for the Committee of Union and Progress to become concerned with the demographic make-up of their remaining territory, primarily in the central region of Anatolia. Like Abdülhamid II, they became fearful that the Armenians and Assyrians, whose homelands resided in much of Eastern and Southern Anatolia, would attempt to break free from the empire as others did previously. Aroused by these fears and guided by Pan-Islamic sentiments, the Committee of Union and Progress began to prepare for genocide with the goal of exterminating the non-Turkish demographic of Anatolia.

            The outbreak of the First World War (1913 – 1918) was the perfect distraction for the Committee of Union and Progress to act on their fears. After global tensions escalated in 1914, the Ottoman Empire, compelled by their membership in the Central Powers, invaded Qajari Persia and the Russian Empire. Local irregulars, primarily ethnic Armenians, were quick to resist the invasion and side with the Russians and Persians. The Committee of Union and Progress took local resistance as a sign of rebellion, and with the west distracted by war, they were finally able to initiate their plan to systematically liquidate Anatolia of its Armenians, Assyrians, and Greek. This part of the greater episode of the Late Ottoman Genocides began with the relocation and deportation of Constantinople’s Armenian and Greek intellectuals. As cited by Rouben Adalian in The Armenian Genocide, many of them were relocated across Anatolia, where most inevitably succumbed in detention camps (Adalian 2013, 121). After the Ottomans silenced minority intellectuals, they systematically rounded up millions of Armenians and Greek. As J.M. Winters notes in America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915, Men, women, and children were forced into a death march south into the Syrian Desert towards the Deir ez-Zor and Ras al-Alyn concentration camps, which were concentrated around Aleppo (Winter 2003, 162). As they were force marched, many succumbed to the deprivation of food and water and those that did survive were subject to intermittent executions and sexual violence by their captors. Many Assyrians were also subject to mass murder and deportation as the Ottomans marched. These marches continued until 1917 and resulted in the death of an estimated 600,000 to 1,500,000 people (Morris and Ze’evi 2019, 1) and the forced conversion and relocation of 100,000 to 200,000 young women and children. Moreover, the Committee of Union and Progress also targeted cultural and religious sites which were sacred to their minorities, primarily the Assyrians and Armenians. As mentioned by Dr. Alexis Dermidjian in A Moving Defense: The Turkish State and the Armenian Genocide, they destroyed an estimated 2,500 Armenian churches and confiscated large swathes of land from land-owning Armenians, Assyrians, and Greek (Dermidjian 2018, 502). Even after the First World War concluded in 1918, ethnically driven killings, land confiscation, and sexual exploitation of the ethnic minorities in the Ottoman Empire and later the Turkish Republic continued up to as far as 1924; many other isolated incidents regarding the Turkish government and its ethnic minorities can be traced even farther, some scholars tracing as far as to 1934.

            The actions issued by the Ottoman Empire from 1894 to 1924 constitute nothing less than the act of political violence known as genocide. Abdülhamid II and later the Committee of Union and Progress were motivated to consolidate the receding political authority of the empire. The empire for quite some time had been in a state of decline, its unique ethnic make-up leaving it vulnerable to nationalism and insurrection. The ruling elite felt that given the unique make-up of their empire, that its existence was at the mercy of its ethnic minorities. They believed that the Armenians, Assyrians, and Greek were an existential threat to the survival of the Ottoman state. This mindset, coupled with the Pan-Islamic movement, is what motivated the empire to prepare for ethnic extermination. By ethnically exterminating these populations, they could consolidate their territorial integrity and create a Turkish nation-state within the region of Anatolia. This sentiment was established with the Hamidian Massacres of 1894 – 1897 but was truly realized after the Committee of Union and Progress seized power in 1908. Under the Committee of Union and Progress, the Ottoman Empire deployed methods such as sexual violence, mass deportation and murder, and the forcible transfer of women and children. These methods are what disqualifies this episode from being defined as an episode of ethnic cleansing, as the Genocide Convention recognizes these acts as genocide and prohibits them; in doing so, it retrospectively categorizes the Late Ottoman Genocides as an episode of genocide.

            One theory that can be employed to further analyze how and why the Late Ottoman Genocides occurred is the Dr. James Waller’s Theory of Extraordinary Ideology, which he highlights with great depth in his Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Mass Genocide and Killing. In the text, he defines extraordinary ideology as the cultural and ideological characteristics which mold individual identities (Waller 2002). To him, extraordinary ideology is a rationalization of personal conviction, a culmination of psychological influences and situational factors which may lower the threshold for people to commit extraordinary acts. He cites Daniel J. Goldhagen who states that “extraordinary culture shaped by an extraordinary ideology can mold ordinary people into extraordinary killers” (Waller 2002, 37). Such is the case of Ottoman Empire, whose government adopted Pan-Islamism and believed that they were existentially threatened by their minorities. The intersection of these beliefs as well as a series of disastrous wars (the Russo-Turkish War and the First Balkan War) allowed for an extraordinary ideology to fester within the government and among the Ottoman Turks, who began to dehumanize their ethnic neighbors and declare them as traitors. Quickly, the dream of a homogenous, Islamic Anatolia at the expense of the Armenians, Assyrians, and Greek was widely adopted by the Ottoman Turks and their rulers. Waller describes the adoption of this dream as “collective potentiation,” which is the lowering of a threshold for action through the organization of groups, communities, organizations, or nations (Waller 2002, 36). As this extraordinary ideology became more commonly adopted, it lowered the threshold for action and increased the willingness of the Ottoman Turks to become extraordinary killers. This is what allowed for them to exterminate the Armenians, Assyrians, and Greek of Anatolia, because they were convinced that what they were doing was justified and in the defense of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Turks succeeded in their political objectives, the Late Ottoman Genocides resulting in the Islamic homogenization of Anatolia through ethnic extermination and deportation. The consequences of the Late Ottoman Genocides were unbelievably high, with an estimated death toll of 600,000 to 1,500,000 ethnic Armenians, Assyrians, and Greek. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the new Turkish Republic had little to worry about what remained of its Armenians, Assyrians, and Greek, as these populations were largely destroyed in years previous. Overall, the outcome of the conflict was the successful homogenization of Anatolia through extermination, with demographic scars that can be seen in Turkey even today.

            To reiterate, the Ottoman Empire and its successor state, the Republic of Turkey, committed acts of political violence that can be defined as genocide. Through the cultivation of extraordinary ideology, Abdülhamid II and later the Committee of Union and Progress were able to set the conditions for the Ottoman Turks to carry out extraordinary killings across Anatolia with the political objective of homogenization through extermination. Their logic was that in order to crush the existential threat that they believed the empire’s ethnic minorities posed, they had to consolidate their political territory by deporting and exterminating them, thereby consolidating and homogenizing Anatolia. They used all sorts of methods to carry out these acts; ethnically targeted murder, mass deportation, and the forcible transfer of women and children; all committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the ethnic minority of the Ottoman Empire. They committed genocidal violence with the overarching political objective of homogenizing Anatolia, which constitutes the Late Ottoman Genocides as an act of political violence because violence was used to secure the political goal of consolidating political territory. The methods used by the Ottoman Turks during the Late Ottoman Genocides such as the Deir ez-Zor and Ras al-Alyn concentration camps were prophetic to the methods used during Holocaust, an episode of genocide which prompted the creation of the Genocide Convention in 1951.

            The Late Ottoman Genocides are a part of a wider problem which is the controversy of genocide denial. The Turkish Republic has, as previously cited, prevented international investigation, destroyed evidence, and tasked Turkish academics with misinformation campaigns meant to disprove or fictionalize the episode all together. The international community must act; because of the old nature of the episode, those who were responsible cannot be held accountable because they are most likely dead, but it is important to legitimize the fact that the genocides did occur and that millions of lives have either been lost or effected as a result of it. This is necessary because as long as it is not recognized and the facts not understood, genocide will continue to happen.

 

Work Cited:

  • Adalian, Rouben P. 2013. “The Armenian Genocide” Centuries of Genocide, 4(1): 121. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203867815-11/armenian-genocide-rouben-adalian
  • Akçam, Taner. 2006. A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility. New York City, NY: Metropolitan Books (Henry Holt and Company).
  • Akçam, Taner. 2021. The Young Turks’ Crime Against Humanity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  • Bartrop, Paul and Samuel Totten. 2007. Dictionary of Genocide. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group.
  • Dermidjian, Alexis. 2018. “A Moving Defense: The Turkish State and the Armenian Genocide.” Journal of International Criminal Justice, 16(3): 501-526. https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqy035.
  • Gutman, David. 2015. “Historiography and the End of the Genocide Taboo: Writing the Armenian Genocide into Late Ottoman History.” Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association, (2)1: 167-183. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/jottturstuass.2.1.167
  • Hovannisian, Richard. 1969. Armenia on the Road to Independence. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
  • Hut, David. 2021. “Armenians in the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War.” Turkish-Armenian Relations Throughout History, (1)1: 1. https://turksandarmenians.marmara.edu.tr/en/armenians-in-1877-1878-ottoman-russian-war-the-93-war/
  • Morris, Benny, and Dror Ze’evi. 2019. The Thirty-Year Genocide: Turkey’s Destruction of Christian Minorities (1894 – 1924). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  • Sharkey, Heather. 2017. A History of Muslims, Christians, and Jews in the Middle East. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
  • Şikorad, A.B. 2009. 240 Years of Russo-Ottoman Wars in the Eyes of Russia. Istanbul: Selenge Yayınları.
  • Standon, Gregory. 1998. The Eight Stages of Genocide. Genocide Watch. https://www.keene.edu/academics/ah/cchgs/resources/educational-handouts/the-eight-stages-of-genocide/download/
  • UN General Assembly. 1948. “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.” United Nations, Treaty Series (78)1: 277. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ac0.html
  • Waller, James. 2002. Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Mass Genocide and Killing. New York City, NY: Oxford University Press.
  • Wilson, Mary. 1987. King Abdullah, Britain, and the Making of Jordan. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
  • Winters, Jay M. 2003. America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Michael Panfil Jr. is currently a BA/MA student at Loyola University of Chicago, where he studies Political Science & Government with a focus on War Studies. His research interests include the study of power differentials, genocide studies, and weapons system analysis. He is on track to receive both degrees in 2024 and is hoping to graduate with a commission from the U.S. Army through Loyola’s Rambler Battalion that same year. His present goal is to pursue a PhD in Political Science and to enter academia after his military service. 

 

Ex-Armenian FM Vardan Oskanian not to participate in Artsakh war inquiry

Panorama
Armenia –

Former Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian will not participate in the parliamentary inquiry into the 2020 war in Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh), he said in a statement shared by the media on Saturday.

Earlier, Andranik Kocharyan, the chair of the parliament’s Standing Committee on Defense and Security, said Oskanian had been invited to join the ad hoc commission investigating the circumstances of the 44-day war.

Oskanian says he has not yet received a written invitation from the commission but has decided not to participate in its work, arguing that it cannot be objective.

The ex-minister believes the war could have been averted through good diplomacy.

“The same holds true for the current situation. Through skillful diplomacy, without risking renewed war and with the support of the international community, we can avoid the recognition of Artsakh within the borders of the former NKAO as a part of Azerbaijan, the handover of any sovereign Armenian territory to Azerbaijan and the opening of a transport corridor in Syunik, contrary to the pressure exerted by Turkey and Azerbaijan," Oskanian said.

Police use force against protesters blocking highway in Armenia

Panorama
Armenia –

Opposition protesters blocked the Yerevan-Sevan highway near the town of Charentsavan in Armenia on Friday as part of the ongoing civil disobedience campaign to topple Nikol Pashinyan.

Demonstrators paralyzed the road, chanting “Armenia without Nikol!” and “Nikol the traitor!”.

After some time, the police started to use force, pulling the activists off the road to restore traffic.

Addressing a rally on Thursday evening, deputy parliament speaker and opposition leader Ishkhan Saghatelyan said the acts of civil disobedience would resume in Yerevan on Friday morning, with protests also planned in Armenian regions. The opposition will not hold a rally this evening.

Video at 

U.S. Embassy donates five Virtual Reality headsets to Pediatric Cancer and Blood Disorders Center of Armenia

Public Radio of Armenia
May 17 2022

The Office of Defense Cooperation of the U.S. Embassy has donated five Virtual Reality headsets for the Pediatric Cancer and Blood Disorders Center of Armenia.

These headsets are an innovative technology developed by a local Armenian startup company “10X Immersive, Inc.”

The tests have registered extremely positive results in relieving pain during pediatric care, vaccination, immunization, anesthetics induction, blood transfusion, blood tests, and finger prick (for diabetics) procedures.

These VR sets have been shown to be 374 percent more effective than traditional entertainment content delivered to children during medical procedures.

The donation was funded by United States European Command’s Humanitarian Assistance Program.

The California Courier Online, May 19, 2022

1-         Biden Wants to Sell Arms to Turkey

            While Ankara is Undermining NATO

            By Harut Sassounian

            Publisher, The California Courier

            www.TheCaliforniaCourier.com

2-         Art dealer Larry Gagosian buys Warhol’s

            iconic Marilyn Monroe for $195 Million

3-         Armenian flag disallowed at NZ Ataturk memorial

4-         COMMENTARY

            Not ‘All in a System of a Down’ These Days
            By Jenny Yettem

5-         Armenia Continues Fight Against COVID-19

************************************************************************************************************************************************

1-         Biden Wants to Sell Arms to Turkey

            While Ankara is Undermining NATO

            By Harut Sassounian

            Publisher, The California Courier

            www.TheCaliforniaCourier.com

With each passing day, the Armenian-American community is getting
increasingly disappointed with Pres. Joe Biden’s anti-Armenian
actions. He has done more harm than good to Armenia’s interests.

Last year, 24 hours before acknowledging the Armenian Genocide, Pres.
Biden waived Section 907 of the U.S. Freedom Support Act, thus
allowing the United States to provide various types of aid to
Azerbaijan, including ‘security’ assistance.

The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that from 2002 to
2020 the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, and the U.S.
Agency for International Development provided to Azerbaijan $808
million in U.S. aid, of which $164 million (20%) was for ‘security’
assistance. On March 31, 2022, the American Ambassador to Baku proudly
tweeted that the U.S. Department of Defense just donated $30 million
of ‘equipment’ to Azerbaijan. It makes no sense whatsoever, to provide
assistance to oil-rich Azerbaijan which is plush with billions of
petrodollars. This is a complete waste of U.S. taxpayers’ money.

During a recent hearing, when Senator Robert Menendez, Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, questioned Secretary of State
Antony Blinken why the State Department failed to report to Congress
the impact of the assistance to Baku on the military balance between
Azerbaijan and Armenia, Blinken gave an evasive answer by promising to
look into it.

Even though previous presidents had also waived Section 907, thus
providing assistance to filthy rich Azerbaijan, Joe Biden, during his
2020 presidential campaign, boldly criticized Pres. Donald Trump for
waiving Section 907. Yet, within three months of becoming President,
he did the same thing as Trump.

What is the point of acknowledging the Armenian Genocide and then
providing weapons to Azerbaijan to continue killing Armenians, as was
the case in the 2020 war? What is needed is action, not empty words.

Another blunder of the Biden administration is not enforcing the ban
on the transfer of U.S. weapons to third countries. The prime example
of this violation is the use of U.S. F-16 military jets by Turkey in
Azerbaijan during the 2020 Artsakh war. In addition, the U.S. did not
ban the sale of U.S. parts in the Bayraktar Turkish drones which
played a key role in the 2020 war.

The Biden administration reduced aid to Armenia to $24 Million and
allocated a pitiful amount of humanitarian assistance to thousands of
displaced Armenians from Artsakh, while acknowledging that they are in
an “acute humanitarian crisis.”

Other shortcomings of the Biden administration are:

1) Did not pressure Azerbaijan to release immediately the Armenian
prisoners from Baku jails, after the end of the 2020 war.

2) Did not condemn Turkey’s recruitment and transfer of Islamist
terrorists to participate in the 2020 Artsakh war on behalf of
Azerbaijan.

3) Did not criticize the incursion of Azeri troops into Armenia’s
territory since May 12, 2021.

4) Failed to take action regarding the massive human rights violations
by Azerbaijan and Turkey, while Pres. Biden hypocritically talks about
human rights being a core tenet of U.S. foreign policy.

Instead, we hear repeated U.S. calls in support of “Armenia-Turkey
reconciliation” and “peace agreement with Azerbaijan,” which are
contrary to Armenia’s national interests.

Amazingly, the Biden administration just informed Congress that it
supports the sale to Turkey of missiles, radar, and electronics for
its existing fleet of F-16 fighter jets. In addition, Turkey has asked
for the purchase of 40 new F-16 jets.

The Biden administration is wrong that the proposed arms sale to
Turkey “serves NATO’s interests.” In fact, this sale faces an uphill
battle in Congress as 60 Members of Congress have expressed their
vehement opposition.

Contrary to the Biden administration’s assertion, the proposed arms
sale to Turkey will undermine U.S. and NATO interests for the
following reasons:

1) The F-16 jets will be used by Turkey in Syria and Iraq to bomb
Kurdish fighters who are U.S. allies in the fight against ISIS
terrorists, whom Turkey supports.

2) Turkey will use the F-16’s to continue its illegal intrusions into
the territorial waters of Greece, a NATO member.

3) Turkey will use the F-16 jets to threaten the territorial integrity
of Armenia.

4) Turkey continues to occupy Northern Cyprus ever since 1974 and
refuses to leave despite scores of U.N. Security Council resolutions.

5) The United States sanctioned Turkey and blocked the sale of F-35
U.S. advanced fighter jets for purchasing S-400 Russian missiles,
contrary to NATO’s interests.

Finally, at a time when NATO countries, including the United States,
are confronting Russia in Ukraine, the governments of Finland and
Sweden have asked to join NATO. Except for Turkey, all other NATO
members are in favor of the expedited memberships of Finland and
Sweden. Pres. Erdogan announced that his country will veto the
membership applications of these two countries, using the ridiculous
argument that Finland and Sweden are “home to many terrorist
organizations,” meaning Kurdish refugees. This is highly ironic coming
from a country like Turkey which for years supported ISIS terrorists
in Syria and Iraq.

By opposing Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO memberships, Turkey hopes to
achieve the following aims:

1) To cater to Russia with which it has important military and
commercial ties. Turkey is the only NATO member that has refused to
sanction Russia and close its airspace to Russian planes. Turkey is
Russia’s mole inside NATO.

2) To extract concessions from the United States to purchase arms and
gain political support in return for allowing the applications of
Finland and Sweden to join NATO.

It is clear that Turkey, Russia’s ally, does not belong in NATO.
Before Pres. Biden decides to sell F-16 jets to Turkey, I suggest that
he read The Washington Post editorial published on April 29, 2022,
titled: “Turkey reaches a new low of despotism.”

************************************************************************************************************************************************
2-         Art dealer Larry Gagosian buys Warhol’s

            iconic Marilyn Monroe for $195 Million

By Low De Wei

(Bloomberg)—The sale of a vividly-colored Marilyn Monroe portrait by
Andy Warhol for a record $195 million has drawn attention to Larry
Gagosian, the winning bidder and art world mega-dealer. It is the most
expensive work by an American artist sold at auction.

The owner of one of the largest art galleries in the world, Gagosian
is often described as the world’s most important art dealer. The
77-year-old manages an art empire with 19 exhibition spaces spanning
the world, from New York’s Madison Avenue to the heart of Hong Kong’s
financial district.

Gagosian’s “mega gallery” business model has been a major force
driving the art market’s worldwide expansion for the past two decades.
His galleries have often put up major shows rivaling those of major
museums, including a 2017 exhibition in London featuring Pablo
Picasso’s works.

The grandson of Armenian immigrants, he studied English literature and
swam competitively at UCLA.

He then rose from selling posters in a parking lot in Los Angeles in
the 1970s to becoming one of the art world’s most powerful figures.

“I didn’t have family in the business. I never worked for another
gallery,” he told Bloomberg News in a 2020 profile. “So by nature,
I’ve been a survivor and a scrappy businessman.”

He has represented Warhol, and sold the silk-screen Monroe image to
Swiss art collector Thomas Ammann in 1986. Gagosian’s stable of
artists has also included Damien Hirst, Jeff Koons, Takashi Murakami,
Richard Prince and Cy Twombly, many of them poached from rivals.

Art collectors who are customers of dealers like Gagosian often prefer
anonymity. Still, he is known for acquiring artwork for the rich and
famous including hedge fund manager Steve Cohen, entertainment
industry mogul David Geffen and Blackstone Inc. chief executive
officer Steve Schwarzman.

He has declined to comment on the sale of Warhol’s Shot Sage Blue
Marilyn, after beating out bidders at Christie’s in New York. While
Gagosian has not revealed details of his business or wealth, he is
estimated to clear $1 billion in sales annually.

************************************************************************************************************************************************
3-         Armenian flag disallowed at NZ Ataturk memorial

By Hamish Cardwell

A Wellington man who claims police threatened to trespass him from an
Anzac Day memorial if he displayed an Armenian flag in memory of
genocide victims says it is “shameful”.

He said the exclusion kowtowed to an authoritarian Turkish regime,
while a lawyer said it trampled on fundamental human rights.

Meanwhile, the Christchurch City Council has shot down a proposal for
a flag pole, citing international relations implications for flying
certain contentious flags.

The genocide of a million Armenians by the rulers of the Ottoman
empire is one of the terrible chapters of human history. Turkey
disputes the number killed and the label genocide, but most scholars
on the topic and many countries recognize the events as a genocide.

For a few years, without incident, Richard Noble has gone to
Wellington’s Ataturk memorial on Anzac day to silently protest the New
Zealand government’s lack of formal recognition of the extermination.

This year he introduced himself to a police officer on site letting
him know he was going to hold his Armenian flag, but he was told doing
so would be offensive to Turkish officials.

Noble said the officer told him he had been authorised by the
Wellington City Council to trespass anyone with an Armenian flag—on
the request of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Turkish
Embassy—something they both deny.

“It was a shameful and expedient move by council to circumvent my
freedom of _expression_ guaranteed under … [the] Bill of Rights in
order to protect the sensibilities of an authoritarian and repressive
regime,” Noble told a council meeting yesterday.

Noble said he left the council owned area that day, but stood out on
the public road with his flag.

He said he was an RSA member and his grandfather fought and was
wounded at Gallipoli—and his action was in no way to disparage the
solemnity of the event.

Richard Noble protesting for recognition of the Armenian genocide, at
the Ataturk Memorial in 2017.

Wellington City Council said it supported the rights of people to
protest, and that it delegated trespass authority to Police on Anzac
Day.

It denied ever being asked to stop or dissuade those protesting against Turkey.

The Foreign Affairs Ministry and Turkey’s Embassy also denied making
any request—and MFAT said no such request was made to it by the
Turkish Embassy.

The police said “they were made aware a flag the man intended to
display could be offensive to people of Turkish heritage attending the
service”.

It said a senior officer told Noble he would be asked to leave if he
displayed the flag, and he could be arrested for trespass if he did
not comply, but he was welcome to stay if he kept the flag away.

“The man then left the service without incident. He was not arrested
or issued with a trespass notice.”

Human rights lawyer Douglas Ewen said the officer’s actions were
totally inappropriate.

He said it was hard to find rights in the Bill of Rights that were not
being impinged upon.

“I find it remarkable to say the least that the police officer thought
this was a good idea—that police officer needs some re-training.”

Ewen said it would not hold water in court, and the fact Noble’s
protest was at an Anzac event changed nothing.

He said it was a terrible idea for the council to devolve power in this way.

University of Auckland senior politics lecturer Maria Armoudian said a
large number of her family was wiped out in the genocide and the
incident on Anzac day was traumatising.

“It is devastating for us… deeply disturbed by this. Your wounds
can’t heal without some kind of acknowledgement that what happened in
the past was wrong. We just want our history acknowledged and
everything that was taken from us, and taken in the most brutal and
violating ways—that’s not that much to ask for.”

Armoudian wants an apology from police.

New Zealand has to strike a difficult balance while sticking up for
human rights in the face of mass arrests and other human rights abuses
by Turkey’s leader President Tayyip Erdogan.

There was a serious falling out between the countries when the New
Zealand’s ambassador last year joined nine international diplomats
calling for the release of a jailed Turkish businessman and
philanthropist.

It has raised the specter of New Zealand being denied access to the
Gallipoli peninsula for official Anzac celebrations.

**********************************************************************************************************************************************

4-         COMMENTARY

Not ‘All in a System of a Down’ These Days
By Jenny Yettem

(Combined Sources)—Where on stage they may arouse rage against
so-called machines, in reality three of the members of System of a
Down are at political ends—with two calling for the resignation of
Nikol Pashinyan, and one remaining tacitly in support of his political
ally.

Last week, bassist Shavo Odadjian and drummer John Dolmayan, welcomed
the “Resistance” movement in Armenia, calling for the resignation of
Pashinyan and his government. According to Oragark, Odadjian and
Dolmayan have both reportedly posted information about the movement on
their Instagram accounts.

On April 24, vocalist Serj Tankian penned an op-ed for Asbarez
newspaper asking, “Would Israel Normalize Relations with Germany
Without Germany’s Recognition of the Holocaust?”

Tankian opines, “Armenians around the world are in a state of trauma
having to accept normalization of relations with a genocidal state
that continues its denial of our genocide. Not a single Armenian
thinks that normalization without reconciliation is a good idea. Would
Israel have accepted such terms at its inception as a homeland for all
Jews around the world if there were no Nuremberg trials, and if
Germany had denied its role in the Holocaust?”

He continues, “The need for normalization between the people of Turkey
and Armenia is important right now as a step in building confidence to
deal with the difficult issues of genocide acceptance and the just
steps which follow. After all, normalization and reconciliation are
not the same thing, though one can lead to the other. The dictator of
Turkey, Erdogan, and his government will never realistically take that
step, so it’s important to note that a true democratic conversion of
Turkey is necessary to ultimately lead to reconciliation with
Armenia.”

Tankian concludes, “If normalization with Turkey prevails, Armenia
will have to be smart in legislating economic protections so that
larger Turkish companies do not compromise its economy or national
security. The opening of trade routes and access to Europe, currently
only through Georgia, will lead to increased economic gain for
Armenia. It is inconceivable that we are talking about normalizing
relations with a genocidal neighbor who just attacked us 18 months
ago, but geopolitical reality necessitates peace for Armenia at this
time.”

In this op-ed, Tankian does not once mention the name Nikol Pashinyan
let alone that the current geopolitical reality was a direct result of
Pashinyan unilaterally signing a tripartite agreement in November 2020
in order to jerry-rig peace towards this lopsided normalization
agreement. Tankian has repeatedly rebuffed calls for him to withdraw
what was his ardent support of Pashinyan—for whom he flew to Armenia
in 2018, to rally on behalf of the arguably populist Pashinyan and
extend his support of the My Step movement, donning a hat bearing the
party’s slogan “Dukhov” that means “with gusto” in Russian.

It isn’t the first time that the bandmates disagree. In 2020, it
became widely known through Instagram that Tankian was a staunch
supporter of Joe Biden, while Dolmayan loaned his support to former
president Donald Trump. The two made light of their political
division, saying that it didn’t impact their personal
relationship—Tankian and Dolmayan are also brothers-in-law by marriage
to sisters, Angela Madatyan Tankian and Diana Madatyan Dolmayan.

***********************************************************************************************************************************************

5-         Armenia Continues Fight Against COVID-19

Armenia continues the fight against COVID-19. The government continues
to promote vaccinations. There were 2,223 active COVID-19 cases in
Armenia as of May 16. Armenia has recorded 422,917 coronavirus cases.
Armenia has recorded 8,623 deaths; this marks the second week where no
new deaths were recorded. 412,071 have recovered.

***************************************************************************************************************************

************************************************************************************************************************************************

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Armenpress: 30 years of diplomatic relations also speak of 30 years of friendship – Ambassador of Uruguay to Armenia

30 years of diplomatic relations also speak of 30 years of friendship – Ambassador of Uruguay to Armenia

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 09:59,

YEREVAN, MAY 13, ARMENPRESS. Ambassador of Uruguay to Armenia Eduardo Rosenbrock Bidart says Armenia and Uruguay are taking a number of steps to further develop and strengthen the bilateral relations.

May 27 marks the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

In an interview to Armenpress, the Ambassador said that Uruguay attaches great importance to the relations with Armenia. “30 years of uninterrupted diplomatic relations also speak of 30 years of friendship”, he said.

Eduardo Rosenbrock Bidart said that the opening of the Embassy of Uruguay in Armenia on September 30, 2021 was a historic event as Uruguay has never had a political representation in Armenia before.

“And I am pleased to note that our friendship will further strengthen in the end of this year or in the beginning of the next year by the long awaited opening of the Embassy of Armenia in Uruguay, which will lay a foundation for firmer and longer relations”, the Ambassador said.

Uruguay was the first country to officially recognize and condemn the Armenian Genocide. The Ambassador says that Uruguay, being a small country, but having a very large and active Armenian community, made that move as a humanitarian gesture.  

“Acknowledging the Armenian Genocide was a very important step, and it took a lot of effort from Uruguay to do that. Uruguay was the first to take a step, let’s say, towards laying the groundwork for the recognition of the Armenian Genocide and served as an example for the other countries. Our country will continue also in the future and will support by all means the recognition of the Genocide”, he said.

The events marking the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the Armenia-Uruguay diplomatic relations have launched in the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute. During the event the Armenian community of Uruguay handed over a number of important materials about the Armenian history, the Armenian Genocide to the Museum-Institute.

 

Interview by Gayane Gaboyan

Photos by Mkhitar Khachatryan




Armenian and Azerbaijani exclaves back on the agenda

Heydar Isayev, Ani Mejlumyan 

As negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan advance, the question of what will happen to their Soviet-vestige exclaves has again become a matter for dispute.

In recent days the issue has again become the subject of diplomatic jockeying. The two sides have for the most part repeated their previous, mutually incompatible positions on the issue, casting doubt on the prospects for delineation of the two countries’ border just as serious work is set to begin.

On May 5, as he was discussing Armenia’s new framework for negotiations for the first time in public, the Secretary of Armenia’s National Security Council, Armen Grigoryan brought up the issue of the exclaves, quirks of Soviet border-drawing along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border that will have to be settled along with the bigger, thornier issue of Nagorno-Karabakh.

"In general, the opposition is constantly making baseless statements, which have nothing to do with reality. The issue of exclaves has not been raised so far, as there is an exclave on both sides,” Grigoryan told reporters. “Those territories are almost equal. Neither side is saying anything on this issue, it has not been discussed yet!"

The fact that he brought up the issue during his brief on Armenia’s new six-point proposal, which has yet to be made public, led to suspicion that Grigoryan was protesting too much and that the exclaves may be part of that deal.

But his mention of the opposition appeared to be a reference to a recent protest march from one of the exclaves in question: Karki, which Armenians call Tigranashen.

Karki is one of a handful of parts of Soviet Azerbaijan that were effectively islands inside Soviet Armenia. There was one, larger corresponding exclave of Soviet Armenia, Artvashen, located inside the borders of Soviet Azerbaijan and which Azerbaijanis call Bashkand. Following the war between the two sides in the 1990s, each side occupied the exclaves that were surrounded by their territory, and the respective populations had to flee.

The views of the Armenians and Azerbaijanis displaced from the exclaves more or less mirrors that of their governments: while many Armenians from Artvashen are resigned to not going back home, many Azerbaijanis still harbor hopes of being able to return back to live in their villages.

Armenia’s political opposition has regularly accused the government of preparing to return the Azerbaijani exclaves – which happen to straddle the country’s strategic north-south highway – to Azerbaijan. In the new wave of protests that the opposition has launched against the government’s negotiations, one key event was the march to Yerevan from Karki/Tigranashen, highlighting what they claim is a government wish to hand the territory back to Azerbaijan.

“Today the most important thing is fighting against these Turkish-subject authorities and saving the homeland,” one participant in the march, Hripsimeh Arshakyan, told reporters. “Nothing is scarier than losing a homeland."

The government denies any plan to hand over the exclaves inside Armenia; it says that it is negotiating to allow each side to keep the exclaves that they now control.

“Our hope is that the possible solution is that the exclave of Armenia is left to Azerbaijan, the exclaves of Azerbaijan, which are in the territory of Armenia, are left to Armenia," Grigoryan said.

Grigoryan’s comments occasioned a rebuttal from Azerbaijan Deputy Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan Khalaf Khalafov, who on May 10 reiterated Azerbaijan’s position that it wants back control of its exclaves. "These territories are part of Azerbaijan. The return of these lands to Azerbaijan will be considered within the delimitation process. These issues will be resolved after discussions," he told journalists.

Responding to Khalafov’s comments, Armenian ambassador-at-large Edmon Marukyan rolled out a new bargaining position: that Armenia has a stronger claim to Artvashen than Azerbaijan does to its exclaves.

"We've stated numerous times that delimitation and demarcation processes should be based on facts and documents of de jure significance. At this moment, we don't possess any legal substantiation that any de jure Azerbaijani enclave has ever existed in the territory of Armenia,” Marukyan told reporters. “On the contrary, there are legal grounds for the village of Artsvashen belonging to Armenia. … These issues must certainly be discussed and resolved in the delimitation and demarcation process."

A joint commission to work on delimiting the border between the two countries, which was agreed at an April meeting between the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders, will hold its first meeting in Moscow May 16-17, Armenia Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan said

 

Ani Mejlumyan is a reporter based in Yerevan.

Heydar Isayev is a journalist from Baku.

https://eurasianet.org/armenian-and-azerbaijani-exclaves-back-on-the-agenda

RFE/RL Armenian Report – 05/12/2022

                                        Thursday, 


Armenia, Azerbaijan Reaffirm Commitment To Russian-Brokered Deals


Tajikistan - Foreign Ministers Ararat Mirzoyan (left) of Armenia, Sergei Lavrov 
of Russia and Jeyhun Bayramov of Azerbaijan meet in Dushanbe, 


The foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan reaffirmed their countries’ 
commitment to implementing Armenian-Azerbaijani agreements brokered by Russia 
when they held a trilateral meeting with their Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov 
on Thursday.

Lavrov organized the talks with Ararat Mirzoyan and Jeyhun Bayramov in 
Tajikistan’s capital Dushanbe as part of Russia’s apparent efforts to regain the 
initiative in the peace process.

Moscow accused the European Union and the United States last month of trying to 
hijack the process and use it in the standoff over Ukraine.

"I hope that today's meeting will make it possible to move forward along the 
path that was outlined by our leaders," the Russian news agency RIA Novosti 
quoted Lavrov as saying at the start of the talks held on the sidelines of 
meeting of top diplomats of ex-Soviet states.

He alluded to the Russian-brokered agreements to stop the 2020 war in 
Nagorno-Karabakh, open transport links between Armenia and Azerbaijan and 
demarcate their border.

“We believe that there is a good prospect, a good opportunity to achieve … the 
full implementation of the tripartite statements in full," Bayramov said, for 
his part.

In a statement issued after the talks, the Russian Foreign Ministry said the 
three ministers “reaffirmed the commitment to strict compliance with all 
provisions” of those agreements. They also discussed planned negotiations on an 
Armenian-Azerbaijani peace treaty, it said, adding that Moscow is ready to 
facilitate them.

The trilateral encounter followed Lavrov’s separate talks with Bayramov and 
Mirzoyan. The latter was reported to tell Lavrov that a newly formed 
Armenian-Azerbaijani commission on the border demarcation will hold its first 
session in Moscow next week.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev 
agreed to set up the commission before the end of April when they met in 
Brussels on April 6. European Council President Charles Michel, who hosted the 
summit, said they also plan to “move rapidly” towards negotiating the peace 
treaty.

Russia responded by accusing the West of trying to sideline it and claim credit 
for the Armenian-Azerbaijani agreements.

Mirzoyan also indicated in Dushanbe that a Russian-Armenian-Azerbaijani working 
group dealing with economic and transport issues will resume its work in Moscow 
May 16 after a nearly five-month hiatus.

The group’s Russian co-chair, Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk, visited 
Yerevan and met with Pashinian on Thursday.



Policeman In Pashinian’s Motorcade Arrested Again Over Deadly Crash

        • Narine Ghalechian

Armenia - Citizens pay their respects to a pregnant woman who was hit and killed 
by a police car that was part of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian's motorcade, 
Yerevan, April 27, 2022.


A traffic police officer whose car hit and killed a young woman while escorting 
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian’s motorcade in Yerevan was arrested again on 
Thursday two weeks after being released from custody.

The 29-year-old pregnant woman, Sona Mnatsakanian, was struck by a police SUV 
while crossing a street in the city center on April 26. The vehicle did not stop 
after the collision that sparked more opposition calls for Pashinian’s 
resignation. Its driver, Major Aram Navasardian, was arrested a few hours later.

Armenia’s Investigative Committee charged Navasardian with violating traffic 
rules but released him shortly afterwards. It decided not to accuse him of also 
fleeing the scene and not helping the victim, who later died from her severe 
injuries

According to a spokesman for the Office of the Prosecutor-General, a prosecutor 
overseeing the probe ordered the law-enforcement agency to reverse that 
decision, arrest the policeman again and seek a court permission to hold him in 
pre-trial detention. A Yerevan court opened hearings on the arrest warrant later 
on Thursday.

Navasardian rejected through his lawyer the accusations leveled against him. The 
lawyer, Ruben Baloyan, insisted that he did not violate any traffic rules or 
flee the scene.

“Do not forget that the motorcade escorted the country’s leader,” Baloyan told 
RFE/RL’s Armenian Service.

Armenia - Law-enforcement officers inspect the scene of a fatal accident caused 
by a police car escorting Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian, Yerevan, April 26, 
2022.

He cited a government directive allowing such motorcades to move at up to 100 
kilometers/hour inside Yerevan. “[Navasardian’s] car moved at around that 
speed,” he said.

Raffi Aslanian, a lawyer representing the victim’s family, dismissed these 
arguments.

“In accordance with Armenia’s law on road safety, the driver was obliged to stop 
at the scene of the accident and to take the victim to hospital in his or 
somebody else’s car,” said Aslanian.

Pashinian’s limousine and the six other cars making up his motorcade also drove 
past the dying woman and did not help her. The prime minister has still not 
publicly commented on her death.

The deputy chief of Pashinian’s staff, Taron Chakhoyan, claimed on April 27 that 
the motorcade would have caused a traffic jam and made it harder for an 
ambulance to reach the victim had it stopped right after the crash.

Opposition figures and other government critics brushed aside that explanation. 
Some of them blamed Pashinian for the unprecedented accident.



Armenia To Increase Gas Imports From Iran

        • Sargis Harutyunyan

Armenia - An under-construction gas pipeline leading to Iran, 19Mar2007


Armenia plans to significantly increase the presently modest import of natural 
gas from neighboring Iran, a senior Armenian official said on Thursday.

Hakob Vartanian, a deputy minister of territorial administration and 
infrastructures, told RFE/RL’s Armenian Service that the governments of the two 
states will finalize a corresponding agreement during Territorial Administration 
Minister Gnel Sanosian’s visit to Tehran next week.

Armenia has imported roughly 350 million cubic meters of Iranian gas annually 
under a swap deal agreed more than a decade ago. It has paid for the fuel with 
electricity generated by Armenian thermal power plants and exported to the 
Islamic Republic.

The deal runs until 2026. Vartanian said that it will be extended by four years.

“There is now an agreement to increase that volume to up to 600 million cubic 
meters per annum,” added the official.

In his words, Armenia will be able to import up to 1.8 billion cubic meters of 
Iranian gas after completing the protracted construction of a third power 
transmission line connecting it to Iran.

Work on the 276-kilometer Armenian section of the high-voltage line began in 
2006 and repeatedly fell behind schedule. It is now slated for completion by the 
end of 2023.

Russia will likely remain the principal supplier of gas to Armenian households 
and corporate consumers even after its construction. Armenia buys over 2 billion 
cubic meters of Russian gas annually, paying $165 per thousand cubic meters.

By comparison, the market-based gas price for Germany and other European Union 
nations currently stands at $1,200 per thousand cubic meters.



Blinken, Aliyev Discuss ‘Positive Momentum’ In Armenian-Azeri Talks



U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken phoned Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev 
late on Wednesday to discuss ways of building on recent progress made in 
Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks.

“I spoke with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev today about how the United 
States can continue to support recent positive momentum on peace talks between 
Azerbaijan and Armenia,” Blinken tweeted after the call.

According to the U.S. State Department, the two men discussed “future concrete 
steps on the path to peace in the South Caucasus,” including the planned 
demarcation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and opening of transport links 
between the two nations.

“Secretary Blinken reiterated the United States stands ready to help by engaging 
bilaterally and with like-minded partners, including through our role as an OSCE 
Minsk Group Co-Chair, to help the countries find a long-term comprehensive 
peace,” said the department spokesman, Ned Price.

Price did not mention plans for negotiating a comprehensive Armenian-Azerbaijani 
peace treaty sought by Baku.

In March, Azerbaijan presented Armenia with five elements which it wants to be 
at the heart of the treaty. They include a mutual recognition of each other’s 
territorial integrity. The Armenian government said they are acceptable to it in 
principle, setting the stage for official negotiations on the issue.

Armenian officials revealed earlier this month that Yerevan came up, for its 
part, with six other issues that should also be included on the agenda of the 
talks. They said the proposals relate to the future of status of Karabakh and 
the security of its ethnic Armenian population.

Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov dismissed them on Tuesday, saying 
that they “can’t be called proposals.”

Netherlands - Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian speaks at the Dutch 
Institute of International Relations, .

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian complained on Wednesday that Baku wants the 
planned talks on the peace treaty to focus only on its own ideas.

“That does not correspond to understandings reached by us in Brussels,” 
Pashinian said, referring to his April 6 meeting with Aliyev hosted by European 
Council President Charles Michel.

Speaking during a visit to the Netherlands, Pashinian also said that during that 
meeting Aliyev promised to free more Armenian soldiers who were taken prisoner 
during the 2020 war in Karabakh. The Azerbaijani leader has still not honored 
that pledge, he said.

The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry rejected Pashinian’s “baseless allegations” on 
Thursday. A ministry spokeswoman said they show that Yerevan is “far from being 
sincere about normalizing relations between the two countries.”

Incidentally, Blinken also discussed with Aliyev the “release of the remaining 
Armenian detainees,” according to the State Department spokesman.


Reprinted on ANN/Armenian News with permission from RFE/RL
Copyright (c) 2022 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, Inc.
1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.

 

Thousands of protesters in Armenia demand Prime Minister Pashinyan’s resignation

May 3 2022

Thousands march demanding PM's resignation in Yerevan. Screenshot from livestream by Zabby.

As people across the world took the streets to mark International Worker's Day on May 1, in Armenia’s capital Yerevan thousands of citizens organized an anti-government rally demanding the incumbent Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, resign.

The protests were triggered by potential government concessions over Karabakh — a long-disputed territory over which Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a 44-day war in 2020. According to local media, some 200 protesters were detained on May 2, as demonstrations continued and police resorted to violence to disperse the crowds. By some accounts, over 10,000 people attended the rally. According to Civilnet.am, an Armenian news outlet, “demonstrators, who have dubbed themselves the Resistance Movement, also announced Monday they would be setting up tents at France Square, a major intersection in central Yerevan, for an indefinite sit-in. In addition, they called on employees to strike and university students not to attend classes.”

The anti-government protests began in April when Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan hinted at making concessions regarding the final status of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, after attending a meeting on April 6 in Brussels with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, facilitated by President of the European Council Charles Michel. During the meeting, the two leaders pledged to explore a “possible peace treaty,” to finally resolve the conflict.

Days after his visit to Brussels, Pashinyan said in his speech at the national parliament that the “international community was calling Armenia to lower the bars of the status of the disputed region.” 

In response, the Nagorno-Karabakh Parliament adopted a resolution that said, “no government has a right to lower the negotiating bar for a status acceptable to Artsakth [Nagorno-Karabakh] and the internationally rebounded right to self-determination under the pretext of peace.”

Meanwhile, Parliament Vice-Speaker and opposition leader Ishkhan Sagatelyan said: “Any political status of Karabakh within Azerbaijan is unacceptable to us.” Sagatelyan also said, “a large scale campaign of civil disobedience to begin on Monday [May 2].”

Also, in early April, the de facto foreign minister of Karabakh, Davit Babayan said, “any attempt to incorporate Artsakh into Azerbaijan would lead to bloodshed and the destruction of Artsakh.” Babayan also told the Armenian Service of Radio Liberty that Prime Minister's statements caused a “wave of discontent in Nagorno-Karabakh.”

The protests had been brewing prior to Pashinyan’s trip to Brussels. According to OC Media, an independent outlet that covers the caucuses, “over ten thousand protesters rallied in Yerevan, led by Armenia’s parliamentary opposition parties.  They called on the Pashinyan government to resign and not to make any concessions to Azerbaijan.”

Critics accused him of being willing to accept Baku’s assertion of control over Nagorno-Karabakh. Pashinyan defended himself, saying the recent negotiations with Azerbaijan in no way mean surrendering Karabakh. In a special session of parliament, Pashinyan said, “we are saying that the people of Karabakh must not leave Karabakh, the people of Karabakh must live in Karabakh, the people of Karabakh must have rights, freedoms, and a status.”

On April 21, Pashinyan traveled to Moscow where he met with President Putin. The two leaders “reached an agreement on a number of important issues, including the security of Nagorno-Karabakh, the unblocking of regional infrastructure and demarcation of Armenia and Azerbaijan’s borders,” reported OC Media.

Nagorno-Karabakh has been under the control of its ethnic Armenian population as a self-declared state since a war fought in the early 1990s, which ended with a 1994 ceasefire and Armenian military victory. In the aftermath of the first war, a new, internationally unrecognized, de facto Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was established. Seven adjacent regions were occupied by Armenian forces. As a result of that war, “more than a million people had been forced from their homes: Azerbaijanis fled Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the adjacent territories, while Armenians left homes in Azerbaijan,” according to the International Crisis Group, an independent organization that works to prevent wars and shape policies.

Following the second Karabakh war in 2020, Azerbaijan regained control over much of the previously occupied seven regions. Azerbaijan also captured one-third of Karabakh itself as a result of the second war.

On Nov. 10, 2020, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia. Among several points of the agreement, Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to a presence of 1,960 Russian peacekeeping forces in those parts of Karabakh “not recaptured by Azerbaijan and a narrow corridor connecting with Armenia across the Azerbaijani district of Lachin.” There are 27 Russian peacekeeping posts inside Azerbaijan.

Meanwhile, the demonstrators vowed not to leave the area until Prime Minister Pashinyan and his cabinet resigned.

https://globalvoices.org/2022/05/03/thousands-of-protesters-in-armenia-demand-prime-minister-pashinyans-resignation/