13:36, 9 August 2022
YEREVAN, AUGUST 9, ARMENPRESS. The Armenian men’s team at the 44th FIDE Chess Olympiad in Chennai won the silver medal.
The final results were reported after the Uzbekistan-Netherlands game ended 2,5-1,5.
India’s second team won bronze.
Armenia and Uzbekistan both had equal ranking before going into the final round.
The Azerbaijani Armed Forces releases footage on Wednesday showing what it said were successful strikes against Armenian forces using the Turkish-made Bakar Bayraktar TB2 armed drones.
According to a press release from the Ministry Of Defense Of Azerbaijan, illegal Armenian armed formations in the territory of Azerbaijan, where the Russian peacekeeping contingent is temporarily deployed, grossly violated the provisions of the Statement of November 10, 2020, and committed a terrorist and sabotage act against the Azerbaijan Army Units on August 3.
“Members of illegal Armenian armed detachments attempted to seize the Girkhgiz high ground, located on a mountain range covering the territory of the Kalbajar and Lachin regions, and establish new combat positions there,” the news release says.
The Azerbaijani military carried out a “Revenge” retaliatory operation in response, killing and wounding an unspecified number of “illegal Armenian militants.”
The official press release also states that as a result of the “Revenge” retaliatory operation conducted by the Azerbaijan Army Units, the Girkhgiz high ground, including Saribaba and several advantageous high grounds along the Karabakh range of the Lesser Caucasus Mountains were taken under control. Currently, Azerbaijan Army Units are carrying out engineering work on the establishment of new positions and laying supply roads on advantageous frontiers.
Relations between the former Soviet republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan have been tense since 1991 when the Armenian military occupied Nagorno-Karabakh, also known as Upper Karabakh, a territory internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, and seven adjacent regions.
Their most recent clashes were in September 2020, during which Azerbaijan liberated several cities and nearly 300 settlements and villages that were occupied by Armenia for nearly three decades.
In the spring of 1982, shortly before the First International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide was scheduled to begin in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, the Turkish government demanded that the six sessions on the Armenian Genocide (out of 150 overall) be canceled, and Armenian speakers prohibited from participating. If the Israeli government, which was co-sponsoring the conference, did not comply, Turkish authorities threatened to end protection to Jews escaping from Iran and Syria through their country.
Under pressure from Israeli officials, Elie Wiesel resigned as president of the conference; Yad Vashem withdrew its offer to host the opening ceremonies; Tel Aviv University backed out as a co-sponsor; the Szold National Institute for Research in the Behavioral Sciences in Jerusalem and Hunter College of the City University of New York stopped participating; many speakers, including professors Yehuda Bauer and Alan Dershowitz canceled; donations from philanthropists dried up; pre-conference coverage in the Jewish press was curtailed; and the number of registrants shrank from 600 to 300.
Nonetheless, Israel Charny, the originator and director of the conference, decided to go ahead. The proceedings are now regarded as an important event in the development of the field of genocide studies, marking the first recognition of the Armenian Genocide in an international setting.
In Israel’s Failed Response to the Armenian Genocide, Charny, an American-Israeli psychologist, co-founder of the International Association of Genocide Scholars, author of How Can We Commit The Unthinkable: Genocide: The Human Cancer and editor-in-chief of the two-volume Encyclopedia of Genocide, revisits the conference, attempts by the Foreign Ministry to torpedo it, and issues a scathing indictment of Israel’s refusal, then and now, to officially recognize genocidal wars against other peoples.
Understandably, perhaps, even after 40 years, Charny approaches his subject with a mixture of pride and pain. Intent on setting the record straight and speaking truth to power, he steps on his analysis by going over familiar ground, repeating himself in clumsy prose, and inserting long lists of panels, presenters, book titles and extended excerpts from essays written by him and other human rights advocates in the 1980s and 1990s. And on occasion, Charny seems determined to settle scores.
That said, serious consideration of Charny’s claim – “the basic and horrendous commonality” in all genocides, including the Armenian tragedy, should override obsessions about uniqueness and a consensus definition of the “category name” – is as urgently necessary as it has ever been.
Because he defied the Israeli government in 1982, Charny states, the rector of Tel Aviv University denied him tenure at the School of Social Work, despite favorable recommendations by the relevant committees. The decision “hurt deeply” and “may have contributed psychosomatically” to “the development of cancer a few years later.” Charny sued Tel Aviv University, was appointed a professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and for a time collected a TAU pension along with his Hebrew University salary. Grateful in retrospect for being forced to choose between personal, professional and financial security and fundamental ethical values, the experience, he now believes, was “a Turkish delight.”
Charny maintains that in response to Turkey’s threats and the Israeli government’s intervention, he considered reducing the visibility of the Armenian sessions at the conference, but not eliminating them. He indicates as well, rather contradictorily, that he was convinced that “threats of this sort should never be honored to any extent whatsoever.” And then lets himself off the hook by adding that an official of the US State Department assured him, “almost without any reservation or uncertainty,” that the Turks were bluffing.
In any event, Charny makes a compelling case that the principal reason Israeli leaders opposed the conference was their determination to keep the Holocaust, the “unbearable cataclysmic tragedy” of the Jewish people, “at the ultimate untouchable apex of a hierarchy of genocidal suffering… the greatest evil ever seen in human history.”
Wiesel, who “believed entirely – naively and, one might say, messianically – in the virtue, decency and integrity of the miraculous State of Israel,” Charny writes, warned him “not to use genocide in plural.”
Charny emphasizes that he is a Zionist, proud of Israel’s survival in the face of enemies determined to destroy the Jewish state, and its efforts “to achieve a secure country that is basically still largely democratic.” He also blasts Israel’s quest for exclusivity and superiority; for refusing to acknowledge “the genocidal massacre of unarmed civilian Arabs” in Kafr Kassem in 1956; for indifference toward the forced expulsion of the Rohingya in Myanmar; persecution of Uighurs in China; and “genocidal orgies” in Yemen; for arm sales to Azerbaijan, “where there are gathering storms of potential genocide;” and for recent “fascist trends,” including discrimination against non-Jewish people who are fully entitled citizens of Israel.
Irrepressibly candid and combative at age 91, Charny has thrown down the gauntlet. Whether or not they “claim to be the most important and chosen victim people,” he insists, those who have “experienced fiendish genocidal destruction” should have “heightened sensitivity and caring for others who became victims.” And it is unnecessary, unproductive and unjust for them “to continue denying hard historical facts” about the commission of brutal acts of genocide.
The writer is the Thomas and Dorothy Litwin Professor of American Studies at Cornell University.
Israel’s Failed Response to the Armenian GenocideBy Israel W. Charny
Academic Studies Press
267 pages;
$26.95
Azerbaijani soldier transferred back after crossing border into Armenia
00:29, 3 August 2022
YEREVAN, AUGUST 3, ARMENPRESS. Armenian servicemembers patrolling the border zone in Gegharkunik Province found an Azerbaijani soldier who had crossed the Armenia-Azerbaijan border around 13:30, July 23.
The soldier was identified as Private Kamiz M. Ibayev, a serviceman of the Azeri armed forces, the Armenian Ministry of Defense said in a press release.
The Armenian military said that it clarified that the Azeri soldier got lost.
On August 3, the Armenian Defense Ministry said that Private Ibayev was handed over to the Azerbaijani side through the Russian peacekeeping contingent of Nagorno Karabakh.
On August 2, at 6:59 p.m., the National Center for Crisis Management received information that explosive devices were placed in Yerevan City Hall, all metro stations, Zvartnots International Airport, as well as in all important military and civilian facilities, the Ministry of Emergency Situations informs.
Rescuers, firefighters, as well as canine teams have been dispatched to the above-mentioned sites.
ArmInfo.The Armenian men's chess team ranks 2nd at the 44th Chess Olympiad in Chennai, China, FIDE reports.
The Armenian team won all the four rounds and is only inferior to the Indian team in terms of additional indices. In the fifth round the Armenian team will play with the English team, which ranks 4th. Yesterday, the Armenian team won a victory over the Austrian team, 3:1.
The Armenian women's team ranks 16th. Yesterday, the Armenian team won a 4:0 victory over the Irish team.
The Armenian men's team includes Gabriel Sargsyan, Hrant Melkumyan, Samvel Ter-Sahakyan, Manuel Petrosyan and Robert Hovhanisyan.
The women's team includes Ellina Danielyan, Lilit Mkrtchyan. Anna Sargsyan, Mariam Mkrtchyan, Susanna Gaboyan.
Welcome to today’s Morning Brief, looking at the EU’s gas search in Azerbaijan, the latest from Ukraine, Britain’s next prime minister, and the world this week.
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Von der Leyen Prepares EU Gas Deal
Just days after U.S. President Joe Biden’s fist bump with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman showed the lengths the world’s largest energy consumer will go to secure its supplies, European Union chief Ursula von der Leyen visits another authoritarian regime to help keep the bloc’s energy market afloat.
Von der Leyen visits Azerbaijan today, where she is expected to sign a gas deal to help cover European supplies as the EU seeks to wean itself off Russian gas.
With Russia focused on Ukraine, the European Union has become more engaged in mediation efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. In May, Brussels hosted rare face-to-face talks between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. The foreign ministers from the two countries held their first bilateral talks since 2020 just yesterday.
But as EU leaders seek to present a neutral position between the two countries, some Armenians fear a gas-fueled shift toward Azerbaijan, which could have an impact on Nagorno-Karabakh, over which Baku and Yerevan fought their most recent war in 2020.
Gabriel Gavin, writing in Foreign Policy in May, spoke with Artak Beglaryan, the state minister and de facto leader of the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh, Nagorno-Karabakh’s ethnic Armenian enclave within territory internationally recognized as Azerbaijan’s, who expressed concern over Europe’s growing dependence on Azerbaijan. “If democracy and human rights, as well as regional stability, matter to the West, there should be conditions set as part of gas negotiations with Azerbaijan,” Beglaryan said.
Today’s meeting is part of a European plan to diversify its energy imports and decrease reliance on Russian gas. That’s a tall order: Around 40 percent of EU gas imports came from Russia in 2021. So far, EU members have not set out to ban Russian gas entirely, but they have agreed to reduce dependence by two-thirds by the end of this year.
So how much can Baku make up? Russia’s gas deliveries to Europe amounted to 155 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2021, but current EU plans call for Azerbaijan to supply only a fraction of that—just 11 bcm—by the end of this year.
Today’s agreement between EU and Azerbaijani officials plans to change that—but slowly. A draft deal between the two sides says they “aspire” to almost double imports of gas to 20 bcm by 2027 by relying on upgrades to the Southern Gas Corridor, an array of pipelines that moves gas from the Caspian Sea through Turkey and onward into Europe.
Europe’s gas hunt. Where Europe can find the rest of the gas it needs is a question that has taken EU leaders across oceans and in search of both traditional and unorthodox partners: Norway, Israel, the United States, Egypt, and Qatar have all been tapped as candidates to provide increased flows.
New markets are also being considered. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz went to Senegal in May to encourage its government to boost offshore gas production. Italy has recently made gas deals with Algeria, Angola, and the Republic of the Congo.
Heat warnings. Even though Scholz has tried to play down the renewed focus on fossil fuels as “temporary,” the increase in exploration comes at a perilous time.
The International Energy Agency has already sounded the alarm, warning that the world cannot afford any new fossil fuel projects if net-zero targets are to be met—a key consideration in keeping the planet below 1.5 degrees Celsius of warming. EU officials argue that gas is a better alternative to much dirtier coal, and that liquefied natural gas terminals can later be converted to hydrogen facilities, so the investment does not necessarily tie them to gas.
The reality of a warming planet is already apparent across the world: Dozens of Chinese cities operated under heat alerts this month, wildfires have raged across Southern Europe as well as the United States, and this week the United Kingdom is forecast to record its highest-ever temperature—over 100 degrees Fahrenheit.
Cutting demand. There’s one option Europe has yet to take that doesn’t involve politically fraught deals or investments in infrastructure—simply using less energy. The difference in energy use between a typical Westerner and people in the developing world is vast: An average European uses more than five times as much electricity as the average Indian, while the average American uses 10 times as much as an Indian consumer.
As part of its 10-point plan to reduce dependency on Russian gas, the International Energy Agency recommends reducing home thermostats by 1 degree Celsius, a reduction that would save 10 bcm in gas—or Azerbaijan’s current EU export volume.
Jason Bordoff and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, writing in Foreign Policy in June, argue that “the world has sadly lost sight of one of the most important energy facts: Efficiency investments and demand conservation are often the cheapest and quickest ways to cut the use of oil, gas, and coal—and to reduce the need for replacing Russian supplies (not to mention carbon emissions).”
Bordoff and O’Sullivan echo energy efficiency guru Amory Lovins’s call, made in 1973, for governments to choose the “soft path” of conservation, efficiency, and renewables rather than the “hard path” of mining, extraction, and more industrial construction. “If the best time to have followed the soft path would have been decades ago,” Bordoff and O’Sullivan write, “the second-best time is now.”
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/18/azerbaijan-gas-eu-von-der-leyen/
David Davidian
The secretary of the Security Council of Armenia, Armen Grigoryan, has emphasized that conscripts from Armenia will no longer be deployed to Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) for military service. In an interview with Armenpress, Grigoryan added that conscripts in Artsakh will continue being conscripted to military service in the Artsakh Defense Army. Below is the text of this interview
Mr. Grigoryan, there’s been much criticism recently saying that the Republic of Armenia is withdrawing troops from Nagorno-Karabakh [(NK)], thus leaving Nagorno-Karabakh undefended. How would you respond to this criticism?
During the war a number of units from the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia went to help the Defense Army of NK. After the establishment of the ceasefire and the deployment of the peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation the withdrawal of the units of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia from NK is logical.
But doesn’t this mean that Nagorno-Karabakh is indeed being left undefended?
No, because in the past the function of ensuring the security of NK was again being fulfilled by the NK Defense Army. And nothing is being changed in this regard. Although, it should be noted for the record that the deployment of the Russian peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh should be a security guarantee.
But the events in Parukh [village of Artsakh] showed that this is not the case….
The events in Parukh were a gross violation of the 2020 November 9 trilateral statement and applicable international law. The Azerbaijani Armed Forces invaded into the area of responsibility of the Russian peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. The Russian Federation assured us that the invading Azerbaijani forces must withdraw, and we hope that the Russian peacekeeping forces will ensure the withdrawal of the Azerbaijani units that have illegally invaded into the area of responsibility of the Russian peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. The presence of the Russian peacekeeping forces in itself shows Russia’s accepting the fact that there is a real existential threat for the population of NK and the peacekeeping forces have a key significance in guaranteeing the security of the Armenians of NK.
Please clarify: Are the conscripted servicemen of the Armed Forces of Armenia in NK being replaced with contract (voluntary) servicemen or are the units of the Armed Forces of Armenia withdrawing from NK?
Let me clarify to be clear. Due to the war, a number of units of the Armed Forces of Armenia entered NK to help the Defense Army. After the establishment of the ceasefire they are returning to the Republic of Armenia. This process is nearing completion and will end in September. Regarding the Defense Army: it has been and continues to be in Nagorno-Karabakh.
This means that no conscripted servicemen from Armenia will be deployed in NK from September?
Yes. But according to information received from NK authorities the conscripts of Nagorno-Karabakh will continue serving in the Defense Army just like before.
What about contract [voluntary] servicemembers?
According to information received from NK authorities, contract servicemen will continue serving in the Defense Army just like before.
From Armenia also?
Contract servicemembers from Armenia are not deployed to the NK Defense Army. Upon necessity, NK is organizing the involvement of contract servicemembers on spot.
Fifteen years ago, a Turkish nationalist shot Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink point-blank in the head, shouting to horrified onlookers in the heart of Istanbul that he killed the “infidel.” The murder made international headlines and shocked not only Armenians but also liberal Turks. There was a silver lining, though, as the Turkish government sought to change the narrative by addressing its bilateral tensions with Armenia.
Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan invited his Turkish counterpart, Abdullah Gül, to a soccer game in Yerevan, and more such exchanges followed. Finally, in October 2009, Armenian and Turkish negotiators agreed on two bilateral protocols that created a roadmap to formalize diplomatic relations, opening the border to end Turkey’s unilateral blockade and setting up a joint committee to address the Armenian Genocide.
Within days, however, optimism turned to defeat. The Turkish parliament refused to ratify the Zurich protocols, absent a greenlight from Azerbaijan. It was a nonsense excuse: Ankara commands Baku, not vice versa. It was also classic Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He feigned diplomacy to avoid accountability for the violence that logically flowed from his nationalist and extremist excesses.
At the same time, Erdogan sought advantage from a lack of relations. The Turkish-Azerbaijani blockade of Armenia forced Armenia to rely on Iran as its economic outlet to the world. Partisans then pointed to these ties as reasons to ally with Turkey and Azerbaijan over Armenia. In reality, this policy was like an arsonist setting his neighbor’s house on fire next door and then complaining about the smoke. Nevertheless, in Washington, such tactics work, both because the Turkey cadre at the State Department far outnumbers employees assigned to manage the relations of other regional countries and because Azerbaijan and Turkey’s embassies have traditionally been more active than Armenia’s.
History repeats. As Turkey today faces triple-digit inflation and looming bankruptcy, Erdogan again signals a willingness to bury hatchets and talk. Whereas he once berated Israeli President and Nobel Laureate Shimon Peres as a murderer, he now welcomes his Israeli counterpart to Ankara. And whereas he once promised he would stop at nothing to hold Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS) accountable for the murder of Saudi journalist and former intelligence operative Jamal Khashoggi, he welcomed MBS to Ankara last month after ordering the court case against him dropped. That Riyadh played hardball with Erdogan and forced his retreat raises questions about why Washington and Brussels always opt for a softer approach and then wonder why it never works.
Now, it is Armenia’s turn to be the subject of Turkey’s diplomatic turn. Almost two years ago, Azerbaijan, along with Turkish Special Forces and Israeli drones, launched a surprise attack on Artsakh, the Armenian-populated republic in Nagorno-Karabakh, a region whose status they had pledged to resolve diplomatically. That the attack occurred on the 100th anniversary of the Ottoman assault on the Armenian-populated region was no coincidence. Erdogan repeatedly framed the attack in religious terms as a jihad against Christians.
Today, however, Turkey signals renewed interest in negotiating with Armenia. On July 1, Turkey agreed to open the border for cargo and non-Armenian, non-Turkish passport holders. Erdogan and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan spoke directly as a result. While Turkish officials said they were coordinating with their Azerbaijani counterparts, Baku has been generally cool to Turkey’s diplomatic moves. The looming question now is whether Turkey truly wants to normalize ties with Armenia or, conversely, just wants to appear moderate.
There are ways to find out.
Rather than meet in Austria or other third countries, Turkey and Armenia can resume their talks in Ankara and Yerevan. Turkey signals willingness. Should Turkey be sincere, Turkish negotiators should pay their respects at the Armenian Genocide Memorial. They can also signal that they support a fair solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute by encouraging Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to resolve it rather than supporting his attempts to eliminate the Armenian population and erase their cultural heritage. The elimination of cultural heritage and restraint from ethnic cleansing should not be something over which Turkey should seek to bargain. Indeed, there is hypocrisy about Erdogan complaining about the treatment of Muslims while presiding over the elimination of Christian presence in Turkey, Azerbaijan, and even northern Syria.
It is in the interest of all parties to resolve disputes in the South Caucasus diplomatically. To do otherwise only benefits Russia and Iran. If the State Department wants to show diplomacy to be back, however, it can play a role. First, rather than reward Ankara for signaling conciliation, it should instead judge Turkey on the substance of its actions. Never again should Turkey reap the benefits of a policy it has no intention to implement. Second, it should appoint someone with ambassadorial rank to succeed U.S. Minsk Group Co-Chair Andrew Schofer, who has rotated into a new assignment. That the French and Russian co-chairs were ambassadors, but Schofer was a self-inflicted wound to U.S. influence. Third, maximalist approaches will never bring peace. Only cultural and political autonomy will. Artsakh is not Donetsk; it is not an artificial creation. Instead, it predates and has survived Ottoman, Soviet, and Azerbaijani attempts to erase it. It is time to embrace the Kosovo model.
Expert Biography – Now a 1945 Contributing Editor, Dr. Michael Rubin is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Dr. Rubin is the author, coauthor, and coeditor of several books exploring diplomacy, Iranian history, Arab culture, Kurdish studies, and Shi’ite politics, including “Seven Pillars: What Really Causes Instability in the Middle East?” (AEI Press, 2019); “Kurdistan Rising” (AEI Press, 2016); “Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes” (Encounter Books, 2014); and “Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos” (Palgrave, 2005). You can follow him on Twitter: @mrubin1971.