Author: Mike Maghakian

On August 1 and August 3, Azerbaijan launched a new limited military operation along the line of contact between Azerbaijan and the Nagorno Karabakh Republic. As a result of this new escalation, Azerbaijan claimed the capture of several strategic heights, which, according to Azerbaijani sources, allowed them to visually control several villages in Nagorno Karabakh and part of the Stepanakert–Martakert highway. The announced reason behind this escalation was Azerbaijan’s demand to stop using the current Goris–Stepanakert highway running through Berdzor, move the Armenian population out of Berdzor and surrounding villages and shift transport flow to the newly-built alternative highway. 

Entrance to Berdzor (Photo: Dickran Khodanian)

To better understand this recent escalation, we should look back to the Azerbaijani strategy employed since November 2020. At the strategic level, Azerbaijan has two primary goals – to reduce the numbers of Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh as much as possible and to push out Russian peacekeepers from Nagorno Karabakh in November 2025. The latter goal will significantly contribute to the realization of the first one, as most Armenians will follow the Russian peacekeepers and leave their homeland. Theoretically, few Armenians, who have neither financial nor other resources to leave, may remain in Nagorno Karabakh and live under Azerbaijani control after the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers. Azerbaijan probably will use this handful of persons for PR purposes, organizing international media tours to Karabakh and chatting about tolerant Azerbaijani society. However, it will not change the reality that most Armenians will be forced to leave Karabakh, which will soon become the new Nakhichevan. 

According to Azerbaijani logic, Baku should not repeat the mistake made by Armenia in 1994, as after the decisive military victory, Armenia did not force Azerbaijan to sign a final deal fixing the status of Nagorno Karabakh. Azerbaijan wants to fully utilize the benefits of its military victory in 2020 and finish with the Nagorno Karabakh issue as soon as possible. Azerbaijan is concerned that if current uncertainty around the future of Nagorno Karabakh continues for several years, the potential domestic changes in Armenia and shifting regional balance of power may create a more favorable situation for Armenia to resist Azerbaijani pressure. 

The construction of the new road, which bypasses Berdzor, and forcing Armenians to withdraw from the city and surrounding villages are a part of that strategy. The new highway will complicate the connection between Armenia and the Nagorno Karabakh Republic. As all communications – a gas pipeline, high voltage electricity transmission lines and fiber optic cables – pass through the old road, Azerbaijan may find a plethora of reasons to cut them all and force the Armenian population of Nagorno Karabakh to either buy gas, electricity and internet from Azerbaijani providers or go back to the 19th century. 

Meanwhile, the change of the road and withdrawal from Berdzor and surrounding villages are not the only demands of Azerbaijan. Baku argues that the Defense Army of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic is an illegal military organization and requires its dissolution. Otherwise, Azerbaijan threatened a new military operation under the guise of the so-called “anti-terrorist operation” to dismantle illegal military units. As Armenia finished withdrawing all conscripted soldiers from Nagorno Karabakh, the dissolution of the Defense Army will make the Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh feel less secure and contribute to their immigration to Armenia or elsewhere. Several thousand Russian peacekeepers cannot protect the entire line of contact, especially given the absence of trenches or other fortifications. On a political level, as Azerbaijan rejected signing the mandate of peacekeepers, they do not have any confirmed rules of engagement, which put them in a complicated situation.

If Azerbaijani strategy is clear – to get maximum benefits from its 2020 military victory and to push as many Armenians from Nagorno Karabakh as possible – Armenia’s vision lacks clarity. In recent months, the Armenian government has spoken about the necessity to protect the rights and security of Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh, while the status of Karabakh should derive from these elaborations. In March 2022, Azerbaijan published its five points which should be the basis for the future Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty. In May 2022, Armenia presented its six points, including the security and rights of the Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh, as well as the final status of Nagorno Karabakh. According to Armenian officials, the negotiations over the peace treaty should be based on both Armenian and Azerbaijani suggestions, and the peace treaty should also cover the issue of Nagorno Karabakh. However, a few weeks ago, the secretary of the Armenian security council stated that Armenia would like to separate the peace treaty from the Nagorno Karabakh issue. 

In April 2022, the Armenian prime minister stated that the international community wanted Armenia to lower the bar on the status of Nagorno Karabakh. However, no further explanations were provided on what Armenia understands under this idea. Is Armenia ready to recognize Nagorno Karabakh as a part of Azerbaijan with broad autonomy and under solid international guarantees, or is Armenia ready to accept “so-called cultural autonomy,” which will provide Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh Armenian language classes in schools? Meanwhile, the Armenian government continues blaming Russian peacekeepers for not properly executing their responsibilities after every escalation, increasing tensions in Armenia–Russia relations and stoking more anti-Russia sentiments in Armenia. This pattern also repeated after the escalation on August 1 and August 3. There is a perception that the Armenian government would like to shift the blame on Russian peacekeepers for surrendering Berdzor and surrounding villages to Azerbaijan, presenting this as a result of the Russia–Azerbaijan deal against Armenian interests.

Directing criticism against Russian peacekeepers and stoking anti-Russian sentiments in Armenia are in line with the US and EU interests in the region, which would like to see less Russia in the South Caucasus, including no Russian troops in Nagorno Karabakh. Simultaneously, the high-level Armenian officials continue to speak about the significance of the Armenia–Russia strategic alliance while asking Russia to put more Russian border troops along some parts of the Armenia–Azerbaijan borders. 

The contradicting statements and actions by the Armenian government and the lack of clarity about the government’s strategy toward the future of Nagorno Karabakh create confusion among Armenian partners and allies. This confusion only strengthens Azerbaijani positions in the region and makes Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh more vulnerable to Azerbaijani military blackmail.

Armenian soldier (Armenian MoD, July 27, 2022)

Two Armenian soldiers were killed on Wednesday in renewed fighting in Artsakh, following a week of escalated military hostilities.

On the morning of August 3, Azeri forces fired grenade launchers, drones and mortars in the direction of the northwestern section of the Artsakh border and deployed firearms, according to the Artsakh Defense Army. Gurgen Galeri Gabrielyan and Artur Yuri Khachatryan were killed in the attack. More than a dozen Armenian soldiers were wounded. 

“Measures are being taken with the Russian peacekeeping mission in Artsakh to stabilize the situation,” the Artsakh Defense Army wrote.  

Artsakh President Arayik Harutyunyan has declared a partial military mobilization. 

Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry reported that one Azerbaijani soldier, Kazimov Anar Rustam, was killed when Armenian forces subjected Azerbaijani positions in the Lachin district to “intensive fire.” 

Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry placed “all responsibility for the incident that took place on the territory of Azerbaijan” on Armenia, which it says “has not yet withdrawn illegal armed detachments from the territories of the neighboring state.” The Azerbaijani government has repeatedly insisted that all Armenian forces must leave Artsakh, according to the ceasefire agreement ending the 2020 Artsakh War. Armenian authorities say that the ceasefire stipulates the withdrawal of Armenian forces from regions captured by Azerbaijan during the war.

During a meeting with the personal representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office Andrzej Kaspryzk on August 3, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan “condemned the arbitrary interpretation of trilateral statements and attempts to destabilize the situation by Azerbaijan.” 

Wednesday’s attack followed three days of sustained tensions along the Artsakh border. On the morning of August 1, subdivisions of the Azerbaijani armed forces attempted to cross the line of contact in the southern and southwestern parts of Artsakh, according to the Artsakh Defense Army. One Armenian soldier, Albert Vladiki Bakhshiyan, was wounded. 

The Russian peacekeeping contingent in Artsakh verified the report, stating that the Azerbaijani armed forces had committed three violations of the ceasefire. 

“The command of the Russian peacekeepers, in cooperation with representatives of the Azerbaijani and Armenian sides, has resolved the situation,” the Russian peacekeeping force wrote of the August 1 advance. 

The latest attacks follow several accusations of ceasefire violations in Artsakh and Armenia over the previous week. From July 27-28, Azeri forces fired on positions of the Artsakh Defense Army near the Tonashen, Karmir Shuka and Taghavard villages in the Martuni region for 20 minutes, according to the Artsakh Defense Army. The window of a residential home in Karmir Shuka was broken, and eight bullets were found lying nearby in the yard, according to images shared by Artsakh Human Rights Defender Gegham Stepanyan. 

Window broken by gunfire (Gegham Stepanyan, July 28, 2022)

The Armenian Defense Ministry also accused the Azerbaijani military of firing on Armenian positions on the eastern section of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border on July 28. 

Amid Azerbaijani incursions into Artsakh this week, Azerbaijani authorities have demanded that Armenians halt use of the Lachin corridor.

“The Azerbaijani side made a claim through the peacekeeping contingent deployed in Artsakh to organize traffic via the new route in the near future,” a readout of an Artsakh Security Council meeting on August 2 by the office of Artsakh’s President Arayik Harutyunyan states. 

The statement adds that the Security Council discussed “ensuring safe traffic with the assistance of the Russian peacekeeping troops.”

The Berdzor/Lachin corridor is currently the only route connecting Armenia and Artsakh and passes through the Berdzor district, which was ceded to Azerbaijan after the 2020 Artsakh War. Under the terms of the November 9, 2020 ceasefire agreement, Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to construct an alternate route to the Berdzor/Lachin corridor within the following three years, to which Russian soldiers would be deployed. 

Construction of the portion of the road passing through Azerbaijani-controlled territory is nearly complete. Meanwhile, the Armenian Ministry of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure announced just this week that construction of the Armenian section of the road will start this month.

Secretary of Armenia’s Security Council Armen Grigoryan said that Azerbaijan’s demand to organize traffic connecting Armenia and Artsakh via the new route is “not legitimate.” 

“The trilateral statement mentions the plan for the construction of a new route. No such agreed upon plan exists. The Republic of Armenia has already proposed to agree over and sign the plan in a trilateral format and move forward with an agreed schedule and roadmap,” Grigoryan told state-run news agency Armenpress. 

Several critical pieces of infrastructure are located on the Berdzor corridor, including the natural gas pipeline that supplies Artsakh with its entire energy supply. Artsakh residents were deprived of heating and hot water for three weeks amid freezing temperatures in March after the Azerbaijani military prevented Armenian sapper groups from accessing a damaged section of the pipeline. 

Pashinyan confirmed in late June that several communities currently inhabited by Armenians in the Berdzor district, including the town of Berdzor and the villages of Aghavno, Nerkin Sus and Sus, will pass to Azerbaijani control after the construction of the new route. 

Political analyst Benyamin Poghosyan attributed this latest escalation by Azerbaijan to “some frustration in the Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations.” 

“Probably Armenia did not accept or did reject some demand of Azerbaijan. Definitely now the Azerbaijani government is frustrated,” Poghosyan told CivilNet.

The Azerbaijani government escalates military hostilities to “create nervousness” in Armenia and Artsakh and “convince or force the Armenian government to accept all its demands during the negotiations.” 

The renewed military hostilities has prompted conversations between high-ranking leaders. 

On August 2, Pashinyan had a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The readout of the meeting from the PM’s office was brief, stating that the leaders discussed the implementation of the various trilateral agreements reached between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia after the 2020 Artsakh War. 

That same day, Mirzoyan spoke with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov to discuss the “security situation in the region.” Azerbaijani Defense Minister Zakir Hasanov also spoke with his Russian counterpart Sergey Shoigu on August 2 to discuss “regional security.” 

The previous day, Mirzoyan held a phone conversation with the US Assistant Secretary of State Karen Donfried to discuss the “current security environment in the region” and “normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.”