RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
_________________________________________ ____________________
RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly
Vol. 4, No. 24, 24 June 2004
A Weekly Review of News and Analysis of Russian Domestic Politics
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HEADLINES:
* PUTIN CASTS HIS VOTE FOR BUSH
* ART TRIAL IN RUSSIA SEEN AS TEST OF FREE EXPRESSION
* RUSSIA’S DEFEATED LIBERALS MULL MERGING WITH PARTY
OF POWER
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KREMLIN/WHITE HOUSE
PUTIN CASTS HIS VOTE FOR BUSH
By Robert Coalson
President Vladimir Putin caught Russian, U.S., and European
observers off guard on 18 June when he unexpectedly announced that
Russian intelligence services had repeatedly received information
that former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was planning terrorist
attacks against the United States and U.S. interests abroad. In the
ensuing days, Russian commentators have been energetically dissecting
the context of Putin’s statement and speculating on just what the
KGB veteran might be thinking.
Russian media reports were decidedly skeptical about the
veracity and spontaneity of Putin’s remarks. They noted that
almost as soon as the preliminary report of the U.S. commission
investigating the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks was made
public, an anonymous “Russian intelligence source” told Interfax that
“as early as early 2002 Russian intelligence learned that the Iraqi
special services were planning terrorist attacks on the United States
and on U.S. diplomatic and military facilities abroad.”
“Kommersant-Daily” reported on 21 June that the Interfax report was
issued even before the final commission session had ended.
The statement came just as U.S. President George W. Bush was
facing harsh criticism for launching a military operation against
Hussein largely on the basis of arguments from his administration
that the Iraqi leader posed a terrorist threat to the United States.
Journalists and analysts quickly began describing Putin’s
statement as open support for Bush.
“Kommersant-Daily” and “Vremya novostei” on 21 June both
speculated that this low-level support for Bush failed to produce a
sufficient resonance in the West. Therefore, the newspapers wrote, at
a press conference in Astana, Kazakhstan, the Kremlin arranged to
have a reporter ask Putin a completely off-the-wall question about
the U.S. commission’s report. This gave Putin the opportunity to
repeat — almost word for word — the statement from the anonymous
intelligence source that Interfax had reported the previous day.
“Yes, after the events of 11 September 2001 and before the
beginning of the military operation in Iraq, the Russian special
services repeatedly received information that official organs of the
Hussein regime were preparing terrorist attacks on the territory of
the United States and on military and civilian targets outside its
borders,” Putin said. “This information really was transmitted
through cooperative channels to our American colleagues.”
Although Putin was quick to add that Russia’s opposition
to the military operation in Iraq had not changed, his remarks
clearly marked a shift toward the Bush administration’s
positions. “Does this mean that there is reason to argue that the
United States acted in self-defense?” Putin said. “I don’t know.
That is a separate topic.”
Journalists and analysts quickly began describing Putin’s
statement as open support for Bush. Moscow “is looking pragmatically
at the future — at the presidential elections in the United States.
It seems that the Kremlin has made up its mind and is backing Bush,”
“Vremya novostei” wrote. A sampling of leading Russian analysts
published by politcom.ru on 15 June found both that most of them felt
that Bush will win the 4 November election, and that Iraq will be the
most important issue.
But there was considerable skepticism about the veracity of
Putin’s declaration. The press argued that if the U.S.
administration had had such information in the run-up to the military
operation, it would have used it to convince the UN Security Council
to adopt a resolution authorizing the action. Media reports noted
that neither Bush nor Vice President Dick Cheney mentioned such
Russian reports during their testimony before the 11 September
commission. Analyst Boris Vinogradov, writing in “Novye izvestiya” on
21 June, noted that Putin’s statement put German Chancellor
Gerhard Schroeder and French President Jacques Chirac — both of whom
have heretofore enjoyed close personal relations with Putin — in an
“idiotic position,” because Putin implied that Russia did not share
this intelligence with its “allies” in the antiwar coalition.
These doubts and others reinforced the impression that the
statement was clearly intended as political support for Bush. And
although there was no shortage of theories about what might be
motivating Putin to make such a transparent gesture now, none of them
seemed entirely convincing.
“Kommersant-Daily” on 21 June noted that the Kremlin
traditionally “finds it much more convenient” to deal with Republican
U.S. administrations than Democratic ones, which “tend to harp too
much on human rights.” Bush, it noted, did not listen to a group of
U.S. congressmen who recently called on the administration to exclude
Russia from the Group of Eight (G-8) leading industrialized
countries. One of the analysts surveyed earlier by politcom.ru,
Strategic Studies Center Director Andrei Piontokovskii, noted in his
assessment of the U.S. election that Democratic challenger Senator
John Kerry has been rumored to be considering asking Republican
Senator John McCain to be his vice presidential candidate and that
McCain was one of the sponsors of the movement to exclude Russia from
the G-8.
Putin’s comments about Hussein lent added significance to
his many statements in support of Bush at the G-8 summit in the
United States earlier this month. At that time, Putin congratulated
Bush for the turnaround of the U.S. economy and said that the
Democrats “don’t have the moral right to attack George Bush for
Iraq since they themselves did the same thing [in Yugoslavia in
1999].”
“Kommersant-Daily” also attached significance to the fact
that Putin made his statement while meeting with Central Asian
leaders. Part of Putin’s message, the daily commented, was to
demonstrate that Russia is an equal partner with the United States in
the struggle against international terrorism and “to show who is the
most important in the CIS.”
“Nezavisimaya gazeta” on 22 June speculated that Putin might
be giving Bush a hand regarding “Saddam’s terror” in order “to
get Washington’s support against ‘Chechen terror.'” It
added as well that Putin’s support might enable him to bargain
for “a special role” in post-Hussein Iraq. The daily connected
Putin’s statement and his purported desire for Western
understanding regarding Chechnya with an unsubstantiated 20 June
report in the Italian daily “La Repubblica” that some 300 Chechen
fighters have appeared in Iraq to support Iraqi insurgents.
Finally, Kremlin-connected political consultant Stanislav
Belkovskii told APN on the day of Putin’s Astana comments that
Kremlin wants the United States to pressure Qatar to release the two
Russian secret-service agents currently on trial there for the
February assassination of former acting Chechen President Zelimkhan
Yandarbiev. “It is possible that Vladimir Putin’s support of U.S.
President George Bush was a condition for the Americans help in
return in solving the ‘Qatar problem,'” Belkovskii said.
Although analysts were at a loss to come up with a definitive
explanation of Putin’s comments, they were unanimous in viewing
them as an extraordinary and potentially momentous step, possibly as
important as Putin’s fabled telephone call to Bush immediately
following the 11 September 2001 attacks. In the months after those
attacks, Bush repeatedly reminded the world that Putin was the first
global leader to express his solidarity with the United States, and
those months marked the high point of U.S.-Russian relations since
Bush became president.
CIVIL SOCIETY
STATE AND CHURCH. As the trial of the curator of Moscow’s
Sakharov Museum and the organizer of an exhibition on the role of
religion in modern society continues this week (see story below), new
attention has focused on the increasingly prominent role of the
Russian Orthodox Church. However, experts on religion in Russia
suggest that while the church’s public profile was raised during
President Vladimir Putin’s first term, its already limited
political independence is diminishing even further.
On the one hand, the Russian Orthodox Church has managed to
sign a series of agreements with various state organs at the federal
and local levels over the past seven years, gaining new access to
state institutions, such as prisons and military installations.
Orthodox chapels have been opened at train stations and airports. On
the other hand, the church has not secured some key items on its
agenda. For example, a school course on the foundations of Orthodoxy
has not yet been established, although church officials first raised
the issue with the Education Ministry in 1999. The church has also
lost key battles over tax reform and the restitution of church land
and property confiscated by the Soviet regime.
In an overview of how Putin has handled cooperation with the
Patriarchate during his first term, “Vremya novostei” on 4 March
concluded that despite the fact that Putin is himself Russian
Orthodox, he has not personally supported the issues that the church
has been lobbying. The daily argued that Putin has set the right tone
for the rest of government officialdom by observing the
constitutionally established separation of church and state.
Lawrence Uzzell, president of the International Religious
Freedom Watch, takes a slightly different view. He argues that while
the state might not be serving the church’s agenda, the church —
like other civil-society institutions — is in danger of being
co-opted to the service of the state’s agenda. Writing in “First
Things: The Journal of Religion and Public Life” on 4 May, Uzzell
suggested that Putin’s regime is “reviving the old habit of
treating every social institution as if it were an extension of the
state.” He recounts how at the beginning of the year, Old Believer
priests from across the country were summoned to visit the local
headquarters of the Federal Security Service (FSB) in their regions.
FSB officials asked the priests whom they were going to support at a
February council meeting, at which a new head of the Old Believer
sect was to be elected.
Uzzell told RFE/RL that “since the leading metropolitans and
bishops were not willing to criticize [former President] Boris
Yeltsin’s war on Chechnya and other policies even when Yeltsin
was deeply unpopular, it is not likely that they will suddenly begin
to defy a president who is genuinely popular and who has tighter
control of the news media and other key institutions than any Russian
or Soviet leader since the 1980s.” He concludes that the threat to
civil society is all too real — not because the church is swallowing
the state, but vice versa.
This week, “RFE/RL Political Weekly” spoke with Uzzell and
Geraldine Fagan, the Moscow correspondent for the Forum 18 News
Service about the role of the Russian Orthodox Church under Putin.
(Julie A. Corwin)
INTERVIEW
RFE/RL: How has the role of the Russian Orthodox Church
changed under the Putin regime? The church seems to have a higher
public profile now, but is that all there is to it? Or has there been
a deepening of the church-state partnership?
FAGAN: Symbolism aside, not much has been done in favor of
the church on the federal level under Putin — the church is very
unhappy about the new Tax and Land codes, for instance. Although the
security services have been far more active in limiting the activity
of foreign missionaries than under Yeltsin, and there is a passage to
this effect in the national security doctrine, which was one of the
first things Putin signed as acting president in 2000. Strictly
speaking, this [activity] does not concern the role of the church
directly. Also, the federal authorities have been noticeably reticent
in coming out in support of the church’s main demands —
particularly the introduction of a course called the Foundations of
Orthodox Culture in state schools. However, many regional authorities
and some government ministries have continued to form their own close
links with the church — even to a degree that is clearly
anticonstitutional — but it is anyone’s guess whether this is
allowed to take place because (a) Putin actually approves of it but
doesn’t want to show it, (b) he is powerless to stop it, or (c)
he doesn’t particularly care, as it is not that important.
UZZELL: The Moscow Patriarchate actually has less political
clout now than it did in the 1990s. On 4 March, the website for
“Vremya novostei” [] published an excellent
summary by Aleksandr Morozov, who wrote that on a whole series of
issues the advocates of “clericalism” have suffered defeats or have
at least been neutralized. The Foundations of Orthodox Culture course
has not become a mandatory part of the school curriculum. The Culture
and Mass Communications Ministry has won the debate over ownership of
church valuables confiscated by the Soviet state. The Patriarchate
continues to be frustrated in its quest for the quick, massive return
of its pre-Soviet real-estate holdings. And the introduction of
military chaplains in the army is not even on the agenda.
The state’s unwillingness to enact the Moscow
Patriarchate’s agenda has not at all diminished the
Patriarchate’s willingness to serve as the state’s docile,
obedient agent. As far as one can judge from its public statements
and actions, the Patriarchate is content to accept that role — as
are the other mainstream, “traditional” religious organizations. For
example, the nature of Russia’s March 2004 presidential election
was such that calling on citizens to vote — which under other
circumstances might be seen simply as a neutral call for them to do
their civic duty — was in effect an endorsement of Putin. The Moscow
Patriarchate gladly provided that endorsement the week before the
election, with its spokesman Father Vsevolod Chaplin declaring that
“every person must remember about his responsibility for the
country’s destiny, for its choice of a correct historical path to
follow.” Similarly, from Rabbi Berl Lazar — the Putin-favored
claimant to the disputed title of Russia’s chief rabbi — came
the statement that “participation in democratic elections is not only
a man’s right, but first of all the fulfillment of God’s
commandment.” [Both quoted by RIA-Novosti, March 11, 2004.] One
cannot even imagine today’s Moscow Patriarchate challenging Putin
on moral/political issues that the latter really considers important,
such as military atrocities in Chechnya.
RFE/RL: Has the Kremlin found a potential successor for
Patriarch Aleksii II? Or do different parts of the Kremlin support
different parts of the church? Who is Archimandrite Tikhon and what
role does he play in relations between the Kremlin and Patriarchate?
FAGAN: At the moment, the issue of a potential successor for
Patriarch Aleksii is actually less clear than it ever was!
Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad has long been the
most influential Russian Orthodox hierarch after the patriarch and
Aleksii’s obvious successor. While Kirill might turn out to be
content with just “being patriarch” if he were to succeed Aleksii,
the Kremlin would probably prefer someone more pliable, as Kirill has
so far proved unpredictable and independent-minded. I am not
convinced that anyone in the Kremlin would be so concerned by this
that they would go to great lengths to interfere though (although
there are currently a few rumors circulating to this effect),
especially as it is uncertain how long Aleksii will remain in place,
and two of the few other serious candidates, Metropolitan Mefodii and
Metropolitan Sergii, recently lost their power bases.
Archimandrite Tikhon is the energetic youngish abbot of a
Moscow monastery that has attracted many novices in the 10 years
since it was refounded. Being less Sovietized than many of the
hierarchs, Tikhon finds a natural rapport with the Russian Orthodox
Church Abroad, and has therefore been prominent in the recent
meetings with them. He was rumored to be Putin’s spiritual father
a couple of years ago, but although they are certainly well
acquainted, I am not aware of anything to substantiate any closer
tie. Tikhon’s major sponsor is the patriotic [Mezhprombank head]
Sergei Pugachev — you may want to draw some political conclusions
from that….
UZZELL: My best guess is that the Kremlin will keep its
options open and will intervene decisively when the time is ripe, in
such a way that Aleksii’s successor will feel himself deeply
beholden to the Kremlin.
I agree with Aleksandr Soldatov, who wrote in “Moskovskie
novosti” on 21 January that, “Father Tikhon is a consistent,
traditional statist who ideally would not be at all opposed if the
sovereign emperor were once again to become head of the Church.” He
has faithfully served the state’s interests by calming hysteria
among Orthodox fringe elements over being assigned tax identification
numbers (INN). Tikhon visited the influential so-called all-Russian
elder Father Ioann Krestyankin of the Pskov-Pechorskii Monastery, who
had been among those calling the INN dangerous to the soul, and
persuaded him to make a statement that the INN was not a threat. A
videotape of that statement was widely distributed in the
ultra-Orthodox subculture.
It was also telling that Tikhon, a mere archimandrite of a
monastery, rather than a high-ranking bishop such as Kirill,
accompanied Putin to New York last year for his crucial meeting with
Metropolitan Lavreof the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad. Given the
Russian Orthodox Church Abroad’s long record of criticizing the
Moscow Patriarchate for “Sergianstvo” — excessive servility to the
Soviet regime — it is ironic that Tikhon is an even franker
apologist than Aleksii or Kirill for the Patriarchate’s record
under Stalin. His monastery recently published a book glorifying
Patriarch Sergii’s role during the Stalin years and calling for
his canonization.
RFE/RL: Some analysts seem to believe that Putin has been
careful not to tie himself to church too overtly, do you agree?
FAGAN: Basically, yes. He has been careful not to tie himself
with the hierarchy by appearing at the major functions — Easter and
Christmas at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior — only occasionally.
Doing things like making a pilgrimage to the Solovetskii Monastery
and spending Christmas at an ordinary church in Suzdal — after which
he extolled its “real parish” atmosphere to the patriarch on
television speaks volumes. Putin emphasizes his personal ties with
Orthodoxy as a faith, rather than with the Moscow Patriarchate as a
structure. I also think he projects a slight awkwardness in church
situations, which should appeal to the majority of Russian citizens
who say they are Orthodox, but don’t actually know what it’s
about.
UZZELL: Yes. I think it is interesting that he so often does
his “Orthodox photo-ops” for big holidays such as Christmas and
Easter at places such as provincial monasteries rather than standing
alongside the Patriarch in Moscow. His approach seems calculated to
appeal to the majority of ethnic Russians, who in some vague sense
identify themselves as “Orthodox,” who feel instinctive affection for
and loyalty to the Church, but who want to keep it at a comfortable
distance from their lives.
RFE/RL: Why has Putin tried to mend fences between the
Russian Orthodox Church Abroad and the Moscow Patriarchate? And why
has he tried to act as peacemaker between the Patriarchate and the
Vatican?
FAGAN: Both are important symbolically. If the Russian
Orthodox Church Abroad joined with the Moscow Patriarchate, it would
suggest that modern Russia has gotten over its Soviet past. If the
Russian Orthodox Church Abroad — which has preserved a deep devotion
to the murdered royal family — openly trusts Putin and acknowledges
his leadership, this enhances his historical legitimacy as ruler. If
a papal visit to Russia ever became possible, it would demonstrate
Russia’s openness to the West, and so increase the West’s
confidence in Russia as a “normal” country, which is also desirable
from the Kremlin’s point of view.
UZZELL: I agree with Mikhail Pozdnyaev, who wrote for “Novye
izvestiya” on 16 December 2003 that “for both the Moscow Patriarchate
and the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, and also for the president of
the Russian Federation, the main argument in favor of reunification
is that if our motherland is a super state, it should have a super
church. Just as in the 1970s, the foreign parishes of the Moscow
Patriarchate served as centers of foreign intelligence, so tomorrow
the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad could become an outpost of Russian
geopolitics. Its churches could become something of a fifth column.”
I’m not convinced that Putin is really trying to be a
“peacemaker” with the Vatican. He just wants to look like one. Putin
wants good relations with Western governments for the sake of a broad
range of political and economic goals, and the Vatican is too
important to be ignored. It helps if he can present a civilized face
to the Vatican and to the West in general while leaving faceless
bureaucrats to do the dirty work of denying visas, etc.
TIMELINE: PRESIDENT PUTIN AND THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH
11 June 2004: Putin presents Patriarch Aleksii with the
order For Services to the Fatherland, 1st class
23 November 2003: Putin and Aleksii meet with the religious
leaders of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan at the Novo-Ogarevo
presidential residence
5 November 2003: Putin meets with Pope John Paul II at the
Vatican
15 October 2003: Putin meets with Aleksii at the presidential
residence in Novo-Ogarevo.
25 September 2003: Putin meets with leader of Russian
Orthodox Church Abroad Metropolitan Lavre in New York
31 July 2003: Putin attends ceremony marking the 100th
anniversary of the canonization of St. Serafim in Sarov, Nizhnii
Novogorod Oblast
10 May 2003: Putin visits Aleksii at his residence at
Peredelkino
24 January 2003: Putin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma
attend a Russian Orthodox Church Service in Kyiv
22 January 2003: Putin meets with Aleksii and Bulgarian
Orthodox church leader Patriarch Ignatios IV of Antioch and All the
East at the Kremlin
31 December 2002: Aleksii confers upon Putin the highest
church award for laymen — the Order of St. Prince Vladimir,
Equal-to-the-Apostles, for the president’s services to the
Fatherland and in connection with his 50th birthday
29 May 2002: Putin signs into law amendments to the Tax Code
exempting religious organizations from paying taxes on income
received while conducting worship
6 January 2002: Putin makes a short Christmas pilgrimage to
Orthodox holy places, including the Cathedral of the Transfiguration
of the Savior in Pereslavl-Zalesskii, the Cathedral of the Assumption
in Vladimir, and the Chernoostrovkii Convent in Malayaroslavets
8 May 2001: Putin meets in the Kremlin with Aleksii and
Archbishop Christodoulos of Athens and All Greece
11 April 2001: Putin decorates Metropolitan Kirill of
Smolensk and Kaliningrad, chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate’s
Department for External Church Relations, with the Order of Merit
24 November 2000: Putin and Aleksii meet in the Kremlin with
the religious leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan
7 May 2000: Aleksii blesses Putin at the Cathedral of the
Annunciation in the Kremlin immediately after the presidential
inauguration
(Sources: , “National Catholic Reporter,”
“RFE/RL Newsline”)
ART TRIAL IN RUSSIA SEEN AS TEST OF FREE EXPRESSION. The Russian
Constitution states that Russia is a secular country, with no
state-sponsored religion. But many observers point to the
increasingly prominent role played by the Russian Orthodox Church in
public life as evidence that some would like to see this changed.
Now, a trial in Moscow is focusing the spotlight on the issue
of freedom of expression, Russian ethnicity and the role of the state
in religion and cultural matters. The case pits the
Prosecutor-General’s Office against three human rights activists
charged with inciting religious and ethnic hatred for organizing a
modern art exhibition titled “Caution, Religion.”
The exhibition, which was hosted by Moscow’s Andrei
Sakharov Museum and Social Center, featured 42 artworks by 42 artists
— some of them controversial, but all intended to provoke discussion
about the role of religion in modern society, according to the
curators. One work featured Jesus’s face drawn on a Coca-Cola
logo next to the words “This Is My Blood.”
Just four days after the exhibition opened last year, six
vandals destroyed several of the pieces, smearing graffiti on the
museum’s walls that accused museum workers of being “Orthodox
haters.” The museum sued the men, but lost the case when a Moscow
court ruled that their actions were justified because their religious
sensibilities had been offended.
Now, prosecutors have turned the tables by charging Sakharov
Center Director Yurii Samodurov, exhibition organizer Lyudmila
Vasilovskaya, and artist Anna Mikhalchuk under Article 282 of the
Russian Criminal Code. The article outlaws actions that “incite
ethnic, racial, or religious hatred.”
The prosecutor, speaking at the trial’s opening on 15
June, said the exhibition “insulted and humiliated the national
dignity of a great number of believers.” The three could face up to
five years’ imprisonment if convicted.
Democracy groups have expressed outrage over the prosecutor.
The Sakharov Center posted an open letter on the Internet that
recalls the center’s advocacy work for human rights, including
work on cases involving issues of religious freedom.
Samodurov told the court 15 June that the exhibition’s
message has been twisted and misunderstood by its detractors: “The
name of the exhibition, ‘Caution: Religion,’ has two
meanings. It is a call for people to take care of religion, to
respect it and respect believers, and also a warning sign when we are
dealing with religious fundamentalism, whether it be Islamic
fundamentalism or Orthodox fundamentalism. None of the materials
presented contained any other message, so I do not understand why we
are accused of the motives mentioned by the prosecutor.”
Others, such as activist Lev Ponomarev, head of the NGO For
Human Rights, say the trial has only served to confirm the
exhibition’s warning about the dangers of fundamentalism and of
politicizing religion. He noted that prosecutors brought the charges
against the Sakharov Center staffers after receiving thousands of
petitions collected by ultraconservative members of the Orthodox
Church. Their aim, he said, is to turn Russia into an explicitly
Orthodox country, an ambition that contradicts the constitution. That
the state is helping them further this ideology is something he finds
deeply disturbing. “This would be laughable if it weren’t so
sad,” he said. “Radical elements in the church want our state to
become Orthodox, even though our constitution forbids this.”
Defense lawyer Yurii Shmidt says he hopes the judge in the
case will be guided by Russia’s constitution and uphold the
freedom of expression it guarantees, as well as the secular nature of
the Russian state. He cautions against linking Orthodoxy with Russian
ethnicity, as the prosecution has done in the charges it has brought.
“This case concerns fundamental human rights,” Shmidt told RFE/RL. “I
have no doubt that it will turn into a huge mark of shame for Russia
if a guilty verdict is rendered.”
That is not the view of the Russian Orthodox Church
hierarchy. Father Mikhail Dudko of the church’s department for
external relations told RFE/RL that the church is not responsible for
the case, and he rejects accusations by those who see the trial as an
attempt by the Orthodox clergy to score political points. “The trial
of the museum workers has not come at our initiative,” Dudko said.
“It is the initiative of the prosecutor’s office and this cannot
be interpreted as a trial of the church versus the Sakharov Museum.
It is a trial of the state versus the Sakharov Museum.”
Nevertheless, Dudko makes no secret that the church hierarchy
does not object to the trial, having been deeply offended by the
exhibition. A guilty verdict, he implies, might not be a bad thing.
“Of course, [the exhibition] offended us and it offended us deeply,”
Dudko said. “Of course, we believe that something similar must not
occur again. But I repeat that a state that tries to promote harmony
in religious affairs, that tries to ensure that all citizens —
regardless of faith — feel comfortable, must of course take steps to
ensure this happens. In our view, the trial reflects the legal right
of the state to conduct its religious policy and it could well serve
as a lesson to those people who are fostering tensions in the
religious affairs of our country.” (Jeremy Bransten)
PARTIES
RUSSIA’S DEFEATED LIBERALS MULL MERGING WITH PARTY OF POWER. When
members of the Union of Rightist Forces (SPS) gather on 26 June for a
party congress just outside Moscow, one likely subject for discussion
is a possible merger with the right wing of the pro-Kremlin Unified
Russia party. Boris Nadezhdin, secretary of the party’s
presidium, raised the issue on 19 June at a meeting of the
party’s Moscow Oblast branch. According to Nadezhdin, Kremlin
political strategists would perhaps support the creation of an
electoral bloc composed of SPS and Unified Russia’s “right wing,”
“Gazeta” reported on 21 June.
Nadezhdin’s statement sparked considerable skepticism
within the SPS. Leonid Gozman, head of the party Creative Council,
told “Nezavisimaya gazeta” on 21 June that such a union is hardly
possible since Unified Russia’s right wing is more virtual than
real. The same day, Gozman told Ekho Moskvy that any union between
“such a monster and our party, which failed to show good results at
the elections,” would in reality be more like a “takeover” than a
marriage of equals. “I am absolutely sure that we will never do
that,” he said. Former party co-leader Boris Nemtsov told Interfax
that Unified Russia has neither a right nor a left wing and can
maintain its popularity only so long as the president’s rating
remains high.
Writing on politcom.ru on 21 June, analyst Georgii Kovalev
reported that Nadezhdin also used the 19 June meeting to launch his
own claim to leadership of the party. Nadezhdin stated at the meeting
that “[former SPS co-leader Anatolii] Chubais is not ready to head
the party and there is no other leader of his stature,” according to
politcom.ru. He added that Nemtsov and former Prime Minister Mikhail
Kasyanov are likely candidates, but if new candidates are desirable,
then he is “ready to participate in the process” himself.
Kovalev predicted that while the leadership issue will
probably not be raised at the congress, the idea of joining the
Unified Russia’s “right flank” will certainly be discussed.
According to Kovalev, Chubais is seen as the party’s informal
leader, and the majority of SPS members do not view Nadezhdin’s
ambitions positively. However, a “soft incorporation of the right
into the structure of the pro-presidential party will definitely be
on the agenda,” in part because SPS represents business interests
that “under current conditions would not find it profitable to be in
conflict with the authorities.”
So far, the response from Unified Russia to Nadezhdin’s
idea has been guardedly positive. In an interview with “Nezavisimaya
gazeta,” Deputy Duma Speaker and Unified Russia Supreme Council
member Vyacheslav Volodin called the idea “sensible.” “It is no
surprise that a section of the center-right in SPS can see a great
deal in common with itself and Unified Russia’s party platform,”
Volodin said. Last month, other members of Unified Russia’s Duma
faction — including Andrei Isaev, Gennadii Gudkov, and Oleg Morozov
— raised the issue of splitting the party into right- and left-wing
factions.
The topic of breaking up the party of power has also been the
subject of a number of articles in the Russian press. “Itogi,” No.
23, reported — citing unidentified Kremlin sources — that the
presidential administration plans to split the party up. According to
the weekly, the idea of creating a right-wing group in the Duma by
drawing some members from United Russia was seriously discussed
immediately after the December elections to compensate for the
absence of the defeated Yabloko and SPS. But party leaders reportedly
decided instead to enjoy their new dominance in the Duma and not
create different factions from their 300-plus members.
However, by the 2007 elections, “Itogi” suggested, “the
semi-disintegration of Unified Russia is dictated by several
reasons.” The main one, according to the weekly, is that by the next
elections, there might simply be no one to compete with the “ruling
party” — which “does not suit the president’s multiparty-system
agenda.” Another reason is that “many deputies elected from
single-mandate districts who have joined United Russia faction do not
feel very comfortable there because they have no real opportunities
to lobby their local interests.”
In an article on politcom.ru on 26 May, analyst Tatyana
Stanovaya suggested that Unified Russia might not be big enough to
house all of the egos and diverging ambitions of its members. She
noted that “in such a large faction that brings together extremely
diverse people, many of whom were previously independent political
figures, the problem of distributing power in such a way that these
political figures acquire fitting status and do not feel
‘downgraded’ is a timely one.” According to Stanovaya, it “is
not even a question of a struggle for power within the faction but of
seeking some kind of unique project for [former members] to head and,
in the context of which, to obtain at least a modicum of autonomy.”
Despite the obvious appeal of forming separate parties from
the point of view of individual Duma deputies, some political
analysts are skeptical that the presidential administration has any
interest in seeing the Unified Russia party or faction split into
smaller units. Sergei Markelov, director of the Mark Communications
political-consulting group, told “Izvestiya” on 27 May that the
presidential administration will not support attempts to break up
Unified Russia.
Dmitrii Orlov, head of the Political and Economic
Communications Agency, agreed. “I’m sure these statements are not
authorized by the leaders of the party,” Orlov told “Izvestiya.”
“Measures aimed at separating platforms were logical up to the
mid-1990s. Now, when power is being consolidated, this is not
necessary. Such attempts can only lead to internal fractures within
Unified Russia.” Along these same lines, “Gazeta” opined on 21 June
that while it is well known that the Kremlin is interested in having
an intellectually sound right-wing group in the Duma, it is less
clear whether it would be “happy to break up the already amorphous
Unified Russia.” “Such a merger would be beneficial for the
right-wing leaders, who would get a chance to occupy some Duma
posts,” the daily noted, “but the prospects for the party [itself]
would be [dim].” (Julie A. Corwin)
COMINGS & GOINGS
SHIFTED: Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov signed on 16 June an order
dismissing Ivan Kamenskii and Anatolii Kotelnikov as deputy atomic
energy ministers and naming them deputy directors of the Federal
Atomic Energy Agency, RosBalt reported on 18 June and “Kommersant-
Daily” on 19 June. Fradkov also dismissed Igor Slyunyaev as first
deputy transportation minister. There are now only two deputy
transportation ministers — Sergei Aristov and Aleksandr Misharin.
POLITICAL CALENDAR
23-25 June: Six-country talks on North Korea’s
nuclear program will be held in Beijing
24 June: The cabinet will examine issue of redistributing
property rights over educational, health-care, and cultural
facilities among the federal, regional, and municipal levels of
government
24 June: Moscow Arbitration Court will hold hearing on the
compulsory liquidation of Sodbiznesbank
24 June: Norilsk Nickel will hold a shareholders meeting in
Moscow
24-25 June: Parliamentary assembly of the Russia-Belarus
Union will hold a session in Brest
25 June: Gazprom will hold a shareholders meeting
26 June: Union of Rightist Forces will hold party congress
27 June: International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General
Muhammad el-Baradei will visit Russia
29 June: Founding meeting of the Association of
Russian-Armenian Economic Cooperation will be held in Moscow
30 June: The Qatari court hearing the case of two Russians
accused of carrying out the assassination of former acting Chechen
President Zelimkhan Yandarbiev is expected to announce its verdict
30 June-2 July: Financial Action Task Force will meet in
Paris
Early July: British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw will visit
Russia
July: Russia and the United States will hold bilateral
negotiations on Russia’s possible entry into the World Trade
Organization
July: Audit Chamber will complete its checks on major oil
companies
1 July: First anniversary of the creation of Federal
Antinarcotics Agency
1-2 July: The fourth annual Volga forum on “Strategies for
Regional Development” will be held in Kirov
2 July: State Duma will consider introducing monetary
compensation for in-kind social benefits in its first reading
2 July: The Audit Chamber will hold a session examining the
results of privatization over the last 10 years
2-4 July: Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will visit Seoul
3 July: Communist Party congress will be held to elect new
leadership
3 July: Yabloko will hold its 12th party congress
3 July: The Motherland party headed by Dmitrii Rogozin will
hold a party congress in Moscow
4 July: Vladivostok will hold mayoral election
6 July: Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian will visit
Moscow
6-10 July: International weapons exhibition in Nizhnii Tagil
10 July: State Duma will end its spring session
12 July: Hearing of the case against former Yukos CEO Mikhail
Khodorkovskii and Menatep Chairman Platon Lebedev to resume
21 July: Dutch Foreign Minister Bernard Bot will visit Russia
31 July: State Duma will hold a special session
1 August: Deadline for the Finance Ministry to present its
draft 2005 budget to the government
3 August: State Duma will hold a special session
26 August: Deadline for the government to submit its draft
2005 budget to the State Duma
29 August: Presidential elections will be held in Chechnya
September: St. Petersburg’s Hermitage Museum plans to
open the Hermitage Center, which will exhibit works from the
Hermitage’s collection, in the city of Kazan
15-18 September: The third International Conference of Mayors
of World Cities will be held in Moscow
20 September: The State Duma’s fall session will begin
October: President Putin will visit China
October: International forum of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference will be held in Moscow
25 October: First anniversary of Yukos head Mikhail
Khodorkovskii’s arrest at an airport in Novosibirsk
31 October: Presidential election in Ukraine
November: Gubernatorial election in Pskov Oblast
22 November: President Putin to visit Brazil
December: A draft law on toll roads will be submitted to the
Russian government, according to the Federal Highways Agency’s
Construction Department on 6 April
December: Gubernatorial elections in Bryansk, Kamchatka,
Ulyanovsk, and Ivanovo oblasts
29 December: State Duma’s fall session will come to a
close
March 2005: Gubernatorial election in Saratov Oblast
*********************************************************
Copyright (c) 2004. RFE/RL, Inc. All rights reserved.
The “RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly” is prepared by Julie A. Corwin
on the basis of a variety of sources. It is distributed every
Wednesday.
Direct comments to Julie A. Corwin at [email protected].
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