Robert Fisk: all the world is a mass grave

Robert Fisk: all the world is a mass grave

June 18, 2011 – 12:42 AMT

PanARMENIAN.Net – All the world is a mass grave, Robert Fisk says in
an article he titled `We can’t tell the victims to leave mass graves
in peace.’

`Why, only a few miles north of Jisr al-Shughour, the Syrian fields
are still strewn with thousands of bones and bits of skulls; all that
is left in just this one location of the one and a half million men,
women and children who were murdered in the 1915 Armenian holocaust,’
Fisk says.

`Then there’s there’s a place called “Barbara’s Pit” near a town
called Lasko where the mass grave, only 66 years old this time,
contains perhaps 1,000 skeletons about whom no one really wishes to
talk.’

`Where we can, we do now identify the dead. The vast 1914-1918 war
cemeteries and the graveyards of the Second World War define our
craving for individualism amid barbarism. Yet mass graves lie beneath
every crossroads in Europe; from the war of the Spanish succession to
the Hundred Years War, to the Franco-Prussian war, from Drogheda to
Srebrenica and, of course, to the ash pits of Auschwitz. In 1993, I
visited the remains of the Treblinka extermination camp in Poland just
after a gale had unearthed trees from the ground. In the roots of one,
I found human teeth,’ he continues.

`There’s a mass grave only two miles from my home in Beirut – of
Palestinian victims of the Sabra and Shatila massacre whom I watched
being buried, only a few of whose names I know – and which will never
be reopened. Not in our lifetime. And there are mass graves – of
perhaps 30,000 Iraqi dead – buried alive by US forces in the 1991 Gulf
War, unmarked, of course.’

Fisk concludes, `I’m not sure where the search should end. Who would
deny the relatives of the dead of Srebrenica – whose principal killer
at last resides in the Hague – the chance of praying at the graves?
Who would turn their backs on the mass graves of Buchenwald? Or the
frozen hills of bones that mark the burial of the 350,000 Leningraders
who starved to death in 1941 and 1942?’

BAKU: Expert: Economic problems to occur while constructing new ANPP

Trend Daily News (Azerbaijan)
June 16, 2011 Thursday 6:40 PM GMT +4

Expert: Economic problems to occur while constructing new Armenian
nuclear power plant

Azerbaijan, Baku, June 16 / Trend E. Tariverdiyeva /

There will be a number of economic problems while constructing a new
Armenian nuclear power plant (NPP), scheduled for 2012-2013, a Russian
source, an expert-nuclear scholar, who worked for 20 years in the
nuclear field said.

“The second operating unit of the Armenian NPP must be closed until
2016,” the expert told Trend.

“According to the decision of the G8, more stringent test standards
test must be established. They must apply to the Armenian NPP, and
Russia supports the decision of G8.”

This decision was taken before the accident at “Fukushima-1”, the
first units of which were also old, he said. The Metsamor NPP was
built in 1970.

After the devastating Spitak earthquake the activity of this plant had
been suspended, but in 1995, despite international protests, the work
of the station was reactivated, and in addition, the second reactor
was launched.

Given the large number of minor earthquakes in the past 10 years in
this area, a disaster would hurt the entire South Caucasus and the
Middle East would be seriously affected.
Several European countries have adopted a plan of abandoning nuclear
energy amid the nuclear crisis in Japan, where a large-scale accident
occurred at the nuclear power plant “Fukushima-1 after a devastating
earthquake and tsunami on March 11.

The accident at the nuclear power plant “Fukushima” in Japan can not
lead to Armenia’s denial from the project of building a new nuclear
unit at the Armenian nuclear power plant, Minister of Energy and
Natural Resources Armen Movsisyan said in an interview with
“Interfax”.

“At present, Armenia has no alternative to building a new nuclear
power station. It is planned to begin constructing in the second half
of 2012-2013. The Minister expressed hope that a new nuclear power
unit will be built by 2017.

It was earlier reported that in late April, Chairman of the State
Committee on Nuclear Safety Regulation under the Armenian government
Ashot Martirosyan said that the construction project of a new nuclear
power was temporarily frozen. “All the issues relating to the
construction of a new nuclear power plant in Armenia were temporarily
frozen,” he said.

The expert said that the security requirements are also tightened to
build a new nuclear power plant.

The Russian design standards correspond to the highest international
standards. Of course, all the necessary procedures must be carried out
and have a positive result when making decisions about the
construction, the expert said.

“I think that this problem can be reasonably resolved, but there is an
economic problem,” he said.
A source said that it is necessary to build two units of the nuclear
power plant for reliable energy supply.

“One should periodically stop the stations for prophylactic repair.
However, the power of almost 2.5 GW is clearly abundant for Armenia.
About 1.5 GW of installed capacity would be sufficient even in the
long-term-prospect. I do not know whether the opportunity of selling
excess electricity were calculated.”

Of course, there is an open question who can act as a guarantor on the
possible nuclear damage, the expert said.

“A joint campaign and Armenia are unlikely to be such a guarantee,” he
said. “Russia? But it is not clear whether there is a document
obliging it to do it.”

Cyprus: New Double Taxation Agreements With UAE And Armenia

Mondaq Business Briefing
June 14, 2011

Cyprus: New Double Taxation Agreements With United Arab Emirates And Armenia

BYLINE: Olga Mikhailova

Cyprus has signed new double taxation agreements with the United Arab
Emirates and with Armenia. The agreements have not yet been ratified,
and have not taken effect.

The agreement dated 29 November 1982 between Cyprus and the USSR,
which was adopted by Armenia on independence, will remain in effect
between Cyprus and Armenia until the new agreement is ratified by both
countries.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to
the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your
specific circumstances.

Vahaken Tachdjian, retired gastroenterologist

Philadelphia Inquirer
June 17 2011

Obituary
Vahaken Tachdjian, retired gastroenterologist
By Sally A. Downey

Inquirer Staff Writer

Vahaken Tachdjian, 90, of Wynnewood, a retired gastroenterologist and
an activist in the Armenian community, died of complications of a
stroke Saturday, June 11, at Lankenau Hospital.

Dr. Tachdjian’s grandparents were killed in the massacre of Armenians
in Turkey in the early 20th century. In 1922, his parents fled Turkey
with their year-old son and walked across the Syrian desert to
Lebanon.

Raised and educated in Beirut, Dr. Tachdjian immigrated to the United
States with his wife in 1958 to escape unrest in the Middle East.

In January 1964, he was chosen as spokesman for a group of 97
immigrants at a citizenship ceremony in Philadelphia. “We have chosen
to become citizens of this country because we feel we can live here in
peace and security,” he said. After the swearing-in, he told The
Inquirer that “we felt this was a country where human rights are
respected.”

Dr. Tachdjian earned a medical degree from the American University of
Beirut. He was a fellow at Harvard University Medical School in 1948
and later did research in gastroenterology at Massachusetts General
Hospital in Boston before returning to Beirut.

After moving to the United States, he maintained medical offices in
Wynnewood and at Graduate Hospital until he was in his mid-80s. He was
also on the staff of Haverford Community Hospital.

Dr. Tachdjian was a professor at the University of Pennsylvania
Graduate School of Medicine for many years. He wrote 20 articles
published in scientific journals and was associate editor of the
four-volume reference set Bockus Gastroenterology. In the 1990s, he
served on the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates.

According to an article published in the Armenian Reporter
International in 2002, Dr. Tachdjian was a founder and past president
of the Association of Armenian Doctors of Philadelphia, was active
with a coalition of five Armenian churches in the Philadelphia region,
and was a patron of the Armenian Sisters Academy in Radnor.

He received the key to the city from Mayor Frank L. Rizzo and an award
from the Armenian Missionary Association of America, among other
honors.

Dr. Tachdjian is survived by his wife of 67 years, Asdghik Der
Bedrossian Tachdjian; daughters Ashkhen, Houri, and Maral; a brother;
a sister; five grandchildren; and five great-grandchildren.

A funeral service will be held at noon Saturday, June 18, at Armenian
Martyrs’ Congregational Church, 100 N. Edmonds Ave., Havertown.
Friends may call from 10 a.m.

http://www.philly.com/philly/obituaries/124054839.html

BAKU: Moscow expects decision from Armenian-Azerbaijani summit

news.az, Azerbaijan
June 16 2011

Moscow expects decision from Armenian-Azerbaijani summit
Thu 16 June 2011 13:54 GMT | 9:54 Local Time

The leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia will take a decision on
the basic principles for a Karabakh settlement, a Russian official has
said.
Asked at his weekly briefing about Moscow’s hopes for the summit of
the three presidents on 25 June, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman
Alexander Lukashevich said: “Expectations are of course high. In line
with agreements reached, the forthcoming summit is to review the whole
package, the so-called basic principles for settlement of the Karabakh
conflict.”

The briefing can be watched on the Russian Foreign Ministry’s website.

The presidents of the the USA, Russia and France, the countries
co-chairing the OSCE Minsk Group mediating a settlement to the
conflict, last month urged the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders to
finalize the Basic Principles at their upcoming summit in Kazan on 25
June.

Alexander Lukashevich said today that the precise formulations of the
Basic Principles had been agreed by the Russian, Azerbaijani and
Armenian foreign ministers at their meetings in Moscow in April and
June.

“During the discussions they managed to reconcile positions on several
key issues. The presidents will view these reworkings and take the
relevant decisions,” the spokesman said.

The mediators have been working on the Basic Principles for several
years. If they are not accepted by the sides very soon, the OSCE Minsk
Group co-chairs will have to put forward a new settlement concept,
French co-chair Bernard Fassier said at hearings in the European
Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee yesterday.

The Basic Principles include the following:

-the return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to
Azerbaijani control
-an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for
security and self-governance
-a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh
-future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh
through a legally binding expression of will
-the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return
to their former places of residence
-international security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation.

News.Az

Armenia adopts UNECE recommendations on ageing

news.am, Armenia
June 16 2011

Armenia adopts UNECE recommendations on ageing

June 16, 2011 | 23:08

The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) launched the
report of its first `Road Map for Mainstreaming Ageing’, a project to
help guide Armenia in devising policies relating to ageing and older
people.

The Government of Armenia has formally adopted the recommendations as
a part of their National Strategy and Action Plan on Ageing.

The organization noted that 11% of Armenia’s 3.1 million inhabitants
are aged 65 years or older, and this share is projected to reach 18%
by 2030.

A significant factor that has quickened the pace of change is the
massive emigration of young people: around two thirds of Armenians
live outside of the country and in the period 2005-2010 net migration
out of the country totaled 15,000 people (about 0.5 per cent of the
total population) each year.

UNECE and the Government of Armenia have developed the Road Map for
Mainstreaming Ageing to help ensure that these growing numbers of
older people are integrated into Armenian society, economically,
socially and culturally, their needs are met, their potential
fulfilled and their contributions recognized.

Third One is the Charm: Will AKP’s Victory Finally Lead to New Const

Brookings Institution
June 16 2011

Third One is the Charm: Will AKP’s Victory Finally Lead to a New
Constitution in Turkey?

Ã-mer TaÅ?pınar, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on
the United States and Europe

The Brookings Institution
June 16, 2011 ‘

As widely predicted, Turkey’s June 12 elections produced yet another
landslide victory for the incumbent Justice and Development Party
(AKP). Turkish voters once again voted for political continuity and
rewarded the AKP, and its leader Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan,
for growing prosperity and better socio-economic services,
particularly in areas such as healthcare and affordable housing. It is
only the second time in the history of modern Turkey that a political
party has won three consecutive elections, and the first time it did
so by increasing its vote after each election. The AKP received 34.28
percent in 2002; 46.58 percent in 2007; and 49.90 percent of the votes
this time. Despite such a steady upward trend, AKP seats in the
parliament went down after each electoral victory ‘ from 363 seats in
2002, to 341 in 2007, and 326 in 2011. This paradox is due to the 10
percent threshold for parliamentary representation ‘ a factor that
regularly alters the number of political parties gaining seats in the
parliament ‘ and the increasing ratio of candidates running as
independents in order to bypass this obstacle.

Since the last elections in 2007, Turkey’s domestic political agenda
has been primarily focused on the need for a new constitution. Most
political analysts and a great part of the political parties agree
that Turkey’s Kurdish question and other issues related to good
governance and democratization can no longer be addressed by the 1982
Constitution, which was drafted under military rule. Before the June
12 elections, an important part of the guessing game was about whether
the AKP could muster a two-thirds supermajority of 367+ out of 550
parliamentary seats. This was the required number to amend or rewrite
the constitution unilaterally, without the need for a referendum. With
only 326 seats, the AKP fell well short of such supermajority. Perhaps
more importantly, the party also fell four seats short of the critical
330+ that would have allowed it to unilaterally amend and rewrite the
constitution before presenting it to a referendum. Under the current
parliamentary arithmetic, AKP’s constitutional reforms will need some
modest level of support from the opposition or independent candidates.
This provides a small consolation for Erdogan’s critics concerned
about his authoritarian and illiberal proclivities.

To the disappointment of its supporters, the main opposition
Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP) received only 25.9 percent of the
votes and 135 seats. Despite this result, the new and more charismatic
CHP leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, noted in a celebratory post-election
speech that his party significantly increased its votes, compared to
the 20.88 percent and 112 seats received in the 2007 elections. The
second largest opposition party, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP)
managed to get 13 percent of the votes with 53 seats. This was hardly
a victory for MHP compared to the 14.27 percent and 70 seats received
in 2007. Yet, the fact that the party managed to pass the 10 percent
threshold is, itself, a crucial accomplishment. It cost the AKP the
supermajority that Prime Minister Erdogan was actively seeking by
aggressively courting nationalist voters during his campaign. Finally,
perhaps the most telling result of the election is the number of seats
won by MPs from the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) who ran as
independents in order to bypass the 10 percent threshold. The BDP is
widely seen by Turkish politicians as the political wing of the PKK.
The fact that the party managed to nearly double its seats to 36 MPs
shows that Turkey’s Kurdish challenge has now reached a crucial
turning point.

AKP’s Agenda: The Kurdish Question and a New Constitution

Now that elections are over a complex domestic and international
agenda awaits Ankara. Despite the dangerous turn the Arab Spring took
for Turkey with bloodshed in neighboring Syria and a growing refugee
problem on the southern border, the most urgent issue facing the AKP
is the Kurdish problem at home. The AKP has been promising a reformist
and inclusive brand new constitution since 2009. Yet, somewhat against
the spirit of democratic inclusivity, it was also widely known that
Prime Minister Erdogan wanted to change Turkey’s political system from
its current parliamentary form to a presidential one. Without a
supermajority of 376 seats, he now will be unable to pursue such a
polarizing agenda. Instead, the AKP will have to focus on
constitutional reforms in order to find viable solutions to Turkey’s
Kurdish dilemma.

Addressing domestic Kurdish discontent in the framework of a new
constitution will be a daunting challenge for the government. The
political aspirations of Turkey’s 15 to 20 million large Kurdish
minority (around 20 percent of the total population) reached
unprecedented levels in the last few years. To be sure, the PKK
insurgency is not as strong as it was in the 1990s. But Kurdish
nationalism, as a political force, is alive and well across Turkey.
Kurdish ethnic, cultural, and political demands are fueled by a young
and increasingly resentful generation of Kurds who are vocal and
frustrated not only in Eastern Anatolia but also in Turkey’s large
Western cities including Istanbul, Izmir, Mersin, and Adana. The
formative experience of this Kurdish generation has been the PKK
insurgency that began in the 1980s. Although most Turks and a large
part of the international community consider the PKK a terrorist
organization, most Turkish Kurds romanticize the PKK and its jailed
leader Abdullah Ocalan, who exerts considerable political influence
behind bars. To them, the PKK and Abdullah Ocalan are national symbols
that rejected forced assimilation and paid a heavy price for the
recognition of the `Kurdish reality.’

Today, Kurdish political aspirations are thwarted by legal obstacles
which are largely the remnants of Turkey’s 1982 Constitution written
under military rule. The current situation of increased Kurdish
expectations and limited political space for ethnic recognition does
not bode well for Turkey. Raised expectations facing strict political
restrictions often create a combustible mix. In 2009, in an attempt to
address the root causes of the problem, the AKP launched a `democratic
opening’ process which involved a partial amnesty for PKK fighters.
This was a step in the right direction. Yet, soon after the Habur
border incident, where former PKK fighters were given a hero’s welcome
by the Kurdish population, the opening turned into an impasse. The AKP
faced the worst scenario: an angry Turkish majority greatly alarmed by
Kurdish audacity.

The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) seemed the main beneficiary of the
whole process. Under these circumstances, Prime Minister Erdogan’s
democratic instincts reached their natural pragmatic limits. His
political discourse took an unmistakably nationalist and intolerant
turn vis a vis growing Kurdish demands. Since early 2010 and
throughout the election campaign, the Prime Minister tried to woo
nationalist voters in an attempt to keep the MHP under 10 percent on
June 12th. This strategy has clearly not worked since the MHP received
13 percent of the votes and the AKP lost ground in the Kurdish
southeast. Now that elections are over, the most important question is
whether the AKP will be able to change course and once again try to
address Kurdish demands with the new constitution. Two crucial steps
in the drafting of the document will go a long way in diffusing
tension: (1) removing ethnic attributes from Turkish citizenship (2)
making Turkish `the official’ and not `the only recognized’ language
of Turkey. These constitutional changes can pave the way to other
crucial legal reforms such as the right to bilingual education.

A more self-confident AKP could also broaden and deepen its former
democratic opening by offering permission to Kurdish towns and
villages to revert to their original names and allowing more room for
local government and administrative decentralization. The party should
know that only a more multicultural and less centralized Turkey will
satisfy Kurdish demands. In taking these crucial steps, two factors
should help the AKP government to find the necessary courage and
vision. First, the majority of Turkish Kurds no longer supports an
ambition for a separate state, nor the use of force by the PKK.
According to a poll from January 2011, conducted by Wise Men Center
for Strategic Studies, a Turkish research center based in Istanbul:
90,1% of Turkish Kurds do not believe an independent Kurdish state is
a solution and 96,5% do not believe acquiring `Federal Rights’ will
provide a permanent resolution. [1] Second, the idea of increased
powers for local government, a main demand of many ethnic Kurds, is
now supported by Kemal Kilicdaroglu’s CHP. Under such circumstances
the AKP should face no major problems in forging a parliamentary
coalition with either the CHP or the BDP to support a new
democratization initiative backed by a brand new constitution.

Foreign Policy Challenges

Foreign policy was conspicuously absent during the election campaign.
Neither the AKP nor the CHP bothered to talk about the European Union
or the revolutions in the Middle East. This is probably because
Turkish public opinion is overall satisfied with the more independent
and self-confident route pursued by the AKP government. Yet, Turkey’s
approaches to both the Middle East and the European Union urgently
need fine tuning. The Arab Spring is rapidly changing the balance of
power in the Middle East and causing problems for Foreign Minister
Ahmet Davutoglu’s `zero-problems with neighbors’ policy. After the
emergence of new regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, the turmoil in Yemen
and Bahrain, and civil war in Libya, now Syria is the latest Arab
nation facing the rise of a peoples’ movement.

Until recently, the Syrian-Turkish bilateral relationship was a
remarkable story of a journey from enmity to friendship. It was also
the corner stone of Turkey’s zero-problems strategy. At a time when a
brutal crackdown is taking place in Syria and thousands of Syrian
refugees are crossing the border with Turkey, this situation is
putting a lot of pressure on Turkey’s shoulders. The events in Syria
provide a crucial litmus test for Prime Minister Erdogan in terms of
testing his proclaimed commitment to democratization in the region.
This is not a matter of idealism versus realpolitik for Turkish
foreign policy. Turkey needs to change its `zero problems’ policy with
Syria not because of its ideals of freedom and democracy in the
region. Logic, realism and self-interest should guide Turkey’s changed
strategy toward Damascus.

Simply put, the destabilization of Syria is not in Turkey’s national
interest. Yet, the path that the Assad regime has taken will achieve
just that. It will destabilize Syria and potentially pave the road
toward a sectarian civil war in the country. As Syria’s only
democratic ally, Turkey has a moral and political responsibility to
severely condemn the killing of hundreds of protesters by this brutal
regime. At the same time, Turkey seems uniquely placed to lend some
friendly advice to Syria. Prime Minister Erdogan has, in fact,
significantly raised the tone of his criticism against Bashar Assad.
The obvious issue is that Damascus is in no mood to listen. It should
not be particularly surprising that when a dictator is faced with
regime survival, outside pressure seldom works. As a result, Turkey is
slowly discovering the limits of it regional influence and
zero-problems policy. In case the refugee crisis with Syria gets out
of hand and a much larger influx takes place, Turkey is likely to
consider establishing a buffer zone at the border, which may turn into
a safe haven for the Syrian opposition. The Syrian official news
agency is already blaming Turkey for supporting the Muslim
Brotherhood. These reports are fabricated but since Turkey is a
predominantly Sunni country Turkish public opinion would not look
favorably on a minority Alawite regime massacring Sunnis.

When one looks at the larger picture, the Arab spring is a mixed
blessing for Turkey. On the one hand, most Turks enjoy the fact that
their country is seen as a democratic model and source of inspiration
in the region. On the other hand, it is also important to recognize
that Turkey, until recently, used to fill a vacuum of strategic
leadership in the Arab world. It was the dismal failure of Egyptian
leadership in the region that was at the heart of the Arab predicament
and the deep admiration of Turkey’s growing soft power. With the Arab
Spring and particularly Egypt’s revolution, Cairo is now slowly
re-emerging as the most likely candidate to fill the vacuum of
strategic leadership in the Arab world. As it slowly finds its footing
as a more democratic regime, Egypt, rather than Turkey, will emerge as
a more relevant model for the Middle East. Let’s not forget that
Turkey is not an Arab country and that Turkey’s political evolution
and history is unique. Thanks to the people movements sweeping the
region, the vacuum of strategic leadership is likely to disappear in
the near future. The fact that it was Cairo and not Ankara that
brokered the deal for Palestinian reconciliation between Hamas and
Fatah is a case in point.

The challenge for AKP will be to realize that it now needs to fine
tune its role in the Middle East and find areas where it has
advantages for strategic leadership. Turkey’s comparative advantage
vis a vis Egypt is twofold. First of all, it is the only Muslim
country represented in Western institutions such as NATO and the
Council of Europe. It is also the only Muslim candidate to the
European Union. As such Ankara has a unique advantage as a `Western’
country that can speak on behalf of the Islamic world. Yet, to do so
effectively the AKP will have to boost its `Western credentials’ as a
transatlantic partner and a serious candidate for EU membership.
Despite the French and German leaderships’ lack of strategic vision,
the AKP should realize Turkey still needs to enthusiastically pursue
European Union membership for the sake of its own democratic and
foreign policy ambitions. As the AKP embarks on its constitutional
agenda to solve the Kurdish problem it should remember that Turkey’s
EU candidacy has been the engine of past reforms. Moreover, as
recently argued by Hugh Pope, if there is one thing that makes Turkey
stand out in the troubled Middle East, it is the country’s convergence
with Europe.

Turkey’s second comparative advantage stems from its secular and
democratic identity. Turkey should try harder to find creative ways to
transcend the sectarian and religious divides in the Middle East. The
two most polarizing divides in the Middle East are the Arab-Israeli
conflict and the Sunni-Shiite sectarian tension. On the Sunni-Shiite
divide Ankara is already playing a crucial role that transcends this
deeply rooted and polarizing issue. Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit to
the Shiite holy sites in Najaf and his two hour visit with Iraq’s most
important Shiite religious leader Ayatollah Sistani was a first for
the leader of a Sunni country. As the prime minister of a secular
country and thanks to his own religious credential as a pious Muslim,
Erdogan is better placed than any other leader in the Muslim world to
speak about the dangers of sectarianism in the region.

Turkey should find a similar strategic vision in transcending its
current problems with Israel. A more self-confident and strategically
minded Turkey should be part of solutions on the Arab-Israeli front
and not exacerbate an already very tense situation. The normalization
of Turkish-Israeli relations is in the national interest of both
countries. Given the stakes involved, Washington should play a much
more active role in brokering a face-saving deal between the two
estranged allies. For its part, Ankara should do its best to
discourage a new international flotilla at the end of June by taking
into account the risk of a repeat of Israeli overreaction and the
positive trends in Gaza, such as Israel’s partial lifting of its
blockade and the opening of the border with Egypt. The fact that
Davutoglu recently spoke against the flotilla was a step in the right
direction. There are also some signs that Israel may soften its
position vis a vis Ankara after AKP’s landslide electoral victory.

As far as Turkish-American relations are concerned, the result of the
elections is not likely to have a major impact. Washington is likely
to continue its pressure on Ankara for the normalization of relations
with Armenia and Israel. Some positive momentum in the Azeri-Armenian
dispute over Nagorno-Karabagh may provide Ankara an excuse to open the
border with Armenia. Finally, the Obama administration wants Turkey to
give its official approval for NATO missile-defense related radars.
Ankara, in return, is likely to demand command and control over the
radar system.

In short, a very challenging domestic and international agenda awaits
the AKP. The Kurdish question, a new constitution, challenges with
Syria and Israel, and the new balance of power in the Middle East
after the Arab spring will require a new level of strategic vision and
democratic maturity from the AKP leadership. Where and how Prime
Minister Erdogan will spend his new political capital remains to be
seen. One can only hope that the third one will be the charm and that
AKP’s impressive third electoral victory will pave the road for a less
polarized country ruled by a first class democratic constitution.

—————————————————————-
[1]. Akyürek, Dr. Salih. Pages 37-38.What Do Kurds and Zazas Think? A
Look at Common Values and Symbols. Publication no. 26. Ä°stanbul: Wise
Men Center for Strategic Studies – Bilgesam Publications, January
2011.

http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2011/0616_turkey_taspinar.aspx

BAKU: Sweden, Georgian Foreign Ministers discuss Karabakh

news.az, Azerbaijan
June 16 2011

Sweden, Georgian Foreign Ministers discuss Karabakh
Thu 16 June 2011 06:10 GMT | 2:10 Local Time

Carl Bildt, Grigol Vashadze Carl Bildt, Grigol Vashadze hold joint briefing.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden Carl Bildt is holding
negotiations with Georgian authorities. Before the meeting with the
Foreign Minister of Georgia Grigol Vashadze, Carl Bildt went to the
Square of Heroes and laid wreaths on the memorial.

At the meeting with Mr. Vashadze, the sides discussed regional
security issues, relations with Russia and the internationally
mediated peace talks in Geneva.

Carl Bildt emphasized the significance of the Geneva negotiations,
saying it may not have specific effect, but the negotiations are
necessary for imposing better atmosphere between the Georgian and
Russia sides while discussing specific issues.

`I think that Geneva talks are important not that they are producing
dramatic progress, I did not really expect that, but it`s important to
have them ongoing, but because they can gradually contribute to better
atmosphere on specific issues between the sides,` Carl Bildt said.

Georgian Minister said Georgia had never expressed a desire to cease
Geneva negotiations.

`Any saying that we are going to halt any negotiations, the head of
our delegation in Geneva said that terrorist acts planned and
attempted at our territory, are endangering Geneva talks, but we never
said that we are going to stop these talks, we are not stopping them,`
Vashadze said.

After the meeting in the foreign ministry, the Swedish diplomat held
talks with Georgia`s prime minister.

According to Foreign Minister of Sweden Carl Bildt, Georgia is a
leader in the Caucasus region in terms of progress in the frameworks
of the “Eastern Partnership”. According to the “GHN”, this opinion
Bildt has announced today in Tbilisi after the meeting with his
Georgian counterpart Grigol Vashadze.

“Georgia is the country that has shown the best progress in the region
under the “Eastern Partnership”. I hope that other countries will
catch up with it; but although it should be noted that all countries
have different standards” – said Bildt.

The Swedish minister, speaking of the subject of negotiations between
Georgia and Russia on the WTO, has said that the accession of the
Russian Federation in the organization will be also useful for
Georgia.

We are on the threshold of the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict settlement, Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt said
Wednesday in Tbilisi at a joint briefing with his Georgian counterpart
Grigol Vashadze.

“We pay great attention to this conflict and hope that the Azerbaijani
and Armenian presidents will make a great progress in the upcoming
talks,” he said.

Bildt stressed that the issue was discussed during a meeting with
Vashadze, which lasted over an hour.

Trend GeorgiaTimes Rustavi2

Armenian Cause 2.0 to Explore 2012 Elections as Smart Advocacy Opp.

Armenian Cause 2.0 to Explore 2012 Elections as Smart Advocacy Opportunity

Fri, Jun 17 2011
By Armenian Weekly

Krikorian and Stepanian-Bennett to Empower Armenian Americans as
Effective Candidates and Campaigners

WASHINGTON – As America gears up for the 2012 Presidential and
Congressional elections, the Armenian National Committee of America’s
upcoming Armenian Cause 2.0 conference will explore how Armenian
Americans can more effectively leverage their vision, votes and voices
to increase their power and presence in the U.S. political system.

David Krikorian
Ohio Congressional candidate David Krikorian will be joined by
Washington, DC-based political consultant Dan Stepanian-Bennett in
discussing how Armenian Americans can use new techniques as well as
tried and true methods, as candidates, campaigners and contributors,
to elect friends and defeat opponents this election cycle.

`We are tremendously encouraged to be joined by David and Dan, two
wonderfully talented presenters who bring with them hard-earned wisdom
and first-hand experience from years of work on the front lines of our
nation’s democratic marketplace of ideas,’ said Aram Hamparian,
executive director of the ANCA. `As we approach the start of Armenian
Cause 2.0, we look forward to hearing their insights and inspiration,
and to taking part in an open and robust discussion about how we can
chart the best path forward for our community in a complex and rapidly
evolving electoral landscape.’

David Krikorian is a successful 42 year-old entrepreneur and business
owner. Formally trained in economics and finance, David has held
several management positions with top companies including Fidelity
Investments and Deloitte & Touche. He ran for U.S. Representative in
2008 as an Independent candidate and despite having no prior political
experience or name ID, finished with nearly 18% of the vote in a three
way race. His campaigned centered on monetary policy and reforming
the financial system. In 2010, David challenged for the Democratic
nomination, losing narrowly in the primary race. David and his wife
Elena have three children and live in the Greater Cincinnati area.

Dan Stepanian-Bennett works at a prominent political consulting firm
in Washington, DC, where he specializes in political communications
and elections. A native of metro-Detroit, Dan earned departmental
honors with a degree in Marketing from the School of Business
Administration at Oakland University. He has worked in the front
office of the Detroit Tigers organization, and also as a Marketing
Assistant for BBK, Ltd., a turnaround management firm in Southfield,
Michigan.

In 2007 Dan moved to the nation’s capital as part of the ANCA’s
Capital Gateway Program. After completing his fellowship, he worked
for a political advertising agency, SRCP Media, serving as Media
Associate, while also serving, in a volunteer capacity, as the local
chairman of the ANCA of Greater Washington. Since 2008, he has been a
Project Manager at Political Media, Inc. He has been heavily involved
in campaigns over the last few election cycles ranging from small-town
mayoral elections to a U.S. Senate race.

Dan Stepanian
The break-out session presentations by Krikorian and Stepanian-Bennett
will build upon the conference’s keynote address by POLITICO National
Politics Editor Charlie Mahtesian, who will provide an in-depth
overview of the 2012 electoral landscape.

Armenian Cause 2.0’s full schedule of educational workshops and
interactive presentations will include presentations on Armenian
American advocacy including remarks by former U.S. Ambassador to
Armenia John Evans and a panel discussion on international efforts to
secure justice for the Armenian Genocide, featuring Susan Karamanian,
Nick Koumjian, Jeremy McCalpin, and Kate Nahapetian. Internet
innovator and investor Haig Kayserian will explore social networking
opportunities. These and other presentations and break-out sessions
will be complemented by social and networking opportunities, including
a dinner reception at the Armenian Embassy hosted by Ambassador Tatoul
Markarian.

With just a week left until the conference, which is being hosted by
the ANCA and ANCA Endowment Fund, interested supporters of the
Armenian Cause can still register for a limited number of available
spaces by visiting The registration
deadline is close-of-business on Monday, June 20th, with late
registrants considered on a space availability basis. Due to
overwhelming demand, the reception at the W Hotel is now sold out.
All registrants are invited to the ANCA offices for a welcoming
reception beginning Friday June 24th at 5:30pm. The special ANCA rate
of $149/night at the L’Enfant Plaza Hotel is no longer available.
Please consider as an option to secure hotel lodgings.

http://www.anca.org/conference.
www.hotels.com

Azerbaijan uses any pretext to get rid of oppositionists

Azerbaijan uses any pretext to get rid of oppositionists

June 17, 2011 – 20:34 AMT

PanARMENIAN.Net – The chairman of Azerbaijan National Statehood (ANSP)
opposition party Nemat Panahli has been sentenced to six years
imprisonment.

Another defendant in this case – Ceyhun Farzullaev was sentenced to
four years imprisonment at the trial, held at the Narimanov District
Court.

Baku resident Eldaniz Rzayev called the Interior Ministry’s service
102 and informed that Nemat Panahli and Ceyhun Farzullayev had
threatened him on the Mirali Gashqai street of the Nizami district.
Based on the complaint, the abovementioned persons were arrested.

A criminal has been filed under the Article 221.3 (hooliganism
committed with application of a weapon or subjects, used as the
weapon) of the Criminal Code.

Two months arrest as a preventive measure was taken with regards to
Panahli and Farzullayev by the Nasimi District Court on Jan.10.

According to the Interior Ministry, the investigation revealed that a
dispute took place during a car purchase deal

Rzayev, who was subjected to beating, bought a car from Panahli. On
the day of the incident on the Mirali Gashqai Street, technical
problems were identified in the car. Rzayev phoned Panahli and
reported the problems. Panahli met Rzayev and as a result of a
dispute, beat the buyer, according to Trend News.

However, Panahli himself denies the accusations, stressing that the
authorities are persecuting him for oppositon activities.

ANSP leader failed to make it to Azerbaijani parliament at last year’s
elections. He accused the authorities of falsifying the votes, urging
the public against acknoledging the legitimacy of the parliaemtn and
acting authorities, Lenta.ru reported.