Azerbaijanis shoot at houses in Artsakh’s Taghavard village

 NEWS.am 
Armenia – Feb 19 2022

Azerbaijanis shoot at houses in Artsakh's Taghavard village (PHOTOS)
10:54, 19.02.2022

Composer Levon Chaushian passed away

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 10:20,

YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 18, ARMENPRESS. Composer, Honorary Artist of Armenia, member of the Union of Composers of Armenia, Levon Chaushian has passed away at the age of 75, the Union of Composers said, offering its condolences to the composer’s family, relatives and fans.

In 1969 he graduated from the Yerevan Komitas State Conservatory, majoring in composition in the class of Edvard Mirzoyan. In 1970 he studied piano with Georgi Sarajev. In 1972 he graduated from the post-graduate studies.

Since 1995, he has served as the chairman of the Armenian Composers Assembly, established by him.

His works were performed in the USA, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Hungary, Portugal, Bulgaria, Greece.

In 2021, Chaushian was awarded with the Movses Khorenatsi Medal.

Civil Center providing 110 services opens in Armenia’s Vanadzor

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 10:50,

YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 18, ARMENPRESS. A Civil Center providing 110 services opened in Armenia’s Vanadzor town.

The Center is located in the office of HayPost postal service. It will provide the locals with an opportunity to get multiple services in one place.

The Center offers services provided by the Civil Acts Registration Agency at the Ministry of Justice, the Agency of State Registry of Legal Entities, the State Revenue Committee, the Cadastre Committee, etc.

The opening of the Center was attended by Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan, Minister of Justice Karen Andreasyan and representatives of other agencies.

“Imagine when a citizen has dozens of problems with the state, he/she visits just the HayPost branch, closest to his/her place of residence, and is able to solve all the problems with the state”, the Justice Minister said, adding that the citizen must understand that communication with the state is easy and comfortable.

The Minister said they plan to increase the services, raising their number to 450, in other words to gather all types of services in one office.

“Unfortunately, we haven’t managed to gather all the services in one office. Therefore, citizens still have to visit other places for some services, such as passport department, road police, etc. And the purpose of this whole initiative is for the citizen to know only one place, one office”, Karen Andreasyan said.

Chief Executive Officer of HayPost CJSC Hayk Karapetyan said they want to establish a digital platform through which the remaining 850 offices of HayPost will be able to provide the same number of services.

Earlier similar Civil Centers have opened in Yerevan, Ijevan and Gyumri.

The sitting of CSTO PA Standing Commission on Political Affairs and International Cooperation will be held in Yerevan

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 18:38,

YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 18, ARMENPRESS. An online coordinating meeting of the heads of the parliamentary delegations of the CSTO member states took place on February 18 at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. As ARMENPRESS was informed from the press service of the parlaiment of Armenia, the meeting was chaired by Eduard Aghajanyan, Chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee on Foreign Relations, Head of the Armenian parlaimentary delegation to the OSCE PA.

Representatives of Russia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, as well as the CSTO PA Secretariat took part in the online meeting.

Welcoming the participants of the meeting, Eduard Aghajanyan spoke about the coordination of foreign policy activities of the parliamentary delegations of the CSTO member states at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

Touching upon the goals of the working meeting, Eduard Aghajanyan stressed the need to coordinate joint positions on international political and security issues, mutual assistance, and the need to take into account the interests and obligations of the CSTO member states.

According to the head of the Armenian delegation, as the format of the OSCE PA winter sessions does not envisage voting on resolutions or adoption of any report, general views will be presented at today's meeting, as well as the parties' positions on the problematic issues of the forthcoming 21st OSCE PA winter session will be harmonized.

It was noted that the information on this meeting, the work of the delegations in the winter session and its results will be included in the agenda of the regular sitting of the CSTO PA Standing Committee on Political Affairs and International Cooperation. The sitting is planned to be held on March 11, 2022 in Yerevan.

In his speech on the coordination of the activities of the CSTO member states in the international arena, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Alexander Pankin spoke about the effectiveness of the use of flexible mechanisms of parliamentary diplomacy. The coordinated work of the CSTO PA delegations in various international structures was highlighted, taking into account the interests of the member states as well.

Afterwards, the participants of the remote discussion touched upon the issues of the forthcoming 21st winter session of the OSCE PA and exchanged views on current issues. They spoke about the need to develop and adopt a number of model laws.

Demonstrators in Yerevan ask United Nations to prevent destruction of Armenian monuments by Azerbaijan

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 16:53,

YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 16, ARMENPRESS. A demonstration was held outside the UN Armenia Office in Yerevan demanding the international community and the UN to take measures and prevent the destruction of Armenian cultural heritage in Artsakh by Azerbaijan.

Gayane Abrahamyan, a former lawmaker and the representative of the For Equal Rights Educational Center, told reporters that the demonstration is organized by several NGOs and public figures.

“The Azerbaijani side is falsely claiming that the heritage which is in Artsakh for centuries isn’t Armenian. This is a lie, however the actions that they are carrying out for decades cause concern that one day we wont be able to counter these lies. That’s why we are stressing that we have months. If we don’t fight against these lies now and don’t apply to all possible international organizations, namely UNESCO, we will simply lose the Armenianness of Artsakh, because the Azerbaijani authorities are trying to erase our trace. By doing so, they are trying to rule out the right to self-determination from the Armenian side and generally any aspiration in Artsakh,” Abrahamyan warned.

She reminded that the International Court of Justice ruled that Azerbaijan must take all necessary measures to prevent and punish acts of vandalism and desecration affecting Armenian cultural heritage, including but not limited to churches and other places of worship, monuments, landmarks, cemeteries and artefacts.

Abrahamyan said they will meet the UN Armenia Office administration after the demonstration. She said they’ve addressed a letter to UNESCO last week.

Anther member of the initiative, Seda Grigoryan, highlighted the need to ensure access of international monitoring groups to the territories which Azerbaijan captured during the war. “According to the information I have the Armenian authorities are doing everything they can so that such groups are dispatched there, but Azerbaijan is denying access. International observers must go and see the monuments on the ground and document them,” she said.

Photos by Hayk Manukyan




Turkey’s Careful and Risky Fence-Sitting between Ukraine and Russia

Foreign Policy Research Institute


By Aaron Stein
Feb. 8, 2022

On February 3, 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan traveled
to Kyiv, where he met with his Ukrainian counterpart, President
Volodymyr Zelensky, for a pre-planned meeting to co-chair the tenth
High-Level Strategic Council between the two countries. The two sides
signed a series of bilateral agreements, including a deal on the
co-production of drones and a free trade agreement. The
Turkish-Ukrainian defense relationship is mutually beneficial and
serves as the core component of a rapidly expanding bilateral
relationship.

The relationship took on new importance in 2019, following Turkey’s
downturn in relations with the United States and the imposition of
sanctions for Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air and missile
defense system. Ankara is keen to explore non-American suppliers for
export-controlled items or American-origin technologies that are
subject to U.S. end-user agreements, while Ukraine’s Motor Sich hopes
to alleviate funding shortages. This relationship is slated to be the
lynchpin of current and future Turkish aerospace efforts, beginning
with cooperation on drones and helicopters and, potentially, on
jet-powered drones and fighter jets. However, all of this progress may
be upended by a Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the outcome of a
large-scale conflict could threaten the regime in Kyiv and upend the
security situation in the Black Sea.

The Russian military has positioned enough forces and equipment on
Ukraine’s borders to topple the regime in Kyiv. Moscow has significant
military overmatch and could choose any number of military options
ranging from punitive air and artillery strikes, a limited military
incursion in the Donbas, to the toppling of the Zelensky government.
The Turkish position has been to balance its relations with Kyiv and
Moscow. This policy is grounded in Turkish affirmation of Ukrainian
sovereignty, balanced against Ankara’s ongoing effort to retain
cordial and functional ties with Moscow. As Erdogan explained to
pro-government media on his plane ride home, Ankara’s ideal outcome in
this crisis is for Russia to de-escalate and to agree to direct,
bilateral talks with Kyiv with a Turkish mediator. Erdogan has been
explicit and has repeatedly offered to mediate leader-to-leader talks.
He has also cast blame on the United States for mishandling the crisis
and the West, more broadly, for making it worse. Erdogan’s opinion on
the topic fits with the Zelensky government’s handling of the crisis
and Kyiv’s criticism of the West for overhyping the threat of invasion
and exacerbating Ukrainian economic woes.

The Kremlin has managed to shroud its ultimate ambitions in secrecy,
leaving outside observers to guess about the ultimate intent of a
potential military operation. Ankara has attached considerable
significance to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s potential visit to
Turkey after the Winter Olympics in Beijing and views the invitation
as part of the government’s broader effort to mediate the crisis by
engaging with both sides. This visit—should it happen—may coincide
with Russian offensive operations in Ukraine, so the trip could be
delayed or cancelled outright. In any case, one potential outcome is
that Ankara hosts a victorious war leader who would use the
leader-to-leader visit to lend credibility to the military campaign
and position Turkey to affirm a military victory, rather than find an
off-ramp to current tensions.

The broader challenge that Ankara now faces is that a large-scale
Russian operation in Ukraine will upset the fragile balance in the
Black Sea region. Turkish elites have made a series of political
decisions over the past decade that suggests Erdogan’s circle believes
that great power war is unlikely in Europe and Turkey’s near abroad.
In December 2017, Ankara has made the decision to purchase the Russian
S-400 air and missile defense system, despite being told that such
action would lead to the country’s removal from the F-35 co-production
consortium. The F-35 serves as the backbone of Western tactical air
power and was slated to serve as Turkey’s front-line fighter. Ankara
was removed from the consortium in 2019 and has since invested heavily
in comparatively low-tech (and low cost) unmanned platforms, some of
which are now partly produced in Ukraine.

A Russian invasion of Ukraine would upend Ankara’s assumption about
regional, large-scale conflict and could have a series of cascading
consequences for Turkey, ranging from negative economic effects to
increased tensions in the Black Sea. Ankara’s agreements with Kyiv
could also be at risk. If Moscow opts for regime change, it is unclear
what a pro-Russian government in Ukraine would do vis-à-vis the
aerospace agreements with Turkey. The suspension of any agreement
could have secondary effects on Turkey’s future drone development and
could even extend to its design efforts for an indigenous jet fighter.

In the past, Ankara has sought to decouple from the United States on
the purchase of aerospace products. This decision stems from Turkey’s
removal from the F-35 consortium and broader Western discomfort about
how Western-origin technological products are used in the Turkish TB2
drone in regional wars, ranging from Nagorno-Karabakh to Ethiopia.
Turkish elites have adopted an autarkic vision for the future of the
country’s defense products in order to insulate the country from
Western pressure. The relationship with Ukraine is a pillar of this
policy precisely because the country manufactures the engines that
Ankara is interested in using to power its next generation of drones.
In short, Ankara has a vested interest in retaining cordial ties with
the current government in Ukraine. If these agreements were suspended,
then Ankara would have to consider a different approach. Its
leadership could continue to invest in indigenous products, or it
could once again turn to the United States or suppliers in the West.
The Turkish government has also flirted with Russia although the
United States has promised to impose sanctions on Moscow in the event
of war, which could complicate any further Turkish-Russian
cooperation.

The Turkish-Russian relationship is multi-faceted, so Ankara faces an
equally difficult challenge in severing ties with Moscow. Ankara,
therefore, may not join the United States and Brussels in sanctioning
Russia and, instead, continue to position itself as a potential
arbiter between the two sides, even after a Russian invasion. The
tensions between Ukraine and Russia have obvious implications for
Turkish security. Ankara has ample incentives to “fence-sit” in the
near term. This policy does not preclude defense cooperation with
Ukraine, or even supporting broader NATO responses to reassure member
states and to punish Moscow for an invasion. However, it does not mean
that the United States should expect Erdogan to second U.S. actions
and seek to engage with Russia continuously, even in the event of a
conflict. The broader challenges that Ankara will face, though, are
going to be outside of its control. The scope and size of a Russian
military response depends on thinking in the Kremlin. For now, the
signs point to a large-scale offensive. The Turkish relationship with
Ukraine may, in fact, be at risk in such a scenario, and, beyond this,
the security environment in the Black Sea could degrade and negatively
impact Turkish interests. The Ukrainian-Turkish relationship is
nuanced and complicated, but it also impacts Ankara’s thinking about
its place in the world, as well as its defense relationship with the
United States.

The security situation in Turkey’s near-abroad can change rapidly and
at any moment. Ankara has few good options to manage Russian actions,
but it appears committed to trying to meet with Putin and to mediate a
solution. The Russian government, at this time, appears to have no
interest in any Turkish role. A large-scale war would test recent
Turkish elite assumptions about the future of great power conflict and
could have broader implications for the defense industry. Only time
will tell, but, at some point, Ankara may have to make broader
decisions about its future foreign policy that either risk its
relations with Moscow or strain its ties with the West.

*

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and
do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research
Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish
well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and
national security priorities.



 

Officials work with collection owner to find venue for salvaged carpets of Shushi museum

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 14:14, 9 February, 2022

YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 9, ARMENPRESS. The Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Sport has offered the owner of the carpet collection from the Shushi Carpet Museum to display the collection at the best available museums in Armenia.

When asked to clarify, the Deputy Minister of Education, Science, Culture and Sport Ara Khzmalyan told MP Elinar Vardanyan in parliament that the ministry is now working with the owner of the collection.

Around 170 carpets were saved from the museum when Shushi was under heavy Azeri bombardment during the 2020 war before its fall.

The carpets were temporarily stored at the National Museum-Institute of Architecture in Yerevan, but the administration of the institute notified the ministry officials that the carpets must be moved elsewhere.

Khzmalyan said he’s met several times with the collection’s owner.

“We have the following picture: we have a policy of bringing together values, not allocating a new building for each value, because when the exhibits on display are rich and various there are more visitors. Realizing the necessity for displaying these carpets, its political importance, we offered to organize the display in the best, modern museums. Take into consideration that this is a private collection. I think there isn’t anything better to offer today. Otherwise we’ll have to build a new museum, perhaps this could be discussed, I don’t know,” Khzmalyan said.

The Press Collection of The Mekhitarist Library is Now Online

PRESS RELEASE
Armenian Communities Department of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation Avenida de 
Berna 45-A, 1067-001 Lisboa, Portugal
Contact: Vera Cunha
Telf: (+351) 21 782 3658
Web: gulbenkian.pt

ՄԽԻԹԱՐԵԱՆ ՄԻԱԲԱՆՈՒԹԵԱՆ ԳՐԱԴԱՐԱՆԻ ՀԱՆԴԷՍՆԵՐԸ ԱՅԺՄ ՀԱՍԱՆԵԼԻ ԵՆ ԱՌՑԱՆՑ
Մխիթարեան Միաբանութեան հանդէսներու թուային գրադարանը եւ կայքէջը թողարկուած են. 
անոնք կը ներկայացնեն 1794-էն 1920-ի միջեւ տպուած հայ մամուլէն հաւաքածոներ՝ 
թուայնացուած ու անվճար։
 
Առ այժմ, Մխիթարեան Միաբանութեան Վիեննայի Աւագ Մենաստանի գրադարանի հարուստ 
հաւաքածոյէն թուայնացուած է աւելի քան 400.000 էջ։ Թուայնացումի եւ հանրութեան 
անվճար տրամադրելի դարձնելու այս ծրագիրը համագործակցութեան արդիւնքն է՝ Մխիթարեան 
Միաբանութեան, Գալուստ Կիւլպէնկեան Հիմնարկութեան Հայկական Բաժանմունքին եւ 
Հայաստանի Հանրապետութեան Գիտութիւնների Ազգային Ակադեմիայի Հիմնարար Գիտական 
Գրադարանին միջեւ։
 
Թուային գրադարանի կայքէջը կը ներկայացնէ Միաբանութեան գրադարանէն հաւաքածոներ, 
անոր նպատակն է մէկ հասցէով կամ յղումով ընթերցողն ու հետազօտողը առաջնորդել դէպի 
թուային նիւթերը, որոնք ամբարուած են Հիմնարար Գիտական Գրադարանին շտեմարաններուն 
մէջ, եւ ցանկագրուած Ակադեմիային կողմէ։ Թուայնացումի աշխատանքը շարունակական է, 
իսկ նիւթերը համապատասխան կայքէջերուն եւ շտեմարաններուն մէջ հասանելի պիտի դառնան 
իրենց պատրաստութեան կարգով։
 
Այս յոյժ կարեւոր նախաձեռնութեան եւ մեծածաւալ աշխատանքին շնորհիւ, հայ ժողովուրդի 
մշակութային գրաւոր ժառանգութիւնը հասանելի պիտի դառնայ հանրութեան՝ առցանց, անվճար 
ու բաց ձեւաչափով։
 
Ծանօթանալու համար ծրագիրին նպատակներուն, եւ կարդալու թուայնացուած մամուլը, 
կարելի է այցելել թուային գրադարանին կայքէջն ու շտեմարանները՝ 
https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://arm.mechitaristlibrary.org/__;!!LIr3w8kk_Xxm!_RJCU0gdfvXy2W-rB01icKewykfKe-xdiE9UhWHsuV5rQkdYt6xfAfpPIp1bHg$
 
https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://arar.sci.am/dlibra/collectiondescription/11?language=hyw__;!!LIr3w8kk_Xxm!_RJCU0gdfvXy2W-rB01icKewykfKe-xdiE9UhWHsuV5rQkdYt6xfAfog3ndrDw$
 
https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://vmc.sci.am/__;!!LIr3w8kk_Xxm!_RJCU0gdfvXy2W-rB01icKewykfKe-xdiE9UhWHsuV5rQkdYt6xfAfq7lcSf3Q$
 
 
Հիմնարկութեան ներկայ ինչպէս նաեւ այլ ծրագիրներու մասին կարդալու եւ տեղեկանալու 
համար այցելել՝ 

  կայքէջը եւ արձանագրուիլ լրատուին։
 
--
 
THE PRESS COLLECTION OF THE MEKHITARIST LIBRARY IS NOW ONLINE
 
The Mekhitarist Congregation’s journal collection and its portal website are now 
live, featuring digitized Armenian press published between 1794 and 1920, in a 
free and accessible format.
 
To date, the online library of the Mekhitarist press and its corresponding 
databases have been endowed with more than 400,000 pages of digitized Armenian 
newspapers and periodicals from the rich collection of the Mekhitarist Monastery 
of Vienna. The digitization of these materials and making them available to the 
public is made possible through the collaboration between the Mekhitarist 
Congregation, the Armenian Communities Department of the Calouste Gulbenkian 
Foundation and the Fundamental Scientific Library of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the Republic of Armenia.   
 
The portal website gives the reader and researcher access to the Mekhitarist 
Congregation digital library content via one address: an address that directs 
the visitor to all the digitized and indexed materials stored in the databases 
of the RA Fundamental Scientific Library. Digitization is continuous, and new 
materials will be added periodically as additional journals are digitized.
 
Addressing the great and immediate need for accessibility, the goal of the 
collaboration is to make this great pan-Armenian wealth of knowledge and 
collective heritage available to all free of charge, ensuring its wide and easy 
accessibility.
 
To read more about the project’s objectives and to access the digitized 
materials, please visit the portal website and the respective databases here:
https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://www.mechitaristlibrary.org/__;!!LIr3w8kk_Xxm!_RJCU0gdfvXy2W-rB01icKewykfKe-xdiE9UhWHsuV5rQkdYt6xfAfpSGiP6qQ$
 
https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://arar.sci.am/dlibra/collectiondescription/11?language=en__;!!LIr3w8kk_Xxm!_RJCU0gdfvXy2W-rB01icKewykfKe-xdiE9UhWHsuV5rQkdYt6xfAfqQK_7nXg$
 
https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://vmc.sci.am/__;!!LIr3w8kk_Xxm!_RJCU0gdfvXy2W-rB01icKewykfKe-xdiE9UhWHsuV5rQkdYt6xfAfq7lcSf3Q$
 
 
For further information on the programmes of the Armenian Communities Department 
of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation please visit: 

  and subscribe to our newsletter.
 
--END--

President’s resignation ends Armenian political calm

Jan 28 2022
By Neil Hauer in Yerevan 

After a tumultuous first half of 2021, Armenia had settled into a comfortable rhythm. The political crisis that had been brewing since Armenia’s defeat in the 2020 war with Azerbaijan reached a near-breaking point by the time of the June national election, but ended quietly with incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s resounding victory, ushering in a period of normality. While there was the occasional blip, such as the ousting of popular Yerevan Mayor Hayk Marutyan in December, the past seven months produced few surprises in political terms.

That calm was abruptly broken on January 23, when Armen Sarkissian, Armenia’s president, suddenly announced his resignation. In a statement posted around 8pm local time, Sarkissian declared that he “decided to resign from the position as the president of the Republic of Armenia after almost four years of active work”.

While he emphasised that the decision was “entirely non-emotional and comes from a certain logic”, he repeatedly lamented his lack of policy-shaping power, stating that “the president does not have the necessary tools to influence the fundamental processes in domestic and foreign policy” and that “the president cannot influence issues related to war and peace”.

The strange wording of the statement invited speculation: Sarkissian’s words repeatedly implied that he desired greater executive power for his role, but he had known the limitations when he agreed to take up the largely ceremonial position of president in early 2018. 

The more proximate apparent impetus for his resignation, however, was to come the next day. On January 24, Armenian investigative outlet Hetq released a bombshell investigation regarding the just-departed president.

Hetq revealed that at the time of his appointment as president, Sarkissian had in fact held a second citizenship: not British (as he had previously held but renounced), but from the Caribbean island nation of Saint Kitts and Nevis. Sarkissian had not relinquished this citizenship by the time he was inaugurated as Armenia’s head of state, making him ineligible under the country’s constitution, which bars dual passport holders from the office.

Sarkissian was still abroad in the United Arab Emirates when he made the declaration, having taken a vacation there following an official visit. Were he to return to Armenia, he could now face charges for his allegedly illegal assumption of the presidency.

Diminished role

The resignation was not expected at this time, but certainly had precedent.

“Although the resignation comes as a surprise, President Sarkissian was increasingly angry over personal attacks and profoundly uncomfortable with what he saw as a diminished role in the decision-making process,” Richard Giragosian, director of the Regional Studies Center, a Yerevan-based think tank, told bne IntelliNews.

“This was only exacerbated by the combination of tense personal relations and political rivalry between President Sarkissian and Prime Minister Pashinyan. And even in the more limited areas of his policy activity, such as promoting Armenia’s investment climate and seeking to improve relations with the Armenian diaspora, the president often faced obstacles from the prime minister and his cabinet,” said Giragosian.

Sarkissian and Pashinyan had a complicated relationship. The former had been the only senior member of the previous Armenian establishment to stay in his position following 2018’s ‘Velvet Revolution’ that brought the latter to power. While they had remained largely cordial for the first few years, they came into open conflict following Armenia’s defeat in the 2020 Karabakh war. Following the loss, Sarkissian repeatedly called for Pashinyan and his government to resign, while making his own trips to Moscow to meet with allies.

Following the military’s ‘coup attempt’ in February, when army generals demanded that Pashinyan step down, Sarkissian refused to sign the prime minister’s order dismissing the head of the army’s general staff (and ringleader of the demand), Onik Gasparyan. That was the last of serious ruptures between the erstwhile president and PM, but there was clearly no love lost between the two.

The revelation of Sarkissian’s Saint Kitts and Nevis citizenship and his heavy investment in the Caribbean tax haven has come as a complete shock.

“I think only Sarkissian's family members knew about the [second] citizenship,” said Samson Martirosyan, a journalist at Hetq and one of the authors of the report on Sarkissian. “It’s hard to tell whether Pashinyan personally or anyone from [the ruling party] knew, but I feel like his citizenship and investment in St. Kitts was something that should have never become public knowledge and only his closest family members knew about,” Martirosyan said.

Martirosyan says that in correspondence with Hetq, Sarkissian confirmed he received his St Kitts citizenship as a result of investing in the country. The exact amount of his investment is not yet known, but some resources put the amount needed for citizenship at a minimum of about $200,000.

Sarkissian has been an Armenian public servant in various roles all the way back to the country’s independence in 1991; not all these roles required him to forego business activities, but certainly his public salaries (Sarkissian earned about $24,000 a year as president) would not have enabled him to make such an investment.

It now appears that the ex-president, who is outside the country, may not be able to return at all.

“Our initial assessment was that he'd choose to stay in the UK after [our] investigation was published,” said Martirosyan. “We made such an assessment because when we started the correspondence he was in UAE, then his office said he was leaving on vacation due to health reasons and then he announced his resignation. This happened as we exchanged rounds of questions.

“His resignation was a surprise for us. We were not planning to publish the investigation now, but had to since he resigned,” Martirosyan added. “Yesterday [January 25], his office said he will return to Armenia, though they didn't specify when exactly. If a proper investigation is launched, I believe he will face criminal charges,” Martirosyan said.

Drawn-out voting

With Sarkissian seemingly eliminated as a political force, the question now falls as to his successor, with parliament speaker Alen Simonyan currently holding the role temporarily.

“The parliament has a short window of only five days from the resignation and then between 25-35 days to elect a new president,” explained Giragosyan. “This roughly month-long period will most likely be sufficient, and with a strong majority of seats in the parliament, the Civil Contract party of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan should be able to select a viable candidate.

“The election of a new president, however, is more likely to be drawn out into two or three rounds of voting, as the pro-government majority will face a challenge from opposition deputies. As the first round of the election requires at least three quarters of votes, and three-fifths for the second round, a third round of the election, which is a simple majority vote, is most likely,” Giragosyan said.

The question of Sarkissian’s successor has already created some drama. Initial reports suggested that the government would seek another third-party candidate (as Sarkissian had been). Western diplomatic sources confirmed to bne IntelliNews that Edmon Marukyan, head of the Bright Armenia party (which had held seats in parliament from 2018-2021), had been approached by Civil Contract representatives for the post, while Armen Sargsyan, head of the Republic Party which received 3% of the vote in the 2021 election, was also being considered. At the time of writing, however, reports indicated that the ruling party had shifted towards the nomination of Arayik Harutyunyan, head of the prime minister’s office and a former education minister.

As a close Pashinyan ally, Harutyunyan’s nomination would thus not only require several rounds of confirmation votes, being almost certain to face rejection by the parliamentary opposition, but would continue a trend of the PM selecting close loyalists for key posts. There are now few checks and balances left: Pashinyan has filled all the other top constitutional posts with his allies.

Whatever the case, the next candidate is likely to have little influence on policy, like Sarkissian. Moreover, they are unlikely to seek it: The recent saga shows that the ceremonial position is not an effective avenue for making one’s mark on the country’s direction. For Sarkissian himself, meanwhile, it may be quite some time before he sets foot on Armenian soil again.

Yerevan-Istanbul flights’ passengers shall be exempt from Departure Tax for 3 years

  News.am  
Armenia – Jan 26 2022

The Civil Aviation Committee of Armenia has exempted the passengers of the forthcoming Yerevan-Istanbul flights from the AMD 10,000 Departure Tax for three years.

In December 2019, the Armenian parliament amended the Law on State Duties and, accordingly, exempted from the AMD 10,000 Departure Tax those airline passengers who will travel from Armenia to newly opened destinations within three years.

The Departure Tax exemption is granted in Armenia for three years—with the possibility of extension for two years—for those flights whose destination was not conducted 12 months before the start of these flights.

Airlines conducting the Departure Tax exemption destination flights must conduct these flights for at least one year.

And the Armenian government, in turn, has stipulated that these flights must be at least once a week, or at least 28 flights during the summer season and 20 flights during the winter season.