13:53,
YEREVAN, MAY 29, ARMENPRESS. Armenia’s national low-cost airline Fly Arna has announced flights to Kuwait.
The airline will commence Yerevan-Kuwait flights twice a week on June 22.
“NOW BOARDING KUWAIT! We're expanding our routes! Direct flights to the modern metropolis commence on June 22, 2023, available twice a week,” Fly Arna said on social media.
The direct flights will be operated from Yerevan’s Zvartnots Airport to Kuwait City.
19:02,
YEREVAN, MAY 27, ARMENPRESS. The illegal abduction of 2 Armenian servicemen by Azerbaijan is an attempt to deviate from its own obligations, ARMENPRESS reports, the Foreign Ministry of Armenia said in a Twitter post.
“We call on Azerbaijani authorities to release them and fulfill commitment to release all Armenian POWs in line with Trilateral Statement of Nov 9, 2020, as well as calls of international partners and institutions”, reads the post.
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, tens of thousands of Russians fled to Georgia and Armenia. More than a year on, many have stayed, finding ways to fight Putin's war from abroad. OC Media and CivilNet met some of them.
“Ineeded to do something”, says Anatoly Sobolev. The 36-year-old digital advertising professional moved to Georgia at the beginning of March 2022, not long after being arrested at an anti-war protest in Russia. Having begun as a volunteer with Volunteer Tbilisi, an organisation that provides support to Ukrainian refugees in Georgia, Sobolev is now the director of the organisation’s development department.
Many others have found new opportunities to put their time and effort to good use. Whether helping Ukrainians find housing and work, organising protests, or educating their compatriots about colonialism and imperialism, Russian activists are finding ways to push back against Vladimir Putin’s war from abroad.
“When I left […] I thought that it would all end quickly”, says Vasilisa Borzova. “It seemed so absurd and pointless, that it was hard to imagine that the war could last for a long time.”
Borzova, who was studying for a master’s degree in Political Science and International Relations at the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences before she moved to Armenia. Instead, things only got worse. After an initial wave of Russians fled the outbreak of war and concomitant political crackdown, a second wave fled after the announcement of mobilisation in September 2022.
Darina Mayatskaya similarly says that the move, and the fact that she remains in Armenia a year later, were entirely unexpected.
“I was making career plans, I had come up with a to-do list for 2022”, says Mayatskaya. In Saint Petersburg, Mayataskaya had worked as a lawyer at a real estate agency, while also helping independent political candidates to run and be elected as lawmakers.
When she decided to leave, Armenia seemed the easiest option available to her: visa-free entry, direct flights from Russia, and Russians can enter with just an internal passport. She did not intend or expect to be in Yerevan over a year later.
But some who migrated have found since their arrival that they were unable to leave. Alongside increasing restrictions on where Russian passport holders can travel, a large number of Russian activists and journalists have been denied entry into Georgia, driving unease amongst many émigrés that on leaving Georgia, they might not be able to return.
Vera Oleynikova, a 22-year-old activist and jazz musician, hadn’t planned to move to Georgia at all. She had frequently taken part in anti-Kremlin demonstrations and been arrested, once even having bones broken at a police station after carrying an anti-Putin poster at a protest.
After the war broke out on 24 February 2022, she continued to take part in anti-war demonstrations, and was repeatedly arrested, fined, and even followed. In June of that year, a friend told her that a criminal case was about to be opened against her, and Oleynikova decided that it was time to leave.
She bought tickets to Armenia, but was told at the airport that she was not allowed to leave Russia.
“They didn’t give me any reason why I was forbidden to leave the country. My mother took me to Minsk [the capital of Belarus] by car, and from there, I managed to fly to Tbilisi with the last money I had,” Oleynikova recalls.
A month after her arrival, Vera received the news that her mother had died suddenly. She did not return for the funeral, as her mother had told her. Both Vera and her mother knew that if she returned, it was likely that she would be arrested as soon as she crossed the border.
On leaving Russia, all the activists we spoke with sought ways to continue their fight against the Kremlin from abroad..
Some, like Oleynikova, have taken action intermittently since their arrival: attending protests, posting on social media, and contributing to fundraisers for Ukraine. Others have taken on larger and longer-running projects.
When Vasilisa Borzova realised that Armenia was not going to be the transit point she’d initially expected it to be, she launched the Ethos project: an organisation which helps refugees from Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as people from Armenia’s border areas who have recently suffered in the conflict with Azerbaijan.
She also notes how supportive Armenians have been, both to other Armenians affected by war and of Ethos’ work. She highlights the response to the September 2022 two-day war; after the initial attack on the country’s borders, Armenians immediately began to collect humanitarian aid.
Darina Mayatskaya says the same is true of her experience. Mayatskaya is the Armenia project coordinator for The Ark, an organisation which helps people facing persecution because of their anti-war positions leave Russia and get settled abroad.
Neither Mayatskaya nor The Ark have faced any obstruction in Armenia.
Now, the project is gradually shifting its focus to integrating Russians into a new environment and way of thinking, as well as hosting discussions amongst Russian émigrés on the factors that led to the war: colonialism, imperialism, and poor civic education. The organisation also partners with anti-war initiatives and independent projects around the world.
Victoria Krongard, a 25-year-old former medical student and activist, is similarly working to fill in the gaps her country’s education glossed over.
Reforum Space, an organisation that provides support to foundations that help Ukrainians, as well as activists and journalists from Russia, runs free anti-war events and master classes.
She says that many Russians are not familiar with the Georgian perspective on the 2008 August War, and that Reforum Space informs them of Russia’s continuing role in the conflicts in Georgia.
“In [Russian] media, all this is positioned as [Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s] desire”, says Krongard.
“[The war in Ukraine] is terrible. It is a crime. Putin’s fomenting of this conflict since 2014 is inhumane and unprincipled”, Krongard concludes.
Despite reports that both countries had seen a rise in anti-Russian sentiment, in Georgia in response to waves of Russian immigration, and in Armenia following Russia’s failure to provide military assistance to its ally during and following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, all our respondents said that they have only had good experiences in their new homes.
“The people here are much kinder. They are always ready to help”, says Artur Asafiev, a freelance reporter with RFE/RL from Ufa, central-southern Russia, who has been living in Yerevan for over a year.
He adds that because of their recent history, Armenians understand the actuality of war, and have previously dealt with influxes of refugees from the Nagorno-Karabakh wars. He admires the country’s desire to cooperate with the European Union, despite its current ties with Russia.
“Armenia is a democracy that observes laws and regulations, where any form of _expression_ of one’s opinion is allowed, both for citizens and visitors. The police not only do not break up rallies, but also help if you turn to them․ There is a huge amount of official, accredited media covering all positions, ambulances arrive on time, and people do not show aggression toward each other”, says Mayatskaya.
In contrast to fears that Armenians might grow hostile to the increasing numbers of Russians in their country, Mayatskaya has faced negative reactions not from Armenians, but from Russian propagandists, who at some point found The Ark and began to write negative comments about their assistance to Ukrainians.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many Georgians have expressed hostility towards the influx of Russians, and polling shows that a majority of the population supports the introduction of visas for Russian citizens.
But Krongard says she found only a sense of freedom in the county.
“Here I have no fear of saying out loud that Putin and Lukashenka are bad. Here I have no fear that [for expressing my opinion] someone will report me to the security forces and I will have problems.”
Anatoly Sobolev similarly says that, since his arrival in Georgia, he has faced no hostility related to his nationality.
“I have been living in Georgia for two years now. Here, I am given the opportunity to live, no one hits me on the street, I can [talk about] my opinions, to do something that, in my opinion, is very important,” says Sobolev. “That’s why, while I’m here, I’m grateful to [Georgia]. If they kick me out, I’ll still be grateful.”
The activists we spoke to all emphasised their commitment to resuming their activism in Russia given the opportunity.
“If there is any chance to change the regime, I will return [to Russia] on the first flight”, says Sobolev, adding that he believes that Russia is not currently safe for anyone.
“I miss Russia, it’s my country, which was stolen from me, and now people are being killed on my behalf. [At the moment] Russia is a big cockroach devouring its own [people]”, Sobolev explained.
Victoria Krongard similarly says that, while she does not know when she will return, she wants to return to Russia to help improve the lives of people living there.
Viktoria Krongard also says that she has faced no issues in Georgia related to her nationality, despite having heard stories about conflicts at protests demanding that Georgia’s government ceases to let Russian citizens into the country.
Vasilisa Borzova, however, says that she wants to continue helping those in need from Armenia, and would like to deepen her organisation’s ties with its host country. She says she has an idea for a project dedicated to Armenia, teaching Russian-speaking audiences about Armenia’s culture and history.
“I want somehow to thank Armenia, which sheltered us, accepted us and showed us how to live by supporting each other. It seems to me that Armenian culture can give us a lot and teach us how to be.”
15:09, 10 May 2023
YEREVAN, MAY 10, ARMENPRESS. Azerbaijan has been obstructing the activities of the Red Cross in transferring patients from Artsakh/Nagorno Karabakh to Armenia ever since it illegally set up a checkpoint on the Lachin Corridor, the Human Rights Defender of Artsakh Gegham Stepanyan said on May 10.
“After setting up a checkpoint, Azerbaijan obstructs the activities of the Red Cross in Artsakh in every possible way. For 11 days now, the ICRC has been unable to transport patients in critical health conditions to medical facilities in Armenia,” Stepanyan tweeted.
10:57,
YEREVAN, MAY 13, ARMENPRESS. During the night, no significant violations of the ceasefire were recorded on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, ARMENPRESS reports, MoD Armenia informed.
As of 08:30, the situation on the front line is relatively stable.
On May 12, the armed forces of Azerbaijan regularly violated the ceasefire in the areas of Sotk, Kut and Verin Shorzha, using various types of weapons. As a result of Azerbaijan's aggression on May 12, one soldier was killed and 1 was injured from the Armenian side.
Introduction
On 18 January 2023, Azerbaijan announced that it had launched against Armenia an inter-state case under the dispute settlement provision in the 1979 Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (Bern Convention). Azerbaijan notified the Bern Convention Secretariat of the dispute by letter on 27 March 2023, stating that negotiations would have failed to resolve it and that the dispute had been submitted to arbitration. This is another episode in a fiery exchanges of legal proceedings between the two states, in particular in relation to the contested area of Nagorno-Karabakh. At the time this post is written, there is a pending case brought by Azerbaijan against Armenia before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), a pending case brought by Armenia against Azerbaijan before the same Court, a number of inter-state proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights, and, most recently, an arbitration initiated by Azerbaijan under the Energy Charter Treaty.
Azerbaijan’s Bern Convention initiative has reached mainstream media not only because it is a new chapter in the legal battle on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (which has sparked several international law commentaries over the years), but because it pertains to environmental damage in armed conflict. According to its January 2023 press release, Azerbaijan seeks an order that Armenia cease all ongoing violations of the Bern Convention, and pay full reparation for environmental destruction in the formerly occupied territories. This is the first time that the inter-state dispute settlement provision under the Bern Convention has been invoked. This blog post analyses the relevance of this case in relation to the applicability of multilateral environmental agreements in occupied territory. Using the lack of explicit rules on the protection of the environment in occupied territory as a starting point, we will explore whether environmental treaties such as the Bern Convention are applicable to occupied territory, and their potential to enhance the protection of the environment in occupied areas. We will also discuss under which conditions the specific inter-state mechanisms under the Bern Convention can be activated.
The Law of Occupation and the Environment
The area of Nagorno-Karabakh has been under Armenian occupation between 1994 and 2020 (see e.g. RULAC). The rules governing occupied territory (so-called law of occupation) are customary in nature and are mainly codified by the 1907 Hague Regulations (HR), the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV), and the 1977 First Additional Protocol (API). In contrast to the law on the conduct of the hostilities, which offers some protection to the environment (see e.g. Articles 35(3) and 55 API), the law of occupation contains no explicit reference to the protection of the environment.
The limited protection offered by the law of occupation to the environment is limited and indirect. For instance, under Article 43 HR, the occupying power must take ‘all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and civil life, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.’ There is a mutual relationship between the occupant’s responsibility under the first part of Article 43 to maintain public order and civil life on the one hand, and the protection of the environment in the occupied territory. The more the environment is protected, the more civil life of the local population is guaranteed. Moreover, the duty to respect ‘unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country’ prior to the occupation encompasses the duty to respect the local environmental legislation.
Moreover, indirect protection of the environment under the law of occupation can be provided through the rules on property and objects indispensable to the survival of civilians. The rules on both public and private property in the law of occupation focus on the illegality of aspects of the occupying power’s conduct such as unjustified destruction and pillage of property in the occupied territory, as recently affirmed by the 2023 French Military Manual (section 4.4.2.5). For example, Articles 46(2) and 55 HR, Article 53 GCIV, and Article 54 API can be applied to those elements of the environment that are private or public property. For instance, in 2005, the ICJ has recognised the responsibility of Uganda for the illegal exploitation of some components of the natural environment in occupied DRC in light of the applicable rules of the law of occupation on property (paras 219 and 245); later in 2022, the Court awarded to DRC reparations for damage to flora and fauna caused by Uganda in the occupied region of Ituri (paras 328-363).
However, not all the components of the environment are either public or private property. In part to adopt a more comprehensive approach to the protection of the environment in armed conflict, since 2013, the ILC has been working on codifying the rules on the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts, with significant attention devoted to occupied territories.
The Applicability of the Bern Convention in Occupied Territory
Although scholars have debated for decades whether international environmental treaties apply to armed conflict and occupied territories (see e.g. Bothe et als; Dam-de Jong; Sjostedt; Longobardo; Dienelt), no international court or tribunal has provided an answer to whether these conventions apply to occupied territory (Abegón Novella, section IV.III). Accordingly, if the proceedings launched by Azerbaijan against Armenia result in an arbitral award on the merits, this would be an important precedent with potentially significant repercussions in this field.
Although in the Nuclear Weapons opinion, the ICJ avoided the question affirming that ‘the issue is not whether the treaties relating to the protection of the environment are or are not applicable during an armed conflict, but rather whether the obligations stemming from these treaties were intended to be obligations of total restraint during military conflict’ (para 30), the International Law Commission (ILC) has confirmed that the existence of an armed conflict does not suspend or terminate the application of a treaty (Article 3 2011 Draft articles on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties). Rather, the ILC considered that ‘treaties relating to the international protection of the environment’ are among those treaties whose ‘subject-matter … involves an implication that they continue in operation’ (ibid, Article 7 and Annex, g).
The analysis of whether the Bern Convention applies to occupied territory can be performed taking into account the twofold test devised to assess whether international human rights law conventions are applicable to occupied territory (see e.g. Ben-Naftali and Shany; Vité; Lubell; Gutiérrez Castillo): first, it is necessary to explore whether a certain convention is applicable to situations of armed conflict given that occupations are situations of armed conflict; and second, one has to explore if the convention applies extraterritorially, the occupied territory being located outside the sovereign territory of the occupying power. The analogy with the applicability of international human rights law conventions is logical: the legal issues at hand are similar (i.e., the applicability of peacetime conventions in armed conflict outside the territory of a state). Moreover, international human rights law is relevant per se to the protection of the environment in occupied territory e.g. in the field of the right to health (see Hulme).
The Bern Convention does not include any provision regarding its application to situations of armed conflict and occupation, nor does it address its extraterritorial scope of application. However, that does not mean the Convention is not applicable to situations of occupation. The applicability of the Bern Convention to occupied territory can be compared to the applicability of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which, similarly, does not contain any clause on its application in armed conflict and on its extraterritorial scope. In 2004, the ICJ affirmed in its Wall opinion that the ICESCR is applicable to occupied territory (para 112). There is no reason why such an approach should not be employed by the arbitral tribunal created under the Bern Convention in relation to the application of the Bern Convention to Nagorno-Karabakh: nothing in the Bern Convention excludes its applicability during armed conflict and denying its applicability to situations of extraterritorial jurisdiction (i.e., occupations) would frustrate the object and purpose of the Convention itself. In this vein, in relation to the 1971 Ramsar Convention, the Conference of the Contracting Parties in 2022 confirmed that its obligations are applicable to Ukrainian territory under Russia occupation.
In light of the above, we consider that the Bern Convention is applicable to the occupation of the Nagorno-Karabakh, along with international humanitarian law. Accordingly, there is no reason that the arbitral tribunal should decline to hear the case because of the inapplicability of the Bern Convention.
Procedural Issues under the Bern Convention
The arbitral proceedings have been commenced by Azerbaijan under Article 18 of the Bern Convention. This provision refers first to the role of the Convention’s Standing Committee in facilitating a friendly settlement of any difficulty to which the execution of the convention may give rise. Where a dispute between contracting parties cannot be settled through the endeavours of the Standing Committee or by negotiation, then Article 18 provides for arbitration at the request of one of the parties to the dispute. It is not uncommon for multilateral environmental agreements to provide for arbitration of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of their provisions, either at the request of one party to the dispute or with the agreement of both parties. In such instances, the agreement often incorporates a set of arbitration provisions, while providing for the tribunal to determine its own rules of procedure (see for example, Convention on Biological Diversity, Annex II; OSPAR Convention, Article 32). Article 18 of the Bern Convention does not contain a full set of arbitration rules. It sets out the rules governing the appointment of arbitrators, and the tribunal is then to draw up its own rules of procedure. Each party to the dispute should designate one arbitrator, and the two party-appointed arbitrators should appoint a third.
Article 18 contains a default appointment procedure, so that the arbitral tribunal can be constituted even if one of the parties does not designate an arbitrator. This could be a time-consuming process. If a party fails to designate an arbitrator within three months of the request for arbitration, the other party may request the President of the European Court of Human Rights to designate an arbitrator within the next three months. The same procedure applies if, within three months of their designation, the two designated arbitrators cannot agree on the choice of the third arbitrator. If Armenia rejects Azerbaijan’s complaints and objects to them being formulated in the terms of compliance with the Bern Convention, one might anticipate a lengthy process for the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, and, in due course, objections to jurisdiction and admissibility.
Besides the applicability of the Convention to the dispute, a further jurisdictional hurdle might be whether prior recourse to negotiation or to the friendly settlement role of the Convention’s Standing Committee constitutes a prerequisite to commencement of arbitral proceedings under Article 18 (in ICJ, see Georgia v Russian Federation and Ukraine v Russian Federation, and see Nakajima).
Should the arbitral tribunal be established, there are plenty of examples of inter-state arbitration rules upon which the tribunal might draw, including those established by other MEAs, and the optional rules published by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which include specific rules for arbitrating disputes between states, and rules for arbitrating disputes relating to natural resources and the environment. Any use and adaptation of such rules would generally be made in consultation with the parties to the dispute. Given the nature of Azerbaijan’s claims, rules relating to scientific evidence and the possible appointment of experts in respect of the identification, attribution and assessment of environmental damage are likely be of particular importance. Such issues have proved challenging for international courts in recent cases involving compensation for damage to the environment, including in the context of armed conflict (on assessment of compensation, see for example, Certain Activities (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) and Armed Activities (DRC v Uganda), and see Desierto, Bendel). Further, arbitration rules relating to the failure of a party to appear or make submissions in the proceedings may also be of significance.
Under Article 18 of the Bern Convention, decisions of the tribunal may be taken by majority vote, and the arbitral award is final and binding. Parties are to bear the expenses of their designated arbitrator, and share the expenses of the third arbitrator and other costs entailed by the arbitration. The designation of the registry and provisions for the administration for the arbitration are also not addressed in Article 18. The Permanent Court of Arbitration has been selected as the registry for most inter-state arbitral proceedings in recent years, but it may also be that this role could be fulfilled within the Council of Europe institutions.
Conclusions
This post has explored the potential for the pending arbitral proceedings between Azerbaijan and Armenia under the Bern Convention to offer an authoritative clarification on whether multilateral environmental treaties conventions apply in occupied territory. We argued that this is possible. Accordingly, the outcomes of these proceedings should be closely monitored since they offer the possibility to finally conclude that international environmental law complements the law of occupation in relation to the protection of the environment in occupied territory.
The dispute also has implications for the evolution of the Council of Europe’s approach to environmental protection in armed conflict. In early 2023, the Parliamentary Assembly adopted a resolution and a recommendation, which propose, among others, consideration of further measures under the Bern Convention and/or under a separate regional legal instrument on the protection of the environmentally during armed conflicts.
BRUSSELS — The leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan will meet again in an effort to reach a resolution to their conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, European Council President Charles Michel said Monday.
The two former Soviet republics have been fighting for decades over control of Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous region in Azerbaijan inhabited by a majority of Armenians.
Michel said Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had agreed to meet on Sunday in a Brussels trilateral meeting.
Their discussions would be flanked by a meeting together with French President Emmanuel Macron of France and Germany Chancellor Olaf Scholz, on the sidelines of upcoming European Political Community summit in Chisinau, Moldova, on June 1.
"The leaders have also agreed to continue to meet trilaterally in Brussels as frequently as necessary to address ongoing developments on the ground and standing agenda items of the Brussels meetings," a statement from Michel said.
The leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, France and Germany would also be invited to meet a second time at the margins of the next EPC summit in Granada in October 2023, he said.
Armenia made a peace offer to its neighbor Azerbaijan in mid-February. According to Pashinyan, an agreement should provide for mechanisms of mutual control to prevent breaches of the peace.
The conflict flared up again last year, barely two years after the two countries ended their war over the region. More than 6,500 people were killed in the fighting in 2020, according to estimates. A cease-fire was then negotiated in November 2020 with the mediation of Russia.
https://thebrunswicknews.com/news/world_news/new-peace-talks-scheduled-between-armenia-and-azerbaijan-in-brussels/article_b5d7c002-938b-5a47-9dec-b6823856d061.html
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken held a telephone conversation with President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, discussing the importance of reopening of the Lachin Corridor for commercial and private vehicles, US Department of State Spokesperson Matthew Miller announced in a statement.
“Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke with Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev today to underscore the importance of Azerbaijan-Armenia peace discussions and pledged continued US support,” the statement reads.
“Secretary Blinken shared his belief that peace was possible,” it said.
“He also expressed the United States’ deep concern that Azerbaijan’s establishment of a checkpoint on the Lachin Corridor undermines efforts to establish confidence in the peace process, and emphasized the importance of reopening the Lachin Corridor to commercial and private vehicles as soon as possible,” the statement added.
Azerbaijan’s presidential press office said in a statement later that “President Ilham Aliyev noted [that] Azerbaijan supports the peace agenda and that Azerbaijan had been the initiator of starting peace treaty talks and normalization of relations with Armenia.”
“With respect to setting up the ‘Lachin’ checkpoint on the Azerbaijan-Armenia border, President Ilham Aliyev said that the checkpoint had been set up in accordance with Azerbaijan’s sovereign rights and all international rules,” the statement from the Azerbaijani president’s press office reads.
“The Azerbaijani President underlined that the aim was to ensure control rather than restrict movement as passage is already allowed through the checkpoint,” the statement added.
French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna stated last Friday after a meeting with her Armenian counterpart Ararat Mirzoyan that Azerbaijan’s deployment of a checkpoint in the Lachin Corridor violates the agreements that Yerevan and Baku currently have in place.
Armenian Foreign Minister Mirzoyan stated on April 28 that Yerevan had no plans to hold talks with Baku about unblocking the Lachin Corridor, since this issue was settled under the trilateral statement of November 9, 2020.
The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh escalated on September 27, 2020. On November 9, 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan signed a joint statement on the full cessation of hostilities. The sides stopped at their positions at that moment, a number of districts went under Baku’s control, and Russian peacekeepers were deployed at the contact line and at the Lachin Corridor.
On December 12, 2022, a group of Azerbaijani activists claiming to be environmentalists blocked the Lachin Corridor, the only road connecting Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh and the place where Russian peacekeepers are temporarily stationed.
Baku stated that blocking the road was not the goal of the protest and civilian vehicles could freely move in both directions. However, Yerevan slammed the activity as a provocation by the Azerbaijani authorities aimed at creating a humanitarian disaster in the unrecognized Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Pashinyan pointed out that Nagorno-Karabakh was facing food shortages due to the blocking of the corridor. On December 14, Armenia requested that the European Court of Human Rights compel Azerbaijan to unblock the Lachin Corridor.
04 May 2023
Further extending the operating life of the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant's second unit was identified as a priority during a meeting between Rosatom Director General Alexei Likhachev and Armenia's Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.
During the meeting, in Yerevan, the two "agreed on specific steps for the near future, which will allow the re-extension work to be launched by the end of this year".
According to Rosatom "during the meeting the construction of new nuclear power units in Armenia was also touched upon" and they were "ready to offer Russian-designed nuclear power plants with VVER reactors".
The Prime Minister's office reported that the talks also saw the sides discuss "possible cooperation in the field of nuclear medicine," as well as partnership on decontamination of hazardous waste at the former Nairit chemicals plant. Rosatom said that it had "unique technologies for bringing complex industrial facilities to a safe state" and was ready to tackle the issues at Nairit.
Rosatom signed an agreement with the management of the Armenian nuclear power plant in January last year to look into the possible building of new Russia-designed units on the site of the current plant at Metsamor. Armenia has long been in discussions with Russia about replacing Metsamor, which comprises two Russian-built 376 MWe VVER reactors which started operating in 1976 and 1980, respectively. Both units were taken offline in 1988 due to safety concerns regarding seismic vulnerability. Unit 2 was restarted in 1995, and accounts for some 39% of total electricity generation in the country.
In November 2021 it was announced that the service life of unit 2 had been extended to 2026 after collaboration with Rosatom which saw the unit's emergency cooling system, engine room, turbines, steam generators modernised, and a unique operation carried out to anneal the reactor pressure vessel.
As a result of the modernisation, the station's capacity increased by almost 10% and there are plans for a further 10-year extension to 2036.
Researched and written by World Nuclear News