Author: Suren Karakhanian

But as the dust settles, the attack’s ripple effects are reverberating far beyond Nagorno-Karabakh itself. Russia’s decision to stand aside and allow Azerbaijan to conduct its final invasion, despite its peacekeeping role as part of the cease-fire deal that ended the fighting in 2020, has sparked a profound sense of betrayal in Yerevan. That in turn has created an opportunity for the European Union to forge stronger ties with Armenia and reshape the geopolitical orientation of the South Caucasus. 

Armenia has diverged from many other post-Soviet countries—such as the Baltic states, Ukraine and Georgia—by maintaining deep ties with Russia rather than seeking to integrate with the EU. As a formal Russian ally under the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, or CSTO, Yerevan has long counted on Moscow to guarantee its security. Their robust defense ties include discounted purchases of Russian arms as well as a Russian military base in Gyumri, Armenia’s second-largest city.

Yet these ties have recently frayed—and this past autumn’s events may have been the breaking point. Doubts about relying on Russia initially arose in 2020, after it failed to prevent considerable Armenian losses in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. They intensified following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which exposed the Russian military’s weaknesses and aggressive tendencies toward its post-Soviet neighbors. These doubts turned to outrage when Russian peacekeepers refrained from intervening to prevent Azerbaijan’s attack in September, with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan asserting afterward that the relationship with Russia was no longer “enough to ensure the external security of Armenia.”

Yerevan has since attempted to reorient itself away from Russia. In a symbolic blow, the Armenian Parliament voted in October to join the International Criminal Court, despite the arrest warrant the court issued against Russian President Vladimir Putin for war crimes in Ukraine. As a result, Putin is now at risk of arrest if he sets foot on Armenian soil. Armenia subsequently declined to take part in CSTO exercises and summits, and Pashinyan has cast doubt on the future of Russian military bases in Armenia.

The Armenian government has simultaneously pursued stronger ties with the EU. Its recent acquisition of French weaponry—contrasting with Moscow’s failure to deliver prepaid arms shipments—indicates its ambitions to find alternative security partners to Russia. Yerevan has also sought aid from the European Peace Facility, which reimburses EU member states for their arms donations to partner countries. This coincides with Pashinyan’s statement that “Armenia is ready to be closer to the European Union, as much as the European Union considers it possible.”

Armenian citizens also find it increasingly difficult to see a future with Russia. A January-March 2023 survey by the International Republican Institute found that only 50 percent of Armenians believed the country’s relationship with Russia to be “very good” or “somewhat good,” down from 93 percent in the autumn of 2019. By contrast, 86 percent of respondents to the 2023 survey had a positive view of relations with the EU—and this gap has almost certainly widened since September’s events.

Yet various factors could restrict Armenia’s ability to pivot. Besides Azerbaijan, its neighbors include a hostile Turkey and a bitterly anti-Western Iran. Attempting to break from Russia and align with the EU could make Armenia more vulnerable, unless it receives security guarantees, which the EU’s current inadequacy as a security provider makes unlikely for the foreseeable future.

This explains Yerevan’s insistence on remaining within the CSTO, despite calls from opposition groups to withdraw. Armenia likewise seems set to remain within the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union, or EEU, given its high economic dependence on Russia. The Kremlin is well-aware of these obstacles, as demonstrated by Putin’s recent statement that it would not be in Armenia’s interests to leave Russian-led organizations such as the CSTO, EEU and Commonwealth of Independent States.

While these constraints are considerable, the degree to which they limit Armenia’s room for maneuver depends on the EU. And while the bloc has undoubtedly stepped up its support for Armenia in recent months, it could do substantially more. Although it may be unable to offer formal security guarantees to Yerevan, the EU should do everything possible to prevent further aggression by Azerbaijan, including a potential attempt by Baku to seize Armenian land to establish a corridor to its Nakhichevan enclave.

To do so, Brussels should build on its previous mediation efforts between Yerevan and Baku, as well as the current positive momentum in the Armenia-Azerbaijan relationship, to drive negotiations toward a conclusive peace settlement. Strengthening Yerevan’s negotiating hand could incentivize Baku to make peace. The EU should therefore follow through with equipping the Armenian military through the European Peace Facility and offering training to Armenian forces, and it should consider upgrading the EU Mission in Armenia by arming its border monitors stationed there.

Moreover, the EU could help Armenia wean itself off of economic dependence on Russia by instituting a regular macro-financial assistance program, similar to those currently in place for Ukraine and Moldova. It could also work toward a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, or DCFTA, as part of a potential broader Association Agreement with Yerevan, an idea now gaining traction in Brussels. This would simultaneously function as a major political signal of long-term commitment to close relations with Armenia. As the trajectories of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia demonstrate, DCFTAs can even be precursors to EU candidate status. And while that does not currently appear on the horizon for Armenia, the same was true for all three of these other post-Soviet republics only a decade ago. More immediately, the EU should proceed with visa liberalization for Armenians to foster closer societal links.

Taking these actions could allow the EU to make good on its promise to work toward “the strengthening of EU-Armenia relations, in all its dimensions, based on the needs of the Republic of Armenia.” While following through on certain measures could trigger backlash from Azerbaijan, which the EU has been careful not to antagonize due to its status as a major energy partner, Brussels is due for a reassessment of its relationship with Baku, as called for in an October 2023 European Parliament resolution. It could use that reassessment process to incentivize Azerbaijan to accept closer EU ties with Armenia.

Engaging Armenia as a close partner in the South Caucasus would export stability to the region and represent a strategic victory vis-à-vis Russia, undermining Moscow’s broader goal of asserting an exclusive sphere of influence within which core EU values such as democracy, freedom and human rights hold no sway. Seizing the chance for such a broad strategic victory should outweigh the temptation to tiptoe around Baku in order to advance narrow economic interests. 

Ten years after Armenia backed down from signing a DCFTA with the EU due to Russian pressure, the country is once again turning its focus to the West. Meanwhile, the EU’s decision to grant candidate status to Georgia has given Brussels a greater stake in the future of the South Caucasus. Having reached this inflection point, the EU has an immense opportunity to help Armenia set a resolutely pro-Western trajectory that results in a permanent shift in the geopolitical orientation of the region.

Yet capitalizing on it will require the bloc to commit fully to Yerevan by offering credible alternatives to Russian partnership. Making half-hearted or empty promises, on the other hand, could leave Armenia dangerously exposed and force it unwillingly back into Moscow’s embrace. Bold action is thus imperative—and time is of the essence. 

Nicholas Lokker is a research associate for the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. His work explores the development of the political and security order in Europe, focusing in particular on the integration and enlargement of the European Union as well as the evolving roles of Russia and the United States in the region.

Anna Avanesyan is a researcher for the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security.

Trace through centuries of wine history and almost every trail will lead back to Armenia. As the Book of Genesis describes, the country—nestled between Iran to the south, Turkey to the west and Azerbaijan to the East—was home to the world’s first grapevines. When Noah’s Ark ran aground on Mount Ararat, he planted rows of vines (and got quite drunk off the first harvest). Students of history know that the snow-capped peak, despite its present-day location within the borders of neighboring Turkey, is an iconic symbol of Armenia.

You can label the Noah’s Ark story as legend or lore depending on your beliefs, but in 2007, the world’s oldest-known winery was uncovered in Areni, a town just 60 miles from Mount Ararat. Nestled deep in a cave perched up a rocky outcrop, researchers found a 6,000-year-old grape press and fermentation vats buried in the floor. It’s thought that wine played a significant role in the era’s human sacrifices and other religious ceremonies.

Winemaking continued in the country for thousands of years until practices wilted under Soviet rule. “Georgia was tasked with wine production and we got brandy,” says Mariam Saghatelyan, owner of InVino wine bar in Yerevan. Grape varieties better suited to spirits production were introduced and still-wine production fell dormant.

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Over the last twenty years, however, producers have re-emerged, reclaiming family land and planting indigenous grapes like Tozot, Voskehat and Khatoun.

When Paul Hobbs started his Yacoubian-Hobbs project with the Yacoubian brothers in Armenia two decades ago, “the wine industry was in rough shape,” he says. “A lot of expertise was lost and Soviet-era facilities were rusted and run down.”

So he tried planting American grapes to match his California background. “I looked to classic Western varieties: Chardonnay, Sauvignon Blanc, Cabernet Sauvignon and Pinot Noir—a total disaster,” he says. “We wanted to understand how these vines would behave in the Old World. It’s been very revealing—most of the varieties we brought ripened earlier and jumped up in sugar. They didn’t work here. Meanwhile, the indigenous varieties ripen late and never get out of control.” Now he relies on Armenian grapes—hyper-aromatic examples like Voskehat or intense reds like Areni Noir, just two of the offerings that make up Armenia’s 400 autochthonous grape varieties.

To really understand Armenian wine, these indigenous varieties are the place to start.

Known as the queen of Armenian grape varieties, Voskehat has been cultivated for over 3,000 years, most commonly in the cooler, forested province of Aragatsotn and higher altitude sites in Vayots Dzor.

Voskehat is known for its longevity and ability to withstand increasingly unpredictable climates, thanks to its thick skin and hardy vines. (It’s not uncommon to find 150-year-old plantings of Voskehat.) Because of these traits, wineries are starting to look to this grape as the future of the region amidst warming conditions.

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Voskehat is also malleable to style preferences. Depending on the growing season or winemaking treatment, the grape can be formed to bring out vegetal and key lime flavors or richer tropical notes of white flower and beeswax.

“I appreciate Voskehat because of its similarity to Chenin Blanc,” says Danya Degen, wine director at Meli in Washington, D.C. “Both grapes blend floral flavors with moderate acidity and fuller body. Like Chenin Blanc, acidity and body also make it a fabulous blending variety for sparkling wine. Armenia makes some of the best non-Champagne, non-Prosecco bubbles from Voskehat.”

Scott Stroemer, beverage director of Galit in Chicago, describes Khatoun (also known as Khatun, Khatouni or Khatun Kharji) as “a total acid freak.” With a yellow-green hue and near-colorless juice, Khatoun is known for its tart lemon, alpine flower and pineapple characteristics. “It’s great as a blending grape for Voskehat, which can be a bit flabby on its own,” he says.

Kangun (or Gangun, depending on who you ask) was born during Soviet rule and specifically created for brandy production. It’s the child of three grape varieties: First, it was crossed with the Ukrainian grape Sukholimansky Bely and the Georgian grape Rkatsiteli, then that offspring was later crossed with Chardonnay. It settled well in Armenian terroir and was adopted for not just brandy, but white and sparkling wines. Expect a light straw color, ample freshness and notes of honey, wildflower and quince.

The white grape variety—found most commonly in the Ararat region—is planted widely in the clay and higher desert soils of Armenia. It’s known for its vegetal and ripe pear characteristics, though Stroemer compares it to something more French in nature. “I want this to be the Sancerre of 2024,” he says.

“Areni Noir, often known as Sev Areni or Sev Malahi, is considered the pearl of Armenian grape varieties,” says Bertil Jean-Chronberg, the owner and operator of Bonde Fine Wine Shop in Cambridge, Massachusetts. “It grows in the Vayots Dzor region—distinguished by a unique climate of mild winters and sunny days—at an average altitude of 3,000 to 5,900 feet. This terroir reflects the peculiar characteristics of this grape variety: In its youth, it produces wines with a pronounced acidity and a deep and intense color with delicate aromas of cherry, blackcurrant and black pepper. Aged in Armenian oak barrels, it becomes finer and more velvety and gains aromatic complexity and roundness.”

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Areni Noir is “thin-skinned with bright acid,” adds Stroemer. “When grown in Vayots Dzor, Areni Noir becomes more Burgundian in presence with a black pepper finish.”

While Tigrani is Armenian in origin, part of its parentage comes from Georgia, the Caucasus’s other historic wine region. The grape is a cross between Saperavi, one of Georgia’s ancient grapes, and Areni Noir.

It’s seldom seen on its own. Instead, Tigrani lends fruit and florality to more tannic red varieties. The grapes are juicy, sweet and tart with deep natural color, a subtle spice and touches of ripe pomegranate.

Translating to “victory” in Armenian, Haghtanak’s deep purple berries and intense red juice have made the grape one of Armenia’s most beloved varieties. It’s often found in blends—the deep color adds oomph to lighter grapes like Tozot—though if you do find a single varietal wine, it’s deeply cherry-like, hyper tannic with additional notes of plum, cloves, coffee and vanilla. “I find it quite similar to Saperavi from Georgia,” says Stroemer. “It’s red-fleshed and super tannic.”

Kakhet has deep roots that date back to the 4th century, but for the last few centuries, the grape has been exclusively reserved for Port-style sweet wines. Producers are wising up to the grape’s potential: While Haghtanak and Areni are rich and tannic, Kakhet tends to be berry-forward and terroir-driven—it’s light and aromatic, with notes of blackberry, black currant, fig and black pepper. Experts at U.C. Davis reckon the grape is a relative of the French varietal Carbonneau.

“I see a lot of potential in this grape,” says Pavel Vardanyan, who makes a Tozot at Noa Wine in Vayots Dzor, located at the tippy-top of one of the region’s rolling mountains. “You can make Tozot elegant and ageable, you can make it into a rosé, you can make it into a blanc de noir,” he explains.

While Tozot isn’t found widely (and often only in older vineyards), the red grape offers up high acidity and freshness, with vibrant, bright strawberry notes not dissimilar to something from, say, Beaujolais.

Because of its rarity, “these days, it’s often blended into a still wine, used in table wine, dessert wine or distilled into Armenian brandy,” says Jean-Chronberg. “If vinified alone, it produces wines of great freshness, which are unique and invigorating.”

Published: January 11, 2024

https://www.wineenthusiast.com/basics/grapes-101/armenian-wine-grapes/ 

Ameeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council was held in St. Petersburg on December 25. During the meeting, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan made remarks about his country's position on the separation of economic and political issues, according to Azatutyun.

The head of the Armenian government says that "the Eurasian Economic Union is an economic association that should not have a political, let alone a geopolitical agenda."

"We continue to perceive it in this way and develop interaction within the framework of our economic cooperation in this context, seeking to stop all attempts to politicize Eurasian integration," Pashinyan says.

According to him, the EAEU and its economic principles should not correlate with political ambitions.

"The EAEU and its economic principles should not be associated with political ambitions. The fundamental freedoms of trade and integration cannot and should not be restricted for political reasons, as this will lead to corrosion of the fundamental principles of the association," the Prime Minister says.

In contrast to Pashinyan, Russian and Belarusian dictators Vladimir Putin and Alexander Lukashenko regularly advocate the politicization of all associations in the post-Soviet space.

Deterioration of Armenia's relations with Russia and Belarus

The Armenian authorities have repeatedly expressed their dissatisfaction with the lack of effective support for the Collective Security Treaty Organization in the framework of international cooperation among its member states. In particular, the last such complaint about the presence of Russian military bases on the territory of the country was expressed by Armenia during active hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The CSTO members are Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

In the summer, Armenia refused to participate in the Skela-2023 exercise in Belarus under the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

At the end of October, it became known that the Armenian authorities were considering closing down Russian state TV channels because they had committed violations.

In early November, the Russian Federation stated that it perceived Armenia's participation in the Ukrainian peace formula summit in Malta as a "demonstrative anti-Russian gesture."

https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/world/armenian-prime-minister-rebukes-putin-and-lukashenko-at-summit-in-russia/ar-AA1m3l7f