Author: Tamamian Anna

TURKEY IMPOSES DEFENSE SANCTIONS ON FRANCE

Middle East Newsline, Canada
Nov 20 2006

ANKARA [MENL] — Turkey has imposed defense sanctions on France.

Officials said Ankara would not consider French military and defense
cooperation in wake of the French parliament’s approval of a bill that
recognized the Turkish genocide of Armenians in 1918. They said France
would also not attend military and security meetings in Turkey. Both
countries are members of NATO.

Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul said France would not be invited
to the biannual International Defense Fair in Ankara. The next IDEF
exhibition was meant to take place in September 2007.

"France has a renowned [defense] minister, but due to the recent
developments we haven’t sent her an invitation for the upcoming fair,"
Gonul said on Nov. 16. "France has not been officially invited to
the fair."

NOTE: The above is not the full item.

DEMOCRATS WILL SET HARDER STIPULATIONS

Lragir, Armenia
Nov 16 2006

The Hay Dat Committee of America backed 198 congressional candidates,
and the majority are Democrats. 93 percent of these candidates
were elected to the House and the Senate. The Hay Dat Committee of
America expects that the Democrats they backed will live up to the
expectations of the Armenian lobby connected with the international
recognition of the genocide.

It is not clear, however, why this time the Democrats should justify
the expectations of the Armenian lobby, if formerly they were majority
in the Congress and the White House but the hopes of the Armenians
of America did not come true. Why are the Armenians of the United
States and namely the Hay Dat Committee hopeful that this time the
Democrats will not disappoint them? On November 16 the news reporters
asked this question to Kiro Manoyan in charge of Hay Dat and political
issues ARF Bureau, hosted at the National Press Club.

He thinks the situation today is different.

"It is different because the elections are new, and all this time
the Democrats or an important part of the Democrats made promises,
and acted besides making promises. Second, a parliamentary election
will be held in two years, and both political parties will hardly want
a politically organized community like the Armenian community to work
against them because it is clear that the community has considerable
political possibilities and strength, and despite controversies
over certain issues they agree on the issue of the genocide," says
Kiro Manoyan.

For the change or reconsideration of the Armenian and American
relations after the victory of the Democrats, Kiro Manoyan says the
main issue is the U.S. attitude towards Iran and the Russian-American
relation.

"There is already an opinion that there is attitude, which is not final
and formal, which will undergo certain changes, Iran may become engaged
in building peace, stability and security in Iran, which will mean
that Iran and the United States agree on this question, the stance
of Iran on the United States, not suddenly, but will become milder,"
says Kiro Manoyan. According to him, this change will affect our
region because tensions between these two are against the Armenian
interest. Kiro Manoyan says it is possible to expect changes in terms
of the Russian-Armenian relations.

"Although the Russian-Armenian relations may be tenser because the
Democrats may have a harder stance on Russia," says Kiro Manoyan.

With regard to the U.S.-Armenian relation Kiro Manoyan says that the
Congress will keep the U.S. assistance to Armenia on the same level.

But Kiro Manoyan thinks that the Democrats will be harder in terms
of the stipulations for this assistance: civil rights, democracy. The
representative of the ARF Dashnaktsutyun thinks that in reality this
favors Armenia, because Armenia needs this for progress rather than
for meeting the demands of the great powers.

SERGE SARGSYAN MET WITH HIS IRAQI COUNTERPART

Public Radio, Armenia
Nov 15 2006

In the framework of the official visit to Iraq, RA Defense Minister
Serge Sargsyan met with the Defense Minister of Iraq, Major-General
Abdul Al Obeydi Mohamed Jasim. During the meeting reference was made
to the domestic situation in Iraq, security issues in Iraq and the
region as a whole. The parties discussed also questions related to
the security of the Armenian community in Iraq.

The same day Serge Sargsyan met with the Commander of the Multinational
Forces, General of the US Armed Forces George Casey.

The parties discussed a broad circle of questions connected with
the operative situation in Iraq and the future strategy of the
Multinational Forces.

After the official meetings RA Defense Minister visited the place
of location of the Armenian division. He talked with officers and
soldiers carrying out peacekeeping mission in Iraq and familiarized
with the conditions of their service.

IN ARA PAPIAN’S WORDS, ARMENIA CAN APPLY TO UN INTERNATIONAL COURT TO CHECK
VALIDITY OF WOODROW WILSON’S 1920 DECISION ON ARMENIAN-TURKISH BORDER

Noyan Tapan News Agency, Armenia
Nov 14 2006

YEREVAN, NOVEMBER 14, NOYAN TAPAN – ARMENIANS TODAY. The only document,
by which the state frontier between Armenia and Turkey was determined
from legal point of view was Article 89 of the Treaty of Sevres
and this article still can be recognized valid. Ara Papian, former
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Armenia to Canada,
expressed such an opinion at the November 14 press conference.

In his words, when the legal authorities of the Ottoman Empire, the
Republic of Armenia and another twenty countries signed the Treaty
of Sevres (consequently, Article 89, too) in 1920, they decided that
any decision on Armenian and Turkish border will be acceptable by them.

The drawing of the Armenian-Turkish border was reserved for
U.S. President Woodrow Wilson who signed under that treaty after long
discussions. According to the treaty, the territory of Armenia was
to be 169 thousand sq.km against the current 29 thousand.

Papian expressed an opinion that Armenia can apply to UN International
Court in order to receive a conclusion whether Wilson’s arbiter
decision of 1920 is in force up to present.

"We cannot surpass Turkey in economic, military or other aspects,
we should accentuate the legal side," the speaker emphasized. In
his words, Turkey will not dare to ignore the International Court’s
decisions. He said that there have been cases when a treaty signed
between the states was recognized in several years. He gave the
example of Honduras and Nicaragua when the arbiter decision made by
the Spanish king during the territorial argument between the latters
was fulfilled only 54 years later, as a result of the issue’s being
raised at the UN International Court.

AGBU Press Office
55 East 59th Street
New York, NY 10022-1112
Phone: 212.319.6383, x118
Fax: 212.319.6507
Email: [email protected]
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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Tuesday, November 14, 2006

Karabakh President Meets With AGBU Central Board Members

On November 7, 2006, the President of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic,
Arkady Ghoukassian, met with AGBU President Berge Setrakian and
Board Member Michael Ansour at AGBU Central Office in Manhattan
for a discussion of the issues facing Armenians around the world,
and Karabakh in particular, today and in the years to come.

The meeting, which included the participation of Kevork Toroyan of
Armenia Fund USA and Vartan Barseghian, Permanent Representative of the
Nagorno Karabakh Republic in the USA, covered matters related to AGBU’s
extensive programming in Karabakh and points of cooperation between
the world’s largest Armenian non-profit organization and the Republic.

Mr. Setrakian highlighted AGBU’s continuing support of Karabakh’s
civil society through projects that tackle the educational, cultural
and infrastructure difficulties facing the nation.

Since 2001, AGBU has initiated and financially supported a number of
projects in Karabakh, including the reconstruction of Alex Manoogian
Street in central Stepanakert, the construction of a housing
complex for war veterans and widows, the building of Stepanakert
Secondary School #7, the establishment and funding of the Karabakh
Chamber Orchestra and the Karabakh Repopulation Project, which has
rejuvenated two villages in the southeast Hadrut region and is poised
to reconstruct two additional settlements.

Mr. Ghoukassian was in the United States to participate in Armenia
Fund’s Thanksgiving Telethon, which annually raises millions of dollars
for various projects in Armenia and Karabakh. Proceeds from Telethon
2006 will benefit the region of Hadrut in Karabakh.

Established in 1906, AGBU () is the world’s largest
non-profit Armenian organization. Headquartered in New York City
with an annual budget of $34 million, AGBU preserves and promotes
the Armenian identity and heritage through educational, cultural and
humanitarian programs, annually serving some 400,000 Armenians in
35 countries.

Kurdish Media, UK
Nov 10 2006

Possibilities of prosecuting Turkish leaders for crimes against
humanity and war crimes – VII

11/9/2006 KurdishMedia.com – By Karim Salih
Part VII:

C) International tribunal:

Since war crimes and crimes against humanity are crimes against
international law, international courts, according to Cassese, `are
the most appropriate bodies to pronounce on them’. [352] The Security
Council which has responsibility to address matters of international
peace and security pursuant to its power under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter may establish, as it has done in both ICTY and ICTR cases, an
international criminal tribunal for the prosecution of persons
responsible for serious violations of international law committed in
Turkey (ICTT) as a subsidiary organ of the UN. [353]

While the Security Council is not expected to handle relatively minor
conflicts, it is competent under the UN Charter to deal with
international crises that are likely to threaten international peace
and security. [354] As the establishment of ICTR indicates a conflict
does not have to be of truly international character to trigger the
Security Council action. Though the strife was internal, the Security
Council viewed large scale and brutal human rights violations in
Rwanda as a threat to international peace and security. The alleged
massive indiscriminate use of force against civilians, the burning
and depopulation of almost entire villages of the South-east and
forcible displacement of 2.5 – 3 million persons coupled with
credible accusations of state involvement could be considered as
justifying the need for them to be adjudicated by an international
institution. [355]

The military operations of the Turkish armed forces are not confined
within international borders of Turkey. The alleged atrocities
perpetrated by Turkish army against the Greek population of the
northern part of Cyprus following the 1974 invasion are of purely
international nature where international institutions appear to be
the only appropriate bodies to adjudicate on them. [356]

Due, in particular, to the transnational nature of the Kurdish
question in the Middle East and the failure of Turkish military
solution to that question in Turkey, [357] the armed conflict between
PKK – Turkey has inherently the potential to spill over and endanger
the international peace and security in the whole region, as it
already led Turkey to the brink of war with Syria in 1998. [358] In
order to keep the internal armed conflict in the country under
control, Turkey also consistently threatens the use of force in
breach of Article 2 of the UN Charter against the Iraqi Kurds in case
of dissolution of Iraq, [359] something itself not prohibited by
international law as manifested by the dissolution of former Soviet,
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in early 1990s and the independence of
Montenegro from Serbia and Montenegro in May 2006. [360] The Turkish
military incursions into Iraqi Kurdistan since March 2003, [361]
which have been carried out with no formal Iraqi consent and despite
the opposition of Iraqi Kurdish leaders, [362] not only violate
Article 2 of the UN Charter, but also tend to destabilise Iraqi
Kurdistan, the only safe and stable part of Iraq since 2003 which is
seen as a crucial ingredient for the stability of the whole Iraq.
[363]

The Security Council is not only not precluded by the principled idea
of legalism from creating an ICTT but it is its responsibility to
find ways to ensure that `the ongoing serious violations of
international law’ [364] in Turkey are halted and one of the ways, if
not `the only way’, [365] to do this, is by prosecuting persons
responsible for such violations. [366] In addition to contributing to
the restoration of peace in Turkey, a country whose stability is
regarded as a key to peace and security in the Middle East and East
Europe, [367] much like the ICTY and ICTR, an ICTT can play `an
important role in maintaining international peace and security’ in
Turkey `by assisting with the establishment of civil society, under
the rule of law, which is necessary to bring about lasting peace’.
[368]

An ICTT can be permitted by the Security Council pursuant to its
Chapter VII powers to prosecute incumbent Head of State for
international crimes. [369] Its ability to indict, prosecute and
punish all persons, regardless of their former or current political
or military posts, [370] for crimes against international law can
contribute to ending the ongoing conflict. ICTT will be able to bring
to justice Turkish generals suspected of war crimes or sponsoring, or
having implicated in, underworld criminal gangs that allegedly
committed thousands of extra judicial killings of political opponents
since early 1970s, who otherwise practically immune from prosecution
unless by license from the general chief of staff and before military
courts, as manifested by Susurluk affair and Semdinli bookshop
bombing case. The only way to end violence unleashed by `criminal
elements who are claiming leadership’, as John Shattuck strongly
asserts, [371] is `to bring to justice those responsible for
unleashing it’. [372]

Even initiating the process of bringing war criminals to justice –
indicting them with war crimes – would turn them into pariahs within
the international community unable to travel without fear of being
arrested. [373] As ICTT, like ICTY and ICTR, may not hold trials in
abstentia, for indicted defendants who fail to surrender, the
prosecutor could present the indictment to a judicial panel, who may
issue an arrest warrant that if ignored will become an international
arrest warrant. [374] An ICTT, being created by the Security Council,
its arrest warrants will be binding on all member states who will be
obligated to surrender the wanted suspects. [375] Additionally, by
being created under Chapter VII, the Security Council can use
sanctions to enforce the decisions of ICTT. [376] Until the armed
conflict between the army and the PKK is halted, the prospect of
indictment and criminal trials for war crimes before an international
tribunal can have strong deterrent effect on foot soldiers as well as
the commanders of both parties who contemplate violating rules of
humanitarian law.

An impartial international tribunal is also better positioned to help
creating an accurate record of the Turkey’s three year direct
military rule following the 1980 coup and twenty two years of armed
conflict. [377] There are so many unresolved injustices in recent
Turkish history which make existence of a true and credible record
imperative in order to confine blame in guilty individuals rather
than being shifted to entire communities. Criminal trials through
interrogating evidence in a procedurally fair setting and applying
high standards of proof can distinguish guilt from innocence in the
specific cases in question. [378] They can unearth information about
the work of perpetrators and the organisers of brutalities like the
1996 Guclukonak Massacre [379] and establish whether the state or PKK
was involved in the `mystery killings’, disappearances and hiring
death squads.

The scale of the atrocities and their ambiguity merit being
adjudicated by impartial criminal tribunals to both unravel the
mysteries and punish the perpetrators. The Raboteau Massacre trial in
Haiti in 2000 is the case in point here. [380] Only through rigorous
interrogation the criminal trial uncovered the internal organization
and operation of the FRAPH death squad and the fact it is being
sponsored by the state. [381] After lengthy proceedings, in November
2000, a Haitian court found sixteen former soldiers and
paramilitaries guilty of participating in the 1994 Raboteau Massacre,
and convicted further thirty-seven in absentia, including the entire
military high command of the former military regime and the heads of
FRAPH death squad. [382]

Such a record can be most beneficial in the case of Turkey where
appears to be a culture of systematic denial and falsification of the
past as well the ongoing events. [383] Fair criminal trials can help
establishing truth with respect of the identity of those masterminded
and organised the destruction of thousands of villages which subsumed
so many crimes and human sufferings [384] as the government maintains
that most village destruction cases was perpetrated by the PKK. [385]
The responsibility is so obscured that at the height of village
destruction in 1996 Prime Minster Ciller tried to convince others
that the helicopters destroyed villages in the South-east belonged to
the PKK, a guerrilla group not known for having an air force. [386]
Such claims and counter claims if remained unresolved may cause even
greater confusion and tension among future generations of Kurds and
Turks and become obstacle to laying firm foundations of a lasting
peace.

Prosecutorial accountability is indeed a duty equally owed to the
future generations. By creating an accurate and credible record of
past events, fair trials can prevent expansion of their accounts into
exaggerated mythologies exploited by nationalists to instil fear in
the other ethnic groups. [387] The ongoing controversy over the
mass-murder of one and half millions Armenians and the expulsion of
the survivors from their ancestral homeland, should at least serve as
a lesson. In the absence of an authoritative record obtained from
judicial proceedings applying stringent evidential standards, still
recognition of the massacres as genocide risks diplomatic sanctions
[388] or prosecution. [389]

Criminal trials by a truly independent and impartial tribunal may
turn demands for vengeance into `institutionalized and fair
proceedings for assessing guilt’. [390] Dissatisfied and disappointed
communities are more likely to `take justice into their own hands’
and turn to retaliation if victims’ need to see justice and
accountability for gross abuses of their human rights were not
satisfied by fair trials, [391] as it is evident by the events
following World War I in the case of the disappointed Armenians.
[392] In deed, `the only civilised alternative’ to the desire for
revenge, as ICTY articulates `is to render justice: to conduct a fair
trial by a truly independent and impartial tribunal and to punish
those found guilty’. [393] Rather than an obstacle, criminal
accountability may make reconciliation and lasting peace more
achievable. [394] By clearly identifying and punishing the guilty
individuals -generals, police chiefs, leaders and the organisers,
claims of collective guilt that associate crimes committed in
internal conflicts such as in Turkey may be avoided. [395]

In a violence-ridden country where state involvement in hiring
criminal gangs to kill political opponents is spoken of in the
parliament as certain as thing as `we all know it’, [396] criminal
prosecutions by impartial bodies seem essential to re-establish moral
standards and basic criteria of legitimate behaviour. [397]
Punishment of the guilty individuals can serve to end a `culture of
impunity’ [398] and install rule of law in Turkey by making it clear
that violations on human life and dignity are not only criminalised
by law, but subject to punishment. [399]

Accountability also addresses the victims’ needs for recognition and
justice which must not be overlooked. By judicially condemning the
acts perpetrated against the victims, in their millions since 1980,
the international community reaffirms their dignity and value and may
contribute in the recovery of those survived violations of their
human rights. [400]

Arguments against prosecutorial approach may include that criminal
trials could serve to foster resentment among the majority Turkish
population and further civil conflict, and may have the potential to
undermine the legislative and political efforts that otherwise would
gradually resolve the Kurdish question and eliminate human rights
abuses. Exacerbating the civil conflict and EU conditionality effect
arguments may have little validity as the level violence is
increasing [401] and the reforms are practically stalled. [402] The
majority resentment, if assuming that is factually correct despite
some evidence to the contrary, [403] may pose immense practical
challenge to pursuing accountability. [404] However, it will neither
legitimise the wrongs appear to have been committed by the army and
the `deep state’ Kemalists as the German youth’s support did not do
so to the Nazi crimes nor should it thwart any efforts to bring
guilty individuals to justice especially considering accountability’s
educative effects. [405] When in a society `inverted morality’ has
elevated otherwise `deviant crimes’ to the highest expression of
group loyalty, international stigmatization of criminal conduct, as
Akhavan asserts, may have far-reaching influence, changing the rules
of `legitimacy’ and promoting post-conflict reconciliation. [406]

Even if establishing an ICTT could not serve as a model alternative
to controversial military interventions to deal with tyrannical and
authoritarian regimes in the region, it will hopefully have deterrent
effect by demonstrating the consequence for violations of
international law and the variety of international community’s
weapons. Pursuing individual criminal accountability in Turkey and
ensuring that the defendants, the army commanders as well as PKK
leaders, receive fair trial may command popular legitimacy in the
eyes of Middle Eastern and wider Islamic countries and may serve a
valuable lesson for these societies to agree to disagree and to use
non-violent means to accommodate differences. [407]

Given that already ICTY and ICTR together consume nearly a quarter of
a billion dollars each year, [408] operation of another ad hoc
tribunal may prove too expensive for UN. [409] An international
tribunal also may take long time to be operational. [410] These all
may prompt a second possible scenario: expanding the ICTY
jurisdiction, by the Security Council, to cover international crimes
committed in Turkey. The expansion scenario is an attractive option
inasmuch as it saves time and money and retains the advantages of an
ICTT especially being staffed by international experts able to apply
international law and clarify hazy areas of law. [411]

Given the political complications of enforcing international criminal
law in Turkey, [412] an impartial and independent investigatory
commission can be employed to specifically identify perpetrators and
circumstances of the violations that could be a precursor to criminal
trials. Although this approach would not discharge the prosecutorial
duty, it may represent a good first step, especially if created by
the Security Council under Chapter VII similar to the case of former
Yugoslavia. [413] An attractive alternative to UN sponsorship for
Turkey, as a member state of the Council of Europe and a candidate
country of EU, can be an investigatory commission, created by the
Security Council and sponsored by the EU.

While both options are likely to ensure greater neutrality,
credibility, security to witnesses, financial support and
international attention, [414] the latter option which will be the
EU’s first involvement in such type of work, seems more effective
given the potential stick and carrot policy involved.

Notes

352. Cassese, 2001.

353. For a thorough analysis of the work of ICTY since its inception,
see Bassiouni, Cherif M., The Law of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, (Irvington-on-Hudson, NY:
Transnational Publishers, 1996).

354. See Charter of the United Nations, , (last visited 11 September
2006) ; Cassese 2001.

355. See, Tadic Interlocutory Appeal, para. 58; Simon, Jan-Michael,
`State-sponsored mass violence: Criminal Accountability and
Reconciliation’, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International
Criminal Law – Freiburg, Germany, September/October 2002; Cassese,
Antonio, `The International Criminal Court: Some preliminary
reflections", European Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, 1999,
pp. 144-71, at 164.

356. Tadic, Interlocutory Appeal, para. 58.

357. TDN, Kurdish impasse, supra note 4.

358. Kerim Yildiz and Mark Muller, `the EU, Turkey and the Kurds’, EU
– Turkey Civic Commission, Brussels 2004, (Second International
Conference on Turkey, the Kurds and the EU – The European Parliament,
Brussels, 22-23 November 2004 – Conference Papers).

359. Office of Prime Minister: Directorate of General of Press and
Information, `Erdogan: `Those Talking about Dividing Iraq are Playing
With Fire’, 15 January 2004 (Erdogan warned that `Iraqi Kurdish
groups are playing with fire. Turkey won’t let them divide Iraq’).

360. Musgrave, Thomas D., Self Determination and National Minorities
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 193.

361. Turkish Daily News, `Turkish army entered and pulled out of
Iraq, say reports’, TDN Ankara, 29 July 2006.

362. Cihan News Agency, `Saddam-era Agreements with Turkey Not
Valid’, Zaman, Ankara, 14 July 2006.

363. Hawley, Caroline, `Iraqi Kurdistan a world away from war’, BBC
News, Baghdad, 12 August 2005.

364. United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 on Establishing
an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. res. 827, 48 U.N. SCOR,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1992).

365. Tenth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., Agenda Item 55,
U.N. Doc. A/58/297-S/2003/829 (2003), para. 348: (`[ICTY] trials have
sent a powerful message that only through justice can all the peoples
of former Yugoslavia achieve reconciliation and create thriving
societies.’ [Emphasis added.])

366. First Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 152,
U.N. Doc. A/49/342-S/1994/1007 (1994) , paras. 11-15; also see
subsequent annual reports, 1995 Report para. 199; 1996 Report,
para.5; 1997 Report, para. 4; 1998 Report. para. 5.

367. Çakmak, 2003, pp. 63-90, at 63.

368. Sixth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 53,
U.N. Doc. A/54/187-S/1999/846 (1999), para. 212, [emphasis added].

369. Kambanda, supra 324, para. 40.

370. Ibid.

371. Issues of Democracy, USIA Electronic Journals, `Bringing
Violators to Justice: An American View’, An Interview with John
Shattuck, Issues of Democracy, USIA Electronic Journals, Vol. 1, No.
3, May 1996, pp. 5-9, at 8.

372. Ibid.; for a relevant report in this contexts, see Human Rights
Association of Turkey (IHD), `What happens if those who should
maintain Democracy, Freedoms and Human Rights make call for
Repression and Violence?’ Press Release, 06 April 2006; Human Rights
Association of Turkey (IHD), `Attacks and Lynching Attempts Occurring
Every Coming Day are Threatening Social Peace and Democracy’, Press
Statement, Ankara, 07 September, 2005.

373. Hildreth, Brian T., `Hunting the Hunters: the United Nations
Unleashes Its Latest Weapon in the Fight Against Fugitive War Crimes
Suspects – Rule 61′, Tulane Journal of International and Comparative
Law, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring 1998, pp. 499-524.

374. Ibid; this procedure, which is called `super indictment’, is
provided by Rule 61 of the Rules and Procedures of the ICTY has,
since its first use on 20 October 1995, become part of ICTY strategy.

375. Article 25 of the UN Charter.

376. Article 41 of the UN Charter.

377. Kritz, 2002, p. 23.

378. Ibid.

379. AI the Guclukonak Massacre, supra 365.

380. Concannon, Brian. Jr., `Justice for Haiti: The Raboteau Trial’,
Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, 2001.

381. Ibid.

382. Ibid.

383. Öktem, Kerem, `Return of the Turkish `State of Exception’,’
Middle East Report Online, 3 June 2006.

384. Ayata, 2005, pp.5-42, at 08, 10, 40-42.

385. United States Department of State, `Report on Allegations of
Human Rights Abuses

by the Turkish Military and on the Situation in Cyprus’, Bureau of
European Affairs, 01 June 1995 (see the Turkish official response to
the allegations made by the villagers and journalists).

386. AI, No security, supra 91, p. 4 citing Cumhuriyet, 28 October
1994; Kirisci and Winrow, 1998, p. 131 citing Hurriyet, 28 October
1994.

387. One of the few items available at the English version of the
official website of the Turkish Parliament (TBMM) is a `documentary’
book on Armenian genocide of the Turks in 1914-18: `Archive Documents
about the Atrocities and Genocide inflicted upon Turks by Armenians’
, compiled by Grand National Assembly of Turkey Board of Culture,
Arts and Publications, – Publication No. 93, Ankara – 2002, , (last
visited 10 September 2006).

388. Shawl, Jeannie, `Turkey threatens sanctions if France adopts
Armenian genocide law’, Jurist – Legal News and Research, 15 May
2006.

389. Human Rights Watch, `Turkey: Pamuk Trial Tests Commitment to
Free Speech’, 08 December 2005.

390. Kritz, 2002, p. 24.

391. Linton, Suzannah, `Prosecuting Atrocities at the District Court
of Dili’, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 2, 2001, pp.
414-58, at 458.

392. Cassese, 2001. Probably the most famous revenge case was the
assassination of Talaat Pasha in Berlin in 1922 by a young Armenian
student, on whose trial Raphael Lemkin, the lawyer who later coined
the word `genocide’, commented: `It is a crime for Tehlirian to kill
a man, but it is not a crime for his oppressor to kill more than a
million men’; quoted in Cooper, Belinda and Taner Akcam, `Turks,
Armenians, and the `G-Word”, World Policy Journal, Fall 2005, pp.
81-93, at 84.

393. First Annual Report ICTY, supra 432, paras. 11-15.

394. Huyse, Luc, `The Process of Reconciliation’, in David Bloomfield
and others, (Ed.), Reconciliation after Violent Conflict, (Stockholm:
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance,
2003), pp. 19-22, at 21.

395. Fatic, Aleksandar, Reconciliation via the War Crimes Tribunal?
(Aldershot: Ashgate, January 2000), p. 2.

396. Supra, note 138 and the accompanying text.

397. Fatic, 2000, p. 2.

398. AI An end to torture and impunity is overdue, supra note 85; US
DOS 1999, supra note 64: (`a climate of impunity’).

399. Kritz, 2002, pp. 31, 35.

400. Kritz, 2002, p. 23.

401. Turkish Daily News, `Turkey unveils tragic toll of mounting PKK
attacks’, TDN Ankara, 11 September 2006; TDN, Kurdish impasse, supra
note 4.

402. Financial Times, Editorial, `Turkey’s penal code’, 22 September
2006 (stating that `the government’s refusal to repeal Article 301 is
not only a failure of leadership but a capitulation to rightwing
nationalists that is expanding their constituency’); Turkish Daily
News, `Reform bill put on hold’, TDN Parliament Bureau, 22 September
2006.

403. CNN, `Landslide win for Islamic party in Turkey’, 4 November
2002. (AKP is subscribed to Kemalism).

404. Mayerfeld, Jamie, `The Mutual Dependence of External and
Internal Justice: The Democratic Achievement of the International
Criminal Court,’ Finnish Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 12, pp.
71-107, at 79.

405. Ibid, pp. 71, 79-80, 92, 107 (outlining the democracy promoting
role of international criminal tribunals and their educative values).

406. Akhavan, Payam, `Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal
Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?’ American Journal of International
Law, Vol. 95, No. 1, January 2001, pp. 7-31, at 7.

407. Ahmed, Nafeez, `Routing out the Opposition: The Comprehensive
Repression of Human Rights in Turkish Society’, Islamic Human Rights
Commission, London, 2000, , (last visited 10 September 2006).

408. Schabas, William A., `International Tribunals for Yugoslavia and
Rwanda: Doing More Good than Harm’ Ethnic Conflict Research Digest,
Vol. 3, No. 2, September 2000.

409. Both ICTY are ICTR are funded out of the UN’s annual budget.
Ibid.

410. Kritz, Neil J., `War Crimes on Trial’ ‘, Issues of Democracy,
USIA Electronic Journals, Vol. 1, No. 3, May 1996, pp. 20-8, at 22.

411. Ibid., p. 24.

412. For a discussion on enforcement of international law, see
Penrose, Mary Margaret, `Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement
in International Criminal Law’, American University International Law
Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2000, pp. 321-94, at 321.

413. The [United Nations] Commission of Experts, Established Pursuant
to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), S/1994/674, 27 May 1994;
see supra note162.

414. Ratner, 2001, p. 230.

JONATHAN HENIK: US DOES NOT RECOGNIZE ELECTION, REFERENDUM OR OTHER EVENT HELD IN NAGORNO GARABAGH

Azeri Press Agency, Azerbaijan
Nov 9 2006

"US does not recognize election, referendum or any other event held
in Nagorno Garabagh," U.S. Embassy Public Relations Officer Jonathan
Henik told the APA.

He took his stand on the referendum concerning the Constitution to
be held by separatist Nagorno Garabagh regime on December 10. The
diplomat said he does not believe such steps to influence the current
situation and stressed that the conflict can only settled by OSCE
Minsk Group mediation and through negotiations. Mr.Henik noted that
the US recognizes Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.

"No country, as well as the US recognizes Nagorno Garabagh as an
independent country," Mr.Henik said.

TURKISH PARLIAMENT APPROVES EU-SOUGHT RELIGION LAW

Reuters, UK
Nov 9 2006

ANKARA (Reuters) – Turkey’s parliament approved on Thursday a law
required by the European Union that will improve property rights of
non-Muslim religious minorities, but it is likely to fall short of
EU expectations.

Parliament approved the "religious foundations law" by 241 votes
for to 31 against after months of sometimes stormy debate and much
fine-tuning of its wording.

The law was passed a day after the European Commission published a
report on Turkey, which called for greater rights for groups such as
religious minorities, criticised a lack of reform and set a deadline
for it to open its ports to EU member Cyprus or face unspecified
consequences.

The EU had criticised the foundations law draft, saying it failed
to provide for compensation to those whose properties have already
been sold to third parties since being taken over by the state or
other entities.

Brussels has urged Ankara to create a comprehensive legal framework
that allows all religious groups unrestricted freedom to operate in
this overwhelmingly Muslim but secular country.

The main minorities affected by the law are historic Greek Orthodox,
Syriac and Armenian communities and also Protestant and Roman Catholic
congregations.

The reform prompted months of debate and stirred nationalist fears,
with opposition parties suggesting it could increase the influence
of the Istanbul-based Orthodox Christian patriarch, the spiritual
head of the world’s Orthodox Christians.

The EU has also expressed concern over restrictions on training of
Christian clergy in Turkey, an issue not tackled in the foundations
law.

Ankara is under EU pressure to reopen a Greek Orthodox seminary, but
has been unable to find a legal formula that both complies with Turkish
secularist principles and is acceptable to Patriarch Bartholomew.

President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, sometimes wary of EU-linked reforms he
fears may weaken the Turkish nation state or its secular structure,
could still block the foundations law, but parliament would be able
to override his veto.

Turkey began EU entry talks one year ago, but is not expected to join
the wealthy bloc for many years.

ANDRANIK MANOUKYAN WILL SELL

A1+
[05:14 pm] 08 November, 2006

The RA Government intends to sell the 10% of the shares of "ArmenTel"
to Russian "Vympelcom" if the latter renounces monopoly, RA Minister
of Transport and Communication Andranik Manoukyan said today.

"Why did we keep the 10%? As far as there were provisions about
monopoly, having that 10% the Government participated in the session
and discussions and tried to affect the decisions. But it didn’t. Only
one of the five members of the Council represented the Government. And
four is always more than one. Now that there is no monopoly, the
tariffs are formed in the circumstances of competition", Andranik
Manoukyan explained. Let us remind you that he has the control over
the 10% of shares of "ArmenTel".

By the way, Andranik Manoukyan also informed that the third cellular
operator can appear in Armenia no sooner than in 2009 as the Government
has promised not to give a license to any new operator until then.

ANGER AT ‘OFFENSIVE’ KEBAB BAN

Birmingham Post, UK
November 7, 2006, Tuesday
First Edition

Armenians in Glendale, California, are trying to skewer the city’s
ban on outdoor restaurant grilling, saying it is an offence to the
kebab culture.

But efforts to overturn it have stalled in the city council.

Glendale, whose 85,000 Armenian residents comprise the largest such
population in the US, is 40 per cent Armenian and Armenian-American.

Last year, voters elected three Armenians to the five-member city
council, partly on an agenda to remove the outdoor grilling ban. But
they have been unable to win the four votes needed for passage.

That annoys Armenians who say indoor gas grills simply cannot do
justice to their traditional cuisine.

Vrej Sarkissian says it takes more than salt, pepper, onions and olive
oil to make a decent kebab. He cooks the skewered meat on charcoal
outside his restaurant.

"People can always tell the difference," said Sarkissian, owner of
Anoush Banquets & Catering. "They want the original flavour of home."

"It’s what our culture is about," said his brother Sacco. "It’s great,
because they’re able to hold on to their heritage. They haven’t been
forced to Americanise."

The ban may have a chilling effect on the city’s dining, city
councilman Ara Najarian said.

"Most Armenians are highly sophisticated, and they demand the best,"
he told the Los Angeles Times. "It’s developed into a gourmet war
between these folks. I once saw a place serve a flaming rack of lamb.

I think we all know that burgers on the grill taste better than on
the frying pan."

But mayor Dave Weaver, who opposes lifting the ban, accused
his colleagues of playing "the race card". "We’re portrayed as
anti-Armenian, and that’s so far off the mark," he said.