Author: Tamamian Anna

Armenian president amends decree on government activity

Arminfo
8 Apr 04

YEREVAN

Armenian President Robert Kocharyan on 8 April signed a decree on
changes to his decree on the schedule of the government’s activity
signed on 16 March 2002, the Armenian presidential press service has
told Arminfo news agency.

Nothing is reported about the essence of the changes envisaged by the
decree. It is only reported that “the schedule has new wording”.

Rueters
April 9 2004

20,000 Armenian Protesters Demand President Quit

By Hasmik Lazarian

YEREVAN (Reuters) – About 20,000 demonstrators massed in the capital
of ex-Soviet Armenia on Friday to demand the resignation of President
Robert Kocharyan and vowed to press their protests through next week.

In the largest public gathering since mass protests denouncing
alleged irregularities in Kocharyan’s re-election last year,
demonstrators answering the call of two opposition parties poured
into Freedom Square.

“Today, the fate of Armenia is being decided,” Stepan Demirchyan,
head of the opposition Justice Party, told supporters chanting
“Kocharyan out!”

Protest leaders had failed to seek official permission to hold the
rally, but police took no action. New protests were planned every
evening next week to pursue opposition demands.

Kocharyan’s leadership in the Caucasus country remains beset by a
failure to resolve a protracted dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh — a
territory populated by ethnic Armenians but assigned to mainly Muslim
Azerbaijan in Soviet times.

Participants in Friday’s rally said they wanted to secure changes to
a law on referendums to hold a nationwide confidence vote on
Kocharyan’s administration.

The Constitutional Court proposed such a vote immediately after
Kocharyan’s re-election, but authorities took no action. “This would
be a good chance to ensure the president’s departure in a civilized
fashion,” Demirchyan told the crowd.

Parties backing the president have said a referendum would be
unconstitutional, but have offered talks with the opposition.

Opposition parties, which hold 25 of 131 seats in parliament after
elections in May 2003, suspended their activity in the assembly in
February after failing to persuade authorities to stage a referendum.
But they returned last month to press their campaign for Kocharyan’s
resignation.

Observers said the parliamentary election last year was less
fraudulent than the poll two months earlier that kept Kocharyan in
power, but was still not up to international standards.

The parliamentary poll was the first since eight senior officials,
including Armenia’s prime minister, were killed in a 1999 shooting
spree in the National Assembly.

Dover Sherborn Tab, MA
April 8 2004

Women bring world in music

By Chris Orchard/ Correspondent

SHERBORN – Music from around the world filled the
Unitarian-Universalist Church in Sherborn last Saturday.

Libana performed several international folk songs, many of which
dealt with longing for home.

The group brought rhythms, lyrics, instruments, and voices from
across the globe into the church. Their songs came from countries
such as South Africa, Republic of Georgia, Israel, Armenia, Russia,
Hawaii and 14th-century Persia.

“We’ve been exploring music from around the globe” for 25 years, they
said.

Libana performs “contemporary and traditional music of the world’s
women,” said artistic director and founder Susan Robbins.

“We play ancient folk songs,” and “also songs that give voice to a
more visionary sense of how women” are creating better lives for
themselves, she said.

The group, composed of seven women, was formed in 1979, when “world
music was hardly even a term yet,” said Robbins.

That year was a turning point, musically, in the life of Robbins.

“It was the times and my curiosity,” she said. “I wanted to see what
the women of the world had created.”

Other members of Libana are Lisa Bosley, Allison Coleman, Charlotte
Miller, Marytha Paffrath, Linda Ugelow and Cheryl Weber.

In folk cultures, where men and women work separately, there are
differences between men’s music and women’s music, said Robbins.

“Women were the carrier of a lot of oral tradition,” she said.

Gary Strichartz, chairman of the music committee at the
Unitarian-Universalist Church, said “I’m enraptured” by the music.

“Sue and Marytha have come to our Sunday services,” he said. Marytha,
who is Libana’s main percussionist, also leads a drum group at the
church.

Libana’s rhythms and songs brought listeners, momentarily, to another
place and time. Their music has a spiritual dimension, said
Strichartz.

“It’s one of the most wonderful things to drive around in, especially
in Boston traffic,” he said.

While the group hails from Harvard Square, its members travel and
perform around the world, learning as they go.

“We do a lot of listening to world music,” said Robbins.

There’s international flavor right here in Boston, too. In order to
get songs right, “we will go about finding someone from the greater
Boston area,” said Robbins.

They specifically mentioned local Armenian communities as great
sources of music and authenticity right here in Eastern
Massachusetts.

Some of their most profound songs that night came from Islamic
countries, such as Algeria and Egypt, where women still struggle for
a public voice in society. One song, from the Bedouin tradition, they
said, involved heavy drum beats. One rhythm melted into the next
rhythm, with dancing and high-pitched shrieking.

The music they played that night was also being recorded for a live
album.

“I love this church,” said Robbins.

“I don’t think you can have any idea how glad we are to be here
tonight,” said Paffrath.

Though in their minds they were probably somewhere else – in some
far-off country, the crowd seemed glad to be there, too.

PRESS RELEASE
Catholicosate of Cilicia
Communication and Information Department
Tel: (04) 410001, 410003
Fax: (04) 419724
E- mail: [email protected]
Web:

PO Box 70 317
Antelias-Lebanon

THE ARMENIAN CATHOLICOSATE OF CILICIA

COMMUNIQUE

At its most recent meeting, on 5 April 2004, the Central Committee of the
Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia was profoundly disturbed to hear the
Statement made by the Supreme Spiritual Council on 2 April 2004. The
Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia has always preferred not to discuss issues
related to the Church and Nation publicly, but, rather, within the context
of the meetings and correspondence between the two Catholicoi and the two
executive bodies of the two Catholicosates. Our Catholicosate adopted this
approach in order not to expose our people to the confusion and
misunderstanding that may result from one-sided and biased statements made
in the Press. Therefore, we will not react directly to the Statement of 2
April. We would like simply to make a few corrections and to underscore a
few points:

1) Knowing that it could be a sensitive issue and attempting to prevent a
one-sided interpretation, the Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia has, on more
than one occasion, duly informed the Catholicosate of All Armenians in
Etchmiadzin, Armenia, that the reorganization due to take place in the
Canadian part of our “Prelacy of the Eastern United States and Canada”, was
aimed at changing the status of the Vice-prelate to Prelate. This was an act
of internal organizational rearrangement within an already existing
jurisdiction, not the creation of a new jurisdiction. In fact, making
internal organizational rearrangement within an already existing
jurisdiction is something, and creating a new jurisdiction is something
else. These are two completely different ecclesiological, jurisdictional and
administrative acts. This internal rearrangement was made by the decision of
the Prelacy’s Executive Councils of the USA and Canada, and was done for
practical reasons. To interpret this initiative differently is wrong. The
Statement made by our Prelacy in Montreal, Canada provides full information
concerning this matter.

2) The Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia has consistently expressed its
strong desire and commitment to seriously and comprehensively discuss with
the Catholicosate of All Armenians in Etchmiadzin, issues and concerns
pertaining to the Armenian Church in general and to the relations between
the two Catholicosates in particular. The Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia
believes that we must not approach these issues, which come from the past
and touch the whole life of the Armenian Church, theoretically, but rather
practically, and that we must take into consideration the specific contexts,
local conditions and new realities of our communities in diaspora,
preserving always the inseparable unity of our Church and Nation. Our
approach remains unchanged.

3) The Catholicoi of our Holy See have considered the reformation and
renewal of the Armenian Church a top priority among other administrative and
jurisdictional concerns. We should continue to do this, no matter how
difficult it may be or how long it takes. We firmly believe that the
reformation of the Armenian Church and the renewal and revitalization of its
spiritual, moral and people-oriented mission is an urgent concern. We must
look beyond existing sensitivities and misunderstandings, and not allow them
to hinder the renewal of the Armenian Church. This process should include
the active participation of the four Hierarchical Sees of our Church.

The Central Committee of the Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia rejects the
approach and the spirit displayed in the Statement of the Supreme Spiritual
Council of Etchmiadzin. Antelias remains firmly committed to its mission of
faith and people-oriented service. It is with this spirit and with brotherly
love, that the Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia appeals to the
Catholicosate of All Armenians to start together a process of reflection,
consultation and planing by which we will be able together to renew and
strengthen the Armenian Church, deepen the collaboration between Armenia and
Armenian Diaspora, and support our homeland.

SECRETARIAT
THE ARMENIAN CATHOLICOSATE OF CILICIA

5 April, 2004
Antelias, Lebanon.

##

The Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia is one of the two Catholicosates of
the Armenian Orthodox Church. For detailed information about the history and
the mission of the Cilician Catholicosate, you may refer to the web page of
the Catholicosate, The Cilician Catholicosate, the
administrative center of the church is located in Antelias, Lebanon.

In-depth analysis shows Caspian oil’s potential

World Oil
Monday, March 1, 2004
Volume 225; Issue 3
ISSN: 0043-8790

An in-depth analysis shows Caspian oil’s potential: whether one talks
about exploration, field projects or pipeline construction, the
Caspian Sea region is destined to influence global energy and
geopolitics for years to come.

(Supply And Demand)

By Collum, Randall, Jr., Gregorek, Adrian J., Sondhi, Amit, and
Economides, Michael J.

As new sources of hydrocarbons, particularly from non-OPEC countries,
become increasingly important to the world, the Caspian Sea region has
the potential to become one of the major oil- and gas-producing
areas. The region is thought to hold the world’s third-largest oil and
gas reserves behind the Middle East and Russia. New oil discoveries in
the northern Caspian Sea have underlined the region’s
importance. Kashagan field, off the northern shore of the Caspian Sea,
is expected to be the second-largest petroleum deposit in the world,
following Saudi Arabia’s Ghawar field. It is the largest new oil field
found over the last 30 years. By 2010, the Caspian region is expected
to produce 3 million bopd, doubling current output of about 1.5
million bopd.

Most of the Caspian discoveries are in Kazakhstan, although by 2010 a
significant amount of oil should come from Azerbaijan, predicted to
account for almost one-third of the region.

In December 2003, Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbaev stated,
“Global experts consider the nervousness of Arab countries and all of
OPEC’s (members) comes not only from the massiveness of the Caspian
reserves, but also because the region’s states do not enter OPEC.” He
further suggested that the countries surrounding the Caspian should
create an OPEC-like oil cartel, to support oil prices and reassure
OPEC, itself.

Until recently, Russia controlled oil exports from the area, with the
main export pipelines for Caspian oil passing through its
territory. The US government supports alternative routes that bypass
Russia, which is not pleased that the new pipelines will give the West
access to Caspian oil and gas, without Russian control.

The geopolitics associated with the region have been a major influence
on the Caspian petroleum industry. The US has blatantly thrown its
clout behind the American petroleum companies involved.

Transportation of Caspian oil and gas does not only involve
Russia. Conflicts over land ownership and the US’ bad relationship
with Iran have played important roles in establishing potential
pipeline routes. Also, the division of reserves located in the Caspian
Sea has been an ongoing dispute, with Iran and Turkmenistan in
disagreement with Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Russia on how the Caspian
Sea should be divided.

An example of hostility that surrounds this issue is what happened to
BP in 2001. While a BP research vessel was in a presumably Azerbaijani
sector of the Caspian Sea disputed by Iran, an Iranian gunboat chased
it out of those waters. This event prompted BP to suspend its work in
that Caspian oil field for a period of time.

The US has played an important role in influencing the Caspian
pipeline situation by endorsing five pipelines in the region, three of
which originate in Baku. (1) These three pipelines consist of the two
already exporting oil, plus the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline
that is under construction. Construction associated with the BTC
pipeline is shown in Fig. 1. (2)

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

For now, the pipeline routes seem to be accepted by most
countries. Russia has accepted construction of the BTC pipeline, and
there are questions as to whether Iran would have transported
Azerbaijan’s oil through its territory. The route to ship oil through
Iran would have been the cheapest, by far.

AZERBAIJAN

Of the estimated 3 million bopd to be produced from the Caspian by
2010, about one third would come from Azerbaijan. (3,4) In 2002,
Azerbaijan’s oil production was 22% of total Caspian Sea output. If
Azerbaijan’s political situation continues to favor investment by
foreign companies, and the geopolitical state of affairs can be
resolved between the Caspian Sea’s surrounding countries, then
Azerbaijan’s potential is even greater.

Azerbaijan has been an oil-producing province for a long
time. According to some historians, it is supposed to be the site of
the first purpose-drilled oil well in the world, drilled in 1848-1849,
just south of Baku. Oil field exploitation began in the 1870s and
continued until World War I. Azerbaijan became an independent republic
after the demise of the Russian Empire in 1918 and was recognized as
an independent country by Western nations in January 1920. Three
months following this recognition (April 1920), the Russian Red Army
took over this country, and it became part of the emerging Soviet
Union (USSR).

Azerbaijan’s production peaked at over 500,000 bopd during World War
II, but it has yet to reach that production level again. It was a
strategic, potential oil supply that Nazi Germany targeted in World
War II but was never able to acquire. Had the Germans achieved this,
the balance of the war could have shifted from the Allies to the
Germans. Azerbaijan stayed as a member of the USSR for most of the
Twentieth Century, until it became an independent country for the
second time in history, in August 1991.

Azerbaijan’s current promise of hydrocarbons lies in the Caspian Sea,
to the country’s east. In 2002, Azerbaijan’s oil production was a
little over 300,000 bpd. (5) Given the current development projects in
the Caspian Sea, the country should surpass its historical oil
production peak in the near future.

From 1987 through 1995, Azerbaijan’s oil production declined at a
rate of 5.4%. (5) Thanks to the “Contract of the Century,” this
decline has ended. The contract, signed in 1994 between Azerbaijan and
11 international companies, involves the development of Caspian Sea
reserves in the Azeri, Chirag and

Gunashli (ACG) fields. Through this contract, Azerbaijan International
Oil Co. (AIOC) was created. Members include state oil company SOCAR
and 11 international firms.

After the contract was signed, oil production stabilized between 1995
and 1997. It has been increasing at an average 10.2% since 1997. (5)
If this rate (considered conservative, given the number of new
projects slated) continues, Azerbaijan will surpass 500,000 bopd in
2007. First oil from the BP-operated ACG fields was in 1997, and this
has been the main reason for the country’s production increase. In
early 2004, the area produced 130,000 bopd. It is expected to produce
400,000 bopd by 2005 and peak at 1 million bopd. (6) Production,
consumption and exports of Azerbaijani oil since 1985 are shown in
Fig. 2. (5)

[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]

The Contract of the Century paved the way for many more production
sharing agreements. So far, these pacts have committed a total
investment of more than $60 billion in Azerbaijan’s oil
development. (7) The prize that the international operators are
chasing is proven oil reserves of between 7 billion bbl and 12.5
billion bbl, with a potential for an additional 32 billion bbl.
Proven natural gas reserves also total 30 Tcf. Potential exists for
an additional 35 Tcf. (4) Although Azerbaijan has fewer reserves than
Kazakhstan, the country’s ability to cooperate with, and openness to,
international investment has enticed such companies as BP, ExxonMobil,
Statoil and others to invest heavily.

Azerbaijan’s economy. Azerbaijan’s future economy depends greatly on
the proper utilization of hydrocarbon revenues. The country is
low-income, with a per capita income in 2002 of only $710. (8)
Nonetheless, Azerbaijan’s income has quadrupled since 1995, much of it
due to the Contract of the Century. This increase compares to a GDP
that decreased by 18.5% in 1995. (8) The projected GDP growth in 2004
is 9.1%. (9) The economy is growing at a fast pace.

With 64% of the population below the poverty line, the country is in a
transitional economy. While the oil sector accounted for 90% of
Azerbaijan’s exports, it generated only 1% of all jobs. (10) The
projected $60 billion of international investment in oilfield
development should add plenty of employment.

One sign that the government is attempting to diversify its economy
and keep it growing far into the future is the creation of the State
Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ). SOFAZ was established
in 1999 and created to put aside some of the country’s oil-related
revenue and manage it for future use. (11)

Becoming a major player. Azerbaijan faces many of the problems common
to other Caspian Sea nations in its quest to become a major player in
hydrocarbon exports.

While oil companies have lined tip to take part in Azerbaijan’s
hydrocarbon development, issues still stand in the way of delivering
commercially viable hydrocarbons. Azerbaijan sits on the western coast
of the Caspian Sea, and its neighbors include Iran to the south,
Georgia and Armenia to the west, and Russia to the north.

“Transportation of Azerbaijan’s abundant reserves is a major
problem. There is not enough pipeline capacity to export the amount of
oil that can be produced. Also, as Azerbaijan in the past has been a
gas importer, there are no export pipelines available for its
potential gas output. New lines will be necessary for fields that will
be coming onstream, such as Shah Deniz. As one of the largest
gas/condensate fields in the world, it will begin exporting gas in
2006.

Pipelines are the only feasible way to transport oil and gas out of
the Caspian Sea, where most of Azerbaijan’s reserves are located.
With the Caspian landlocked, there is no possibility of using tankers
to ship oil to other locations. Therefore, new pipelines are being
built, and more are contemplated for the future. With some of the
future pipelines still under consideration, Azerbaijan’s location and
Western geopolitics are playing an important role in the location of
these lines.

With current and planned pipelines, Azerbaijan seems to be in
reasonable shape regarding future capacity. Currently, Azerbaijan has
two export pipelines. The “northern route” is the 100,000-bpd
Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline, which sends oil to the Russian Black Sea
coast. h began exporting oil in 1997. Under present plans, this
pipeline’s capacity will be upgraded to 300,000 bopd. (2) The “western
route” is the 115,000-bpd Baku-Supsa pipeline, which sends oil to
Georgia’s Black Sea coast. It began exporting oil in 1999.

Under construction since early 2003, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)
pipeline is expected to increase export capacity five-fold with its
1-million-bopd capacity. This new pipeline is scheduled to begin
exporting oil in early 2005, and it will cover 1,040 mi through
Georgia and Turkey, bypassing the progressively busier Bosporus
Straits. Another new pipeline will be built parallel to this, to
transport natural gas. It will be called the Baku-Tbilisi- Erzurum
pipeline and will handle 233 Bcf of natural gas per year. It should be
finished in 2006, in time for Shah Deniz’s first contracted gas
exports. The locations of the existing, under construction and/or
proposed pipelines in the region are shown in Fig. 3. (12)

[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]

Azerbaijan fully intends to become a major player and has tried to
alleviate the region’s geopolitical tensions. The one conflict that
needs to be resolved is a dispute with Turkmenistan and Iran with
regard to overlapping fields. Hopefully, this can be resolved
peacefully.

One troubling event to international observers is the recent election
of Ilham Aliyev as president in October 2003. He is the previous
president’s son, and he won in a landslide election described as
“falling short of international standards.”

GEORGIA

Georgia is strategically located between the Black Sea and the
oil-rich Caspian, and it has been a focus of potential conflict
between the US, other Western nations and Russia, Fig. 4. (13,14)
Although Georgia has limited hydrocarbon resources, it controls much
of the Caucasus Mountains and the potential pipeline routes through
them. Thus, it is emerging as a key transit country. (15,16,17)

[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]

Georgia was absorbed into the Russian Empire in the 19th
century. Independent for three years (1918-1921) following the Russian
revolution, it was forcibly incorporated into the USSR until the
Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991. Ethnic separation in Abkhazia (18)
and South Ossetia, plus poor governance and Russian military bases,
deny the government effective control over all of the state’s
internationally recognized territory. There has been a discernible
effort by Georgia to approach the West, often at the consternation and
mistrust of Russia. (19)

Widespread corruption in Georgia led to the storming of parliament in
December 2003. Mikhail Saakashvili, a 35-year-old American-trained
lawyer, organized and headed up the nearly month-long street
demonstrations that led to President Eduard Shevardnadze’s
resignation. Georgian parliamentary and presidential elections were
planned for January 2004.

Georgian economy. The dissolution of the USSR precipitated a
significant fall in the overall size of Georgia’s economy. This was
made worse by hyperinflation, and accompanied by an associated fall in
standards of living. The Georgian economy reached a record low in
1992-1994, although the country still enjoys a considerably higher
per-capita GDP than Azerbaijan, at about $5,500. However, recent
statistics suggest that more than half of Georgians are unemployed.

The country risks financial collapse without immediate Western
aid. The economy is in worse shape than is publicly known. Georgia’s
interim leaders are seeking help, not only in financing the new
elections, but even more important, in rebuilding Georgia’s
dilapidated public infrastructure.

Georgia vs. Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin has expressed
readiness for radical improvement of Russian-Georgian relations. Yet
Georgia accuses Russia of being “barbaric” at the same time that it
wants to improve relations. This is important, as the Georgian
economy and energy needs depend so much on Russia.

One of the main issues of conflict with Russia is the Georgian army’s
inability to deal with Chechen rebels, who have been embroiled in
militant activities in Russia. The would-be, breakaway Russian
republic of Chechnya is crucial for control of the rich oil supplies
of the Caucuses. Georgia and Russia conflicted recently over the
“Pankisi Gorge” on the border with Chechnya, after Tbilisi accused
Moscow of aggression. Russia strongly denies the accusations and in
turn, claims that Georgia has failed to act against Chechen rebels,
who Moscow believes use the gorge as a shelter. Russian politicians
are also angry at US support of the Georgian version of events. (20,
21)

Russia is very much interested in Georgia’s political stability,
because an unstable Georgia can mean hundreds of thousands of refugees
crossing into Russian territory. Also, Georgia’s territory could be
taken by international terrorists, who might launch attacks on Russia
from that site. Russia has long considered Georgia part of its sphere
of influence and is uneasy seeing US troops deployed there.

Georgia and the US. The relationship between Georgia and the US is
growing stronger. The American influence and its role in the recent
political drama is the most vivid example. Shortly after Eduard
Shevardnadze resigned as president, his US-backed successors joined
with US Secretary of State Colin Powell to publicly criticize Russia,
and demand that it remove its troops from Georgia and another former
Soviet republic, Moldova. US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s
visit in December 2003 was an additional show of US support. In
return, Georgia has provided coalition troops in Iraq.

Energy in Georgia. Shortages abound in the energy industry, which is
the most corrupt sector in Georgia and has been for 10 years. Since
1991, Georgia has faced an acute energy crisis. Russia and
Turkmenistan (main exporters to Georgia) dramatically increased the
prices of their energy supplies, and this caused a severe decline in
Georgia’s economy. The situation worsened with destruction of a
stretch of the gas pipeline between southern Russia and Georgia in
1992. It was exacerbated in 1994 by Georgia’s inability to pay for gas
imports. Currently, Georgia imports oil from Iran and continues to
import electricity from Russia and Turkey.

Georgia is important, because it is positioned to become an important
corridor for oil and gas transportation between the Caspian Sea and
Western markets. At least four pipelines are either operational or
planned/under construction: (15,16,17)

* Baku-Supsa Oil Pipeline. In 1999, the Baku-Supsa early oil pipeline
was inaugurated at the Supsa terminal on the Black Sea coast,
beginning the flow of Azeri oil across the Caucasus to market. The
pipeline’s 115,000-bopd capacity can be doubled with additional
pipeline upgrades and facilities. The pipeline is owned by the AIOC
consortium of” Western energy companies.

* Kashuri-Batumi Pipeline. ChevronTexaco has been granted rights to
utilize an existing, yet aging, pipeline from Kashuri (near Tbilisi)
to Batumi (on the Black Sea coast).

* Main Export Pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)
pipeline. Georgia is set to be the transit country for the Baku-Ceyhan
main export pipeline. When completed, the project should deliver up to
1.0 million bopd at its peak. This project is of regional
significance, as it represents the first direct transportation link
between the Caspian and the Mediterranean, thus avoiding the Bosporus
Straits.

The BTC pipeline should be completed by 2005. The Georgian section of
the pipeline is 248 kin (154 mi) long and will generate substantial
revenues for Georgia. Although BP owns 38% of the venture and ENI
recently took a 5% share, all nine members must make final commitments
to the 1,730-km (1,075 mi) project. Construction of the Georgian
section began in April 2003.

* Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline Project: Georgia is set to be one of the
transit countries in the Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) project between
Turkmenistan and Turkey. The line’s capacity is expected to be 1.0 Tcf
of gas per year, with about half consumed in Turkey and the remainder
re-exported to Europe.

KAZAKHSTAN

Situated in central Asia, on the edge of the European and Asian
continents, is the world’s largest landlocked country Kazakhstan. It
is four times the size of Texas and holds the largest recoverable
crude oil reserves in the Caspian Sea region. Kazakhstan produces
roughly 1.0 million bopd, or about two-thirds of the region’s total
production. (5)

It is easy to see why, as foreign investment pours into the country’s
oil and gas sectors, that Kazakhstan is beginning to realize its
enormous production potential. Such companies as ChevronTexaco (the
first major Western oil company to enter the region in 1993) have made
Kazakhstan their place to develop some of the world’s largest oil
fields. (22)

In 2003, ChevronTexaco announced plans to invest $4 billion in
Kazakhstan over the subsequent four to five years. (23) The funds will
further develop the company’s three regional projects, TengizChevroil,
the Caspian Pipeline Consortium and the Karachaganak Integrated
Organization. (24)

Russia’s LUKoil also made a similar announcement last December about
investing $3 billion in the Dostyk Block. Comprising two fields, the
block’s reserves are estimated at “several hundreds of millions of
tons of oil.” (24) With sufficient export options in the near future,
and with much infrastructure presently under development, these
announcements, alone, would make Kazakhstan a major producer and
exporter over the next decade.

Kazakhstan consists of three ethnic groups; it is primarily Kazakh, at
almost half of the population, followed by Russian and Ukrainian. The
population is split almost evenly between the Muslim and Russian
Orthodox religions. Although Kazakh is the official language, Russian
is also spoken rather widely, primarily in business.

After the USSR’s demise, the newly created, independent Republic of
Kazakhstan opened its doors to foreign business in 1991. Its economic
growth in recent years has been driven not only by petroleum, but also
by changes in its governing system. Its President, Nursultan
Nazarbaev, a former leader of the Soviet Kazakhstan Communist Party
since 1977, became the new republic’s first interim president. He was
then elected president in the country’s first national elections in
December 1991. Due to a 1995 referendum that extended his term,
President Nazarbaev was re-elected in 1999. He will be up for
re-election again in 2006. (25)

Kazakhstan’s economy. Kazakhstan holds Central Asia’s largest
economy. Because of its booming energy sector, economic 2reforms and
foreign investment, Kazakhstan’s GDP grew 9.5% in 2002 to an estimated
$120 billion. This resulted in an estimated per-capita GDP of about
$7,200. (25) This marked the first time that significant economic
growth was observed over three consecutive years since Kazakhstan’s
independence in 1991.

More than 55% of the country’s revenue is dependent on oil and
gas. The country’s other exports include zinc, copper, titanium, gold,
silver, machinery, coal and meat. Kazakhstan’s industrial sector
depends heavily on the recovery and processing of these natural
resources, as well as on its growing machine fabrication sector that
focuses on construction equipment, tractors, agricultural machinery
and armaments.

Kazakhstan’s economy experienced a decline in the mid-1990s, as a
direct result of the breakup of the USSR and the fall in demand for
Kazakhstan’s traditional heavy industry. The steepest annual decline
was observed in 1994.

Shortly following the decline, the pace of the governmental program of
economic reform and privatization quickened, resulting in a
significant shift of assets away from the state into the private
sector. The 2001 opening of the Caspian Consortium pipeline, from
Tengiz field to the Black Sea, has significantly raised export
capacity while allowing for economic growth. However, despite the
large petroleum sector, Kazakhstan has adopted an industrial policy
designed to diversify the economy away from over-dependence on oil and
gas by developing light industry. (25)

Kazakhstan’s energy sources. Kazakhstan controls a large portion of
Caspian coastline and possesses this freshwater lake’s largest known
oil field (Kashagan). According, the country has absorbed $20 billion
of foreign petroleum investment since the fall of communism. (26)

Combined onshore and offshore proven reserves are estimated to be
between 9.0 billion bbl and 18 billion bbl. This is comparable to the
reserves of Algeria or Qatar. (4) Kazakhstan’s 2002 oil production was
just shy of 1 million bpd, of which about 130,000 bpd were consumed
inside the country. (5) Kazakhstan’s historical oil
production/consumption trend is charted in Fig. 5. Although still a
relatively minor oil exporter, Kazakhstan is on its way to becoming a
significant player in the next 10 years. The country’s proven natural
gas reserves total 65 Tcf; mostly in western Kazakhstan’s Karachaganak
field. (4) These gas reserves rank roughly 20th in the world.
However, despite the large gas reserves, Kazakhstan has only recently
begun to produce more than it consumes, with current output around 0.4
Tcf(1.1 Bcfd). (5)

[FIGURE 5 OMITTED]

Kazakhstan’s oil production grew an average 16% annually between 1999
and 2002, and output has nearly doubled since its independence in
1991. In June 2003, the government announced a new offshore
development program. Through this program, new offshore blocks will be
auctioned off, starting as early as 2004. Kazakh officials hope that
this effort will boost the country’s production to approximately 2.4
million bopd by 2010 and 3.6 million bopd by 2015. (27) This output is
expected to come from the country’s three largest fields–Tengiz,
Karachaganak and Kashagan.

Located onshore, just inland from the shores of the Caspian, Tengiz is
considered to be the world’s deepest super-giant oil field. (22)
According to operator ChevronTexaco, its discovery in 1979 generated
estimated reserves of 6 billion bbl to 9 billion bbl. The field has
been developed by the Tengizchevroil (TCO) joint venture between
ChevronTexaco, ExxonMobil, Kazmunaigaz and Luk-Arco. Tengiz produces
about 285,000 bopd, or approximately one-third of national
production. A new agreement between Kazakhstan and TCO has initiated a
$3-billion expansion project that will increase the field’s capacity
to 450,000 bopd by 2006. (27)

In northern Kazakhstan is Karachaganak onshore oil and gas/condensate
field. It holds reserves comprising more than 2.3 billion bbl of oil
and 16 Tcf of gas. It has a projected 40-year life span at the
current output rate of about 100,000 bopd, with plans for
expansion. (28)

Kashagan field, although still being appraised, is expected to produce
its first oil in 2005, at an initial rate of 100,000 bopd. (27) As
stated earlier, the field is expected to be the second, most prolific
deposit in the world, following Saudi Arabia’s Ghawar Field. (29)
Future production potential is very significant, but current
difficulties that need to be resolved include Caspian ownership,
export routes and infrastructure.

Petroleum transportation. Kazakh oil is exported in three general
directions– westward, northward and southward. Oil heading west is
transported via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. Additional excess
capacity is shipped on a barge through the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan.

Oil transported north to Russia is shipped via a pipeline system or
carried on the existing rail network. Finally, the oil shipped south
is typically swapped with Iran. Because of its geographical location
and access to ports on both the Black Sea and Persian Gulf; Kazakhstan
is able to trade some of its oil on the world market. Because of the
expected rapid growth of Kazakhstan’s exports, many efforts are
underway to expand infrastructure to allow a higher export capacity.

One such project, which adds extra export capabilities and connects
the area’s oil deposits with Russia’s Black Sea ports, is the Caspian
Pipeline Consortium (CPC), overseen by the Russian, Kazakh and Omani
governments in conjunction with various international companies. The
pipeline opened in November 2001 at an initial capacity of” 560,000
bopd. (27) CPC recently announced plans to more than double its annual
capacity to 67 million t, or approximately 1.3 million bopd. (30)
Prior to completion of the CPC, nearly all of Kazakhstan’s oil exports
were distributed though the Atyrau-Samara line, a northbound pipeline
linking up to the Russian system.

Many other pipelines have been reported under active or theoretical
consideration. They include a highly ambitious, controversial pipeline
heading eastward to what will be an ever more oil-demanding China, as
well as a subsea pipeline across the Caspian Sea connecting to the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project.

Several natural gas pipeline projects are also under consideration or
already in development. Although they are in their infancy, these
lines have the potential to open up markets for Kazakh natural gas.
Further, Kazakhstan could play an important regional role, given that
it serves as a gas transit center for Turkmen and Uzbek gas piped to
Russia and beyond, Fig. 6.

[FIGURE 6 OMITTED]

Kazakhstan-China connection. On its east, Kazakhstan borders China for
approximately 1,000 mi. (25) As the Chinese demand for oil and gas
increases, China has begun exploring options with its neighbor by
making major investments within the Kazakh oil and gas sector. China’s
CNPC recently Joined the Kashagan field consortium. and the firm in
1997 bought 60% of Kazakh oil company Aktobemunaigaz. (31,32) A
pipeline is essential to export oil from Kazakhstan into
China. Feasibility studies for route options are underway and should
be completed by the fall of 2004. (32,33)

Last October, Kazakhstan announced that work would begin in 2004 on
this project, one of the world’s longest pipelines. (34) Building the
pipeline, however, will be a formidable task, with many physical and
political problems looming. Many observers have warned that the
Kazakhstan-China route could be very problematic, due to numerous
obstacles associated with its 3,200-km length. One of the most
important project issues is that China has asked Kazakhstan to deliver
50 million t of oil annually via this pipeline. This is more than
Kazakhstan’s current, total production of 47 million t. The likelihood
of Kazakhstan selling all of its oil to one customer is zero, given
the country’s ambitions for a world role. Initial hopes from several
years ago to complete the entire Kazakhstan-China pipeline by 2005 are
now unattainable.

LITERATURE CITED

(1) “Caspian sea oil and gas exploration update and hearing summary,”
hearing testimony, 106th US Congress, May 16, 2000.

(2) BTC website; BP plc,

(3) Koerner, B., “What if the Caspian region was a major oil
supplier,” Worldlink magazine, World Economic Forum, January/February
2002.

(4) US Energy Information Administration (EIA), Caspian &a Region.”
Key Oil and Gas Statistics, August 2003.

(5) BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2003.

(6) BTC website, BP pie. ,
Azeri-Chirag- Gunashli fact sheet.

(7) The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, December 2003.

(8) Azerbaijan fact sheet, Development Data Group, World Bank.

(9) Azerbaijan Country Analysis Brief, Energy Information
Administration, June 2003.

(10) United Nations Resident Coordinator’s Annual Report for
Azerbaijan, 2002.

(11) “About the fun&” State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan website,
http://www. oilfund.az.

(12) An energy overview of the Republic of Azerbaijan,” US Dep’t. of
Energy,

(13) “Georgia’s rose revolution: A made-in-America coup,”
, December 7, 2003.

(14) Caspian development map and pipelines, BTC website, BP pie,

(15) “Georgia: Transit of Caspian Sea region oil and gas.” US Energy
Information Administration, April 2001.

(16) “Pipeline projects in Georgia,” US International Trade
Administration

(17) “Oil & gas production, Georgia, 2000,” US Energy Information
Administration,

(18) The Republic of Abkhazia,

(19) Central Intelligence Agency, Ibid.

(20) Political news, Georgia,

(21) Delisio, C., “A quiet battle in the Caucasus: Georgia between
Russia and NATO,

(22) Kazakbstan Fact Sheet, Eurasia Operations, ChevronTexaco.

(23) “CheveronTexaco to invest $4 Billion in Kazakhstan in next 4-5
years,” TASS Energy Service News Agency, November 26, 2003.

(24) “LUKoil to develop Dostyk Block in Kazakhstan,” NOVECON: Russian
Energy Digest, December 8, 2003.

(25) Central Intelligence Agency, Ibid.

(26) “Kazakhstan seeks Caspian oil cartel,” Reuters, Moscow, December
28, 2003.

(27) Kazakhstan Country Analysis Brief, US EIA, July 2003.

(28) “Kazakhstan: Major oil and natural gas projects,” US EIA, July
2002.

(29) Kazakh oil finds Confirm Caspian as world class,” Energy Compass,
November 25, 2003.

(30) Caspian pipeline consortium to increase oil pipeline capacity,”
Kazakhstan-Gateway, RBC, November 20, 2003,

(31) Kazakhstan: China seeks oil investment with an eye on pipeline,”
Radio Free Europe, March 2003.

(32) “What’s at stake for whom–China,” World Press Review Online,

(33) “Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline study to be ready in 2004,”
Interfax, October 2003.

(34) “Work on mammoth Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline to start next
year,” Agence France-Presse, October 10, 2003.

Randall Collum Jr. graduated from the University of Houston with a BS
degree in chemical engineering in 2001 and is enrolled in the masters
of petroleum engineering program at the same university. He has almost
three years of experience with a major petroleum company and has had
roles as both a production and reservoir engineer in the Gulf of
Mexico Continental Shelf.

Adrian J. Gregorek received a BS degree in mechanical engineering with
honors from Texas A&M University in 2000. He has been employed by a
major petroleum company as both a facilities and subsea engineer,
within the firm’s E&P operations His experience ranges from operations
to project development and execution within Gulf of Mexico deepwater
blocks. His current focus is on subseawork He is working on his
masters in petroleum engineering degree from the University of Houston

Amit Sondhi has just completed his masters degree in petroleum
engineering at the University of Houston. He holds a BS degree in
electronics engineering from North Maharashtra University in India.

Michael J. Economides is a professor at the Cullen College of
Engineering, University of Houston, and the chief technology officer
of the Texas Energy Center Previously, he was the Samuel R. Noble
professor of petroleum engineering at Texas A&M University and served
as chief scientist of the Global Petroleum Research Institute
(GPRI). Before that, Dr. Economides worked in a variety of senior
technical and managerial positions with a major petroleum services
company. His publications include authoring or co authoring 11
professional textbooks and books, including The Color Of Oil, and
almost 200 journal papers and articles. He does a wide range of
industrial consulting, including major retainers by national oil
companies at the country level and by Fortune 500 companies.

COPYRIGHT 2004 Euromoney Institutional Investor PLC.

2/4/2004- TURKEY’ S PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSION

1- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT PRESS REPORT
2- FEAJD REPORT

1- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT PRESS RELEASE

Arie OOSTLANDER (EPP-ED, NL). Report on the 2003 regular report of the
Commission on Turkey’s progress towards accession (COM(2003) 676 –
SEC(2003) 1212 – C5-0535/2003 – 2003/2204(INI)) Doc.: A5-0204/2004 Procedure
: Own-initiative report Vote : 01.04.2004

Turkey has made many important reforms since last year in order to meet the
Copenhagen political criteria for EU membership but still needs to
go considerably further and rigorously implement the reforms in many areas,
the European Parliament said in adopting a resolution by rapporteur Arie
OOSTLANDER (EPP-ED, NL) with 211 votes in favour, 84 against and 46
abstentions. Therefore absolute priority should be given to the political
criteria before starting negotiations on the adoption
of EU legislation. Also, the EU’s capacity to absorb new Member States
should fully be taken into account.

MEPs praised the strong motivation and political will demonstrated by the
AKP government and by the great majority of the members of parliament in
favour of making reforms that are revolutionary for Turkey, but they said
that such reforms can only be judged on the basis of how they are put into
practice at all levels of the judicial and
security system and the civil and military administration.

MEPs criticised the continuing influence of the army in politics, business,
culture and education, continuing torture practices and mistreatment, the
intimidation of human rights defenders, the discrimination of religious
minorities and the fact that trade union freedom is not fully guaranteed.
MEPs also condemned the political
persecution of such political parties as HADEP and DEHAP. They were unhappy
with the way the trial reopened against Sakharov Prize winner Leyla Zana and
three other former DEP members of parliament was progressing and called for
an amnesty for them. The government should as soon as possible put a
proposal for the abolition of the state security courts before parliament
and take further steps to revise the role of the National Security Council.
The 10% threshold for obtaining seats in
parliament should be abolished in order to ensure a wider representation,
including predominantly Kurdish parties. Turkey should also speed up the
implementation of certain cultural rights that allow the education in and
use of languages other than Turkish in the media, especially Kurdish. The
Kurdish regions should be provided with the necessary means to stimulate
their socio-economic development.

MEPs called on Turkey to implement without delay outstanding decisions of
the European Court of Human Rights, including in the matter of
restoring property rights on Cyprus and to withdraw its forces from the
northern part of Cyprus. Settlement of the Cyprus conflict was an essential
condition for progress on Turkey’s EU membership application. Turkey was
called upon to sign the International Criminal Court treaty.

The Commission should carry out a study of the impact of Turkey joining,
including the need to reform the agricultural and structural funds policies.
The EU should have a common security and defence policy with regard to
possible new EU external borders and it should do more to support Turkey in
the fight against terrorism.

In the end, MEPs said, it will be up to Turkey to decide whether it wants,
or will be able, to accept the political principles and values of the EU as
appropriate for Turkey’s state and society.

Press enquiries:
Marjory van den Broeke
(Strasbourg) tel.(33-3) 881 72208
(Brussels)  tel.(32-2) 28 44304
e-mail :   [email protected]

_________________________________________________

2- THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT REAFFIRMS THE ABSOLUTE PRE-EMINENCE OF COPENHAGEN
POLITICAL CRITERIA

EUROPEAN ARMENIAN FEDERATION
for Justice and Democracy
Avenue de la Renaissance 10
B – 1000 BRUXELLES
Tel./Fax : +32 (0) 2 732 70 27
E-mail : [email protected]
Web :

– Reiterates the 1987 resolution on the Armenian genocide
– Rejects proposals to waive Copenhagen criteria
– Refuses `Privileged partnership’ as alternative to membership
– Questions `absorption capability’ of the European Union, for the first
time

Brussels, Belgium – On Thursday April 1st 2004, the European Parliament (EP)
examined and adopted the draft resolution on `Turkey’s progress towards
accession’, prepared by Mr Oostlander (PPE
(Christian-Democrat)/Netherlands), announced the European Armenian
Federation for Justice and Democracy (FEAJD).

The European Commissioner responsible for Enlargement, Mr Verheugen, made a
point of attending the debates and explaining the status of the outstanding
negotiations on Cyprus. Nevertheless he affirmed that simply modifying
existing laws without taking action to implement those statutes is not
enough for Turkey. `We also want a change of practice […] We constantly
receive information that demonstrates that the reforms process is only
accepted with hesitation by the Turkish administration’, he declared.

The Armenian Genocide issue was raised specifically by Mrs. Ainardi (GUE,
Group of the European United Left- France), Mrs. Roure (PSE, Party of
European Socialists-France), and Mrs. Schleicher (PPE, Germany).

Mrs Roure mentioned notably that it is difficult to understand `how a
country can join the Union while denying its history and its mistakes. We
therefore expect Turkey to carry out its responsibility toward history and
we will remind Turkey of that at every opportunity.’

Mrs. Schleicher, Chairwoman of the Delegation to the EU-South Caucasus
Parliamentary Cooperation Committees also indicated that by the economic
boycott and the closing of the border with Armenia, Turkey was guilty of
serious violations of the Balladur principles [1]’. She added that `Turkey
had worked to exclude Armenia Baku-Ceyhan pipeline route’ and that `it
contributed thus to increase regional instability’. She concluded that
Armenia `could not have confidence in Turkey under these conditions’.

Mr. Katiforis (PSE, Greece) then noted the Ministry of Education’s
revisionist directive requiring schoolchildren to compose essays `filled
with fanaticism directed towards certain minorities.’

A total of 41 amendments to the Turkey accession legislation were presented
and voted on. Amendments emanating from the Green and Liberal parties
proposing to begin negotiations prior to meeting the requirements of the
`Copenhagen Criteria’ were rejected. Others suggesting that the EU extend a
`privileged partnership’ status to Turkey, during such time that it falls
short of the Copenhagen criteria were also rejected. Finally, the Parliament
voted in support of its initial position, which calls for strict compliance
to the `Copenhagen criteria.’

Concerning the Armenian Genocide and the blockade of Armenia, the EP
maintained the paragraphs adopted by its Committee on Foreign Affairs on
March 17. They stipulate in particular that:

– The EP `requests Turkey to reopen the borders with Armenia and to promote
good neighborly relations with Armenia, to work together to promote
equitable solutions to regional conflicts and not to take any action that
would stand in the way of a historic reconciliation’.

– The EP `would like a dialogue to be established between Turkish and
Armenian academics, social and non-governmental organizations in order to
overcome the tragic experiences of the past as has been expressed in its
earlier resolutions (of 18 June 1987, 15 November 2000, 28 February 2002 and
26 February 2004).’

The PPE (Christians Democrats) and the PSE (Party of European Socialists)
were successful in blocking an amendment introduced by Mrs. Roure and 31
other deputies that aimed to reinforce the idea of Turkey’s responsibility
to begin a dialogue with Armenian people.

Euro-deputies also rejected Mr Coûteaux’s (EDD, France) amendment, proposing
to submit the question of Turkey’s membership to the European nations by
way of referendum. They did, however, make a point of indicating that the
European Commission had to fully take into consideration `the capacity of
the Union to absorb new members’ as stipulated within the `Copenhagen
Criteria.’

In return, the PSE amendment calling on Turkey to sign and to ratify the
statutes of the International Criminal Court was adopted.

The European Parliament adopted the legislation on Turkey’s progress toward
accession by a final vote of 211 in favor, 84 against and 46 abstentions.

`The direct reference to the resolution of 1987, as well as resolutions
adopted in 2000, 2002 and 2004 is a clear victory. For many years, Turkey
has led a large-scale shameful campaign aimed at burying the Armenian
Genocide recognition issue by the EP. It is unfortunate, however, that the
use of the words `blockade’ and `genocide’ remain a taboo,’ explained Hilda
Tchoboian, chairperson of the European Armenian Federation. `It is
particularly troubling to hear EP deputies vote against a measure which
would allow their constituents to speak out on the Turkey accession issue.
We should not be adopting Turkey’s traditions of non-transparency in
government.’

`On the other hand, the European Armenian Federation is pleased to see that
the concept of the Union’s `absorption capacity’ of the Union is
appropriately questioned for the first time. The Federation shares the
Parliamentarians’ concern that Turkey’s membership would cause uncertainties
in the Union’s political, economic, social and cultural
circles, calling the very principle of its integration into question. It
stresses that if Europeans want to believe in Europe again, the European
representatives should work to send a clear signal to European leaders, that
the Union’s membership demands should be scrupulously examined not according
to the opportunities and pressures of the moment, but with respect to
fundamental European values,’ explained Tchoboian.

#####

National Post (Canada)
March 31, 2004 Wednesday All but Toronto Edition

When voters choose ethnicity over issues

by James Cowan

In the final installment of the Post’s series on ethnopolitics, James
Cowan visits Don Valley East, where ethnic alliances determined not
just the issues, but the backroom battles that decided the Liberal
nomination.

– – –

TORONTO – Visible minorities are the visible majority in Don Valley
East, a riding where last Sunday the crowd outside the Liberal
nomination meeting fiddled with prayer beads, nibbled on Persian
cookies and chewed Turkish delight. They spoke Farsi, Tamil, Armenian
and Greek. They rarely spoke English — unless they were chatting
with a different ethic contingent.

Four candidates were vying to replace David Collenette, the former
cabinet minister and Chretien loyalist. Many assumed John Kazanjian,
a Bay Street lawyer closely associated with Paul Martin, would easily
win the nomination.

But he faced still competition from three candidates: George
Kalkounis, a former riding president of Greek extraction; Ali
Ehsassi, a legal scholar who had the backing of the large Iranian
community; and Yasmin Ratansi, an accountant with a solid base
amongst South Asian voters.

Sixty per cent of the residents of Don Valley East are immigrants.
Fifty-five per cent speak a mother tongue other than English.
Twenty-one per cent still live in homes that function in a foreign
language.

These demographics dictated not only the issues discussed by the
candidates, but also the machinations taking place in the backrooms.
There were allegations that the South Asian community stacked the
membership list with illegitimate forms. There were cheat sheets to
help first-generation immigrants understand the complex balloting
process. And there was the suggestion the successful campaign won
because many voters didn’t understand how to mark their ballots
correctly.

It’s not that there weren’t issues that might have been of interest
— the promise of new training opportunities for immigrants, or
faster accreditation programs for professionals from overseas. But
campaign workers said the voters didn’t care about these things. What
mattered to them was what ethnic group an individual represented.

“I was very shocked and surprised by how people weren’t engaging on
the issues,” said one high ranking campaign official, “I never
thought you’d literally get pigeonholed into a particular community.
But that’s what nominations come down to.”

This tribal mentality resulted in some intriguing exchanges as the
throng waited to vote on Sunday.

“Support John Kazanjian,” said one campaign worker, attempting to
hand a button to a man in line.

“But I’m Persian,” responded the man, implying he would be backing
Mr. Ehsassi. “I’m Persian too,” said the Kazanjian supporter.

“And you’re supporting John? That is a crime,” said the man.

Ms. Ratansi insisted she had broad support, but nevertheless made
clear efforts to win the backing of the South Asian community.

“I am the only candidate in this contest who is of South Asian
heritage and understands your issues, because they are my issues
too,” she said in an interview with the Weekly Voice, a community
newspaper.

The Ratansi and Ehsassi campaigns both focussed on limited portions
of the riding population. According to Statistics Canada, 12% of the
riding population is South Asian, while only 4% are Iranian. And yet,
standing outside the middle school at some points, one could easily
believe one-half the local populous spoke Farsi and the other half
Tamil. With the emphasis on these communities, other groups went
untapped, including significant Chinese, black and WASP populations.
In fact, of the nearly 5,000 members eligible to vote, only 220 spoke
English as their first language.

“There are not as many Anglo-Saxons involved as one might expect,”
Mr. Kalkounis said.

“It’s perhaps a matter of the candidates choosing specific groups
based on the individual’s own groups. It’s an easier way to achieve
memberships.”

The masses wearing Ehsassi t-shirts and busloads of Ratansi backers
made it clear they had drawn successfully on their own communities.
Mr. Kazanjian boasted of a broader range of support, with pamphlets
featuring endorsements from local mosque president Assadulah
Farahmand and Abdulhaq Ingar, the president of Toronto Islamic
Society.

But behind the politicking, accusations were flying. The eligibility
of 700 Ratansi supporters was challenged by other camps (one source
indicated almost all the challenges came from the Kazajian team).
Most of the challenges, sources say, related to a voter’s signature
not matching the one appearing on their registration form. In the
past, these problems developed when one member of a large family
filled out forms for all of their relatives.

There were also suggestions Ratansi’s team blockaded the parking lot
at the nomination meeting, an allegation that prompted a shouting
match between Mr. Ehsassi’s campaign director and a Ratansi
supporter. In the end, Ms. Ratansi forced her small frame between the
Liberal members, anxious to stop the infighting.

There were also complaints campaigns were not following through on
agreements struck before the voting began. The selection on Sunday
took place by preferential ballot, with participants marking a first
and second choice on their form. If none of the candidates received
more than 50% of the vote, then the individual with the fewest number
of supporters was dropped from the list and the votes were
retabulated to distribute the loser’s votes to his supporters’ second
choices.

The Kazajian and Ehsassi camps formed an alliance, each agreeing to
select the other’s candidate as their second choice. The Kalkounis
and Ratanis teams had a similar agreement. However, halfway through
the vote, there were complaints that the Kazajian team were not
living up to their bargain. The rumour suggested that Armenian
supporters were told not to mark a second choice at all. The Ehsassi
camp only noticed the problem because they had an Armenian amongst
their Farsi speaking midst.

The allegations against the Kazajian campaign were unproven and all
of the campaigns had taken steps to ensure votes were cast properly.
Each group had printed slips of paper, instructing their supporters
how to fill in their ballots and providing a handy graphic. Thus, if
a voter did not speak English well enough to understand the
instructions on how to fill in the ballots, they only needed to copy
the slip of paper. While the other candidates disguised their voting
guides as pedagogical aids, the Kazajian page provided very clear
instructions.

“When voting, mark you ballot as follows,” the slip reads, before
telling the voter to choose Kazajian, followed by Ehsassi.

When the ballots were counted, redistributed, recounted,
redistributed and recounted again, Ms. Ratansi won a convincing
victory. The Liberal Party does not disclose the number of votes cast
for each candidate, but senior officials indicated Ms. Ratansi
defeated Mr. Kazanjian on the third ballot by a margin of 895 to 580
votes. “I guess you had the incorrect information,” She told the
National Post, anxious to contradict suggestions she had a limited
base of support.

However, those privy to the full results suggest Ms. Ratansi did have
narrow support, but won anyway. After the first ballot, Mr. Kalkounis
was eliminated and much of his vote transferred to Ms. Ratansi. On
the second count, Mrs. Kazanjian and Mr. Ehsassi were closely matched
but it was the Paul Martin lawyer who won out. Thus, Mr. Ehsassi
dropped from the contest. However, many of Mr. Ehsassi’s supporters
had not marked a second choice on their ballot, meaning his
supporters failed to carry to Mr. Kazanjian. Ms. Ratansi was handed
the win.

One can only speculate why Ehsassi supporters did not back Mr.
Kazanjian in the end. Others believe the Ehsassi camp quietly
withdrew their support once rumours of the Armenian scandal started
to circulate. Most, however, believe many immigrant voters simply had
a hard time understanding the preferential balloting process and so
many Ehsassi supporters failed to select a second choice candidate at
all.

Regardless of the reason, Ms. Ratansi will apparently have a hard
time convincing some Liberals that she is the candidate with appeal
beyond her South Asian roots.

“It’s a wasted nomination,” one prominent Kazanjian supporter told
the Post, “No matter who the Conservatives put in here, she can’t
win. All of her support is with the South Asians, she can’t reach out
to the broader community. Either of the guys — Ali or John — could
have done it. But she can’t win the seat. And all I know is I’m not
going to help her with the fight.”

GRAPHIC: Black & White Photo: Zoran Bozicevic, National Post; Voters
wait inside Milne Valley School to vote for a Liberal candidate in
Toronto’s Don Valley East riding.

Armenian president says civil service best way to fight gangs

Public Television of Armenia, Yerevan
23 Mar 04

[Presenter] The law on the civil service is the best tool to fight
gangs, President Robert Kocharyan said today during a working meeting
which discussed the civil service system. According to the president’s
assessment, a civil service staff has already been formed in the
country and is performing a serious service. But the president’s
control service carried out studies of the civil service sphere for
two months and disclosed instances of abuse and breach of law.

Robert Kocharyan said that during the competitions for senior posts in
the civil service, the commissions were objective, but the
participants in the competition submitted false documents.

[Correspondent over video of session] The session chaired by the
president today discussed issues regarding the civil service system.

[Robert Kocharyan, captioned] Great work has been done in this
sphere. We have formed a serious system which is carrying out public
service and which is accepted today in all the world. We did not have
this system in our country for many years.

[Correspondent] The president’s control service studied more than 500
competitions for posts in 13 state bodies. Robert Kocharyan said that
these checks disclosed instances of abuse and breach of law.

[Robert Kocharyan] I think that this law is the best tool to fight
gangs and we shall not allow anybody to break the law. These instances
are sufficient and we have to discuss them seriously and not to allow
such instances to be repeated. We have already included changes to the
law. We have to discuss and complete this system, so that it can be
formed correctly as we planned.

[Correspondent] The chairman of the Council of the State Service,
Manvel Badalyan, presented the study results and announced that 1,022
competitions for posts had already been organized and 2,000 civil
service employees have already been certified, of whom 125 were
dismissed.

The ministers and heads of department made their observations and
suggestions for improvement of the system.

Lilit Setrakyan, “Aylur”.

Armenian National Committee of Wisconsin
4100 N. Newman Road
Racine, WI 53406

PRESS RELEASE
March 23, 2004
For Immediate Release

Contact: A. Zohrab Khaligian
[email protected]

COMMEMORATION OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AT WISCONSIN STATE CAPITOL

MADISON, WI–On Tuesday, April 20, 2004, the Armenian National Committee
(ANC) of Wisconsin, State Representatives Mark Honadel, Bonnie Ladwig, and
Jeff Stone, and State Senators Mary Lazich, Jeff Plale, and Cathy Stepp are
hosting a reception and program to commemorate the 89th Anniversary of the
Armenian Genocide. This event will be held from 10:30 am to 12 noon in the
GAR Hearing Room, 417 North, at the Wisconsin State Capitol. The program
will feature remarks from Robert O. Krikorian, PhD, Representative Jeff
Stone, Senator Mary Lazich, and Mayor John Antaramian from the City of
Kenosha.

The purpose of this event is to thank the Wisconsin State Assembly and State
Senate for adopting Armenian Genocide Resolutions which designate April 24
of each year as “Wisconsin Day of Remembrance for the Armenian Genocide of
1915 to 1923″ and to continue to educate and promote awareness of Armenia
and Armenian issues, particularly the Armenian Genocide.

This reception and program is one of five events being held in commemoration
of this tragic event in history and to continue efforts to obtain justice
for this crime against humanity. The other events include:

Three lectures by Robert O. Krikorian, PhD. Dr. Krikorian is a historian in
the Office of the Historian at the US Department of State and a Professorial
Lecturer at George Washington University.

The first lecture, entitled ” Education and Responsibility”, will take place
Sunday, April 18, at St. Hagop Armenian Church, 4100 N. Newman Road, Racine.
The lecture will begin at 12:00 pm and is hosted by the Racine “Marzbed”
Committee of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation.

The second and third lectures, entitled “In the Shadow of War: The Ottoman
Empire and the Extermination of the Armenians”, will take place Monday,
April 19, at the University of Wisconsin, Parkside Library in Kenosha and at
the University of Wisconsin, Madison Union South Building, respectively.
The UW-Parkside lecture will begin at 12:00 pm and is hosted by the Friends
of the UW-Parkside Library as part of their Spring Speaker Forum. The
UW-Madison lecture will begin at 7:00 pm and is hosted by the UW-Madison
Armenian Students Organization and UW-Madison History Department.

A joint memorial service on Saturday, April 24, 6:30 pm will take place at
Holy Resurrection Armenian Church, 909 Michigan Avenue, South Milwaukee.
The memorial service will include the participation of all four Armenian
churches in Wisconsin: St. Hagop and St. Mesrob in Racine, St. John the
Baptist in Greenfield, and Holy Resurrection.

All events are free and open to the public. For more information on any of
these events or about the Armenian National Committee of Wisconsin, please
contact Zohrab Khaligian at [email protected].

The Armenian National Committee is the largest Armenian American grassroots
political organization in Wisconsin and nationwide. The ANC actively
advances a broad range of issues of concern to the Armenian American
community.

####

United Human Rights Council
March 23, 2004 6:15:02 AM

Armenian Genocide- 1915-1918 – 1,500,000 Deaths

The first genocide of the 20th Century occurred when two million Armenians
living in Turkey were eliminated from their historic homeland through forced
deportations and massacres.

For three thousand years, a thriving Armenian community had existed inside
the vast region of the Middle East bordered by the Black, Mediterranean and
Caspian Seas. The area, known as Asia Minor, stands at the crossroads of
three continents; Europe, Asia and Africa. Great powers rose and fell over
the many centuries and the Armenian homeland was at various times ruled by
Persians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs and Mongols.

Despite the repeated invasions and occupations, Armenian pride and cultural
identity never wavered. The snow-capped peak of Mount Ararat became its
focal point and by 600 BC Armenia as a nation sprang into being. Following
the advent of Christianity, Armenia became the very first nation to accept
it as the state religion. A golden era of peace and prosperity followed
which saw the invention of a distinct alphabet, a flourishing of literature,
art, commerce, and a unique style of architecture. By the 10th century,
Armenians had established a new capital at Ani, affectionately called the
‘city of a thousand and one churches.’

In the eleventh century, the first Turkish invasion of the Armenian homeland
occurred. Thus began several hundred years of rule by Muslim Turks. By the
sixteenth century, Armenia had been absorbed into the vast and mighty
Ottoman Empire. At its peak, this Turkish empire included much of Southeast
Europe, North Africa, and almost all of the Middle East.

But by the 1800s the once powerful Ottoman Empire was in serious decline.
For centuries, it had spurned technological and economic progress, while the
nations of Europe had embraced innovation and became industrial giants.
Turkish armies had once been virtually invincible. Now, they lost battle
after battle to modern European armies.

As the empire gradually disintegrated, formerly subject peoples including
the Greeks, Serbs and Romanians achieved their long-awaited independence.
Only the Armenians and the Arabs of the Middle East remained stuck in the
backward and nearly bankrupt empire, now under the autocratic rule of Sultan
Abdul Hamid.

By the 1890s, young Armenians began to press for political reforms, calling
for a constitutional government, the right to vote and an end to
discriminatory practices such as special taxes levied solely against them
because they were Christians. The despotic Sultan responded to their pleas
with brutal persecutions. Between 1894 and 1896 over 100,000 inhabitants of
Armenian villages were massacred during widespread pogroms conducted by the
Sultan’s special regiments.

But the Sultan’s days were numbered. In July 1908, reform-minded Turkish
nationalists known as “Young Turks” forced the Sultan to allow a
constitutional government and guarantee basic rights. The Young Turks were
ambitious junior officers in the Turkish Army who hoped to halt their
country’s steady decline.

Armenians in Turkey were delighted with this sudden turn of events and its
prospects for a brighter future. Both Turks and Armenians held jubilant
public rallies attended with banners held high calling for freedom, equality
and justice.

However, their hopes were dashed when three of the Young Turks seized full
control of the government via a coup in 1913. This triumvirate of Young
Turks, consisting of Mehmed Talaat, Ismail Enver and Ahmed Djemal, came to
wield dictatorial powers and concocted their own ambitious plans for the
future of Turkey. They wanted to unite all of the Turkic peoples in the
entire region while expanding the borders of Turkey eastward across the
Caucasus all the way into Central Asia. This would create a new Turkish
empire, a “great and eternal land” called Turan with one language and one
religion.

But there was a big problem. The traditional historic homeland of Armenia
lay right in the path of their plans to expand eastward. And on that land
was a large population of Christian Armenians totaling some two million
persons, making up about 10 percent of Turkey’s overall population.

Along with the Young Turk’s newfound “Turanism” there was a dramatic rise in
Islamic fundamentalist agitation throughout Turkey. Christian Armenians were
once again branded as infidels (non-believers in Islam). Young Islamic
extremists, sometimes leading to violence, staged anti-Armenian
demonstrations. During one such outbreak in 1909, two hundred villages were
plundered and over 30,000 persons massacred in the Cilicia district on the
Mediterranean coast. Throughout Turkey, sporadic local attacks against
Armenians continued unchecked over the next several years.

There were also big cultural differences between Armenians and Turks. The
Armenians had always been one of the best-educated communities within the
old Turkish Empire. Armenians were the professionals in society, the
businessmen, lawyers, doctors and skilled craftsmen. And they were more open
to new scientific, political and social ideas from the West (Europe and
America). Children of wealthy Armenians went to Paris, Geneva or even to
America to complete their education.

By contrast, the majority of Turks were illiterate peasant farmers and small
shopkeepers. Leaders of the Ottoman Empire had traditionally placed little
value on education and not a single institute of higher learning could be
found within their old empire. The various autocratic and despotic rulers
throughout the empire’s history had valued loyalty and blind obedience above
all. Their uneducated subjects had never heard of democracy or liberalism
and thus had no inclination toward political reform. But this was not the
case with the better-educated Armenians who sought political and social
reforms that would improve life for themselves and Turkey’s other
minorities.

The Young Turks decided to glorify the virtues of simple Turkish peasantry
at the expense of the Armenians in order to capture peasant loyalty. They
exploited the religious, cultural, economic and political differences
between Turks and Armenians so that the average Turk came to regard
Armenians as strangers among them.

When World War I broke out in 1914, leaders of the Young Turk regime sided
with the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary). The outbreak of war
would provide the perfect opportunity to solve the “Armenian question” once
and for all. The world’s attention became fixed upon the battlegrounds of
France and Belgium where the young men of Europe were soon falling dead by
the hundreds of thousands. The Eastern Front eventually included the border
between Turkey and Russia. With war at hand, unusual measures involving the
civilian population would not seem too out of the ordinary.

As a prelude to the coming action, Turks disarmed the entire Armenian
population under the pretext that the people were naturally sympathetic
toward Christian Russia. Every last rifle and pistol was forcibly seized,
with severe penalties for anyone who failed to turn in a weapon. Quite a few
Armenian men actually purchased a weapon from local Turks or Kurds (nomadic
Muslim tribesmen) at very high prices so they would have something to turn
in.

At this time, about forty thousand Armenian men were serving in the Turkish
Army. In the fall and winter of 1914, all of their weapons were confiscated
and they were put into slave labor battalions building roads or were used as
human pack animals. Under the brutal work conditions they suffered a very
high death rate. Those who survived would soon be shot outright. For the
time had come to move against the Armenians.

The decision to annihilate the entire population came directly from the
ruling triumvirate of ultra-nationalist Young Turks. The actual
extermination orders were transmitted in coded telegrams to all provincial
governors throughout Turkey. Armed roundups began on the evening of April
24, 1915, as 300 Armenian political leaders, educators, writers, clergy and
dignitaries in Constantinople (present day Istanbul) were taken from their
homes, briefly jailed and tortured, then hanged or shot.

Next, there were mass arrests of Armenian men throughout the country by
Turkish soldiers, police agents and bands of Turkish volunteers. The men
were tied together with ropes in small groups then taken to the outskirts of
their town and shot dead or bayoneted by death squads. Local Turks and Kurds
armed with knives and sticks often joined in on the killing.

Then it was the turn of Armenian women, children, and the elderly. On very
short notice, they were ordered to pack a few belongings and be ready to
leave home, under the pretext that they were being relocated to a
non-military zone for their own safety. They were actually being taken on
death marches heading south toward the Syrian Desert.

Muslim Turks who assumed instant ownership of everything quickly occupied
most of the homes and villages left behind by the rousted Armenians. In many
cases, local Turks who took them from their families spared young Armenian
children from deportation. The children were coerced into denouncing
Christianity and becoming Muslims, and were then given new Turkish names.
For Armenian boys the forced conversion meant they each had to endure
painful circumcision as required by Islamic custom.

Turkish gendarmes escorted individual caravans consisting of thousands of
deported Armenians. These guards allowed roving government units of hardened
criminals known as the “Special Organization” to attack the defenseless
people, killing anyone they pleased. They also encouraged Kurdish bandits to
raid the caravans and steal anything they wanted. In addition, an
extraordinary amount of sexual abuse and rape of girls and young women
occurred at the hands of the Special Organization and Kurdish bandits. Most
of the attractive young females were kidnapped for a life of involuntary
servitude.

The death marches, involving over a million Armenians, covered hundreds of
miles and lasted months. Indirect routes through mountains and wilderness
areas were deliberately chosen in order to prolong the ordeal and to keep
the caravans away from Turkish villages.

Food supplies being carried by the people quickly ran out and they were
usually denied further food or water. Anyone stopping to rest or lagging
behind the caravan was mercilessly beaten until they rejoined the march. If
they couldn’t continue they were shot. A common practice was to force all of
the people in the caravan to remove every stitch of clothing and have them
resume the march in the nude under the scorching sun until they dropped dead
by the roadside from exhaustion and dehydration.

An estimated 75 percent of the Armenians on these marches perished,
especially children and the elderly. Those who survived the ordeal were
herded into the desert without a drop of water. Being thrown off cliffs,
burned alive, or drowned in rivers, killed others.

The Turkish countryside became littered with decomposing corpses. At one
point, Mehmed Talaat responded to the problem by sending a coded message to
all provincial leaders: “I have been advised that in certain areas unburied
corpses are still to be seen. I ask you to issue the strictest instructions
so that the corpses and their debris in your vilayet are buried.”

But his instructions were generally ignored. Those involved in the mass
murder showed little interest in stopping to dig graves. The roadside
corpses and emaciated deportees were a shocking sight to foreigners working
in Turkey. Eyewitnesses included German government liaisons, American
missionaries, and U.S. diplomats stationed in the country.

The Christian missionaries were often threatened with death they and were
unable to help the people. Diplomats from the still neutral United States
communicated their blunt assessments of the ongoing government actions. U.S.
ambassador to Turkey, Henry Morgenthau, reported to Washington: “When the
Turkish authorities gave the orders for these deportations, they were merely
giving the death warrant to a whole race…”

The Allied Powers (Great Britain, France, Russia) responded to news of the
massacres by issuing a warning to Turkey: “…the Allied governments
announce publicly…that they will hold all the members of the Ottoman
Government, as well as such of their agents as are implicated, personally
responsible for such matters.”

The warning had no effect. Newspapers in the West including the New York
Times published reports of the continuing deportations with the headlines:
Armenians Are Sent to Perish in the Desert – Turks Accused of Plan to
Exterminate Whole Population (August 18, 1915) – Million Armenians Killed or
in Exile – American Committee on Relief Says Victims of Turks Are Steadily
Increasing – Policy of Extermination (December 15, 1915).

Temporary relief for some Armenians came as Russian troops attacked along
the Eastern Front and made their way into central Turkey. But the troops
withdrew in 1917 upon the Russian Revolution. Armenian survivors withdrew
along with them and settled in among fellow Armenians already living in
provinces of the former Russian Empire. There were in total about 500,000
Armenians gathered in this region.

In May 1918, Turkish armies attacked the area to achieve the goal of
expanding Turkey eastward into the Caucasus and also to resume the
annihilation of the Armenians. As many as 100,000 Armenians may have fallen
victim to the advancing Turkish troops.

However, the Armenians managed to acquire weapons and they fought back,
finally repelling the Turkish invasion at the battle of Sardarabad, thus
saving the remaining population from total extermination with no help from
the outside world. Following that victory, Armenian leaders declared the
establishment of the independent Republic of Armenia.

World War I ended in November 1918 with a defeat for Germany and the Central
Powers including Turkey. Shortly before the war had ended, the Young Turk
triumvirate; Talaat, Enver and Djemal, abruptly resigned their government
posts and fled to Germany where they had been offered asylum.

In the months that followed, repeated requests by Turkey’s new moderate
government and the Allies were made asking Germany to send the Young Turks
back home to stand trial. However all such requests were turned down. As a
result, Armenian activists took matters into their own hands, located the
Young Turks and assassinated them along with two other instigators of the
mass murder.

Meanwhile, representatives from the fledgling Republic of Armenia attended
the Paris Peace Conference in the hope that the victorious Allies would give
them back their historic lands seized by Turkey. The European Allies
responded to their request by asked the United States to assume guardianship
of the new Republic. However, President Woodrow Wilson’s attempt to make
Armenia an official U.S. protectorate was rejected by the U.S. Congress in
May 1920.

But Wilson did not give up on Armenia. As a result of his efforts, the
Treaty of Sevres was signed on August 10, 1920 by the Allied Powers, the
Republic of Armenia, and the new moderate leaders of Turkey. The treaty
recognized an independent Armenian state in an area comprising much of the
former historic homeland.

However, Turkish nationalism once again reared its head. The moderate
Turkish leaders who signed the treaty were ousted in favor of a new
nationalist leader, Mustafa Kemal, who simply refused to accept the treaty
and even re-occupied the very lands in question then expelled any surviving
Armenians, including thousands of orphans.

No Allied power came to the aid of the Armenian Republic and it collapsed.
Only a tiny portion of the easternmost area of historic Armenia survived by
being becoming part of the Soviet Union.

After the successful obliteration of the people of historic Armenia, the
Turks demolished any remnants of Armenian cultural heritage including
priceless masterpieces of ancient architecture, old libraries and archives.
The Turks even leveled entire cities such as the once thriving Kharpert, Van
and the ancient capital at Ani, to remove all traces of the three thousand
year old civilization.

The young German politician Adolf Hitler duly noted the half-hearted
reaction of the world’s great powers to the plight of the Armenians. After
achieving total power in Germany, Hitler decided to conquer Poland in 1939
and told his generals: “Thus for the time being I have sent to the East only
my ‘Death’s Head Units’ with the orders to kill without pity or mercy all
men, women, and children of Polish race or language. Only in such a way will
we win the vital space that we need. Who still talks nowadays about the
Armenians?”