WHAT IS THE POSSIBLE IMPACT OF TURKEY-RUSSIA RELATIONS ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT?
Today
May 14 2010
Azerbaijan
Interview with Azerbaijani political expert Eldar Namazov.
During talks in Ankara, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev noted
progress in the Karabakh talks saying that "there are encouraging
steps in the conflict resolution." In your opinion, what was the
Russian President referring to by "progress?"
Of course, for us there is sole criterion of progress in the talks,
that is, concrete steps to liberate the occupied territories and to
return refugee to their lands. Azerbaijan sees no progress other
than this. But international mediators have their own opinion and
their criteria.
Apparently, they see some factors as "encouraging": talks based on the
Madrid principles have intensely moved lately, the Minsk Group has
developed "updated version" of the framework document on principles
of the conflict settlement at the presidential level on the basis of
intensive negotiations, Azerbaijan had already declared it accepts
this document and though Armenia delays response, it has not rejected
the document either.
An attempt to normalize Turkish-Armenian relations is also an
encouraging point for the international observers. The fact that this
process has been suspended, but the parties are still taking steps to
normalize relations and have not withdrawn from the Zurich protocols
allows international brokers to make encouraging statements.
This is only opinion of mediators and Azerbaijan has already developed
a strong immunity to the optimistic statements that we have heard
hundreds of times over the last 15 years. We appreciate only the
result, but not Olympic-type process "it is not important to win,
but participate."
How do you assess activities of the OSCE Minsk Group? Turkish Prime
Minister Erdogan announced that Turkey could participate in the
Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations if the Minsk Group will continue to
make a success towards the conflict resolution. How do you assess
Turkey’s chances to become one of the co-chairs at this stage of
the negotiations?
How can we assess the activities of the co-chairs since they have
not achieved even some initial agreements on common principles for a
settlement over the 15-year talks? It took the co-chairs 10 years to
form a coordinated position so that acute geopolitical competition
between them will not turn to the United States, Europe and Russia
into a swan, a pike and cancer from a famous fable and they would
not drag the negotiation process in different directions.
The joint statement made by the presidents of the Minsk Group co-chairs
countries is, apparently, a kind of demonstration that they have a
consolidated position on the Karabakh conflict settlement. But this
is still not enough to persuade Armenia to compromise settlement
plan. With regard to Turkey’s enhanced role, it is very positive
factor which has a positive impact on the overall atmosphere in the
South Caucasus region. But we need to be realistic.
It is unlikely that Turkey will be able to combine the two roles
simultaneously – the party to the Armenian-Turkish normalization
and international mediator in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict
settlement. This does not mean that Turkey’s possibility is limited
or its potential will not be required for the Karabakh conflict
settlement.
The main point is the formal side of things. But in practice, Turkey,
even without being officially OSCE Minsk Group co-chair, can make very
significant contribution to the settlement of the Karabakh conflict
comparable to the role of official co-chairs. Turkish President hinted
precisely to this when he recently talked about the transition to the
"quiet diplomacy". I am sure that this applied both Turkish-Armenian
normalization and Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement.
In your opinion, how the Turkish-Russian relations can be viewed from
the perspective of solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?
Turkish-Russian rapprochement and strategic partnership relations
between the two countries is one of the most important geopolitical
processes in our region from historical viewpoint after the collapse
of the Soviet Union. If this process will develop further, it can
change a lot in our region for the better. For hundreds of years,
Russia has considered the Ottoman Empire and then modern Turkey one
of the major geopolitical opponents in this region and visa versa.
Under this geopolitical rivalry, leverages like the Kurdish and
Armenian separatism and political and military support to Armenia as a
"springboard" to throw into Asia Minor were used against the enemy.
Certainly, these circumstances had an important impact on Russia’s
position on the Karabakh conflict and especially in the early stages
deteriorated the Russian-Azerbaijani relations. But gradually
things fell into place. First, we witnessed normalization of the
Russian-Azerbaijani relations and now the Russian-Turkish relations
have reached the level of strategic partnership.
It certainly will have an impact on many regional issues. Russia
was one of the important co-sponsors of attempts to normalize
Armenian-Turkish relations not by chance. But positively assessing the
whole process, we must bear in mind that these important geopolitical
changes are not implemented in a short time and we must exercise
some patience and consistency and to see tangible results of this
positive project.
May 2 marked 16th anniversary since Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a
ceasefire agreement to end hostilities in the Karabakh conflict zone.
What significant changes have taken place in Nagorno-Karabakh
settlement over the years?
The signing of the ceasefire agreement in May 1994 was result of
achieving certain political and military parity between the parties
to the conflict. In early April 1994, Armenia began a major military
operation to capture Terter, Barda and strike a blow in the direction
of Yelakh in a bid to cut off the western regions of the rest of the
country and go directly to Ganja, threatening to capture the second
largest city in the country.
The Armenian side believed that success of this operation guaranteed
surrender of Azerbaijan and separation of Karabakh from Azerbaijan.
For the month of bloody fighting, the Armenian side lost dozens of
armored vehicles, over a thousand living force and was able to capture
only a few villages. It was the biggest defeat of the Armenian army
and it had to give up offensive operations.
Therefore, in May 1994, Armenia signed a ceasefire agreement
without any preconditions which were previously put forward. As
for the changes that have occurred since then, there is one rule –
the ceasefire is beneficial for the side that effectively uses the
allotted time modernizing its forces and implementing effective
reform in the army. Given that Azerbaijan has a much greater human,
financial and industrial resources than Armenia, I think that once in
1994 the myth of invincibility of the Armenian army was shattered and
certain military and political parity was reached, then in the next
15 years the Azerbaijani side, had greater opportunities to change
the balance of power in region in its favour.