‘The Wound Is Very Deep’: Azerbaijanis And Armenians In Russia Long For Peace

NPR – National Public Radio
Nov 5 2020


Sanubar Aliyeva has lived in Russia for more than half her life, but she says she is still a proud Azerbaijani. On a recent afternoon, the 61-year-old health care worker came to the Azerbaijani Embassy in Moscow to pay her respects to the victims of the fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh, more than 1,000 miles away.

Aliyeva says her younger brother lost a leg in the first Nagorno-Karabakh war almost 30 years ago. When fierce fighting between Armenians and Azerbaijanis flared up again in September, she says, her brother volunteered for the army.

"Of course they didn't take him, he's over 50," Aliyeva says. "They told him the Azerbaijani army is so strong now that they don't need dads like him."

The reignited war in Nagorno-Karabakh has touched the lives of hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis and Armenians who call Russia home. The two ethnic communities are among Russia's biggest and most organized, though the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has driven them into hostile camps.

The Soviet Union fell apart after many of its ethnic groups began to break free in the late 1980s. When Armenia and Azerbaijan gained independence in 1991, the ethnic Armenians living in the Nagorno-Karabakh region fought and won a bloody war of secession from Azerbaijan. Now, with the support of Turkey, Azerbaijanis are determined to take back the territory they lost to Armenians.

Article continues after sponsor message

The renewed fighting has killed hundreds, if not thousands, of people on both sides.

Red carnations, photographs and stuffed animals have piled up outside the Azerbaijani Embassy in Moscow.

Aliyeva also brought flowers. She says she remembers working together with Armenians when she was a young woman in Soviet Azerbaijan.

"I somehow doubt that we'll be able to live together in the same way we used to during Soviet times," she says.

Elshad Agverdiyev, a 32-year-old Muscovite of Azerbaijani descent, was born when the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was just coming to a head. He says he has given up hope on the diplomatic efforts of Russia and the United States, which together with France have co-chaired a peace process since the 1990s.

"We've waited 10 years, 20 years, now it's almost 30 years. Unfortunately the international community has done nothing. We were fed empty promises," Agverdiyev says. "What is left for Azerbaijan to do? We want to resolve this issue on our own."

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has led to tensions between Russia's Azerbaijani and Armenian communities. In July, when Azerbaijan and Armenia skirmished in a prelude to the current fighting, members of the two diasporas clashed in Moscow and St. Petersburg, with reports of dozens of arrests. Following the new outbreak of violence in Nagorno-Karabakh, the city of Moscow had leaders of both ethnic communities sign a statement addressed to their constituents appealing for calm.

"From the first day, we called on people not to give in to provocations and emotions and to follow the law," says Shamil Tagiyev, a leader of the Azerbaijani community in Moscow. His contacts to local Armenians are mediated through the mayor's office, he says.

The chasm between Armenians and Azerbaijanis widens with every day that fighting continues in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.

For Armenians in Moscow, the Armenian Apostolic cathedral has become the center of gravity for the community. The cavernous church, consecrated in 2013, is built out of tuff stone in the traditional Armenian style.

Sasun Davtyan, a migrant worker from Armenia, came to pray for Artsakh, as Armenians call Nagorno-Karabakh.

The Armenian Apostolic cathedral in Moscow has become the center of gravity for the Armenian community in Russia. The church, consecrated in 2013, is built out of tuff stone in the traditional Armenian style.

Lucian Kim/NPR

"My brothers are there now, they're volunteers. They went to defend their homeland," Davtyan, 28, says. "When the time comes, I'll be ready to join them."

He says he doesn't harbor any hope for help from Russia, Armenia's historical protector, or the United States, which also has a significant Armenian community.

"The hope is on us and us alone," Davtyan says.

The Armenian Apostolic Church, one of the oldest in Christianity, has held together Armenians for almost 2,000 years.

"The conflict has brought the community closer together, because we all understand that Armenia and Artsakh are on the verge of extinction," says Gevorg Vardanyan, a priest at the Moscow cathedral. He says Armenians' collective memory of the Ottoman Empire's 1915 mass killing of 1.5 million Armenians looms large. Most historians and a growing number of countries consider it genocide; Turkey rejects the term.

In today's conflict, Vardanyan says, religion plays a big role, with Christian Armenians pitted against predominantly Muslim Azerbaijanis. But he suggests that faith can also show the way to reconciliation.

"Both Azerbaijanis and Armenians understand that young men are dying, and no one wants there to be mourning in their home," Vardanyan says. "Religion is that ray of light around which we can build our relationship, because a religious person never wants to kill and never should kill. There is no need for war; war is there where there is no God."

For some members of his congregation, Vardanyan's words may sound aspirational at best.

Gevorg Vardanyan is a priest at the Armenian Apostolic cathedral in Moscow. "A religious person never wants to kill and never should kill," he says. "There is no need for war; war is there where there is no God."

Lucian Kim/NPR

"The longer the war goes on, the more difficult the situation gets," says Akop Akavyan, who came to the cathedral for an afternoon service with his wife and teenage son. "The wound is very deep and just keeps getting bigger."

Akavyan says he simply wants the fighting to end and hasn't started thinking about how Armenians and Azerbaijanis may one day live in peace.

His son Andrei, 17, who was born and raised in multiethnic Moscow, takes another view.

It will take time, he says, but one day Armenians and Azerbaijanis will think differently, the same way that Germans and Russians — bitter enemies in World War II — can now be friends.


CivilNet: Body of 84-year-old Who Died in Captivity in Azerbaijan Returned to Armenia

CIVILNET.AM

1 November, 2020 21:38

The body of 84-year-old Armenian captive Misha Melkumyan, who died in Azerbaijan, has been handed to Armenia, Zara Amatuni, representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) told CIVILNET.

Melkumyan had died Thursday evening. His body was transferred through Georgia with the mediation of the ICRC.

While in captivity, Melkumyan was visited by an ICRC doctor, who, together with local experts, decided that his health wasn’t good enough for him to be transferred to Armenia on October 29 when 29 Armenian captives were handed over.

“Taking into account all the evidence and documents on the inhumane treatment and cruelty of the Azerbaijani armed forces of the Armenian captives, the reasonable assumption of what our compatriot could have died becomes obvious,” said Armen Tatoyan, Armenia’s Human Rights Defender.

TURKISH press: Erdoğan slams US over sanctions threats

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan speaks during a local congress of his ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in eastern Turkey's Malatya. Oct. 25, 2020. (AA Photo)

"Some Americans call my brother Ilham (Aliyev) and tell him that if Turkey stands by Azerbaijan, they will impose sanctions on Turkey," President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said on Sunday. The comments were in regard to Turkey's support of Azerbaijan amid clashes over Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenian separatists and the acquisition of Russian S-400 missile defense systems, both reasons the president said the U.S. is using as a pretext to impose sanctions on Turkey.

"The U.S. does not know who they are dealing with. Impose the sanctions already, whatever they may be," he said during a local congress of his ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in eastern Turkey's Malatya province.

"The U.S. wants us to send the Russian S-400 missile systems back. We are not a tribal society; we are the (sovereign) nation of Turkey," Erdoğan further stated.

Ties between NATO allies Turkey and the United States were badly strained last year over Ankara’s acquisition of the advanced S-400 Russian air defense system, prompting Washington to remove Turkey from its F-35 Lightning II jet program.

The U.S. argued that the system could be used by Russia to covertly obtain classified details on the Lockheed Martin F-35 jets and is incompatible with NATO systems. Turkey, however, insists that the S-400 would not be integrated into NATO systems and would not pose a threat to the alliance.

Turkey and Azerbaijan sustain a strong diplomatic relationship, based on the "one nation, two states" principle.

Many Turkish officials including Erdoğan have vowed full solidarity with Azerbaijan as Yerevan continues its illegal occupation of Azerbaijani lands.

Vice President Fuat Oktay said last week that Turkey would not hesitate to send troops and provide military support for Azerbaijan if Baku were to request it.

The disputed Nagorno-Karabakh is internationally recognized as Azerbaijani territory.

Nagorno-Karabakh lies within Azerbaijan but has been under the control of Armenian separatists, backed by Armenia, since a war there ended in 1994. The current fighting that started on Sept. 27 marks the biggest escalation in the conflict since then.

Two Russia-brokered cease-fires were violated immediately after coming into effect, and the warring parties have continued to trade blows using heavy artillery, rockets and drones.

According to Armenian separatists, 834 of their troops have been killed, while Azerbaijan has reported 63 civilian deaths and 292 injuries.

Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev has said in order to end hostilities, Armenian forces must withdraw from the illegally occupied Nagorno-Karabakh.

Armenia and Azerbaijan accuse each other of violating latest ceasefire

Vatican News
Oct 26 2020
Armenia and Azerbaijan accuse each other of violating the latest ceasefire over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, where almost 1000 people have been killed. A historic church is among the many damaged targets.

By Stefan J. Bos  

New clashes were reported between Azerbaijan and Armenia just hours after the US President had proudly announced on social networking site Twitter that his team managed to negotiate a ceasefire between the warring Caucasus nations.  

The US-brokered truce was a third attempt to establish a lasting ceasefire in the flare-up of a decades-old conflict over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. 

Two previous Russia-brokered agreements, including one last weekend, collapsed immediately after taking force, with both sides blaming each other for violations.

The new ceasefire was also challenged quickly by accusations from both sides. Azerbaijani Defense Ministry alleged that Armenian forces fired at Azerbaijani settlements and the positions of the Azerbaijani army. 

It said attacks happened "along the entire front, as well as on the Armenia-Azerbaijan state border" and involved various small arms, mortars, and howitzers.

Armenian military officials rejected the accusations and accused Azerbaijani forces of shelling the northeastern area of Nagorno-Karabakh and other regions. 

Local authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh also charged that Azerbaijan targeted the town of Martuni with military aviation. Azerbaijan's Defense Ministry denied it violated the ceasefire agreement. 

Amongst the population in Nagorno-Karabakh, there are Christian and Catholic communities including one that worships in the 19th-century Armenian Apostolic cathedral in the town of Shusha. 

The Holy Saviour Cathedral, also known as Ghazanchetsotswas heavily damaged in recent shelling, allegedly by Azerbaijan's forces. But priests there can still be seen ringing the bells and praying for the victims and for peace inside the damaged church. 

"It doesn't matter if these prayers come from basements, houses, or churches – all prayers reach God," said Armenian priest Andreas Tavadyan. "To be honest, there are far more dangerous places in Artsakh [the Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh]. There is a front line which is really dangerous. But this is our front line; we have to fight the evil, we pray. It's our [spiritual] battlefield." 

He added: "I believe this danger is not that important for us. No matter if we see that the cathedral is damaged, we know God is in all of our prayers. God will save us." 

Nagorno-Karabakh lies within Azerbaijan, a mainly Muslim nation, but has been under the control of ethnic Armenian forces backed by Armenia, which is primarily Christian, since a war there ended in 1994. 

The latest fighting that began on September 27 has involved heavy artillery, rockets, and drones. The violence has officially killed more than 1,000 people in the largest escalation of hostilities over the separatist region in more than a quarter-century.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said last week that Moscow's information suggests the death toll from the fighting was nearing 5,000, significantly higher than what both sides report.


How Turkey’s Erdogan is getting away with his foreign policy adventurism

The Print, India
Oct 22 2020

For Erdogan, the absence of a red flag is a green flag. If you’re looking for a unifying theory, it is this: Turkey’s president does what he does because he gets away with it.

BOBBY GHOSH

In 2010, Turkey’s “Zero Problems” foreign-policy doctrine was the marvel of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the country was using diplomacy and commerce to develop cordial — or at least civil — relations, not only in its neighborhood and near abroad, but across the world. Erdogan himself was the toast of the high table of international affairs, where leaders of the great powers sought his counsel and company.

Ten years later, Turkey’s foreign-policy landscape might more accurately be described as “Only Problems.” Ankara is deploying hard power and harsh rhetoric, rather than diplomacy, to maintain its influence.

It is in various degrees of confrontation with most countries that adjoin either its land borders or the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean: Greece, Syria, Israel, Cyprus, Iraq, Armenia and Egypt. Farther afield, it is in conflict with France, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

And at a time when the world powers can’t seem to agree on anything, they seem to reached near unanimity that Erdogan is a troublemaker.

Turkey’s pugnacious president has recently been attracting sharp jabs even from those who used to pull their punches. The U.S. State Department has said it “deplores” Turkey’s decision to restart a controversial geological survey of the Eastern Mediterranean, and called on Ankara to “end this calculated provocation.”

This language is some of the strongest that the Trump administration has directed against Erdogan, who has the ear and affection of his American counterpart.



Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin, described by Erdogan as a “good friend,” is taking a dim view of his role as cheerleader of the Caucasian conflict, where Turkey is enthusiastically backing Azerbaijan against Armenia. The Kremlin has accused Turkey of adding “fuel to the flames” of the long-simmering dispute over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. A ceasefire called by Moscow has not ended the fighting.

Other sources of criticism are more predictable. French President Emmanuel Macron, who has fulminated against Erdogan for Turkey’s intervention in the Libyan civil war (pot, meet kettle), has added its conduct in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Caucasus to his list of grievances. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who has fended off wider European calls to punish Turkey, finds herself in an awkward position with the resumption of exploration in the troubled waters. It “most certainly would be anything but conducive to the continued development of EU-Turkish relations,” her spokesperson said.

As if all this wasn’t enough, condemnation has come from unexpected quarters — such as India, which was not pleased by Erdogan’s comments about Kashmir to the United Nations General Assembly. “Turkey should learn to respect the sovereignty of other nations and reflect on its own policies more deeply,” sniffed New Delhi’s Permanent Representative to the UN.

The “how” of Turkey’s foreign-policy freefall is well documented: Most of Ankara’s conflicts are of Erdogan’s choosing. He might have easily avoided entanglement in the Libyan civil war or the Caucasian crisis, and held his rhetorical fire on Kashmir. In each instance, he elected to wade in.

The “why” of it all is harder to fathom. Those seeking doctrinaire explanations for Erdogan’s adventurism can choose from neo-Ottomanism, Turkish ethno-nationalism and Islamism. Others point to geopolitics: Turkey, they say, is maneuvering for space in an emerging multipolar order, where it sees itself as a mid-sized world power, with an economic and cultural reach to befit that status as well as the requisite military muscle. Seen in this light, the aggressive foreign policy is an assertion of rights.

Still others focus on more narrow mercantile motivations, such as the scramble for hydrocarbon resources and the quest for new markets. And then there’s the argument from domestic politics, which posits that Erdogan, his approval ratings sinking amid the deepening economic gloom, is waving the Turkish flag abroad to distract his people.

There is more than a little truth in all those explanations. But if you’re looking for a unifying theory for Erdogan’s foreign policy, it is this: Turkey’s president does what he does because he gets away with it.

Whether in domestic politics or regional trade, he has not paid a significant price for his adventurism. The cost in Turkish blood has been remarkably low, not least because a great deal of the fighting is done by foreign mercenaries recruited from the killing fields of Syria. If there is any Turkish presence in the Libyan or Caucasian frontlines, it is more likely to be in the air — showing off the country’s burgeoning capabilities in drone warfare — than on the ground.

In terms of Turkish treasure, the costs are likely to be substantial, but Erdogan can reasonably argue that these will be defrayed by economic gains. By intervening in Libya, for instance, Ankara hopes to salvage construction deals worth $18 billion, as well as open up new opportunities for oil and gas exploration. The maritime maneuvers in the Eastern Mediterranean are designed to lay Turkish claim to vast gas reserves, as well as show off some naval muscle. And economic ties to Azerbaijan will be strengthened by the sale of Turkish military hardware.

In purely commercial terms, the potential profit from these forays greatly outweighs any loss of opportunity with, say, Greece, Armenia or Egypt, none of which is a major trading partner. Turkish businesses complain they’re being pushed out of the Saudi market because of the hostility between Ankara and Riyadh, but the numbers involved are relatively small. (Remarkably, bilateral trade with Israel has held up despite the acrimony between Erdogan and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.)

In contrast, Turkey’s antagonists among major powers have enormous economic leverage, but they have been reluctant to use it. In the European Union — far and away Turkey’s biggest trading partner — diplomats talk airily about a “carrots and sticks approach” toward Ankara, but they are beginning to recognize that it isn’t working. The problem is that they are unwilling to wield the stick.

Despite Macron’s repeated calls for economic sanctions, the EU has yet to summon the collective will to follow through on threats to punish Turkey. This reluctance can only partially be explained by Erdogan’s counter-threat to unleash waves of refugees westward. The EU’s rules for imposing sanctions are too unwieldy for the group to deploy them as a weapon.

That is not a problem for the Trump administration, which dispenses sanctions like candy. But the American president has been coy about applying them to Turkey. When he has, they have carried all the sting of a rap on the knuckles — and Trump has been quick to lift them.

The most enduring disciplinary action the U.S. has taken against Turkey is its suspension from the purchase of F-35 jets and participation in their manufacture. Erdogan still went ahead with the purchase and installation of Russian S-400 missile-defense systems. Trump has disregarded a bipartisan clamor from Congress for sterner measures.

Without full-throated support from the U.S., NATO will not exact any punishment upon its recalcitrant member. Erdogan can dismiss the alliance’s concerns without fear of Turkey’s expulsion.

That leaves Russia as the only other power that might be able to push back against Turkish aggression. The Azeri-Armenian war is the second theater, after Libya, where Erdogan stands in the way of Putin’s objectives. (The two have some common interests, if not always a shared goal, in the third: Syria.)

The Russian leader has tolerated Erdogan’s presumptions in order to pursue Moscow’s greater goals of undermining NATO and prizing Turkey away from the West. In turn, the Turkish president has been careful not to turn his sharp tongue on Russia, a courtesy he has not offered to any Western leader who crosses him. The last time the two men were in a face-off — in the fall of 2015, when Turkey shot down a Russian jet near the border with Syria — Putin, using Erdoganesque rhetoric, called it a “treacherous stab in the back,” and announced economic countermeasures. Erdogan backed down, with a written apology.

In the Caucasian conflict, Erdogan has again avoided barbs at Putin, but he has name-checked Russia in his attacks against the international community for failing to hand the Armenian-majority Nagorno-Karabakh region over to Azerbaijan. And for the first time, Turkey is intervening in what Moscow regards as its sphere of influence: the Caucasus is closer to Russia — not just geographically but also in historical, cultural, strategic and economic terms — than Syria or Libya.

That explains Moscow’s “fuel to the flames” riposte to Erdogan. But it is not in the same league as a “treacherous stab in the back.” What’s more, it didn’t come from the lips of Putin, nor was it accompanied by the threat of sanctions. Moscow is not — or at least not yet — inclined to put Ankara on notice.

For Erdogan, the absence of a red flag is a green flag: He will see Moscow’s reticence as license to pursue his agenda.

In the Caucasus as elsewhere, this pursuit has been opportunistic and the agenda jerry-rigged to fit the circumstances. Seen from a high altitude, Erdogan’s adventurism does not fit any comprehensible doctrine, certainly nothing as coherent as “Zero Problems.” Rather than follow a systematic game plan, he has made it up along the way.

As a result, the Erdogan doctrine is different things from different points of view — a kind of foreign-policy Rashomon.

It is neo-Ottoman to the extent that many of the places that have drawn his attention were part of the old empire. Erdogan frequently embraces Ottoman-era symbolism, and peppers his speeches with invocations of ancient glories. But his adventurism doesn’t follow the map of the world once ruled from Istanbul. There are have been no forays into Eastern Europe, the Balkans or Georgia, all of which were more integral to the empire than, say, Libya. And he seems perfectly happy to coexist with the Ottomans’ sworn enemies, the Persians.

Likewise, the religious motivations for Erdogan’s adventurism are often overstated. He is an avowed Islamist, and can lace his rhetoric with citations from religious texts and expressions of solidarity with Muslims in foreign lands. Much is also made of his support for the Muslim Brotherhood and, especially in Israel, for Hamas. To some of his critics, this all adds up to a quest for leadership of the Muslim world.

But look closer, and you’ll see faith is an instrument rather than a motivation for Erdogan’s foreign policies. Here, too, opportunism is a better explanation than dogma. Meeting with a top Hamas leader is an easy way to set Israeli noses out of joint. Bringing up Kashmir at the UN is a convenient way to please Pakistan, and especially useful when Prime Minister Imran Khan is at odds with his country’s traditional ally, Saudi Arabia.

Ethno-nationalism? If you strain very hard, you might make the case for ancient ties between modern Turks and the Azeris, but the binding power of oil and gas pipelines that connect Azerbaijan to Turkey is a much stronger argument.

Hydrocarbons are at least as thick as bloodlines, and they connect more of the dots that form the outline of Turkish foreign policy than most other theories. In general, economics offer a more consistent explanation for Erdogan’s international outreach — going all the way back to the start of his stewardship of the Turkish state in 2003. At the height of the “Zero Problems” years, he rarely traveled abroad without a retinue of business leaders, and the success of his visits was measured in signed contracts.

But economics don’t explain everything. After all, a leader driven by commercial considerations would be more inclined to make nice with India rather than Pakistan, for instance. He would more likely make common cause with Saudi Arabia and the UAE than be at loggerheads with their leaders. And he might be more circumspect about antagonizing his country’s biggest trading partner.

That leaves the argument from domestic politics, that Erdogan is using the assertion of Turkey’s “deserved place in the world order” to shore up his support base against the headwinds of economic difficulty. Foreign policy has provided the one bright spot in the president’s reign, and his approval ratings have indeed edged upward in recent weeks, despite the decline of the Turkish lira.

But if this is indeed the underlying motivation for Erdogan’s aggressive forays abroad, then the we should all brace for more as the coronavirus-stricken economy worsens. As long as he has opportunity for troublemaking and impunity from punishment, Turkey’s president is not going to stop.- Bloomberg


Turkey’s involvement in Armenia is dangerous. Could Christians face another genocide?

America Magazine
Oct 21 2020

Advocates for the protection of Christian minority populations raised an alarm about Turkey’s role in the renewed fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenian forces over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Hundreds have perished since this latest clash began on Sept. 27 in a significant escalation of the decades-old conflict. More than 30,000 were killed before the last large-scale confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan ended in a sullen truce in 1994. The territory continues to be internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, but that position is rejected by ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh who represent more than 90 percent of its population.

Turkey, which as recently as July conducted military exercises with Azerbaijan forces, has taken a large role in supporting Azerbaijan’s military. Arms sales from Turkey to Azerbaijan surged sixfold in the months before the fighting began. As the fighting continues, some analysts worry other regional actors—Russia, which maintains a security pact with Armenia, and Iran, where errant artillery shells have already landed—might be drawn into the conflict.

But last week representatives from the international advocacy group In Defense of Christians and Armenian advocates warned of even darker outcomes should the international community not intervene immediately. They suggested that the Azerbaijani offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh—most of which is included in the Republic of Artsakh, a self-proclaimed ethnic Armenian statelet within Azerbaijan—could represent only the beginning of a renewed, genocidal aggression against the Armenian people.

Advocates demanded that Turkey and its president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, be “heavily sanctioned” by the Trump administration because of Turkey’s material support of Azerbaijani forces.

The patriarch of the Armenian Apostolic Church, Catholicos Karekin II, shared those concerns in an interview with the Italian daily La Repubblica on Oct. 19. “What else is it if not genocide to indiscriminately bomb civilians, churches, the historical monuments of a people in spite of all international laws?” he said.

At a press briefing on Oct. 16, all fingers pointed to Turkey as the agitating force in the revived conflict. This latest Azerbaijani incursion in Nagorno-Karabakh fits both a contemporary and historic pattern, Christian advocates say, a drive to cleanse the region of Armenians and all Christians with an aim of establishing Turkish hegemony from the Middle East through Turkic-speaking states of the former Soviet Union.

Toufic Baaklini, the president of In Defense of Christians, joined other advocates in demanding that Turkey and its president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, be “heavily sanctioned” by the Trump administration because of Turkey’s material support of Azerbaijani forces during this latest incursion into Nagorno-Karabakh.

“Without real sanctions,” Mr. Baaklini said, “this guy won’t listen.”

[Want to discuss politics with other America readers? Join our Facebook discussion group, moderated by America’s writers and editors.]

He dismissed as insufficient recent protests against the violence and calls for a cease-fire from U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. “We have to continue to pressure, not in words but in action,” Mr. Baaklini said. “We expect the Trump administration to take some action to stop this holy war for [Mr. Erdogan].”

The Azerbaijani offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh could represent only the beginning of a renewed, genocidal aggression against the Armenian people.

He added, “U.S. policy toward Turkey is not working. The Trump administration and Congress need to heavily sanction Turkey and reassess their entire relationship in light of this hostility.”

Michael Rubin, a political analyst for the American Enterprise Institute, offered a harsh assessment of Turkey’s role in the new fighting and in creating instability throughout the region. He called Turkey’s motivations for jumping into the dispute as “malign as they can be.”

Noting that Turkey has always found supporters in Washington who make excuses for its actions in Syria, Iraq and other regional hotspots, he said, “When we look at what’s going on in Artsakh now, there absolutely is no excuse. Turkey has no claim, no history [in the dispute].

“It seems clearly now that Turkey’s sole motivation in helping Azerbaijan create these war plans, execute them and bring in mercenaries has been purely animus, not just to Armenians as a people but also to Christianity.”

These advocates said President Erdogan is driving to restore Ottoman-era borders at the same time he hopes to distract the Turkish people from repression at home and Turkey’s flagging economy. “Turkey is promoting jihadists and persecuting Christians all over the region,” warned Mr. Baaklini.

Speaking on a Zoom link from inside the disputed territory, Robert Avetisyan, the permanent representative of the Republic of Artsakh to the United States, described the Azerbaijani incursion as unprecedented in scope and violence. According to Mr. Avetisyan, the Azerbaijani military has put Caspian Sea oil sales to good use in a defense buildup in recent years with new technology and equipment from Turkey, Russia and Israel that it has now unleashed on both fighters and noncombatants in the Armenian enclave. He charged also that the Turkish military has moved from a hidden role in directing the incursion to open command and control of the entire offensive.

“The issue needs to be resolved, one that excludes the military solution permanently. After so many genocidal threats and so much aggression…no matter how many missiles [Azerbaijan possesses], you have to recognize the Republic of Artsakh.”

After weeks of fighting, the Azerbaijani “blitzkrieg” has failed, according to Mr. Avetisyan, even as indiscriminate shelling of military and civilian targets continues. He adds that the hardening of positions along the frontline suggests a long period of indecisive but bloody fighting ahead unless the United Nations and other multilateral players are able to pressure the two sides away from the battle lines and back to a negotiating table.

Two separate cease-fire agreements broke down in recent days. Each side has alleged that the other has targeted civilians indiscriminately, and evidence accumulates that accusers on both sides are right—Armenian artillery fire claimed civilian lives in Ganja, Azerbaijan’s second largest city, and in Nagorno-Karabakh Azerbaijani forces pummeled homes in Stepanakert, the capital of the separatist republic.  

Mr. Avetisyan charged that “Turkey is completely hands-on in command and control; its special forces are penetrating into sleeping cities.” He alleges that Turkey has been responsible for moving “thousands of mercenaries from Syria and Lebanon” into the fight, an accusation which Turkish officials continue to deny despite mounting evidence of the presence of such fighters.

According to Mr. Avetisyan, the involvement of these mercenaries—battle-hardened by years of fighting in Syria and other Middle East conflict zones—means Nagorno-Karabakh has become the latest theater in the global war against terrorism.

“The U.S. has proclaimed itself to be the leader in fight against international terrorism,” he said, “so we expect the U.S. as well as the rest of the civilized world to defeat this international terrorism.”

The U.S. bishops and Pope Francis have urged a cease-fire and called for a return to the negotiating table. But views on both sides appear to have hardened since the 1994 truce. During the fighting in that earlier conflict, more than 600,000 Azerbaijanis were driven from Nagorno-Karabakh and adjoining Azerbaijani territory seized by Armenian military. They have been seeking a safe return ever since.

After years of fruitless negotiation through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Minsk Group, headed by representatives from Russia, France and the United States, many Azerbaijanis have come to believe that the military option is the only viable path to their return. For their part, Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh believe they face an existential threat should the Azerbaijani military succeed in reclaiming the disputed territory and its surrounding districts. Neither side seems able to contemplate restoring a pre-conflict status quo that would allow displaced Azerbaijanis to return and ethnic Armenians to live in security and peace.

Mr. Avetisyan argued that talking, not fighting, is the only way to finally resolve the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh. “Who can believe this is happening in the 21st century?” he asked.

For now, Turkey and Azerbaijan cannot be restrained by expressions of concern, Mr. Avetisyan said, calling for immediate sanctions to cut off Azerbaijani oil sales, as well as renewed efforts toward a stable cease-fire and a negotiated settlement to the territorial dispute.

Azerbaijan needs to get the message that it cannot have the disputed territory back, he said.

“The issue needs to be resolved, one that excludes the military solution permanently,” he said. “After so many genocidal threats and so much aggression…no matter how many missiles [you possess], you have to recognize the Republic of Artsakh.”

“Recognizing the self-proclaimed republic of [Artsakh] would be enough to solve the problem because it would guarantee the security of its citizens,” said Patriarch Karekin II. “That is what we are waiting for from our friends and from all those who want to prevent a possible new holocaust.”

Expressing mounting frustration with the lack of urgency in the State Department, these advocates called on the U.S. Congress to step in. Describing Armenia as a Christian island surrounded by hostile secular and Islamic forces, they warned that the Armenian Christian genocide is not an event that has passed into history, but a process that continues to this day.

“This is where Christianity began and can remain with our help and support,” Mr. Baaklini said. “We are the voice of the voiceless. If we fail to act right now, we would be implicated by our silence.”

Danger of Russian-Turkish conflict grows as Armenian-Azeri ceasefire fails

WSWS -World Socialist Web Site
Oct 19 2020

Three weeks into a bloody war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Caucasus, the danger is mounting that the conflict could trigger a broader regional and indeed global war.

Casualties are rapidly rising as artillery and missile strikes rain down on civilian and military targets on both sides. Yesterday, Armenian authorities in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh enclave increased their confirmed military losses to 710 deaths. However, neither side has issued precise figures on their total military and civilian losses, while claiming that they have killed thousands of their opponents’ soldiers and civilians.

Fighting continued after a first truce negotiated a week ago by Russia, and then a new truce set to enter into effect at midnight Sunday, brokered by the so-called Minsk Group on the Karabakh conflict led by the United States, Russia and France. This latest ceasefire was presented as a “humanitarian” truce to allow an exchange of bodies and prisoners of war.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Vladimir Putin [Credit: http://en.kremlin.ru]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called his Armenian and Azeri counterparts before the truce was announced to call upon both to adhere to the earlier ceasefire. The Elysée presidential palace in France also called on both sides to “strictly” respect the truce and said that France, which has a substantial Armenian population, would closely follow events.

US officials, who had until now maintained a deafening silence on the Armenian-Azeri war, also made statements last week suggesting support for a truce. “We’re hopeful that the Armenians will be able to defend against what the Azerbaijanis are doing,” US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told WBS radio in Atlanta on Thursday.

Saying he wanted the two sides to “get the ceasefire right,” Pompeo blamed Turkey for the escalation: “We now have the Turks, who have stepped in and provided resources to Azerbaijan, increasing the risk, increasing the firepower that’s taking place in this historic fight over this place called Nagorno-Karabakh.” Pompeo claimed Washington does not want “third-party countries coming in to lend their firepower to what is already a powder keg of a situation.”

US Democratic Party presidential candidate Joe Biden also criticized Ankara’s support for the ethnic-Turkic Azeris, stating, “Turkey’s provision of arms to Azerbaijan and bellicose rhetoric encouraging a military solution are irresponsible.”

Foreword to the German edition of David North’s Quarter Century of War
Johannes Stern, 5 October 2020

After three decades of US-led wars, the outbreak of a third world war, which would be fought with nuclear weapons, is an imminent and concrete danger.

On Sunday, however, Armenian and Azeri officials denounced each other for violating the truce. After Armenian Defense Ministry spokeswoman Shushan Stepanyan blamed Azeri forces for artillery and rocket attacks, the Azeri Defense Ministry accused Armenian forces of launching an early-morning artillery and mortar barrage. On Saturday, Armenian forces had fired missiles on Ganja, Azerbaijan’s second-largest city, leaving 13 civilians dead, including two children, and dozens wounded.

There are signs that Azeri forces have, for now, the upper hand. US military analyst Rob Lee told Al Jazeera that high-altitude Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones have “dramatically” affected Armenian forces. Lee said: “TB2s initially targeted air defence systems. The ones we’ve seen destroyed are from the 1980s. I think the radars are struggling to pick up these small [drones]. Then, the TB2s started going after tanks, artillery and now, because they’ve been going through a succession of targets of priority, we see them targeting squads of soldiers.”

Azerbaijan is buying drones from Turkey, which has used them extensively in the civil wars triggered by decade-long NATO imperialist interventions in both Libya and Syria. Fuad Shahbaz, an official at the Centre for Strategic Communications think-tank in Baku, told Al Jazeera, “We have seen Bayraktar drones actively used in Syria and Libya by the Turkish air force against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and General Khalifa Haftar’s Army in Libya.”

A large-scale Azeri ground invasion, Al Jazeera noted, would still face “well-fortified [Armenian] defensive positions occupying high ground in mountainous territory.” However, Lee added, “TB2s are just sitting overhead and waiting for targets of opportunity. Ultimately, Armenians don’t have a good plan for destroying them. They have to do something or Azerbaijan will keep hitting them.”

The bloody conflict over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh enclave first erupted in the lead-up to the Stalinist bureaucracy’s dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. None of the subsequent negotiations proved able to resolve the 1988-1994 conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which led to over 30,000 dead and 1 million displaced. Armenian forces ended up in control of Nagorno-Karabakh and several surrounding Azeri territories connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, leading to permanent and insoluble conflicts between the two former Soviet republics.

This conflict, which shows the inviability and reactionary character of the nation-state system, has now become deeply enmeshed with the conflicts provoked by the decades of imperialist wars led by Washington in the Middle East and Central Asia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

In particular, it comes amid renewed US war threats against Iran and growing proxy wars between Turkey and Russia. In Syria, Russia and Iran have backed President Bashar al-Assad’s regime against NATO-backed Islamist militias resupplied from Turkey, while Russia and Turkey have backed opposed factions in Libya.

As the Armenian-Azeri war drags on, the risk that it could escalate into a direct conflict between the major powers rises. While Ankara has openly called for Azerbaijan to expel Armenians from the Karabakh, Moscow, which has an alliance and troops stationed in Armenia, has not yet intervened.

While Moscow still calls for peace and de-escalation, there are growing signs that it is considering direct involvement. On October 16, Russia held military exercises in the Caspian Sea, which borders both Azerbaijan and Iran, involving four warships armed with cruise missiles, two escort ships, warplanes and troops. The Russian Defense Ministry stated that the exercise did “not restrict the economic activity of the Caspian littoral states.”

There is undoubtedly concern in Moscow and Tehran about reports of Al Qaeda-linked Islamist fighters deploying to Azerbaijan, which borders both Russia and Iran. These fighters could be used to inflame Turkic-separatist sentiment in Iran or revive civil wars in nearby Muslim-majority areas of Russia, like Chechnya or Dagestan, that erupted after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

In Iran, Mashregh News, close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, warned that Turkish private security firms and Syrian Islamist militias are sending fighters to Azerbaijan. It wrote that if the Karabakh “is captured by [Azeri President Ilham] Aliyev’s forces and the terrorists sent by Erdoğan, there will be a serious threat to Iran in terms of national security and territorial integrity.”

As the Russian drills began in the Caspian Sea, Russia’s Kommersant published detailed allegations of Turkish involvement. It wrote that 600 Turkish troops including drone pilots stayed behind in Azerbaijan after Turkish-Azeri military exercises in July-August. Relying apparently on access to Georgian authorities’ records of Turkish flights through their airspace to Azerbaijan, Kommersant identified the aircraft type and flight numbers of alleged Turkish flights of ammunition and troops to Azerbaijan on September 4, 18, 30 and October 1, 3 and 9.

It also alleged that Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar and army chief of staff General Ümit Dündar traveled to Azerbaijan on September 28-30 and “are in charge on the ground of overall operational leadership on the Karabakh front.”

“Turkish representatives are recruiting mercenaries to participate in fighting in the Karabakh on the Azeri side among Islamist militias loyal to Ankara fighting in Syria and Libya,” the paper added. It said that in the first week of October alone, 1,300 fighters from Syrian militias and 150 fighters from Libyan militias had deployed to fight in the Karabakh war. It alleged that Islamist militias recruit fighters in Syria’s Afrin province, transport them to the Turkish city of Şanlıurfa and by plane to Azerbaijan.

The danger of a horrific escalation in the region, already torn apart by decades of war, is very real. Moreover, none of the regional regimes—the Turkish or Iranian Islamist regimes or the post-Soviet capitalist kleptocracy in the Kremlin—have anything to offer to workers. They are jockeying to assert their interests and position themselves for a deal to be endorsed by the imperialist powers that have plundered the region for decades. Against this, the way forward is the unification of workers in the region, across all ethnic lines, and beyond in a socialist struggle against war and capitalism.


https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2020/10/19/cauc-o19.html?fbclid=IwAR33f2ijJa1M8iPQaRe74xsN5o73Vfi2YqJ8TrX-LAsKEIWeppgNwCi3Im4

Georgia’s Clownish Mikheil Saakashvili is the Perfect Embodiment of Post-Soviet Capitalism

Jacobin Magazine

Georgia’s Clownish Mikheil Saakashvili is the Perfect Embodiment of
Post-Soviet Capitalism

By  Sopiko Japaridze
Oct. 14, 2020

The United States isn’t the only country facing terrible options in
its elections this fall. Georgia, in the Caucasus region south of
Russia, is again looking at the usual lineup of right-wing parties to
choose between — something typical of its politics in recent years.
But there are also dozens of new vanity-project parties that have
formed in order to take advantage of the low barrier to get into
parliament — and hence access state funding.

The low barrier was itself a victory won by the opposition, after
protests last summer prompted by an MP for European Georgia (a
splinter from former president Mikheil Saakashvili’s United National
Movement). He rushed into the parliamentary auditorium draped in the
Georgian flag and threw Russian MP Sergei Gavrilov out of the chamber.
If Gavrilov was chairing a routine meeting — a barely political event
connected to the Orthodox Church — the optics couldn’t have been worse
for the dominant Russophobic mood: a Russian politician sat in the
most powerful seat in the Georgian parliament, and so he had to be
chased out.

Such histrionics have been the norm in Georgian politics over the last
three decades — a blend of farce and tragedy perfectly symbolized by
Saakashvili himself. After his election defeat in late 2012, he was
ousted as president by the then-new Georgian Dream coalition,
bankrolled by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili. Forced to flee the
country, Saakashvili curiously pursued his political career abroad —
becoming a Ukrainian citizen and governor of that country’s Odessa
oblast. His time as governor was short-lived, as he turned on Petro
Poroshenko — the president who appointed him in the first place — with
accusations of corruption.  Ukraine’s new leader, Volodymyr Zelensky,
has since appointed Saakashvili to chair the executive committee of
its National Reforms Council. But in recent weeks, the well-traveled
Saakashvili has announced his return to Georgian politics.

This story of one country’s former president becoming another
country’s governor seems bizarre. But it isn’t quite so odd if one
considers the former Soviet space as one entity. Twenty-seven new
countries were “born” again into capitalism after the destruction of
the Eastern Bloc, and they were all prescribed the exact same shock
therapy by international organizations. These latter would also use
one country’s radical liberal reforms to pressure another unwilling
government to follow the same line, thus forcing the whole region to
swallow neoliberalism and compete for foreign direct investment. This
— combined with the anti-Russian politics that hold sway in much of
the region — gives “Misha” Saakashvili huge sway, not least given the
legendary status drawn from the August 2008 war with Russia. There was
even a tasteless Hollywood film about the conflict, with Andy Garcia
playing Misha.

Saakashvili is particularly important because he has the Western
connections vital to any burgeoning government’s success (John McCain
and Hillary Clinton nominated him for a Nobel Prize). Added to this is
the lack of other experienced personnel locally. But also key are the
limits on democracy in postcommunist countries. Neoliberalism gets
voted out by the people again and again, only for the same policies to
be recycled through international and regional organizations. The
neoliberal reformers ousted by the electorate often get jobs in these
international bodies and think tanks, which then preach these same
measures to other governments in the region.

Now Misha — whose Georgian citizenship was revoked in 2015 and faces
charges for various counts of abuse of power — is not only vying to
return to office in his homeland, but convinced that he is the right
man to lead the country through the storms of the COVID-19 pandemic.
But it’s also worth noting that he remains popular in Georgia. With
each passing day under Georgian Dream’s lackluster rule, Misha’s
period in charge seems better and better for most people — especially
if one takes into account the fact that the economic policies have
stayed the same.

This forgiveness takes many forms. Back in 2012, Saakashvili’s
presidency was undone by revelations of “excessive” police brutality
in prisons, as videos circulated showing shocking scenes of torture
and rape of inmates. Yet with the current government proving feeble in
the face of COVID-19, it seems as if such footage has been relegated
to a distant and blurred memory. Today, a repentant Saakashvili admits
that “mistakes were made” and claims to be a new man — while also
playing down these “errors” by insisting that “only those who don’t do
anything, never make mistakes.” This barely apologetic attitude also
shone through in an interview where it was suggested that many of his
opponents doubted the realism of his current plans; he retorted that
his record on criminal justice had proven his sincerity. As he put it,
“I said zero tolerance towards criminals and everyone would be jailed
— and it happened, no?”

Eating His Tie, Breaking up Old Ties

Why Saakashvili remains popular is a troubling lesson for the Left,
which often considers him simply as the pro-Western father of Georgian
neoliberalism and a madman who ate his own tie on national television.
For despite his neoliberal and radical-libertarian policies, most
Georgians remember him not for being laissez-faire, but for being a
statist and interventionist who disregards cultural norms.

This especially owes to the fact that Georgian politics and society
has a tendency to inertia, due to elaborate friendship and familial
ties that perpetuate patron-client relationships and an inflexible
hyper-patriarchal culture. Such relationships have been disrupted to
some extent by capitalism, internal migration, and emigration, but
among men, these strict behavior codes often persist. Such
relationships also fuel corruption, in the absence of strong
institutions.

Misha was forever willing to disrupt all this. He has always been
absolutely shameless — never backing down from situations that could
be humiliating for other men afraid of losing their standing. This is
the source of both his popularity and the hatred he attracts. Polite
(elite) society finds him embarrassing and insane, while others look
at him as a fighter who risks his personal comfort and reputation for
the greater good: “Misha isn’t loyal to patrons,” “Misha will bite the
hand that feeds him,” they say. This makes him a liability for many
elites.

At the same time, all those who have been typically on the losing end
of patron-client relationships — and in relatively poorer areas of
Georgia — have provided Misha’s electoral base. In general, he
projects the image of doing whatever is necessary to implement his
ideas. As compared to the stereotype of the lethargic Georgian
politician with a huge belly (their size was even the object of an
academic study), the energetic Saakashvili seems like an obsessive
workaholic. If some pundits claim it’s a disaster for the united
opposition to put him up as a candidate — since this is somehow
playing into Georgian Dream’s hands — they underestimate his
popularity.

In fact, Saakashvili’s prospects benefit from much deeper weaknesses
in Georgian Dream. This broad coalition was founded in the run-up to
the 2012 election for the sole purpose of defeating Saakashvili and
started out with promises of social programs and reindustrialization.
Yet such ideas were quickly abandoned in favor of rightfully vilifying
Misha for his eight years in office as a monster who jailed everyone.
Unfortunately, once it reached power the following year, Georgian
Dream didn’t even undermine his legacy effectively. First, in its 2016
constitutional reform, it kept Saakashvili’s egregious Liberty Act,
which outlawed progressive taxation and tightly capped social
spending, even though the coalition had a supermajority that would
have allowed it to revoke this measure. Then — in a  more blatant act
of insincerity and hypocrisy — Georgian Dream kept and handed lifetime
appointments to the very judges who had 99 percent conviction rates
under Saakashvili. This became such a scandal in early 2019 that many
MPs quit Georgian Dream.

In a remarkable illustration of its fecklessness, Georgian Dream’s
leader Bidzina Ivanishvili publicly stated late last year that
Georgians should go and look for work abroad — declaring himself
surprised that anyone demanded jobs be created at home. Startlingly,
he deemed this an unrealistic prospect for the coming decades. His
government has mostly worked to secure legal jobs for the Georgian
workforce in Europe, negotiating with each government. Bidzina, who
once promised dozens of factories would be built in Georgia, was
surprised to learn Georgians expected to be gainfully employed,
without having to leave for other shores.

Further, Georgian Dream abolished the profit tax and forced a
state-sponsored private pension scheme upon the population. Before
COVID-19, the current minister said that she wouldn’t mind if the
Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development would be renamed the
“Ministry of Tourism.” The current government has thus failed to break
with any of Saakashvili’s own purported failings. As one United
National Movement activist stated, “I loved some things Misha did, and
I hated some things Misha did, but I just hate GD, I haven’t found
anything to love or like.”

Misha’s Legacy

In his day, Saakashvili’s politics were developmentalist and went
beyond other postcommunist reformers who were more or less technocrats
— indeed, he compares himself to state builders like Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk and David Ben-Gurion. Obsessed with his legacy as a national
icon, he is conspicuously ideologically flexible. Hence, while he
started out damning his predecessor Eduard Shevardnadze for blaming
Russia for all his problems — thus distracting Georgians from domestic
failings — now, in both Georgia and Ukraine, he has cast himself as an
anti-Putin hero. He went from criticizing British Petroleum’s poor
environmental and social practices and the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan
pipeline — “We won’t be bullied by BP,” he insisted — to
wholeheartedly supporting it.

But an opportunist like Misha couldn’t have ended up as anything else
but right-wing in substance. The difference between left and right on
the political spectrum is weakest in postcommunist countries,
especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union — indeed, such a
split is often unhelpful in understanding what is happening in the
region. Since socialism was discredited among elites (if not among the
population), and there was no alternative to neoliberalism, no
mainstream political party or political figure could emerge to
challenge capitalist hegemony. The main differences instead revolve
around the implementation of neoliberal reforms — how quickly and how
efficiently.

Such political differences as do exist between the so-called Left and
Right never dent a wholesale acceptance of neoliberalism as prescribed
through the Washington consensus and European Union. At times, there
were disputes over selling foreigners land in postcommunist countries
— but even this ended up as a difference over the time frame of
implementation, rather than of stopping the reform completely. After
all, the EU made land liberalization a deal-breaker for countries to
earn associate membership. Indeed, according to one study, left-wing
governments in postcommunist countries were more effective in
implementing neoliberal reforms than right-wing ones. Even when
left-wing governments could have undone reforms, in fact, they
continued them. It’s no surprise that most of the criticism of
capitalism, the EU, and liberalism in postcommunist countries has come
from the Right, presented as a cultural critique.

In his spell living in the United States, Misha claims to have
observed the limits of liberal democracy when he saw the road leading
to the White House in DC. “You get a sense what different governments
are,” he recounted. “The road was really very bad, worse than roads
[in Georgia] in Shevardnadze’s time. But because local D.C. government
was broke — even if it was leading to the White House, who cares?
There he sits, the most powerful President in the world, but he cannot
fix the road!” He went on, “They call it separation of powers. Some
people would call it democracy. I would call it inefficient.”

As president from 2004 to 2013, Saakashvili thus needed a strong
state. But to this end, he had to manipulate the dominant
international and regional organizations peddling structural
adjustment programs. He learned that it was easiest to placate the
international community by adopting their reforms on paper, while
relying on more informal practices to continue implementing his own
“successful” brand of postcommunist capitalism. This approach was
characterized by mafia-type extortions of businesses, which were then
channeled to certain development funds. If Georgia was rife with
corruption and informal patron-client networks, Misha followed the
Mussolini/Rudy Giuliani practice of jailing everyone for petty
violations in order to break the larger racket leaders and fund the
state budget through bail. Such primitive accumulation through
dispossession and violence was, indeed, fundamental to the transition
to capitalism. Far from the rosy story liberals tell themselves of
rising capitalism bringing democracy and “human rights,” we had what
Karl Marx called “expropriation, written in the annals of mankind in
letters of blood and fire.”

Harry Cleaver’s use of the concepts “devalorization” and
“disvalorization” is very helpful in understanding what happened in
post-Soviet Georgia (and elsewhere in the region). A “devalorization”
happened after the fall of the Soviet Union, which is a loss of
skills, abilities, and knowledge, including their passing down over
the generations. The entire political economy of the USSR was erased
in one fell swoop — and so, too, the professionals and bureaucrats
that went with it. The higher skill sets which the Soviet Union had
relied on — for example, occupational disease specialists — were no
longer needed in post-Soviet Georgia, since the new regime no longer
tracked occupational diseases. Similarly, Georgian silk production was
completely destroyed, as part of an abrupt deindustrialization.

While devalorization was occurring throughout the Shevardnadze period,
with Misha we saw a much more powerful “disvalorization” — meaning, a
recasting of skills and abilities and knowledge in service of whatever
can make most profits. Georgia is known to be hospitable, so let’s
turn every home into a guesthouse; Georgia has great food and wine, so
open up restaurants. Misha did accelerate the development of
capitalism in Georgia, but a peculiarly Western-sanctioned one. Our
neoliberal comparative advantage in a province hidden in the Caucasus
didn’t require highly trained and highly skilled people, but a
low-skilled service economy heavily composed of hosts, drivers, sales
associates, restaurateurs, and servers for tourism. This kind of
political economy evidently limits the economic and social development
of the Georgian people — and has additionally proven vulnerable and
volatile through crises like the 2008 war and the current COVID-19
pandemic.

Comeback King?

Saakashvili remains widely credited for tearing down the post-Soviet
purgatory capitalism of Eduard Shevardnadze’s rule and implementing
capitalism as prescribed by neoliberal institutions. He used the heavy
hand of state power as well as informal power to force these reforms
onto the population. He also used big infrastructure plans, colorfully
painted buildings, and many other shiny-looking projects to coax the
population into his vision of Georgia. But though his is a legacy of
liberal economic policies that limit the state’s formal responsibility
toward its people and sends them to sell their labor on a market
defined by precarity, most Georgians remember him as a “big
government” man — and that is precisely why many want him back.
Despite his horrendous human rights record, he retains his reputation
as a capable — or at least, ever-present — leader.

Georgian Dream’s unabashed laissez-faire attitude seems to have made
Georgians nostalgic for a time when the government acted like they
cared about them — even if that meant disciplining them. It’s
unimaginable that anyone from the current government would run into
the Liberty Bank office and scream at management for mistreating the
elderly, like Misha did when he saw a long line of pensioners waiting
to get their measly pensions. Today, the pension lines are still
extremely long, but no one in power protests about it even for PR
reasons.

In a country where remittances from abroad make up three times the
amount salaries do, where people are systematically beaten down every
day, where employers are not held accountable for their oppression and
exploitation, and where huge sections of the population are addicted
to gambling and debt, it’s easy to understand why many Georgians want
“big government” back. So long as we don’t have a Left willing to
promote a state interventionism that actually gives Georgians public
services they can rely on — finally reversing the post-Soviet
destruction of the social fabric — it seems Georgians will continue to
look to a “madman” like Saakashvili as their defender.


 

Champagne discusses fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh with counterparts in Vienna

CBC News, Canada
Oct 14 2020
Foreign Affairs Minister François-Philippe Champagne was in Vienna today for meetings with officials of various international organizations and Austrian leaders to talk about flashpoints in Europe and Azerbaijan.