According to US, Az & Armenian leaders must activate efforts in NKse

ACCORDING TO US AZERBAIJANI AND ARMENIAN LEADERS MUST ACTIVATE THEIR EFFORTS IN KARABAKH CONFLICT SETTLEMENT

PanArmenian News
Feb 11 2005

11.02.2005 18:53

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ According to the US, leaders of Azerbaijan and
Armenia must activate their efforts in settlement of the conflict, US
Ambassador to Azerbaijan Rino Harnish said at a press conference. The
Ambassador gave a positive assessment of the activity of OSCE Minsk
Group and expressed opinion that the visit of OSCE mission to the
region testified to the efforts and interests of OSCE in the fair
and long-term resolution of the conflict. He came out for peaceful
resolution of the conflict in the nearest future, giving a positive
assessment of US’s role and efforts in the given issue, which would
contribute to establishing peace and stability in the region. At
the same time, Ambassador Harnish noted that the resolution does not
depend only on the USA or any other country.

The New Battleground: Central Asia and the Caucasus

The New Battleground: Central Asia and the Caucasus
By Ilan Berman

The Washington Quarterly
Vol. 28, No. 1 (Winter 2004-05), pp. 59-69.

Following his first meeting with President Vladimir Putin in June 2001,
President George W. Bush heaped praise on his Russian counterpart,
hailing a new era in relations between the two countries and claiming
he had gained a sense of the Russian leader’s soul. Just three and a
half years later, however, the strategic partnership forged between
the two leaders in the wake of the September 11 attacks faces a new
obstacle. Recent geopolitical developments, combined with expanding
strategic agendas in Moscow and Washington, are ushering in a new
era of competition in Russia’s near abroad of Central Asia and the
Caucasus.

At least three factors are fueling the unfolding tug of war between
Moscow and Washington. The first is the new strategic emphasis the
United States has placed on Central Asia and the Caucasus as part of
the global war against terrorism. This focus has propelled Washington
to expand its military and strategic foothold in both regions. The
second is Russia’s domestic economic priorities, which have prompted
Moscow to intensify its focus on acquiring a critical energy mass
among the fragile former Soviet republics. The third factor is Putin’s
assumption of sweeping policymaking authority and the concomitant
rise of an increasingly assertive, neo-imperial foreign policy in
the Kremlin.

For most of the last century, the Soviet Union dominated the political
landscape of what is today Central Asia and the Caucasus. The end
of the Cold War did little to alter this state of affairs. Although
prompting the Kremlin to disengage from much of the Middle East and
Latin America, it did not dim Moscow’s involvement in the newly
sovereign states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Nor did
the end of the Cold War extinguish the imperial aspirations of
many Russians, who continue to dream of a return of their country’s
former holdings. Yet, this wish has been called into question since
September 11. The global campaign against terrorism launched by
the United States following the attacks on New York and Washington
has expanded the U.S. military presence in Russia’s near abroad to
unprecedented proportions.

Moscow has watched these moves with growing trepidation. Putin
supported Washington’s initial plans, breaking with many in Moscow
to endorse a U.S. military presence in his country’s backyard. The
steady expansion of this presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia,
however, has lent credence to Russian fears that, despite assurances
that the United States will withdraw its forces once Afghanistan is
“stabilized,” Washington, in fact, plans a regional deployment of
indefinite duration. Over time, such perceptions, accompanied by a
fear of waning Russian influence, have sparked a series of geopolitical
contests in the countries that make up the post-Soviet space.

WASHINGTON LOOKS EAST

The current U.S. presence in the region is a relatively new
phenomenon. Throughout the 1990s, policymakers in Washington paid
only sporadic attention to Central Asia and the Caucasus. Notable
exceptions included the Clinton administration’s support for regional
energy projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the
U.S. military’s 1997 designation of Central Asia as an “area of
responsibility” under the purview of the U.S. Central Command. The
U.S. government’s interest in this part of the world, however,
has changed since September 11. Beginning in late 2001, as part of
its campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan, the United States
codified military basing agreements with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan,
hammered out a deal with Kazakhstan for overflight rights and materiel
transshipments, and acquired contingency use of the national airport
in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.[1] The Bush administration also dramatically
broadened economic assistance to the region, nearly tripling aid
to Uzbekistan alone (to some $300 million) since October 2001.[2] By
the official end of combat operations in Afghanistan on May 1, 2003,
the United States had established forward bases housing a combined
total of close to 3,000 troops in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and had
begun close cooperation on tactical and intelligence matters with
all Central Asian states except Turkmenistan.[3]

If Afghanistan prompted Washington’s initial interest in Central
Asia and the Caucasus, the Pentagon’s strategic transformation has
preserved its attention. Under the guidance of Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. military has commenced a sweeping overhaul
of strategic priorities. For much of the 1990s, the collapse of the
Soviet Union had by and large not been reflected in the strategic
posture of the United States, which chose simply to substitute the
Russian Federation for the USSR as its principal potential adversary,
albeit a smaller and poorer one. By contrast, the Bush administration,
drawing on the recommendations of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review,
shifted the government’s attention to developing capabilities designed
to assure allies; dissuade adversaries; deter aggression; and, if
necessary, decisively defeat undeterred enemies.[4]

These new priorities, in turn, have directed the military posture of
the United States away from the static, adversary-based model that
dominated much of the previous century toward a strategy designed to
achieve assurance, dissuasion, deterrence, and defense against any
potential adversary in any environment. This fundamental change was
enshrined in the National Security Strategy released by the White
House in September 2002, which boldly declared that “[a] military
structured to deter massive Cold War-era armies must be transformed
to focus more on how an adversary might fight rather than where or
when a war might occur.”[5]

The post-Soviet space has become a principal front for this
transformation. In his 2002 report to the president and Congress,
Rumsfeld pointed out that, “[a]long a broad arc of instability that
stretches from the Middle East to Northeast Asia, there exists a
volatile mix of rising and declining regional powers.”[6] In response,
the Pentagon has launched a global realignment of its defense posture
designed to gain strategic control of this arc through an expanded
military presence in those theaters.[7]

This shift in focus has prompted a broad U.S. diplomatic and military
initiative in Central Asia. In Uzbekistan, Washington’s primary ally
in Central Asia, a sweeping grant of authority for military operations
has solidified the Pentagon’s strategic presence, which now consists
of an estimated 1,500 U.S. troops, cooperation with the Uzbek military
on antiterrorism efforts and border security, and substantial joint
initiatives on counterproliferation.

Washington also has opened discussions regarding more permanent
basing arrangements and deeper military-to-military cooperation with
Kyrgyzstan, where the Pentagon currently houses some 1,300 service
members supporting ongoing operations in Afghanistan.[8] In addition,
the United States committed millions of dollars for equipment purchases
and training for Kazakhstan’s military and, since the summer of 2003,
has financed the construction of a cooperative military base in the
Caspian port city of Atyrau.[9]

These efforts have been mirrored in the Caucasus. The United States
has assumed a central military role in Georgia, launching the $64
million Georgia Train and Equip Program in May 2002 as a means to
enhance the antiterrorism capabilities of Georgia’s military and
alleviate tensions between Moscow and Tbilisi over the sporadic Chechen
presence in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge. Pentagon officials have also made
overtures to Georgia’s new president, Mikheil Saakashvili, related
to his country’s pro-Western political direction, a move that has
already spurred the start of significant military reforms in Tbilisi.

Similarly, Washington has pledged some $10 million to Azerbaijan
to strengthen its border security, improve its communications
infrastructure, and help its government carry out security operations
aimed at countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction.[10]
The Bush administration also initiated a series of joint military
exercises in the Caspian Sea designed to train Azerbaijan’s naval
fleet to protect the oil-rich nation’s offshore drilling platforms.[11]
At the same time, Pentagon planners have opened talks with Baku about
establishing a major, cooperative military-training program and raised
the possibility of basing U.S. forces in the country.[12]

The United States has even made inroads with Russia’s closest partner
in the Caucasus-Armenia. In April 2004, the Bush administration
codified an agreement on enhanced military cooperation with Yerevan,
and U.S. government officials subsequently opened preliminary
discussions about joint military exercises between the United States
and Armenia, to be held in the near future.[13]

THE ENERGY IMPERATIVE

The Pentagon’s push east, meanwhile, has been matched in Moscow by a
new economic necessity. Russia has become a bona fide energy superpower
rather suddenly, surpassing Saudi Arabia as the world’s leading oil
producer in February 2002. Since then, the Kremlin has translated
its newfound energy clout into an ambitious foreign agenda, pledging
to provide the United States with 10 percent of its oil imports by
the end of the decade[14] and putting Russia on track to become the
fifth-largest oil supplier to the United States, after Canada, Saudi
Arabia, Mexico, and Venezuela.

An unlikely source has called such hopes into question. Since it
began in the summer of 2003, the very public clampdown by the Kremlin
on Russia’s second-largest oil company, Yukos, and its billionaire
former chief executive officer, Mikhail Khodorkovskii, has rocked
the foundations of Putin’s economic plans. Domestic political
considerations may have been the primary motive for the Kremlin’s
offensive (Khodorkovskii had bankrolled two Duma party factions before
the December 2003 parliamentary elections and even intimated that he
himself might eventually run for president), but the economic impact
has been far-reaching.

First, the campaign against Yukos has succeeded in rattling investor
confidence. Given the unpopularity of Russia’s oligarchs, as well
as the growing boldness of Putin’s authoritarian domestic policies,
many fear that the Yukos affair could merely be a prelude to a larger
government offensive designed to eliminate political opposition
and consolidate the Kremlin’s control over vital Russian economic
sectors. In turn, investors have signaled their unease: from a net
inflow of some $4.6 billion in the first half of 2003, investment in
Russia has seen a dramatic reversal, with capital flight topping $5
billion in the first half of 2004.[15]

Second, the Yukos case has shed light on Moscow’s lack of commitment
to economic integration with the West. The crackdown coincided with
serious bids both from ChevronTexaco and ExxonMobil to acquire major
stakes – 25 percent and 50 percent, respectively – in the Russian oil
giant. All this suggests that the Kremlin’s efforts were, at least in
part, timed to head off the expansion of a Western foothold in the
Russian energy sector. Russian officials’ subsequent talk of vastly
increased governmental control over the country’s energy sector has
only reinforced such speculation.

In turn, as funding for energy exploration and infrastructure
development has dried up, Russian officials have begun to recognize the
limits of their energy potential. According to German Gref, Russia’s
economic development and trade minister, Russian oil production has
now basically plateaued, and it is expected to rise less than 5 percent
annually for the next four years or more.[16] For Russia’s president,
whose 2004 State of the Federation address pledged double-digit
increases in the nation’s gross domestic product by the end of the
decade, this reality only adds impetus to expanding control over
Russia’s energy-rich former holdings as a way of making up the deficit.

RUSSIA’S IMPERIAL IMPULSE RETURNS

Moscow’s reemergence in the post-Soviet space has also been driven
by the revival of an old idea: Russia as empire. This concept has
been present in Russian political life for centuries, and the end of
the Cold War did little tomute Russia’s historically expansionist
tendencies. In fact, calls for a Greater Russia, championed by
advocates such as Nobel laureate Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and by
political thinkers including the controversial geopolitician and
Eurasia Movement founder Aleksandr Dugin, reemerged shortly after
the Soviet Union collapsed. Under Putin, however, these impulses are
beginning to be put into practice.

Domestically, the expansion of executive power has made Russia’s
imperial resurgence possible. Through a variety of legislative
and administrative measures, Putin has succeeded in virtually
monopolizing policymaking authority. The outcome of the December 2003
elections effectively eliminated legislative checks on his executive
authority. The pro-Kremlin United Russia Party was the runaway victor
in the parliamentary race, garnering roughly half of all 447 seats in
the Russian lower house (Duma). As a result, the party has assumed
direction of all Duma committees dealing with foreign affairs and
defense, transforming much of the Russian legislature into an enabler
of the Kremlin’s policies.

Simultaneously, key appointments to government posts and periodic
institutional purges have enabled Putin to create a vibrant subculture
of former KGB officers within the Kremlin bureaucracy. These so-called
siloviki today occupy upward of 60 percent of the key decisionmaking
positions within the Russian government and constitute an important
bloc of political support for official presidential policies.[17]
Together, these dynamics have given Putin a sweeping mandate to pursue
his neo-imperial aspirations.

The mechanism for pursuing such policies can be found in the draft
military concept that the Russian Defense Ministry unveiled in October
2003.[18] The so-called Ivanov Doctrine, named after its chief
architect, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, constitutes a dramatic
overhaul of Russian strategic priorities and military practice. Among
the primary threats to Russian security, the document identifies
“the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of
the military security of the Russian Federation or its allies” and
“the introduction of foreign troops (without the agreement of the
Russian Federation and the authorization of the UN Security Council)
onto the territories of states, which are adjacent to and friendly
toward the Russian Federation.” Clearly, both dangers are thinly
veiled references to the recent strategic inroads made by Washington.

In response, the doctrine embraces the use of preemptive military force
as a means not only to address military threats but also to maintain
access to regions of vital economic or financial importance. As such,
it represents a blue-print for the post-September 11 preservation of
Russian influence in the post-Soviet space, a policy that the Kremlin
has wholeheartedly endorsed.

Moscow has not wasted any time translating these principles into policy
in other ways as well. In Uzbekistan, Kremlin officials have managed
to conclude a series of new deals related to arms and the defense
industry, substantially strengthening military ties between Moscow and
Tashkent. Russia has also codified a framework accord that effectively
puts Moscow at the helm of a large portion of Tashkent’s military
policy. Similarly, in October 2003, in a sign of the Kremlin’s new
forward presence in the region, the Russian military opened its first
foreign base since the fall of the Soviet Union in Kant, Kyrgyzstan,
only 20 minutes from that country’s capital.[19]

Russia has also commenced an intense diplomatic offensive toward
Kazakhstan, with Putin’s January 2004 visit resulting in a significant
strengthening of strategic ties between the Kremlin and its former
satellite.[20] Just one month later, Russia and Kazakhstan inaugurated
a joint action plan for security cooperation, which defined bilateral
cooperation between the two countries as well as their respective
roles in regional security structures such as the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization.[21]
Russia has even reinforced its presence in Tajikistan, announcing in
July 2004 that its vaunted 201st Motorized Infantry Division will soon
have a permanent base in the Central Asian state.[22] Additionally,
in early 2004, in a clear coup for the Kremlin, the government of
Tajik president Imomali Rakhmonov granted Moscow military basing
rights in his country “on a free of charge and open-ended basis.”[23]

In the Caucasus, Moscow has embarked on a campaign designed to undercut
Georgia’s emerging role in the region. As part of this effort, the
Kremlin has fomented separatist tendencies within Georgia’s autonomous
regions (most recently in South Ossetia) and is even rumored to be
behind covert efforts to sabotage the emerging Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
energy pipeline. In late 2003, for example, a leading British paper
charged that Russia’s military intelligence organ, the Glavnoye
Razvedovatelnoye Upravlenie (GRU), was allocating funds to bankroll
eco-terrorists or Chechen rebels in attacks on the energy conduit.[24]

Russia’s approach to Azerbaijan has been more subtle. Through a variety
of diplomatic carrots and sticks, ranging from offers of military aid
to the abrupt cessation of gas supplies, Moscow has attempted to woo
Baku away from its West-ward trajectory.

At the same time, Defense Minister Ivanov has taken pains to stress
Moscow’s commitment to a long-term presence in Armenia. These efforts
include signing a new accord on military cooperation between Moscow
and Yerevan in November 2003, giving Russia the use of military
bases in the Caucasus republic, and announcing the Kremlin’s plans
to modernize Armenia’s military forces by expanding training programs
and weapons transfers.[25]

Russia is also broadening its regional presence by other means. It has
outlined plans to increase its armed forces in the Caspian Sea region
and, in a throwback to the gunboat diplomacy of Soviet times, has
launched a series of regional maneuvers of its Caspian fleet.[26] In
early June 2004, Russia also commenced large-scale military exercises,
dubbed “Mobility 2004,” in a clear signal to the countries in its
near abroad that Moscow possesses both the will and the firepower to
project force. Even though the maneuvers took place in the Russian
Far East, the Russian Foreign Ministry made clear that the exercises
were actually intended to demonstrate to neighboring states and to
the United States that “any place is within our reach.”[27]

Moscow’s moves are about much more than simply rolling back
U.S. influence. Russian officials, in the words of Putin himself,
are at least in part “now working to restore what was lost with the
fall of the Soviet Union, but are doing it on a new, modern basis.”[28]

THE CONFLICT TO COME

The friction resulting from all of these developments has brought
Central Asia and the Caucasus to center stage on the Russian and
U.S. strategic agendas. As Putin told an extraordinary session
of the country’s Security Council in July 2004, “We are facing an
alternative – either we’ll achieve a qualitative strengthening of
the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and create on its basis
an effectively functioning and influential regional organization, or
else we’ll inevitably see the erosion of this geopolitical space.” The
latter, Putin made clear, “should not be allowed to happen.”[29]

The addition of a new regional player has only reinforced Russia’s
sense of siege. With the most recent round of accession in the spring
of 2004, NATO has dramatically widened its scope and reach in Russia’s
near abroad. This expansion has been matched by a rising activism
in the Caspian and Black Sea regions. The Atlantic Alliance is now
angling to become a guarantor of security for countries in Central
Asia and the Caucasus, a fact that NATO formally articulated at its
June 2004 summit in Istanbul with the announcement of plans to put a
“special focus” on engagement in both regions.[30]

It is not surprising that the situation has fanned Russian fears of
Western encroachment. Russian policymakers have begun to worry, with
some justification, that NATO’s new reach might in the future make it
possible for the West to meddle in areas of the Russian Federation
that were previously off limits. The Kremlin is actively moving to
formulate a strategic response. As Yuri Baluyevsky, the new chief
of the Russian General Staff, has written, “A powerful military
stationed at our borders with no declared objective poses a threat
to any non-NATO country…. Sensible leaders would realize this and
prepare to counter the threat.”[31] For its part, the United States
has only strengthened its commitment to engagement with Central Asia
and the Caucasus as part of its plans to realign its global military
posture to address post-Cold War threats more effectively.[32]

The ultimate outcome of the emerging geopolitical tug of war between
Moscow and Washington is still far from certain. Russia and the United
States may yet be able to establish a modus vivendi of sorts in the
post-Soviet space, based on a mutual interest in neutralizing the
threat posed by regional terrorist groups. Indeed, this objective
has been given new urgency in the aftermath of the bloody massacre
of schoolchildren in Beslan, Russia, in early September 2004.

Nevertheless, the recent events in Beslan can just as easily serve as
the harbinger of far greater friction between Russia and the United
States. Russian officials have since unveiled a new counterterrorism
strategy that internalizes the principle of military preemption and
have expressed their right to “eliminate terrorist bases in any region
of the world.”[33] More ominously, Putin has used the tragedy as an
excuse to further centralize government power by altering the process
for the selection of Russia’s 89 regional governors. There is little
doubt either in Washington or in Moscow that such measures are likely
to contribute to a more aggressive Russian presence in the Caucasus
and Central Asia.

Remedial measures, such as a cooperative counterterrorism strategy for
the region or direct U.S. investment designed to revitalize Russia’s
ailing energy infrastructure, could certainly diffuse some of the
pressure at least temporarily, but policymakers in Washington would do
well to recognize the long-term incompatibility of U.S. and Russian
regional priorities. For the Kremlin, remaining the dominant player
in the post-Soviet space is not simply a matter of political prestige;
this role has increasingly become an economic necessity. For the White
House, meanwhile, the continued independence of the fragile regional
republics, not to mention their pro-Western political orientation,
remains critical to the long-term success of the global war against
terrorism.

The dueling strategies of the Russian and U.S. governments will do
more than simply determine the political evolution of Central Asia
and the Caucasus. Given the stakes, they are likely to test the very
limits of the strategic partnership between Moscow and Washington.

Ilan Berman is vice president for policy at the American Foreign
Policy Council in Washington, D.C., where he directs research and
analysis on Central Asia and the Middle East.

NOTES:

1. Elizabeth Wishnick, Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War:
U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia Reassessed (Carlisle, Pa.:
U.S. Army War College, May 2004), pp. 2-4.

2. Council on Foreign Relations,
“Terrorism: Questions & Answers-Uzbekistan,” 2004,
(accessed
October 14, 2004).

3. Wishnick, Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War, p. 2.

4. “Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts],” December 31, 2001,
(accessed
October 14, 2004).

5. National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
September 2002, p. 29, (accessed
October 14, 2004).

6. U.S. Department of Defense, “2002 Annual Report to
the President and the Congress,” Washington, D.C., 2002,
(accessed October
14, 2004).

7. Douglas J. Feith, “Transforming the Global Defense Posture,”
remarks before CSIS, Washington, D.C., December 3, 2003.

8. “Kyrgyz President Meets With U.S. Centcom Commander,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Newsline, July 29, 2004.

9. “Kazakhstan Building Military Base on Caspian With U.S. Help,”
RFE/RL Newsline, October 8, 2003.

10. “United States Signs Agreement With Azerbaijan to Help Ex-Soviet
Republic Strengthen Its Borders,” Associated Press, January 3, 2004;
“Azerbaijan, U.S. Sign Agreement on WMD,” RFE/RL Newsline, January
6, 2004.

11. Sevindzh Abdullayeva and Victor Shulman, “U.S., Azerbaijan Begin
10-Day Naval Exercises,” Itar-TASS News Service, January 26, 2004.

12. “Azerbaijan, U.S. Discuss Military Cooperation,” RFE/RL Newsline,
November 24, 2003.

13. “Armenia, U.S. Discuss Military Cooperation,” RFE/RL Newsline,
April 27, 2004.

14. “Putin Says Russian Oil to Make Up 10% of U.S. Imports in 5-7
Yrs.,” Prime TASS News Service, September 26, 2003.

15. Carola Hoyos and Arkady Ostrovsky, “Russia Fears Dollars 13bn
Capital Flight After Yukos,” Financial Times (London), November 8,
2003; “$5.5Bln Left Russia in First Half of Year,” Moscow Times,
July 5, 2004.

16. “Russia Unable to Increase Oil Production Quickly-Gref,” Interfax,
June 17, 2004.

17. Arkady Ostrovsky, “Putin Oversees Big Rise in Influence of
Security Apparatus,” Financial Times (London), October 31, 2003
(citing Olga Kryshtanovskaia).

18. Russian Ministry of Defense, “Urgent Tasks of the Development
of the Russian Federation Armed Force,” reprinted by the Russian
Information Agency (RIA) Novosti News Service, October 3, 2003.

19. “Russian Base in Kyrgyzstan Seen as Part of ‘Tougher’ Military
Posture,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, October 25, 2003.

20. Viktoria Sokolova, “Putin Visits Kazakhstan-Round-Up,” Itar-TASS
News Service, January 9, 2004; Charles Carlson, “Kazakhstan: Putin
Visit to Focus on Baikonur, CIS, Oil Resources,” RFE/RL, January
9, 2004.

21. “Kazakh, Russian Security Services Sign Cooperation Accord for
2004,” Interfax-Kazakhstan News Service, February 10, 2004.

22. “Russia to Set Up Military Base in Tajikistan in Autumn,” Itar-TASS
News Service, July 12, 2004; “Russia to Get Tajik Base in Fall,”
RFE/RL Newsline, July 13, 2004.

23. Valery Zhukov, “Russian Military Base in Tajikistan Big
Achievement-Armitage,” Itar-TASS News Service, July 17, 2004.

24. Nick Patton Walsh, “Russia Accused of Plot to Sabotage Georgian
Oil Pipeline,” Guardian (London), December 1, 2003.

25. “Russia to Rearm Armenia Base, Defence Minister Says,” RIA Novosti
News Service, November 11, 2003.

26. “Military Balance Needed in Caspian-Kalyuzhny,” Interfax News
Service, April 30, 2004; “Russia Ends Naval Drills in Caspian Sea,
Plans Large-Scale Drills for Summer,” Center TV (Moscow), May 3, 2004.

27. Pavel Baev, “Kremlin Launches Military Exercises in Russian Far
East,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 1, no. 28 (June 10, 2004).

28. “Putin Say CIS Seeks to ‘Restore What Was Lost’ With Soviet
Collapse,” RFE/RL Newsline, June 18, 2004.

29. Igor Torbakov, “Putin Urges Shift in Russia’s CIS Policies,”
Eurasia Daily Monitor 1, no. 60 (July 27, 2004).

30. “Istanbul Summit Communiqu?,” Istanbul, June 28, 2004,
(accessed October 14,
2004).

31. Yuri Baluyevsky, “Cooperation Is Only Path: West Must Finally
Bury Cold War Mindset,” Defense News, June 14, 2004.

32. Pamela Hess, “U.S. Plans Major Global Troop Realignment,” United
Press International, November 25, 2004.

33. Peter Baker, “Russia Says Siege Leader Brutally Killed 3
Followers,” Washington Post, September 9, 2004 (quoting Col. Gen. Yuri
Baluyevsky).

[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

http://www.terrorismanswers.org/coalition/uzbekistan.html
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf
http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr2002/index.htm
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm

Turkey, armenia: Relatives of slain Armenians win New York LifeInsur

Turkey, armenia: Relatives of slain Armenians win New York Life Insurance claims

Monday Morning, Lebanon
Feb 8 2005

Just a kindergartner during the 1915-1917 massacre of Armenians,
Bedros Bedrossian, who saw his parents and baby sister killed in the
dying years of the Ottoman Empire, never expected a big Manhattan
life insurance payout. But Bedros knew little of a New York policy
his father took out in those brutal days that could now pay off after
nearly a century and so many generations.

Bedros’ daughter-in-law Anaid is trying to cash in on an
extraordinary case that has startled Manhattan bankers and thrilled
the survivors of a period in history that nearly erased much of
Armenia from the map.

For the New York Life Insurance company has finally pledged to pay
back what it owed to relatives of those killed during one of the
starkest periods of World War I.

“When we found the name of my husband’s grandfather in the insurance
company’s lists, we were surprised and thrilled”, the 50-year-old
Anaid acknowledged.

“None of us could hope that there would come a day when the victims
and their families could reclaim at least a straw from the haystack
we lost in West Armenia”, she added.

According to a US court ruling of July 30, 2004, the New York Life
Insurance would have to honor its obligations to all who can prove
their blood ties to those named in the company’s lists.

Armenia’s Justice Ministry has arranged for a group of lawyers to
help those seeking to apply for the compensation to put together the
required documents and dispatch them to New York before the February
28 deadline.

But the work launched in September proved hard, with many survivors
having escaped with only clothes on their back, leaving all documents
and insurance policies behind.

“We accept applications from people, we open cases, seek proof in the
archives”, ministry spokesman Ara Sagatelyan said.

Such proof includes birth and marriage certificates, letters,
photographs, and books published in those times and telling of
various families and people.

“As of now, over 700 people applied to us, having found their
relatives in the US company’s lists, and only nine of those still had
the policies. There are also cases of people that have the policies
but their names are not listed”, Sagatelyan noted. Over 180 ready
applications had already been sent on, he said.

New York Life Insurance had pledged to pay a total of 20 million
dollars, with the victims’ relatives due to receive 11.9 million,
three million to be handed over to Armenian charity groups, and the
rest given to the Armenian Church.

However, it was not yet clear how much money would be claimed, as
many of those listed perished along with their whole families.
Turkey, which formed the nucleus of the former Ottoman Empire, has
disputed the scale and nature of the killing of Armenians, and
objected to the term ‘genocide’ used by surviving Armenians and their
descendants.

An estimated 1.5 million Armenians are believed to have died between
1915 and 1917 in the last years of the Ottoman Empire.

“In refusing to admit the fact of genocide, Turkey also fears that
Armenians would call for compensation of their lost property and
reclaim the money Armenians held in Turkish banks for their heirs”,
Turkey expert Akob Chakryan told journalists in the Armenian capital,
Yerevan.

Political coalition makes statement

Political coalition makes statement

Yerkir/arm
February 04, 2005

In response to the proposals for constitutional amendments made by the
Ardarutiun (Justice) and National Unity factions, the parliamentary
coalition issued a statement on Thursday.

Below is the text of the statement.

â~@~Adhering to the spirit of the parliamentary cooperation;

Regretting that the opposition did not react positively to the
coalitionâ~@~Ys proposal to work in cooperation in the stage of
drafting the constitutional reforms;

Considering the oppositionâ~@~Ys constructive role and participation
in the parliamentâ~@~Ys activities important;

Considering the necessity for a wider consensus in elaborating
and adopting constitutional reforms as well as reaffirming the
coalitionâ~@~Ys willingness for a wider cooperation in this process;

Welcoming the willingness of the Ardarutiun and the National Unity
factions to participate in the works of drafting the constitutional
reforms;

Valuing the cooperation for forming positions in the draft reforms;

Finding that the proposals made by the both factions are worth to
be considered;

Underscoring that public and political discussions as well as the work
at the relevant committee are vital to formulate positions regarding
the proposals made by the Ardarutiun and National Unity factions as
well as other proposals;

We call on the authors of the proposals to participate in the process
with an aim of formulating the final positions on the improvements
to be made in the government, judiciary, local governments, as well
as other sections of the Constitution.â~@~]

Republican Party of Armenia Armenian Revolutionary Federation Orinats
Yerkir Party

–Boundary_(ID_8aWiyYpy0oTetbBrJf6UTg)–

Mourners in tribute to a master of the organ

Broadway 24, UK
Feb 4 2005

Mourners in tribute to a master of the organ
[email protected]

Jonathan Marciano

TRIBUTES have been paid to one of Muswell Hill’s best-loved music
enthusiasts.

Felix Aprahamian’s funeral took place last Friday at St Marylebone
Crematorium, East Finchley, with carefully chosen speeches and music.

Guests such as music expert John Amis, baritone Gordon Honey, and
classical singer Danny Gillingwater spoke of the organist’s
contribution to the world of music.

Mr Aprahamian, who lived in Methuen Park for 85 years, was a
self-taught musician.

Guests at his funeral spoke of his enormous influence in musical
circles and remembered his enthusiasm, talent and his campaign to
save the Alexandra Palace organ.

Mr Aprahamian was born in London on June 5, 1914, the son of an
Armenian carpet dealer. The family moved to the Methuen Park home on
January 1, 1919.

Mr Aprahamian’s organ, inherited from the organist André Marchal, was
regularly used by his protégé, the blind organist David Liddle, who
also performed at the funeral.

Mr Aprahamian also encouraged young artists to practise at his house
and is remembered for holding parties with musical accompaniment.

Most recently Mr Aprahamian led the campaign to save the Alexandra
Palace organ, which the then Greater London Council was proposing to
sell.

This became a much greater challenge when it was badly damaged by
fire in 1980.

Mr Liddle said: “Felix would take visitors on sixpenny tours of the
organ at Ally Pally in 1929. He then became committed to restoring
the organ.

“More than that, he was my music mentor. He took me to Paris and
introduced me to the greatest organists and teachers.

“He has done similar things for many young musicians. He changed my
life and changed the life of everyone who met him.”

Mr Aprahamian attended Tollington High school, and became interested
in the organ, taking lessons in Crouch End.

He became a master of the instrument, counting among his friends
organist William Lloyd Webber, father of Andrew and Julian.

The funeral, attended by more than 150 people, began with a slow
movement from Rachmaninov’s 2nd Symphony as mourners arrived.

The coffin was brought in to an extract from Delius’s Mass of Life.

The last voice heard was an extract of Mr Aprahamian’s discussion on
Desert Island Discs about music’s appeal to the heart and head.

Mr Aprahamian died on January 15. He was unmarried.

;category=Newsbroadway&tBrand=northlondon24&tCategory=newsbroadway&itemid=WeED04%20Feb%202005%2016%3A26%3A08%3A187

http://hamhighbroadway.london24.net/broadway/news/story.aspx?brand=NorthLondon24&amp

7 Point Quake Registered in Turkey

7 POINT QUAKE REGISTERED IN TURKEY

YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 4. ARMINFO. A 7-point earthquake was registered in
Turkey last night.

The National Seismic Protection Service of Armenia reports that the
quake took place 50 km southeast of the town of Van at 4:20 a.m. In
the epicenter the shock was 7 point strong. Information on
destructions and casualties is specified.

Holocaust survivor shares memories at memorial event

Ashfield Today, UK
February 2, 2005

Holocaust survivor shares memories at memorial event

A HOLOCAUST survivor now living in Sutton recounted his childhood
memories of the genocide at a special memorial event on Sunday.

Simon Winston spoke to an audience of more than 100 people at
Kirkby’s Festival Hall in an event organised by Ashfield District
Council to mark Holocaust Memorial Day.

Last Thursday signalled the 60th anniversary of the liberation of the
notorious Auschwitz deathcamp, where more than a million Jews were
killed by the Nazis during the Second World War.

Simon (66) was just a small boy living in Poland when the genocide
began, but still has vivid memories of the persecution of Polish Jews
under the Nazi regime.

He and his family survived by hiding from the German authorities, but
many other Jews in his home town of Radzivillov were not so
fortunate.

Simon told Chad one of the main themes of his speech was how the
lessons of the Holocaust have still not been learned.

“After the Holocaust the caption was ‘never again’, but that has
fallen on deaf ears,” he said. “We have had lots of genocides since
the Holocaust – Bosnia, Rwanda and more recently Darfur. We need to
tell the leaders of these countries that what they are doing is wrong
and what they are doing is genocide.”

As part of the Holocaust memorials last week, Simon travelled to a
high-profile ceremony in London where he met the Queen and spoke to
other Holocaust survivors. He told Sunday’s audience of the
significance of that day for many of them.

“I met a lot of survivors who had more horrendous histories than I
had got,” he said. “Many were saying who would have thought that 60
years on they would be shaking hands with the Queen?”

Sherwood MP Paddy Tipping also spoke to the audience about a genocide
which took place in Europe during the First World War.

Around 1.5m people in Armenia were killed in 1915-18 during a
territory dispute with the Ottoman Empire. Many of the victims were
taken into the Syrian Desert and left there without food and water to
die.

There are close links between Ashfield and Armenia because the poet
Lord Byron, who once lived at Newstead Abbey, was a hero figure there
and many refugees relocated to Nottinghamshire. Even 90 years on,
efforts are still on-going to get the Turkish Government to
acknowledge that what happened to the Armenians was genocide.

Mr Tipping said people and politicians must put pressure on
Governments which deny genocide is taking place ? like the slaughter
happening in the Darfur region of Sudan today.

He told Chad: “I was keen to say to people at the meeting that we can
make a difference. We should not deny these things happen, we should
get onto the backs of politicians and say it is completely
unacceptable.”

Simon added: “I was very pleased with the response of the audience,
and particularly the questions they asked. I was also very impressed
with Paddy Tipping’s speech about the Armenian genocide.

“I was able to point out to him that it is worth recollecting that
when Hitler initiated his extermination policy against the Jews he is
reported to have said: ‘Who remembers the Armenians?’ In other words,
it was alright to kill the Jews because one day nobody would even
notice they were gone.”

Yerevan Press Club Weekly Newsletter – 02/03/2005

YEREVAN PRESS CLUB WEEKLY NEWSLETTER

JANUARY 28 – FEBRUARY 3, 2005

HIGHLIGHTS:

STATEMENT OF YEREVAN PRESS CLUB, JOURNALISTS UNION OF ARMENIA, INTERNEWS
ARMENIA PUBLIC ORGANIZATION AND COMMITTEE TO PROTECT FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

JUBILEE “PRESS CLUB” SHOW

FINE ON “HAYRENIK TV” CAUSES INDIGNATION

IN WHOSE WAY ARE THE NEWSPAPER STALLS?

COMMERCIALS ARE WATCHED, BUT ARE PERCEIVED TO BE IRRITATING

STATEMENT OF YEREVAN PRESS CLUB, JOURNALISTS UNION OF ARMENIA, INTERNEWS
ARMENIA PUBLIC ORGANIZATION AND COMMITTEE TO PROTECT FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

By a decree of the RA President of January 20, 2005 a competition was
announced to fill in the vacancies in the Council of Public Television and
Radio Company of Armenia. February 1 was the deadline for the application
submission. We did not make a statement during the application process not
to interfere with it. Presently we think it necessary to reinstate our
stance on the mechanism of broadcasting regulatory bodies formation.

We state that the RA Law “On Television and Radio” and the practice of its
implementation, in particular the present competition, does not correspond
to Armenia’s commitment to the Council of Europe about the transformation of
state broadcasting into public and to international standards.

Amendments to the Law “On Television and Radio”, adopted on December 3,
2003, according to which the vacancies in the Council of Public TV and Radio
Company (as well as in the National Commission on Television and Radio) are
filled by a competition, are allegedly stemming from the CoE experts’
recommendations. Yet, even at that time, having compared the proposals of
the experts and the amendments made, we noted that the latter ones do not in
any way comply with the essence and purpose of the recommendations to ensure
the greatest transparency of regulatory bodies formation. In particular, the
Law does not stipulate the procedure for forming the competition commission,
leaving it completely at the discretion of the President of the republic. If
previously the head of the state directly appointed the members of the
Council, he now appoints them out of the winners determined by the
commission he had formed.

We qualify the amendments to the Law and the competition announced basing on
them to be an imitation of democratic procedures and will keep insisting on
the need for real reforms.

Yerevan Press Club
Journalists Union of Armenia
Internews Armenia public organization
Committee to Protect Freedom of Expression
February 3, 2005

JUBILEE “PRESS CLUB” SHOW

On January 31 on the evening air of the Second Armenian TV Channel the
tenth, jubilee program of “Press Club” cycle was issued. The cycle is
organized by Yerevan Press Club under a homonymous project, supported by the
OSI Network Media Program.

The subject for the discussion by heads and representatives of the leading
Armenian media was the press response to Resolution 1416 (2005) of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe “Conflict over
Nagorno-Karabakh dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference”. The document was
adopted at the PACE session of January 25 basing on the report on
Mountainous Karabagh, prepared by PACE rapporteur David Atkinson. As the
program participants predicted, Karabagh conflict will remain at the focus
of Armenian media attention this week, too, particularly in the context of
the visit of international fact-finding mission to the territories,
controlled by Armenian forces. The two other central subjects for media, as
the “Press Club” participants supposed, can be the possible return of
opposition factions to the Parliament as well as the circumstances of arrest
of an Armenian MP in United Arab Emirates.

FINE ON “HAYRENIK TV” CAUSES INDIGNATION

The decision of the National Commission on Television and Radio of January
18 to penalize “Hayrenik TV” for rebroadcasting the programs of French
“Mezzo” channel and unauthorized demonstration of films (see details in YPC
Weekly Newsletter, January 14-20, 2005) caused much response in the press.
(“Hayrenik TV”, broadcasting since 2001, is the only channel in Armenia
intended for children and essentially non-commercial. The owner of the TV
company is a well-known entrepreneur Hrant Vardanian, the President of
“Grand Holding” company.)

“Ayb-Feh” weekly (January 21-27, 2005) was surprised that the NCTR Chairman
Grigor Amalian “has just noticed” “Mezzo” on the air of “Hayrenik TV”, while
the rebroadcasts are made for the third year already. “During the broadcast
licensing competition in 2002 the same Amalian, answering a journalist’s
question, said confidently, that “Hayrenik” had no problems to rebroadcast
“Mezzo””,”Ayb-Feh” reminds and stresses that “Hayrenik” continues the
rebroadcasts of the French channel to this day.

“Iravunk” newspaper (January 25-27, 2005) referring to “certain sources”
supposed that the “strictness” of NCTR Chairman is not totally without
context, “since he is somewhat related to film licensing and the license for
demonstration of one film costs over 100 USD, which is quite a burden for
the children TV channel”, which is “Hayrenik TV”.

In its issue of January 29 “Azg” daily reported the response of the head of
the National Commission to article “Who Does the NCTR Head Grigor Amalian
Fight With and What For?” published by the daily on January 28. Grigor
Amalian reminded the newspaper of the biblical commandment “Thou Shalt Not
Steal”.

This response gave rise to new comments. On February 1 “Novoye Vremya”
newspaper in an editorial comment to the article by Arman Vaneskeghian, the
press-secretary of “Grand Holding”, asked: “How proper is it to punish
“Hayrenik TV” for “Mezzo”, considering our not very rich cultural life
(…). What is on the other side of balance? Is the Commission as consistent
and strict to other Armenian channels where there is a plenty of shallow
films and programs – are they all licensed, is all this production acquired
legally and demonstrated or re-broadcast by international rules? Has no one
“stolen” anything? Besides, there are ten commandments, and “thou shalt not
steal” is only one of them. There are also others, say, the worldly
commandment “thou shalt make no damage…” Make no damage to thousands of
lovers of serious musical programs that can hardly be found on any other
channel.” In the article itself the press-secretary of “Grand Holding”
notes: “I was sure that French “Mezzo” channel itself demanded the National
Commission on Television and Radio to stop its unauthorized rebroadcasts.
(…) Imagine the surprise when it turned out that the French had nothing to
do with this and had made no protest.” Arman Vaneskeghian also reminded that
“Grand Holding” allocated to “Hayrenik TV” “almost two million USD
throughout its existence, spent to create quality and non-violent programs,
the goal of which is the education of future generation”.

“Haikakan Zhamanak” daily (February 1, 2005) voiced a number of questions
too: “Is NCTR monitoring all other TV companies to determine violations of
the law, is the duration of lotteries, commercials corresponds to the limits
stipulated by the law, is the volume of the self-produced programs compliant
with the legal provisions, is..? In response it these questions Amalian
always says that the technical capacities of the Commission are restricted
and it is impossible to be checking everything thoroughly.”

The opinion of the newspapers above is shared by “Golos Armenii” newspaper
(February 1, 2005): “The problem of “Mezzo” did not escape the attention of
NCTR. But, say, the lottery advertising, often exceeding the time limits
stipulated by the law, does not worry the Commission. Other, much more
outrageous and scandalous facts of incompliance of some Armenian channels
with not simply some clauses of the law, but to it in general, can be
quoted. And of course, examples of the passive behavior of Commission in
terms of revealing such offences can be quoted as well.”

“Aravot” daily (February 2, 2005) thinks it is difficult to determine who is
right in the conflict of NCTR and “Hayrenik TV” and advises the owner of the
latter to file a suit with the court. At the same time the newspaper
expresses its amazement at the fact that “Hayrenik TV” has more supporters
than “A1+” and “Noyan Tapan” had when deprived of air by the same
Commission: “Currently the National Commission on Television and Radio is
accused of lack of state thinking even by those media who used to stand for
it might and main.” Besides, in the opinion of “Aravot”, “the extreme
indignation due to penalizing “Hayrenik TV” is also explained by the fact
that no one in Armenia expect NCTR to pass a decision, corresponding to the
law”. This is why, the newspaper stresses, also in the case of “Hayrenik”
many people refuse to see it as a purely legal problem: “They are trying to
find other reasons for such unusual actions of NCTR – such as backstage
fight against the owner of “Hayrenik” TV company, etc. And frankly speaking,
this version seems to be the closest to reality.”

IN WHOSE WAY ARE THE NEWSPAPER STALLS?

Lately from Yerevan streets newspaper stalls started to disappear. There are
serious fears that the trend is becoming steady, and will thus restrict the
access of the citizens to information. This problem was raised by the
Chairman of “Armenian Press” Association of Editors-Publishers Vardan
Aloyan.

In the permanent section “HotLine” of “Golos Armenii” newspaper on February
1 Vardan Aloyan addressed its guest, Yerevan Mayor Yervand Zakharian with
the following question: “There is an impression that the municipality has
recently announced a war to newspaper stalls. The stalls by “Tashir”
Department Store and Arabkir market have already been demolished. The other
day with no prior notification the specialized newspaper stall of
“Komsomolskaya Pravda” at the crossroads of Terian and Isahakain was
demolished, the demolition of “Haymamul” newspaper stall at the beginning of
Mashtots avenue is a questions of a couple of days. Apparently, the
municipality is unable to suppress the wish of our oligarchs to gain these
nice pieces of Yerevan land. But then why doesn’t the city administration
provide other places on equally animated routes to move the stalls there?
Because every newspaper stall demolished is another attack on media
accessibility for people.”

“This issue is presently on the agenda of city authorities. Within the
coming three months the issue of newspaper stalls will be re-considered for
an appropriate decision to be made. The newspaper stalls will be retained,
and so will be their main purpose – the sale of newspapers and magazines”,
the head of the Yerevan administration assured.

It should be noted that still back in 2001 the media heads demanded that the
government stop the privatization of “Haymamul” Press Dissemination Agency.
The protest was caused in particular by the governmental resolution of
November 15, 2001 on the privatization of over 300 newspaper stalls owned by
“Haymamul”. The privilege here was given to the newspaper vendors
themselves. One of the mandatory terms of the privatization was retaining
the direct function of the newspaper stalls during five years (even in the
case of a change of owner). In the opinion of media and experts, this term
was not sufficient to guarantee that the sale of the publications will not
reduce. The latest events come to confirm the validity of journalistic
fears.

The “list” of the newspaper stalls that disappeared from Yerevan streets
mentioned above has now increased by another one: in the morning of January
25 a stall located in the vicinity of Medical University went on fire.
Whether this was arson, as the newspaper vendor Samvel Gasparian maintains,
is for the investigation to determine. Meanwhile the residents of Yerevan
have lost another opportunity to buy newspapers at one of the animated
places of the capital.

COMMERCIALS ARE WATCHED, BUT ARE PERCEIVED TO BE IRRITATING

Internews Armenia public organization has published the findings of the TV
audience survey in three major cities of Armenia – Yerevan, Gyumri and
Vanadzor. The research was administered by US “InterMedia” organization in
December 2004 by interviewing 500 respondents aged over 15 in each of the
cities above.

According to the survey findings, the TV ownership rates among the
respondents were highest in Vanadzor and Yerevan – 97% for each city. 87% of
respondents in Yerevan, 77% in Gyumri, 70% in Vanadzor watch TV every day.
Most respondents in all three cities had seen advertisements on TV
“yesterday” (72% – in Yerevan), yet the attributes most commonly applied to
TV advertisements are “irritating” and “boring”. The highest number of
available channels is in Yerevan: 61% respondents can receive at least 14 TV
channels. The opportunities in Gyumri and Vanadzor are somewhat restricted:
the majority of the respondents can receive less than 14 TV channels.

In all three cities peak TV viewing times are between 20.00 and 23.00.
Respondents under 30, in all three cities, tend to watch in higher numbers
in the afternoon, from 14.00 until 17.00 or 18.00 and respondents over 30 –
from the morning until about 13.00, except in Gyumri. In all three cities
the respondents, particularly those, aged under 30, consider the
entertainment programs to be the most important for them. This opinion is
shared by 80% in Vanadzor, 66% – in Yerevan, 47% – in Gyumri.

The audience survey for specific TV channels showed that Gyumri viewers
commonly characterize the local “Tsayg” and “Shant” as “independent” and
“objective”. 44% of respondents in Vanadzor qualified the local “Lori” TV
company as “amateurish”, and 41% thought it was “engaging”. Another Vanadzor
TV company “Interkap” was most frequently named “trustworthy” or “engaging”.

In the opinion of respondents in all three cities, the First Channel of the
Public Television of Armenia is one of the two TV channels for news
coverage. The other leaders, the news programs of which are most popular,
are “Armenia” in Yerevan, “Shant” in Gyumri and ORT (Russia) in Vanadzor.

By the survey findings, the PTA First Channel is the most popular station in
Gyumri and Vanadzor and rates a close second to “Armenia” in Yerevan.
Throughout the week the programs of PTA First Channel are watched by 86.8%
of audience in Yerevan, 82.8% – in Gyumri and 93.3% – in Vanadzor. Other top
stations in terms of weekly reach are “Armenia” and RTR (Russia) in Yerevan,
“Shant” and Second Armenian TV Channel in Gyumri, ORT and Second Armenian TV
Channel in Vanadzor.

When reprinting or using the information above, reference to the Yerevan
Press Club is required.

You are welcome to send any comment and feedback about the Newsletter to:
[email protected]

Subscription for the Newsletter is free. To subscribe or unsubscribe from
this mailing list, please send a message to: [email protected]

Editor of YPC Newsletter – Elina POGHOSBEKIAN
____________________________________________
Yerevan Press Club
9B, Ghazar Parpetsi str.
375007, Yerevan, Armenia
Tel.: (+ 374 1) 53 00 67; 53 35 41; 53 76 62
Fax: (+374 1) 53 56 61
E-mail: [email protected]
Web Site:

www.ypc.am

Lavrov’s visit irked Baku

Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
February 2, 2005, Wednesday

LAVROV’S VISIT IRKED BAKU

SOURCE: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 31, 2005, p. 3

by: Sokhbet Mamedov, Elkhan Shaginoglu

Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s visit to Azerbaijan expected on
February 1 is the focus of attention. Some Baku newspapers announced
that Lavrov would insist that Azerbaijan join the Organization of the
CIS Collective Security Treaty. The report alarmed national patriots
who immediately screamed treason on the part of the authorities and
began talking of the danger to sovereignty. Most analysts took the
reports with a certain grain of salt. Zardusht Alizade, a prominent
Azerbaijani political scientist, told journalists that Lavrov was too
old a hand at diplomacy to bring up so delicate a subject
(particularly since Armenia was a member of the Organization of the
CIS Collective Security Treaty).

A source in the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry says that Lavrov is
coming to discuss preparations for the Russian-Azerbaijani summit
scheduled for the second half of February when President Ilham Aliyev
will visit Moscow. Lavrov and his opposite number Elmar Mamedjarov
will also discuss economic problems, the matter of the legal status
of the Caspian Sea, and preparations for the second Caspian Summit.
Special attention will be paid to join efforts against international
terrorism; an audience with Aliyev is scheduled as well.

Commenting on Aliyev’s forthcoming visit to Moscow, opposition media
outlets maintain that the relations between the two countries are
based on economic concessions on the part of Azerbaijan more than on
any political support from Russia.

Karabakh settlement remains the stumbling stone in the
Russian-Azerbaijani relations. According to what information this
newspaper has compiled, Moscow will be asked to abandon its role of a
neutral mediator and talk to its strategic ally Armenia.
Well-informed sources also say that Lavrov will be asked to explain
the latest statements made by Yuri Merzlyakov, Russian Chairman of
the OSCE Minsk Group, which Baku found to be clearly pro-Armenian (as
far as Merzlyakov is concerned, Karabakh is a warring party also).
Armenian origin of the Russian foreign minister may have played its
role in the public outcry in Azerbaijan too.

Some Azerbaijani experts are of the opinion that unless Lavrov
reaches an agreement with Baku on central issues, Moscow may lose
initiatives in dealing with the problems Azerbaijan regards as vital.
This loss of initiative will make the United States and EU major
players in the southern part of the Caucasus. Should Moscow decide to
meet Azerbaijan halfway, Baku is prepared to consider its interests,
intensify economic contacts, and broaden direct contacts between
regions of Russia and Azerbaijan.

Translated by A. Ignatkin

Georgia, Azerbaijan To Sign Protocol Banning Cargo Transit to ROA

GEORGIA AND AZERBAIJAN PLAN TO SIGN PROTOCOL BANNING CARGO TRANSIT TO
ARMENIA

BAKU, FEBRUARY 1. ARMINFO. A protocol on banning cargo transit to
Armenia is to be shortly signed on the Georgian-Azeri border, says the
chairman of the state customs committee of Azerbaijan Kemaleddin
Heydarov.

The protocol has followed the reports of cargo transit to Armenia via
Azerbaijan’s territory. The investigation is well underway and there
is already enough evidence for instituting a criminal case, says
Heydarov. Those guilty will be prosecuted in accordance with Azeri
laws and international agreements.

The protocol signing was scheduled for early Jan but was postponed for
technical reasons