Author: Torgomian Varazdat

YEREVAN HOSTS SEMINAR ON QUALITY INFRASTRUCTURE REFORMS

PanARMENIAN.Net
02.02.2010 19:04 GMT+04:00

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ On February 2, 2010, Armenian-European Policy and
Legal Advice Centre (AEPLAC) in cooperation with the Ministry of
Economy, EU Advisory Group to Armenia, German Institute of Metrology
(PTB) and The World Bank organized a workshop on "Road Map for the
Reform of Quality Infrastructure". The target audience of the workshop
were decision-makers of the Ministry of Economy, National Institute of
Standards, National Institute of Metrology, Agency of Accreditation,
State Inspectorate of Protection of Markets and Consumers Rights,
AEPLAC press service reported.

The workshop was an important milestone in a coordinated effort
of international donors to assist Armenia in the reform of the
quality infrastructure with the objective to raise the international
competitiveness of its economy and ensure progress toward a Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with EU.

Coordinated activities of international donors were initiated in
July 2009 following the need to create a modern system of quality
infrastructure in Armenia, which would comply with international
requirements including EU standards and hence reduce technical
barriers to trade. Since then, an awareness workshop was held, a
metrology assessment report written and submitted to the Ministry of
Economy, road map for the reforms drafted, and additional resources
for high-quality policy advice on respective reform measures convened.

The workshop discussed draft road map for further QI reforms, which
guides the Armenian government in the process.

Monday, February 1, 2010

HISTORY IN SMALL TYPE

THE SPEIR DYNASTY- A long tryst with India

Writing on the wall
Ashok V. Desai

Alexander Speir, a cadet under training in the Royal Military College,
Marlow, in 1802, was extremely short of money. His father, Archibald,
was a rich man in Glasgow, but he had told his son never to get in
touch with him because he did not want his wife to know about his
16-year-old illegitimate son, or did not want her to know he was
financing Alexander. So Alexander had to write to Walter Logan, a
friend of Archibald’s father who managed much business for
him. Sometimes Logan would send Alexander money. At other times, he
would ask Archibald and wait for his answer. Either way, little money
arrived, and it came after long entreaties.
But a cadet had to be properly dressed; and the marching and riding
took a heavy toll on clothes and boots. So Alexander would keep a
detailed account of his expenses and send it to Logan from time to
time. Often he still did not receive the money. And then the College
would close down in vacation, and Alexander had no home to go to. Once
his professor took pity on him and took him in. He was so outraged by
Alexander’s penury that he sent an account of £42 15s 2d to Logan. Of
this, the draper’s (i.e. tailor’s) bill came to £14 1s 9d, stockings
cost £1 6s, and the shoemaker charged £1 6s 7d. A student in a college
could not survive without writing; paper cost £5. Perpetually
embarrassed about money and about his father, Alexander was keen to
leave Britain and try his luck abroad. But his father told him,
through Logan, that he had to study more, and that his handwriting was
atrocious.
Alexander was a well-behaved and motivated student. That led to two
disasters in 1804: in May, he was promoted to corporal, and in July to
sergeant. As sergeant, he had to make a round of the rooms every night
and make sure that every cadet had folded away his clothes and gone to
bed. For that he needed three nightshirts and a flannel dressing
gown. He also had to fence, and the thrusts and lunges were hard on
underclothes; so he needed four stocking-webbed drawers. His clothes
were in such poor shape that in August, his captain wrote to Archibald
Speir that upon inspection of Alexander’s wardrobes, 7 handkerchiefs
and 4 pairs of drawers were found unserviceable or missing.
Archibald knew William Elphinstone, a director of the East India
Company, on whose recommendation Alexander was enlisted in the
Company’s army. On 7 March 1805, he left Portsmouth on the sailing
ship, Surrey – 819 tons, 143ft 11in long, with 6ft 2in headroom
between its three decks – for Calcutta. He should have carried 72
calico shirts with him on the voyage since none could be washed on the
way; but he had only 48. On arriving in August, he joined the first
battalion of the 23rd Bengal Native Infantry as lieutenant.
After the East India Company forces took Asirgarh, the last Mahratta
bastion, in 1819, much of India came under the Company’s
domination. It kept in place most of the kings who littered India
except when they misbehaved, left its own troops in strategic places
to keep the kings under discipline, and appointed officers as
residents or political agents – ambassadors to the various states. As
an army officer, Speir was political agent successively in Sirohi,
Gwalior and Nagpur.
Once he had found his feet, Alexander took on a concubine; he did not
marry her until 1847, when he was on his deathbed. Amongst the
children he had with her, four sons and four daughters survived. The
youngest, John Alpine Speirs, was sent to England where he studied in
King’s College, London, without taking a degree. He returned to India
in 1857 and joined Bray and Co, contractors who were building the
Poona-Sholapur railway line for the Great Indian Peninsula
Railway. After working for them for seven years, he became an
inspector of police in Lucknow. In 1866, he married Rachel, daughter
of Joseph and granddaughter of Dr James Short.
James Short was a surgeon in the service of the East India Company in
the late 18th century. In 1800, he was sent to serve the Bacha (Pasha)
of Baghdad. There he married Mary, widow of an Armenian named
Carrapet. In 1817, he moved his family from Cawnpore to Lucknow, and
sent ahead his 12-year-old daughter Mary, together with his infant son
Joseph, in a palanquin. On the way, they encountered Ghaziuddin Hyder,
Nawab of Oude, returning from a hunt. Mary got out of the palanquin to
watch the Nawab pass by. The Nawab liked her looks, took her with him
to Lucknow and married her. Little Mary, suddenly finding herself
imprisoned in the Nawab’s harem, kept Joseph and brought him
up. Joseph grew up as an oriental prince. He had four children by his
first wife Jane, three by his second wife Amelia, and eight by five
slave girls. Rachel was his daughter born out of an affair with Amelia
in 1846; he married Amelia in 1860, after her first wife Jane Huggins
had died in 1849 and after many more liaisons.
John Alpine Speirs had five children by Rachel, two of whom died in
infancy. One of the survivors was John Sleeman Speirs, named after
William Sleeman, the legendary law enforcer who pursued and eliminated
the Thugs who used to waylay travellers on trunk roads, kill them and
rob them till the 1870s. John also had two other sons – Alexander John
born to John Alpine’s sister-in-law out of an affair with John, and
William Stephen, born out of an affair with the wife of one of his
best friends, Joey Johannes.
John Alpine Speirs remained a policeman for only 7 years. He was an
Anglo-Indian. The government of Her Majesty, Queen Victoria, took over
the government of India from the East India Company in 1857, and began
to send pure-blooded British gentlemen to rule India. Half-breeds or
Anglo-Indians like John Alpine came to be looked down on; John’s
prospects in the police were poor. So he went back to
railway-building, and worked on railway lines built in eastern
India. He left his children in Lucknow with Amelia, the sister-in-law
he had an affair with. Of his children, Alexander John, William
Stephen and John Sleeman took law examinations. William became deputy
registrar of the court of Oude, Alexander practised in Faizabad, and
Sleeman in Moradabad.
Sleeman did well as a lawyer, and built a big bungalow named Fairlawns
to bring up his five sons and two daughters (all legitimate). He
retired in 1940 and went to live in a house in Mussoorie called
Silverwood. But by that time, all his children had left for England –
even those educated in India. By 1945, he could see the end of British
rule coming, and left for England. His son, Lawrence, did physics and
worked on rockets in England in World War II. Lawrence’s son, Malcolm,
was intrigued by his family’s long tryst with India. He researched it
and wrote it up in The Wasikadars of Awadh: A History of Certain
Nineteenth-Century Families of Lucknow (Rupa, 2008).

(I wrote this in the Calcutta Telegraph of 24 February 2009.)

istory-in-small-letters.html

BJNI DEAL IS NULL AND VOID: SIL CONCERN

Tert.am
16:12 ~U 01.02.10

Recent developments over the Bjni Mineral Water Factory CJSC once
again have proved that Armenian authorities have a "special" attitude
towards the Sukiasyan family, says a statement released by SIL Concern.

"Bjni Mineral Water Factory CJSC – currently involved in a bankrupt
court case – was brought by [Armenian] authorities to such a point
where they wanted it to be," reads the statement, according to which
on December 25, 2009, the real estate, movable property, mining rights
and other property rights belonging to Bjni were sold to Armenian
Royal Cigarette CJSC as one entity.

"In this case too, as it was in February 2009, all the property
belonging to the company was sold again to the same person with serious
violations of the law, which certainly lay grounds for us to say that
the deal is null and void," says the statement, adding that Armenian
authorities made 9 violations of the law during the deal.

The statement also says that the fact that Armenian Royal Cigarette
CJSC signed a contract enabling it to pay the sum at an optional time,
is direct proof that the company, in fact, did not have the necessary
money at the time and Armenian authorities decided to donate the
company’s estate to the buyer.

According to the authors of the statement, Armenian Royal Cigarette
CJSC is not a conscientious buyer.

SIL Concern assures that "there will come a time when the company’s
estate will be returned to its real owner with compensation for all the
losses the company has suffered, as the property was taken from its
proprietor illegally, under the pressure of the police, prosecutor’s
office, Judicial Acts Compulsory Service, nature protection and tax
service bodies through illegal acts and torture."

TURKS BAN THE WORD ‘ARARAT’ IN GEOGRAPHY BOOKS

Panorama.am
19:14 29/01/2010

Turkey’s Education Ministry banned the word "Ararat" in country’s
geography books. It goes about the name of the Biblical Mountain
"Ararat". According to Firat news agency, Turkey’s nationalists and
the ruling "Justice and Development" Party rank the word Ararat among
those banned and related to the Armenian Genocide.

"Ararat" symbolizes the Armenian Genocide," they explain.

The leader of the "National Movement" Party Hasan Chalis submitted
a bid to the Turkish parliament over substituting the word "Ararat"
for "Agir Dag" as the Turks call it generally.

Earlier Turkey’s nationalists urged the education ministry for
mediation to ban the word Ararat in "Google-Earth".

ALMA IN US WILL HOST A LECTURE ON DUDUK, ARMENIAN NATIONAL INSTRUMENT

PanARMENIAN.Net
28.01.2010 17:53 GMT+04:00

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ On February 4, Armenian Library and Museum of America
(ALMA) will host a lecture entitled "Armenian duduk and the impact
of cultural policy from Soviet times to present day".

Presentation will be conducted by ALMA Research Fellow Dr. Jonathan
McCollum

Dr. McCollum will examine the impact of folk music both during and
after Soviet rule in Armenia by concentrating specifically on the
duduk as mediator and marker of cultural heritage. Dozens of Hollywood
blockbusters, like "Gladiator," "The Last Temptation of Christ" and
"The Da Vinci Code," have unveiled the Armenian duduk’s ancient soul
in their scores.

Afterwards, master musician Martin Haroutunian will take the audience
on a soulful musical journey with his performance of traditional
Armenian duduk pieces.

Jonathan McCollum’s experiences and interests as an ALMA Research
Fellow have spanned several fields such as ethnomusicology, historical
musicology, archeomusicology, museum studies and art history. He
is the co-author of Armenian Music: A Comprehensive Bibliography
and Discography (Scarecrow Press, 2004), and is a contributor to
Identity, Pluralism, and Soviet Music (Scarecrow Press, in press),
Defining Music: An Ethnomusicological and Philosophical Approach
(Edwin Mellen Press, 2007), and wrote the chapter on "Music of Central
Asia and the Caucasus" in OnMusic World Music Online textbook (2008).

The Duduk (pronounced "doo-dook") is one of the oldest Armenian double
reed instruments in the world. Throughout the centuries, the duduk has
traveled to many neighboring countries and has undergone a few subtle
changes in each of them, such as the specific tuning and the number of
holes, etc. Now variants of duduk can be found in Georgia, Azerbaijan,
Turkey, and Persia, and even as far away as the Balkans. Besides being
called variations of the Armenian word "duduk", such as "duduki" (in
Georgia), it is also referred to as "mey" (in Turkey), and "balaban"
(in Azerbaijan and in parts of Central Asia).

The basic form has changed little in it’s long history. Originally,
like many early flutes, the instrument was made from bone. Then it
advanced to a single, long piece of reed/cane with the mouthpiece
fashioned on one end and holes drilled out along it’s length for
the notes. However, this had the obvious disadvantages of a lack of
durability, namely when any part of it would crack you had to make an
entirely new instrument, and perhaps equally frustrating, it could not
be tuned. So, to address both of these problems, it was eventually
modified into two pieces: a large double reed made of reed/cane;
and a body made of wood. This is the form that is still in use today.

While other countries may use the wood from other fruit and/or nut
trees when making their instruments (often plum and walnut in Georgia,
and Azerbaijan, for example…), in Armenia, the best wood for making
duduks has been found to be from the apricot tree. It has come to be
preferred over the years for it’s unique ability to resonate a sound
that is unique to the Armenian duduk. All of the other variations
of the instrument found in other countries have a very reed-like,
strongly nasal sound, whereas the Armenian duduk has been specifically
developed to produce a warm, soft tone which is closer to a voice than
to a reed. It should be noted that in order to further accentuate these
qualities, a particular technique of reed making has evolved, as well.

AZERBAIJANI LANGUAGE TEACHING AT AIN SHAMS UNIVERSITY OF EGYPT

APA
28 Jan 2010 12:31

Baku. Ibad Bagirov – APA. Chair of Turkish Language and Literature
at Ain Shams University of Egypt is teaching Azerbaijani language,
the university professor Safsafi Ahmad Al-Mursi told APA. He said
Azerbaijani language has been taught at the University since 1998 on
his initiative. Nearly 50 alumni graduated from the chair he headed
in the past years and one those students is continuing his education
at Doctor’s Program of the Baku State University.

Professor Al-Mursi emphasized the role Azerbaijani scientists and
writers in the development of the Islamic culture since the ancient
time already in ancient times. He said he visited Azerbaijan for the
third time and previously he attended the World Azerbaijanis Congress.

Al-Mursi met with the professors of the Azerbaijani Literature Chair
at the Baku State University and chairman of the Writers Union Anar.

They discussed the issues related to popularization of contemporary
writers in Egypt. The professor proposed to translate works of
Azerbaijani poets and writers to Arabic at the translation center
near the Ministry of Culture of Egypt. The process will be continued
at the Egyptian National Translation Center.

Professor Al-Musri is working now on the selected works of classic
and contemporary Azerbaijani literature. He published several articles
about Nagorno Karabakh in the journal "Middle East problems and future
researches" of Ain Shams University. The Egyptian professor is an
author of 60 articles, 21 books, 21 transtaled books, 4 dictionaries,
including Turkish-Arabic dictionary. His book "Azerbaijan in the past
and present periods" will be published in Arabic in near future.

SEYRAN OHANYAN: ARMY IS THE RELIABLE GUARANTEE OF FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE
Karen Ghazaryan

"Radiolur"
27.01.2010 14:23

"Eighteen years ago, when the Ministry of Defense and the Regular
Army of the Republic of Armenia were just being formed, no one,
even the optimists, could believe that we would have a powerful and
effective Army like the one we have today. We were in war and we had
to take the test," Defense Minister Seyran Ohanyan said at the solemn
sitting dedicated to the 18th anniversary of the Armenian Army.

Seyran Ohanyan noted that "Army is the reliable guarantee of the
independence and freedom of the county."

Eurasia Daily Monitor

Friday, January 22, 2010 — Volume 7, Issue 15

YANUKOVYCH CONSISTENTLY RUSSIA-LEANING IN UKRAINE’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

by Vladimir Socor

Russia’s authorities have adopted a position of studied equidistance
between the two main candidates during Ukraine’s presidential election
campaign. Moscow has interfered only to the extent of ostracizing
President Viktor Yushchenko, whose re-election chances it knew to be
nil. Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and Party of Regions leader
(formerly two-time prime minister) Viktor Yanukovych will face each
other in the February 7 run-off. Moscow as well as Western governments
have insisted throughout the campaign that they would work with either
winner after the election, only stipulating that the process be free
and fair.

Formal equidistance seems to be the only possible option at this
stage, in view of the volatile race with an unpredictable outcome. But
this option also reflects the lessons of the 2004 presidential
election in Ukraine, when the Kremlin’s Yanukovych project failed
outright, and the opposite Yushchenko project unraveled soon
afterward. His presidency already sinking in 2006, Yushchenko tried to
keep afloat by bringing RosUkrEnergo into Ukraine (as Yanukovych had
first decided to do in 2004 as prime minister) and bringing Yanukovych
back as prime minister (2006-2007) on a fast track toward the
presidential candidacy again.

Yanukovych’s programmatic statements during this campaign differ
starkly from Tymoshenko’s positions regarding Ukraine-Russia relations
and Ukraine’s place in Europe. Theirs are, in major respects, two
different foreign policies. Yanukovych’s stated positions are aligned
with Russian policy objectives on some issues of central significance
to Ukraine, his prescriptions opposite to those of Tymoshenko.

On gas supplies and transit, Tymoshenko has signed agreements in 2009
with Russia on supplies and with the European Union on modernizing the
transit system. The agreements envisage European-level prices for
Russian gas supplies to Ukraine and E.U.-led technical and financial
assistance to the transit system’s modernization, keeping Ukrainian
ownership intact.

Yanukovych, however, calls for sharing control of the Ukrainian system
with Gazprom, in return for discounted prices on Russian gas
supplies. Yanukovych has brought back the old idea of creating a
Gazprom-led international consortium to implement that
bargain. Apparently reflecting the Donetsk steel and chemical
industries’ need for low-priced gas supplies, Yanukovych is turning
this issue into a campaign promise of cheap gas for the people, vowing
to renegotiate the agreements with Russia (Inter TV, Interfax-Ukraine,
January 15, 19, 21).

Regarding the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union, Yanukovych
considers the possibilities of Ukraine participating in it
selectively, for certain categories of goods and commodities (steel,
chemicals, and agricultural products presumably topping the list of
sheltered interests). Yanukovych and Moscow are willing to negotiate
the terms of such Ukrainian participation. This would, however,
complicate and slow down the negotiations launched by the Tymoshenko
government toward a free trade agreement with the E.U. and an
association agreement with it. Yanukovych claims that Ukraine could
have it both ways, in an overarching framework of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, however, are not
WTO members; and their chances have become more remote since Russia
insists on their admission as a group, which is unacceptable to WTO
countries, including those of the E.U. (Interfax, January 16, 20).

Yanukovych supports a prolongation of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s
stationing on Ukraine’s territory. In return for higher rent payments
(currently a derisory $ 95 million per year), Yanukovych says that he
would favor extending the Russian fleet’s presence beyond the 2017
deadline, and delaying official debate until the deadline draws closer
(thus pre-determining the deadline’s breach). According to him, the
Russian fleet enhances Ukraine’s and Russia’s common security; and
extending the fleet’s presence would fit within Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev’s concept of a new European security
architecture. Tymoshenko, however, insists that no foreign forces may
be stationed in Ukraine after 2017, pointedly citing the
constitutional prohibition in this regard (Inter TV, January 15).

Following Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, Yanukovych came out in
favor of `recognition’ of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Elements in his
Party of Regions submitted resolutions to that effect in the Verkhovna
Rada and the Crimean regional legislature in 2009. Yanukovych did not
seem to actively support that effort but he did not distance himself
from it either. He seems ignorant of such resolutions’ potential
boomerang effect on Ukraine in the Crimea.

In line with Russia’s policy, Yanukovych supports awarding official
status to the Russian language in Ukraine’s regions (not necessarily
confined to the east and south). This would be impossible to legislate
at the national level because it would necessitate a two-thirds
majority in the Verkhovna Rada to amend the constitution. Yanukovych
(as well as Moscow) calls for using the European charter of minority
and regional languages in Ukraine as a means to confer official
status–in practice, a privileged status–for Russian at the level of
Ukraine’s regions.

The Party of Regions has entered into a cooperation agreement with
Russia’s party of power, United Russia. According to the Duma’s
international affairs committee chairman, Konstantin Kosachev, the two
parties’ relations have a `systemic character’ (Interfax, January 17).
Tymoshenko’s presidential candidacy, however, has been endorsed in
emphatic terms by the European People’s Party, the umbrella
organization of Europe’s Christian-Democrat parties.

— Vladimir Socor

Thursday, January 21, 2010 — Volume 7, Issue 14

RUSSIAN-BROKERED DIARCHY WOULD BEST SUIT MOSCOW IN UKRAINE

by Vladimir Socor

Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and opposition Party of
Regions leader (formerly twice prime minister) Viktor Yanukovych will
face each other in the presidential election run-off on February
8. Russia has made clear that it is willing to work with Tymoshenko,
Yanukovych, or both leaders at present and in the post-election
period.

By all indications, Moscow does not have a preferred Ukrainian
candidate. However, Moscow must contemplate a preferred outcome, which
could well be a diarchy in Ukraine. A Russian-brokered governing
diarchy would enable Moscow to play both sides in Ukraine and emerge
as a political arbiter or balance holder between them.

Moscow has previously supported diarchy-type arrangements in two
post-Soviet republics: in Armenia in 1998-2000 and in Moldova in
2001. Both experiments ended with the imposition of de facto
presidential rule by Moscow-friendly presidents, despite the mixed
presidential-parliamentary systems formally existing in both
countries.

Ukraine’s existing constitutional arrangements are a prescription for
stalemate, pitting the presidency against the government and
parliamentary majority, and turning rivalries between parties into
conflicts between institutions. The 2004 constitutional compromise
aggravated this situation, with often paralyzing effects. The Orange
Revolution’s unintended result turned out to be disorganization of the
state and generalized dysfunctionality of its institutions.

As President Viktor Yushchenko-who bears a major share of
responsibility for that situation-departs the scene, Ukraine’s
three-cornered power contest is turning into a bipolar one involving
the Party of Regions and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYUT). A fragile
and unstable equilibrium between these rival forces after the
presidential election would open possibilities for Russia to advance
its objectives in Ukraine (see article below). From Moscow’s
standpoint, the optimal solution in Ukraine would be a tense diarchy.

An unstable Ukraine or a deeply dysfunctional Ukrainian state,
however, is not in Russia’s interest. Ukrainian political leaders
would simply be unable to deliver on agreements reached in such
circumstances. Ukraine’s Western partners as well as Russia have
learned this repeatedly from 2005 onward — with the partial exception
of the BYUT-led government in 2009. Moscow needs a Ukrainian president
and government sufficiently effective to deliver on agreements, but
still unconsolidated and insecure in power, and leaving scope for
Moscow to deal alternately with Ukraine’s rival political forces.

Whether Tymoshenko or Yanukovych win the presidency, Moscow may well
encourage diarchy-type arrangements to take shape for the
post-election period. That would involve a Russian-brokered
cohabitation between the Ukrainian president and government, as well
as between the parliamentary majority and an almost evenly matched
opposition. A delimitation of spheres of authority at the level of
institutions could then, with Russia’s encouragement, take shape also
between Kyiv and Donetsk, formally or informally.

Russia can therefore be expected to try a soft version of the general
post-Soviet paradigm of controlled instability. In Ukraine’s case it
can exploit the stalemate between institutions and branches of power
and their respective political exponents. The Kremlin had earlier
invoked more severe forms of controlled instability by playing on
Ukraine’s regional differences, e.g., to influence the presidential
election in 2004 and derail the Ukraine-NATO membership action plan in
2008. At the present stage, however, Moscow has no cause to encourage
centrifugal forces and no interest in doing so.

On January 19, two days after the first round of Ukraine’s
presidential election, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev instructed
Ambassador Mikhail Zurabov in front of TV cameras to take up his post
in Ukraine immediately. Zurabov had been appointed in August to fill
that vacant post, but was never actually sent to Kyiv, as the Kremlin
refused to deal with Yushchenko. Once Yushchenko lost the election’s
first round on January 17, Medvedev instructed Zurabov in this
set-piece meeting to work with the first-round winners in
Ukraine. Without naming names and without awaiting the run-off,
Medvedev expressed confident hope that `capable, effective authorities
would emerge in Ukraine [from this election], willing to develop
constructive, friendly, multi-dimensional relations with Russia.’ The
message to Tymoshenko and Yanukovych is that Moscow is ready to work
with either of them or both. Medvedev elevated Zurabov’s status by
appointing him special presidential envoy for economic relations with
Ukraine (i.e., reporting directly to the Russian president),
concurrently with the ambassadorial assignment (Interfax, Russian
Television, January 19).

If Tymoshenko wins the presidency, Ukraine could overcome the
political stalemate without a Russian-brokered diarchy
solution. According to many observers, a Tymoshenko success would
induce defections from the Party of Regions and residual
pro-Yushchenko sub-factions, reinforcing the BYUT-led parliamentary
majority and government. Should Yanukovych win the presidency,
however, he is widely expected to trigger pre-term parliamentary
elections for a new majority and government under his Party of Regions
(UCIPR [Kyiv], `The Obvious and the Hidden,’ Research Update, January
14).

Yet another electoral campaign, if Yanukovych does trigger it, would
cripple Ukraine’s and international lenders’ efforts to deal with the
economic crisis in the country. It would also prolong Ukraine’s
permanent election campaign syndrome (almost continuous since 2004)
even further. And it would increase Moscow’s opportunities to play
arbiter and stabilizer between Ukrainian political forces, for greater
Russian political influence in the country.

— Vladimir Socor

Thursday, January 21, 2010 — Volume 7, Issue 14

RUSSIAN POLICY OBJECTIVES IN UKRAINE’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
by Vladimir Socor

FroM its preliminary stages down to the January 17 first round,
Ukraine’s presidential election has occasioned a full and continuous
display of Russia’s strategic policy objectives toward the country.

Irrespective of the presidential run-off’s outcome on February 8,
Moscow has already achieved-largely by default-three basic objectives
regarding Ukraine.

First, the Kremlin no longer has reasons to fear the Orange freedoms’
contaminating effect upon Russia. Given Ukraine’s political and
economic predicaments, it has lost the attractiveness of a democratic
example to Russia’s populace or elite circles. If anything, Russian
business interests associated with the state authorities seem poised
for predatory takeovers of crisis-hit Ukrainian assets.

Second, Russia has managed to remove discussion of Ukraine’s
hypothetical NATO membership from the political agenda. All serious
parties and candidates now avoid this subject as a political liability
in Ukraine and as an irritant to Russia.

And thirdly, Moscow has been content to watch the defeated President
Viktor Yushchenko instrumentalize Ukrainian national identity issues
as his last resort and `anti-Russian’ card. Yushchenko’s tactics
seemingly vindicated Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s August 11
open-letter warnings to him and Ukraine. The outgoing president’s
campaign has split the Ukrainian electorate in the west and center,
complicating the country’s post-election politics even further.

The next tier of Russian objectives emerged both before and during the
Ukrainian presidential election campaign. They can also be deduced in
part from presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych’s campaign
statements. The operational order of Russia’s priorities should become
somewhat clearer after the run-off’s outcome. Moscow’s post-election
goals are mostly familiar ones, albeit in a changing Ukrainian and
international context. They include:

— Introducing some form of shared control over Ukraine’s gas transit
system (several forms are theoretically available), notwithstanding
Ukrainian legislation explicitly banning all forms of alienating that
transit system.

— Acquiring ownership in Ukrainian industries through Russian state
banks and Kremlin-connected oligarchs.

— Expanding the use of the Russian language in Ukraine’s public
sphere; and claiming an inherent Russian vetting right on Ukraine’s
educational policies and interpretations of the national history.

— Using Ukrainian interest groups to link Ukraine with the planned
Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union, which would delay Ukraine’s
free trade agreement with the European Union and its association
agreement with the E.U.

— Stonewalling any preparations for withdrawal of Russia’s Black Sea
Fleet from the Crimea, so as to render the 2017 withdrawal deadline
inoperative long before its technical lapse, and necessitate its
extension by Ukraine.

— Committing Ukraine officially (and notwithstanding the Russian
Fleet’s presence) to neutrality or permanent nonalignment, which would
foreclose the country’s option to join NATO in the future.

— Encouraging a double-vector discourse on Ukraine’s external
orientation, which would confuse Western partners and Ukrainians
themselves about the country’s intentions and prospects.

Russian business interests generally seem to await the final outcome
of Ukraine’s presidential election, before bidding for Ukrainian
industrial property. In one major case, however, they have
jump-started the acquisition process before Ukraine can recover from
crisis. In the second week of January, a consortium of Russia’s
state-owned Vneshekonombank (chairman of the board: Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin) and the Metalloinvest steel holding of
Kremlin-friendly Alisher Usmanov announced a preliminary $ 2 billion
deal to acquire some 50 percent ownership in the Industrial Union of
Donbass, a major Ukrainian steel producer, with plants also in Hungary
and Poland (Interfax-Ukraine, January 6, 8, 15).

Presidential candidate and Party of Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych
seems not only unduly alarmed, but also utterly confused about Russia
bypassing Ukraine’s gas transit system through the Nord Stream and
South Stream projects. In two campaign appearances, Yanukovych has
called for Ukraine to invest in Nord Stream and South Stream, but at
the same time bring Gazprom into Ukraine’s transit system in the hopes
of ensuring larger gas transit volumes through Ukraine
(Interfax-Ukraine, Inter TV, January 15, 19).

Some Russian representatives are testing Ukrainian reactions to more
ambitious goals than those officially announced. Thus the CSTO’s
Secretary-General, Nikolai Bordyuzha, has declared that Ukraine would
be welcome to join the CSTO or participate in at least some of the
organization’s activities (Interfax-Ukraine, January 18).

Ultimately, Moscow would hope to reach a point at which it could,
together with Ukraine, define what Ukrainian interests are in the
Russia-Ukraine relationship. According to Minister of Foreign Affairs
Sergei Lavrov when dispatching Ambassador Mikhail Zurabov to Kyiv (see
article above), Russian policy must ensure that Ukraine’s new
president `understands not to make our relationship hostage to
somebody’s ambitions=80¦that have nothing in common with the Ukrainian
people’s interests, or those of the Russian people’ (Interfax, January
19).

Russia is still very far from achieving that kind of influence over
Ukraine’s political system and decisions. However, Moscow’s
intermediate objectives as displayed during Ukraine’s presidential
election campaign could, if attained, increase Russian political
influence gradually to a significant level in Ukraine.

— Vladimir Socor

LIKE THEY WERE NEGOTIATED

Lragir.am
26/01/10

On Philip Gordon, the decision of the Constitutional Court and the
rule of law

Numerous opinions have been expressed following the decision (on the
12th of January, 2010) of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of
Armenia on the Armenia-Turkey protocols. I believe, as I have already
had the chance to say, that the decision was extremely significant.

Although the decision itself does not resolve any issues in terms of
international law, nevertheless, the legal position of the decision –
which is mandatory for all, including the legislative and executive
branches – creates serious tools for damage control with regards to the
potential dangers of the protocols. Accordingly, everything henceforth
depends on the level of abidance to the law of the president and the
National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia.

One finds, in all this, a very interesting statement by the US
Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon: "We view the court
decision as a positive step forward in the ratification process of
the normalization protocols between Turkey and Armenia. The court
decision permits the protocols, as they were negotiated and signed,
to move forward towards parliamentary ratification, and does not
appear to limit or qualify them in any way".

I believe that the most important and just as problematic idea
in this paragraph is the phrase, "as they were negotiated and
signed". The problem is just that; the parties do not subscribe to
the same interpretation of the very same paragraphs, expressions, or
even words. Their interpretations are often not only fundamentally
different, but also contradictory. It is enough to compare the
statements on the same questions about the protocols by the president
and foreign minister of the Republic of Armenia and by the prime
minister and foreign minister of Turkey for it to be clear that
the parties do not see eye-to-eye on the issues at hand, and it
is therefore impossible to generalise, "as they were negotiated
and signed".

And for this very reason the decision in question of the Constitutional
Court of the Republic of Armenia is very significant.

It is nothing short of the legal interpretation of the Armenian party
on the issues taken up in the protocols, based on the Constitution
and laws of the Republic of Armenia, as well as international law.

I agree with Mr. Gordon, that the decision of the Constitutional Court
of the Republic of Armenia does not hinder the ratification of the
protocols. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia has
decided that the object and purpose of the protocols – to establish
diplomatic relations and to open the border – and also the obligations
arising from them, do not violate the Constitution and laws of the
Republic of Armenia. The Constitutional Court simply clarifies the
Armenian side’s position on other issues included in the protocols,
giving legal expression to the interpretations of the Armenian party
to those issues.

Here one must remind Mr. Gordon of a few facts. Firstly, the decision
of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia is a final
ruling which is in force. Secondly, the decision of the Constitutional
Court of the Republic of Armenia is a non-negotiable and binding
document for all citizens of the Republic of Armenia, including the
president and foreign minister of the Republic of Armenia, as well as
deputies of the National Assembly, just as any decision by the Supreme
Court of the United States would apply to all Americans. Thirdly,
the decision of the Constitutional Court is a complete document as
a whole, where the legal position has just as much legal force as
the conclusion.

And so, taking into account, to begin with, the requirements of
the law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia, as
well as the positive reaction by the Americans to the decision of
the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia, the president
of the Republic of Armenia is obliged to present the protocols in
question for ratification to the National Assembly alongwith the
legal position as per the decision of the Constitutional Court of
the Republic of Armenia, having thus added them in as reservations.

It is mandatory for the president of the Republic of Armenia to
demonstrate by his own example that he abides by the laws of the land.

And the Americans are obliged to demonstrate in turn that they respect
rule of law in general, and not just American law.

Ara Papian Head of the Modus Vivendi Centre 25 January, 2010

ARMENIAN-TURKISH DIALOGUE HAMPERS KARABAKH CONFLICT RESOLUTION

PanARMENIAN.Net
26.01.2010 14:59 GMT+04:00

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ The ongoing Armenian-Turkish dialogue hampers
resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, according to Ruben
Hakobyan, director of analytic research center.

"Turkey has numerously stated that it closed the border with Armenia
because of Karabakh and that the border will be re-opened only in case
the conflict is settled. A question arises: if Armenia is ready to
resolve the conflict and accept Madrid principles, so why does it need
normalization of relations with Turkey?" Hakobyan said, adding that
engaging in a dialogue with Turkey, Armenia got under a disadvantage.

"If the Karabakh conflict is resolved, the Armenian-Turkish border
will open of its own accord," he concluded.