Author: Vanyan Gary

Dangerous liaisons, a clever Greek and a deadly diamond. By Paul Skenazy
by Paul Skenazy

The Washington Post
September 5, 2004 Sunday
Final Edition

Garry Disher’s The Dragon Man (Soho, $23) is a lean, compelling
police procedural that uncovers rural Australian life in all its
hazardous dailiness. Detective Inspector Hal Challis runs the police
office on the Peninsula, “a comma of land hooking into the sea
south-east of Melbourne.” Women have been disappearing along the Old
Peninsula Highway. One body has been discovered. While mothers and
friends appeal for help in finding the other women who are missing,
Challis and his mates at the police station try to trace a pattern in
the crimes. They also cope with a rash of burglaries and a series of
mailboxes set on fire. And a car set on fire. And a house set on
fire.

Disher keeps his style curt, his bits of dialogue short, his
invasions of the psyche pointed. Weaving back and forth between the
police and the criminals, and among the uniformed cops and
detectives, Disher smoothly creates a choral portrait of the police
and the people they work with and for, delivering a community of
stories. Loneliness is as commonplace as the muddy roads and broken
fences. The police force that Challis commands is a varied lot,
including a wife frustrated by an indifferent husband and rebellious
daughter, a cop who falls for a cocaine addict and starts supplying
her from the evidence locker, a young recruit recovering from a car
accident who is as interested in her surfing teachers as in her
police procedures. Challis himself is the “dragon man” of the title
(a nickname that refers to his efforts to restore a vintage airplane,
a de Havilland DH 84 Dragon Rapide). He fluctuates between exhausted
patience on the phone with his ex-wife, who is in prison for trying
to kill him, and a discreet and intermittent affair he’s having with
a local newspaper reporter. Though Disher broadcasts the killer’s
identity a bit too early, this is still a first-rate piece of crime
writing: a dense, hard-nosed portrait of a world unto itself.

Ed McBain (a k a Evan Hunter), the grand master of the police
procedural, returns in Hark! (Simon & Schuster, $24.95), his 54th
book about the 87th Precinct cops, the crimes they solve, and the
lives they live outside the station house. The thief known as the
Deaf Man has returned, eager for revenge on the woman who left him
for dead (he shoots her in the first scene) and eager to mock the
87th crew with a series of teasing clues about his next crime. Steve
Carella, Meyer Meyer, Kling, Cotton Hawes and the rest start
receiving messengered notes that seem impossible to decipher. Some
prove to be anagrams, some palindromes, some quotes from Shakespeare.
The notes appear to define the date, and even hint at the crime —
except they hint at several crimes at once.

Meantime, the detectives are clueless about what to do with their own
lives. Carella is trying to avoid thinking about the joint wedding he
is planning for his mother and sister. Cotton Hawes is making it with
Honey Blair of Channel Four News, until someone starts shooting at
the two of them. Kling is worried that his sweetie is meeting
secretly with a man she used to date. And the Deaf Man (who calls
himself Adam Fen) wanders the city, visiting the New York Public
Library to view an original copy of Shakespeare’s First Folio on
display, showing intense interest in a classical violin recital. He
shacks up with a prostitute named Melissa Summers, whom he sends on
errands to find delivery men for his notes to Carella and Co. And he
waits.

McBain is playing for laughs, and he gets them, working skillfully to
create just enough intrigue to keep us interested in the bad jokes,
the puzzling riddles and the domestic melodramas. The whole
performance is deft and light, like a magician’s sleight of hand: The
trick is pulled off while you look the other way. There’s nothing
lasting here, except the pleasure of watching a master having fun —
and that’s a kind of Shakespearean delight in itself.

Just as the Olympics have brought Greece to the world’s attention
comes the first American publication of Petros Markaris’s Greek crime
fiction. Deadline in Athens, ably translated by David Connolly
(Grove, $23), features Inspector Costas Haritos, an edgy, cynical
policeman in a contemporary Athens more notable for its traffic jams
and rainy weather than its classical ruins. Like all good fictional
cops, Haritos is in trouble with his superiors and unwilling to
settle for the convenient, if unconvincing, solution. So when an
Armenian quickly confesses to killing two other Armenians, Haritos is
willing to follow a tip from Janna, a zealous, ambitious TV reporter,
that there is more to the case than appears. Then Janna herself is
found murdered, just before she was set to air a sensational news
story. And soon after, Janna’s successor is found dead as well.

The evidence from one murder slowly intersects with the next, leading
Haritos to an accused child molester who has just been freed, a love
affair Janna had with her station manager, and the shipping records
of a well-connected travel agency. At home he struggles
unsuccessfully to appease his wife, Adriani, who spends her days
watching TV crime stories, and to find time to see his daughter, who
is away at school.

But the real story here is the geography and culture of Athens. From
Haritos’s wily boss Ghikas, the chief of security, to the
Armani-suited corporate TV executives, this is a world where the rich
and powerful rule. Newscasters point a finger at an innocent man, and
Haritos spends days tracking him down as much to protect as to arrest
him; Haritos builds a case against a TV producer only to find himself
facing suspension. Ghikas urges him to be more “flexible,” while
Haritos charges on, pushing his way through doors that want to remain
closed.

Deadline is a satisfying if sometimes slow-paced read, the wayward
elements of the plot wandering in and out of focus as Haritos reaches
one wrong conclusion after another. Still, the material is rich, the
characters are drawn with depth, and Haritos himself is an intriguing
find: zealous in his work, more in love with his wife than he will
admit, suspicious by training, his only relief from work being the
hours he spends learning new words in his dictionaries at home. Two
more Haritos tales are promised for the near future, and I look
forward to reading them and spending more time with this snarling,
amiable Greek.

Skye Kathleen Moody’s U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service agent Venus
Diamond returns for her seventh outing in The Good Diamond (St.
Martin’s, $24.95). This time Diamond’s name claims major attention as
a pun that echoes from start to finish in a story about diamond
trading and the international arms trade. Big Jim Hardy, a reclusive
prospector, discovers a 384-carat rough diamond he calls “Lac de
Lune,” after the lakebed where he found it, just outside the small
prospecting town of Yellowknife in Canada. But as he is about to
depart to have the diamond cleaved, his compound is invaded, he is
killed, the diamond is stolen, and his geologist is taken hostage.
Before he dies, however, Hardy has time to send an e-mail and scrawl
Venus Diamond’s name in blood.

Still with me? Because now the plot really gets farfetched. Sgt.
Roland Mackenzie of the Royal Canadian Mounties is convinced that
Hardy has written his murderer’s name and so arrests Diamond, who
then reveals that Big Jim Hardy was really Buzz Radke, a U.S. federal
undercover agent whom Diamond worked with years before. The escaping
thieves are, it seems, part of a militant group that dubs itself the
Nation of God’s Chosen Soldiers (or “Company 8”), headquartered on
the Lay-a-Day Chicken Ranch just across the U.S.-Canadian border.
They want to trade the diamond for arms, through a diamond trader in
New York who is sending the guns out West with two hoodlums in a
truck with New Jersey license plates. Evidence turns up that seems to
link Mackenzie to the killing, so suddenly he is arrested and needs
to turn to Diamond for help trying to clear his name. Three master
diamond cutters — in New York City, Antwerp and South Africa — are
working on models of the huge diamond to see if they can successfully
cleave the delicate stone. The New York traders are ruthlessly
working to procure the diamond and frighten competitors away from the
chase. And there are rumors that the stolen diamond itself might be a
fake substituted for the real stone to prevent just the kind of theft
that occurred.

Moody has always liked to stuff her books with plots until they burst
at the seams, and this outing is no different. White supremacists,
greedy hoodlums, devious diamond cutters, desperate jewel traders;
Canadian tundra, Seattle digs, border chicken farms, New York
streets, Antwerp hovels; a militant’s wife who offers a captive a
tape recorder and tapes so she can explain her life (and fill in the
plot details); a hoodlum who deserts his post to sit in the library
— the unbelievable elements and events spiral out at an alarming
pace. Lost in the frenzy is the issue of diamonds-for-guns — the
trade in what are called “blood” diamonds that support arms shipments
to militant groups worldwide. Lost too is Venus herself, who becomes
a cipher that we watch from increasing distances as she tries to make
sense of the confusing events. You will not be bored by this book. It
is filled with interesting diamond lore, and it clips along, jumping
with often comic cunning among its various plots. But Moody seems so
anxious to fit them all in that she sometimes sketches in her stories
rather than writing them out. The result is a confusing, faceless
tale. *

Paul Skenazy teaches literature and writing at the University of
California, Santa Cruz, where he is provost of Kresge College.

VARDAN OSKANYAN RECEIVED FAMOUS AMERICAN ARMENIAN WRITER PETER BALAKIAN

ArmenPress
Sept 2 2004

YEREVAN, SEPTEMBER 2, ARMENPRESS: Armenian foreign minister Vardan
Oskanyan received yesterday famous American Armenian writer Peter
Balakian who is on his second visit to Armenia on the invitation of
Writers’ Union of Armenian and Armenian General Benevolent Union.

According to foreign minister press services, Balakian presented his
impressions from Armenia and talked about his meetings at Writers’
Union and Academy of Sciences where he was granted the titles of
honorable member of Writers’ Union and honorable doctor of Academy
of Sciences. He also conferred on his future plans.

The two talked about Peter Balakian’s writings on Armenian themes
thanks to which the issue of Armenian Genocide has stepped out of
academic circles and become a point of interest for larger public.
With respect to this, the two talked about possibilities of involving
the theme in different branches of art.

Oskanyan briefed Balakian on preparatory works for 90th anniversary of
Armenian Genocide. American Armenian writer also displayed interest in
the present pace of Armenian-American and Armenian-Turkish relations.

Peter Balakian is the author of 5 poetry collections. He is a historian
and a faculty member of Corgate University. He has written “The Black
Dog of Fate” and “Burning Tigris” novels. The Armenian translation of
the first and the publication of the second has been recently presented
in Yerevan. “The Black Dog of Fate” was awarded with Pen/Albrand title
in 1998 and “Burning Tigris” with the title of Outstanding Book and
Bestseller of New York Times.

REFERENCE: TERRORIST ATTACKS IN MOSCOW IN 1999-2004

RIA Novosti
September 01, 2004

1999:
In the evening of August 31, an explosion went off in the Okhotny
Ryad shopping centre on Manezhnaya Square near the Kremlin. Forty-one
people were wounded (one woman later died in hospital).

In the early hours of September 9, an explosion ripped through a
nine-storey apartment house in Guryanova Street, causing the central
part of the building to tumble. Ninety-two people died, 264 were
wounded, including 86 children. The neighbouring houses were damaged
too.

Early on September 13, a blast razed an eight-storey apartment house
in Kashirskoye Shosse (highway). As many as 124 people were killed,
including 13 children, and nine people were wounded. The neighbouring
buildings were hit too.

2000:
In the evening of August 8, an explosion went off in the underpass on
Pushkinskaya Square, central Moscow. Seven people died instantly, 100
people were wounded (five of them died later in hospital).

2001:
In the evening of February 5, an explosive device placed under a
stone bench was activated at the Belorusskaya metro station (the
ring). Ten people were wounded, the bench was completely destroyed,
and the interior of the station was slightly damaged.

2002:
In the evening of October 23, a terrorist detachment headed by Movsar
Barayev took hostage all the spectators and actors, over 800 people,
including 80 foreigners, during the Nord Ost performance in the
Dubrovka theatre centre. The terrorists demanded that federal troops
be withdrawn from the Chechen republic. On October 26, a special
operation to liberate the hostages left all the terrorists – 32 men
and 18 women – dead. Besides, 128 hostages died, including eight
people from CIS and non-CIS countries.

2003:
In the afternoon of July 5, two suicide bombers activated explosive
devices strapped to their belts during he Krylya rock festival in the
Tushino aerodrome, in the immediate vicinity to it, though only one
of them exploded fully. Besides the terrorists,11 people died,
including one child. At least 35 people were wounded (three of them
died later in hospital). Over 60 people asked for medical treatment.

Late on July 9, security guards detained a woman who had an explosive
device in her bag in the Imbir cafe, 1st Tverskaya-Yamskaya Street.
During the bomb disposal, an FSB officer was killed by a blast. The
woman, Zarema Muzhikhoyeva, a Chechen native, was later sentenced to
20 years in prison by the Moscow City Court.

In the morning of December 9, a female suicide bomber exploded
herself near the National hotel in Okhotny Ryad Street (close to the
Kremlin). Besides the terrorist, five people were killed, 13 wounded,
including a Chinese citizen.

2004:
In the morning of February 6, a suicide bomber activated an explosive
device strapped to his belt in a train going from the Avtozavodskaya
to the Paveletskaya underground stations. The train was 300 metres
short of Paveletskaya. Thirty-nine people died on the spot, including
Armenian and Moldovan citizens, and about 140 people were wounded.

On March 15, on the 23rd km of the Krym highway in the Moscow region,
staffers of the Moscow Mainline Electricity Transmission Grids
discovered three damaged masts of the LEP-500 (electricity
transmission lines). The damage was caused by an explosion. Besides,
they found an explosive devices consisting of three cartridges for a
grenade launcher on one of the masts, and another two explosive
devices and a piece of fabric resembling the flag of the Chechen
republic of Ichkeria.

Armenian, Azeri ministers in Prague discuss Karabakh

Public Television of Armenia, Yerevan
30 Aug 04

The Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers, Vardan Oskanyan and
Elmar Mammadyarov, met in Prague today.

The aim of the meeting between the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign
ministers is to prepare the basis for negotiations on the resolution
of the Karabakh conflict. Oskanyan believes that the basis has not yet
been established.

Azeri rights campaigners condemn imprisonment of anti-Armenian protesters

Turan news agency
30 Aug 04

BAKU

The chairwoman of the society to protect women’s rights, Novella
Cafaroglu, has condemned the court ruling sentencing six members of
the Karabakh Liberation Organization (KLO).

“I can’t understand the judge who has handed down such a sentence,”
she said.

According to her, the convicted were not fighting for power, they were
fighting for Karabakh and for the integrity of their motherland. The
arrest and imprisonment of such people is an insult to the whole
Azerbaijani people. They must be freed and this has to be demanded by
the entire Azerbaijani people,” Cafaroglu said.

“Today’s sentence is directed not only against people, it is directed
against Karabakh. It symbolizes our approval of the aggression against
Azerbaijani lands,” says the director of the human rights bureau,
Saida Qocamanli. What is going on shows that it is impossible to
ensure the protection of human rights in Azerbaijan.

“Someone who has handed down such a sentence will have to answer
before the tribunal of conscience for the rest of his life,” the
rights champion said.

The director of the Institute for Peace and Democracy, Leyla Yunus,
believes that today’s ruling is a demonstration of the fact that the
authorities have no inkling of how to liberate the occupied
territories. The sentence has become yet another proof of how absurd
[Azerbaijani President] Ilham Aliyev’s patriotic statements are.

The Signal, CA
Aug 29 2004

Remembering a Fallen Deputy

Judy O’Rourke [Signal Staff Writer]

He was shot and killed while assisting federal officers serve a
search warrant on a home in Stevenson Ranch.
Three years later, the raw memory of Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Deputy Hagop `Jake’ Kuredjian’s death is fresh in the minds of fellow
deputies, making it too painful to talk about him. So their superiors
talk for them.
`I think the third anniversary of Kuredjian’s death causes me to
pause and still feel the anger and resentment for his senseless
murder,’ said Sheriff Lee Baca, speaking on behalf of deputies who
`can’t speak.’
`There’s the pain from the killing of a good man who’s doing the
right thing and protecting the people of Santa Clarita,’ he said. `It
isn’t something we’re going to accept.’
Keeping the slain deputy’s memory alive will make people aware of
the perils faced by law enforcement officers, Baca said. Every deputy
who knew him suffered a personal loss, always with the knowledge,
`there but for the grace of God go them.’
Kuredjian was shot and killed Aug. 31, 2001, while aiding the
federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms serve a search
warrant on a man suspected on impersonating a federal agent. The raid
was televised and received broad media coverage. Hundreds of officers
responded to the scene, including the Sheriff’s Department’s
special-weapons team.
Sheriff honor guards from Los Angeles and Ventura counties
carried the deputy’s flag-draped coffin into St. Mary’s Armenian
Apostolic Church in Glendale for Kuredjian’s funeral; an estimated
4,000 came to pay tribute.
Santa Clarita Valley Sheriff’s Station Capt. Patti Minutello said
she did not know the man. But she has heard the stories.
`Working around deputies who did know him, they say only
wonderful things,’ she said. `It’s been three years, (but) I don’t
think it’s gotten much easier. It’s still hard for them to accept
what happened. I don’t think you ever get over an experience like
this.’
Law enforcement officers need to develop an outer protection
because they see so much tragedy every day, she said. They have to
fight to avoid personal involvement or they wouldn’t be able to
function on a daily basis. But the protective shells can be very
fragile.
`We do get emotionally and personally wrapped up in cases,’ she
said. `We are empathetic; we care. We don’t have the ability to show
it all the time … (because) we have to be prepared to handle the
next call.’
Every year on the anniversary of Kuredjian’s death, deputies at
the Santa Clarita sheriff’s station wear the class A uniform. The
dress uniform.
Among the Santa Clarita Valley memorials to `Deputy Jake’ are a
Newhall street named for him and a park in Stevenson Ranch set aside
in his honor and quietly opened to the public Aug. 10.
Garo Kuredjian, a senior deputy with the Ventura County Sheriff’s
Department, said he is honored people have not forgotten about his
brother.
`It was really moving,’ he said earlier of a visit to the park
with his mother and aunt. `It’s more than a piece of land. It’s in
memory of my brother. It holds a special place in our hearts.’
The official dedication of Jake Kuredjian County Park, named for
the 17-year Sheriff’s Department veteran, is set for Oct. 6. Los
Angeles County Supervisor Michael D. Antonovich, who suggested naming
the park for the deputy, is scheduled to host the ceremony.
Kuredjian’s family will be consulted about installing a memorial at
the park, located at 25265 Pico Canyon Road.

Asia Times Online, Hong Kong
Aug 27 2004

Russian bear calls on gray wolf
By K Gajendra Singh

The two-day state visit to Ankara starting next Thursday by Russian
President Vladimir Putin, three decades after the last visit by the
Soviet Union’s president Nikolay Podgorny in 1973, underlines the
reshuffling of strategic perceptions by major players in the region.

This comes after Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyep Erdogan’s recent
visit to Tehran, which capped warming relations between Turkey and
Iran and their efforts to put aside deep-rooted historical and
ideological differences, because of developments in the region.
Clearly, Turkey is moving away from its North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) ally the United States, and its good regional
friend, Israel.

Even the 1973 Podgorny visit, when the author was first posted at
Ankara, was Turkey’s show of anger at Washington’s warnings that it
not use US arms in its dispute over Cyprus with Greece, also a NATO
member. Of course that was at the peak of the Cold War, and that
visit was an expression of frustration.

But now we are in the post-Cold War era after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the attacks of September 11, 2001, the US-led invasion
of Iraq and the deteriorating security situation and daily bloodbath
there. March last year was a watershed when the Turkish parliament
rejected a government motion (with a two-thirds majority ) to allow
troops of its ally the US to open a second front against Iraq from
Turkish soil.

Perhaps for the first time in history after centuries, after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey and Russia no longer shared a
border. But the strategic interests of Turkey and Russia still
overlap in “near abroads” – in the Caucasus and Central Asia, where
some degree of geopolitical competition is inevitable.

As one expert put it, “Turkish-Russian interactions highlight how the
relationship between key regional powers in the post-Cold War context
can be characterized by significant cooperation and conflict at the
same time.” In the short term, the security problems appear to be
manageable, but they will always remain a major long-term concern.
For the time being, the magnitude of Turkish-Russian trade (based on
large-scale energy imports to Turkey ) and the need for co-existence
at the political level, works against more competitive policies.

Growth of bilateral economic relations
Perhaps the most positive development in Russian-Turkish relations in
recent years has been the 15-20% annual growth in trade. Bilateral
trade, which was just US$200 million 15 years ago, is expected to
reach $8 billion this year. In 2003, Turkey exported $1.3 billion
worth of goods to Russia, while its imports were $5.4 billion. Until
the early 1990s, trade was balanced. Russia is now second only to
Germany as Turkey’s main trading partner. The Turkish Vestel company
has invested $15 million and started production of television sets in
Russia. Koc and Enka Group’s Ramstore has opened more
supermarket-chain stores, which now total 20 in Russia. Turks are
also very active in the construction business.

While Turkish entrepreneurs and traders are active in Russia, Russian
entrepreneurs are also involved in the privatization of Turkish
companies, specifically Tatneft, which won a tender for Turkey’s
largest petrochemical company, and Europe’s fourth-largest. In
February, Tatneft, Russia’s sixth-biggest oil producer, won final
approval from the Turkish government to buy a majority stake in state
oil refiner Tupras for $1.3 billion.

Russia also wants to sell arms to Turkey. In the mid-1990s, Turkey
became the first NATO country to buy arms, rifles, helicopters etc
from Russia, for use against Kurdish rebels, as Western nations
refused to sell them. The number of Russian tourists to Turkey is
also on the rise. In 2003, some 1.2 million Russians visited Turkey.
This number is expected to rise to 1.7 million by the end of 2004.

The “Blue Stream” natural-gas pipeline forms the basis of higher
trade and closer economic relations, increasing Turkish reliance on
Russia. In 1986, Turkey signed an agreement with Russia (for 25
years) for 6 billion cubic meters of natural gas. A similar agreement
was signed in 1998 for 8 billion cubic meters of “Turusgaz”. Moscow
wants to extend the pipeline to Israel. In 2003, the problems of
supply of Russian natural gas through the Blue Stream were resolved
during the visit of Erdogan to Russia, as the leader of his Justice
and Development Party (AK Party). Russia’s Gazprom company agreed to
a lower gas price and the amount of natural gas to be purchased by
Turkey.

Russian project for oil pipeline via Turkey
Now Russia is keen on a Trans-Thracian pipeline, which would allow
its oil to reach the Mediterranean from the Black Sea without passing
through the congested Bosporus. Oil traffic through the strait has
risen by 30% to about 2.8 million barrels per day in the past two
years, mainly from the Black Sea port of Novorossiisk. This figure
will increase as exports to the Black Sea via the Caspian pipeline
from Kazakhstan are set to grow to 67 million tons per year.

Increasing traffic through the strait has been a bone of contention
between Russia and Turkey for many years. The Trans-Thracian
pipeline, from Turkey’s western Black Sea coast, 193 kilometers south
to Ibrikbaba on Turkey’s Aegean coast, would ease the bottleneck in
the strait. The proposed pipeline could transport about 60 million
tons per year directly to the Mediterranean. The Turkish government
supports the idea, but does not want to finance it. London-based
Center for Global Energy Studies analyst Julian Lee told the Moscow
Times recently: “Turkey doesn’t want to fall into the trap which
Ukraine did with the Odessa-Brody project, of building a pipeline
nobody wants to use. The [Turkish] government would rather see an
international consortium take the project forward.”

The Trans-Thracian pipeline proposal is to overcome restrictions
imposed by Turkey on the passage of tankers carrying Russian and
Kazakhstan oil to the world markets through the Bosporus. In 2003,
more than 8,000 ships sailed through the strait, compared with 4,000
in 1996, and carried some 150 million tonnes of cargo. About 15
million people live along the shores of the Bosporus. And there have
been some blazing accidents.

However, apart from environmental and safety concerns for the
inhabitants of the region, the Turkish authorities want to force oil
companies and the governments of the Caspian region to use the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC), which is now being built. Oil
from Azerbaijan is hardly enough to fill the requirements of the new
line, whose chief backer is the United States. The shift from tankers
would fulfill the political and economic objectives of the pipeline.
There is also the problem of an extra 9 million tons of oil per year
that could flow through from Ukraine’s Druzhba pipeline to the Black
Sea. So Turkey remains advantageously placed for transfer of energy
from the Caspian basin to the Mediterranean.

Turkey is also looking for Russian support on the Northern Cyprus
question during Putin’s visit. Russia, a permanent member of the
United Nations Security Council, is seen as a sympathizer of Orthodox
Greek Cypriots, who overwhelmingly voted against a UN plan in April
for reunification of the island. Greek Cypriots oppose efforts at the
UN and the European Union to end the international isolation of
Turkish Cypriots. Turkey did note that Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov met with Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister Mehmet Ali
Talat on the sidelines of the mid-June foreign ministers’ meeting of
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Istanbul.

Relations with the Russian Federation
There was a flurry of visits between Russia and Turkey soon after the
collapse of the USSR. These included the visit of foreign minister
Hikmet Cetin to Moscow on January 20-22, 1992, and a reciprocal visit
to Ankara by foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev the next month. During
prime minister Suleyman Demirel’s official visit to Moscow on May
25-26, 1992, the “Treaty on the Principles of Relations between the
Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation” was signed, replacing
an earlier but similar treaty bearing the same title. This treaty
established the legal basis of relations between the two countries
and also confirmed their willingness to improve this relationship.

Russian president Boris Yeltsin was in Istanbul on June 25, 1992, for
the first summit meeting of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
(BSEC). Cetin paid another official visit to Moscow on March 1, 1993,
while prime minister Tansu Ciller made an official visit on September
8-9, 1993. During that visit, a joint transportation committee and a
working group in the fields of telecommunications, industry and
transfer of high technology were established.

Russian first deputy prime minister Oleg Soskovets paid an official
visit to Ankara on July 15-20, 1994, and signed two protocols on
bilateral economic relations and debt rescheduling related to Turkish
Eximbank loans extended during the Soviet period. Ciller, visiting
Moscow on May 9, 1995, for the ceremony to commemorate the 50th
anniversary of the end of World War II, held official talks with
Russian premier Viktor Chernomyrdin.

Chernomyrdin’s visit to Ankara on December 15-16, 1997, was the first
of a Russian premier since the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Premier
Bulent Ecevit was in Moscow on November 4-6, 1999, during which a
joint declaration on cooperation in the “struggle against terrorism,
agreements on the abolition of visas for diplomatic passports,
cooperation in the veterinary field and a protocol on cooperation in
the field of information” was signed. A protocol on a joint economic
commission provided the framework for bilateral economic cooperation.

During Russian prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov’s visit on October
23-25, 2000, when he was accompanied by the ministers of energy,
public property and industry, and science and technology as well as
other high-ranking officials, agreements including the formation of a
joint committee on cooperation in the defense industry were signed.
During foreign minister Igor Ivanov’s visit to Ankara on June 7-8,
2001, a cultural exchange program for 2001-03 was signed. Ivanov and
his counterpart also held consultations on possible areas of
cooperation in Eurasia.

In early 2004, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul visited Moscow after a
gap of eight years. The two sides discussed accusations of harboring
hostile and terrorist groups, such as Chechen and other groups, by
Turkey and Kurdish groups by Russia. The Kurdistan Workers Party
(PKK) , a Marxist Kurdish rebel group, had support from the USSR and
its proxy, Syria, but Syria was forced to shut down its operations in
1999.

But Chechen-led violence in Moscow and elsewhere in Russia and
terrorist acts in Istanbul have brought realism to the two nations’
view on international terrorism. This is a major problem worrying
Moscow and Ankara. But any agreement after Gul’s visit remained
unknown. Many Chechen leaders, including Akhmed Zakayev, a
representative of the so-called president of Ichkeria, Aslan
Maskhadov, once lived in Turkey. Russians complain that while the
activities of the followers of the pan-Islamic, pan-Turkic Nurcular
organization are banned in Turkey, they carry out a wide variety of
intelligence-related tasks in Russia.

At a press conference, Gul responded that Moscow had supplied Turkey
with “a list of Turkish citizens involved in terrorist activity” and
that it would be thoroughly studied. He agreed that some of the
fighters killed in Chechnya might be Turkish citizens and declared,
“Terrorist acts have occurred in Istanbul, and their perpetrators
also hold Turkish passports.” As for funds collected for humanitarian
purposes in Chechnya, they are handled by the Turkish Red Crescent,
he added. Gul said Turkey had demanded that Russia declare the PKK,
now called Kong La, a terrorist group. “The Russians had promised to
study the question,” the minister said.

Contacts at the military level have also been established after the
signing of a framework agreement on “cooperation in the military
field and agreement on cooperation of training of military personnel”
in January 2002 during the visit of General Anatoly Kvashnin, chief
of staff of the Russian Federation, to Ankara. Turkish chief of staff
General Huseyin Kivrikoglu returned the visit in June 2002. The first
meeting of the joint military-technical cooperation commission was
held in September 2002 in Ankara and a second meeting in November
2003 in Moscow.

Relations have also been established at the level of the parliaments.
During the visit of the Speaker of the Turkish Grand National
Assembly (TGNA), Mustafa Kalemli, to Moscow on July 14-18, 1996, a
“protocol on cooperation between the TGNA and the Federal Assembly of
the Russian Federation” was signed.

Competition in Central Asia
Muslim tribes around the Black and Caspian seas and the mountainous
Caucasian region that separates Russia and the Middle East and
Anatolia migrated to the Ottoman Empire and are now spread all over
the region and beyond, and have long-established roots. The region
has complex linkages and relationships between the people of Turkey
and the people of the Caucasian region, which were established when
the empire was shrinking. Contacts between citizens of the Turkish
Republic and the republics of Central Asia are also abiding.

But after World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and the
creation of the Turkish Republic in Anatolia by Kemal Ataturk,
contacts with Muslim people of not only Central Asia but the
Caucasian region ceased almost altogether. A pan-Turkic leader, Col
Turkesh, told this writer that he met Turks from Central Asia for the
first time in New Delhi, when invited by Indira Gandhi to meet
delegations from the USSR. Even relations with Arabs were limited,
who, according to the Turks, had revolted against the Sultan Caliph.
Ataturk jettisoned the Arab and Ottoman religious heritage and
Islamic and Central Asian baggage. He turned Turks around to look at
the West and become Westernized, modern and secular citizens to reach
the level of contemporary European civilization.

The sudden collapse in 1991 of the Soviet Union, Turkey’s historical
enemy, pleased Turks no end. It opened the floodgates of exchanges
and relations between the Turks of Anatolia and the Turkic peoples of
Central Asia and the Caucasus. There were delegations galore, with
the two “lost peoples” hugging each other, with many Central Asian
leaders bending down to touch the soil of Turkey with their foreheads
on first arrival. The Iranians and the Russians had cut off exchanges
and relations between the Ottomans and their ethnic kin in the
Caucasus and Central Asia, known as Turkestan.

The author remembers the romantic vision sold to former communist
states by Western leadership and media that with democracy and
capitalism, prosperity was around the corner. Soon the reality
dawned, how Western leadership trifled with the ex-communist
leadership, making them reliant on Western capitalism and
institutions. Billions of dollars were transferred from Russia to
Western banks and institutions under the charade of globalization.

Many Central Asian leaders to whom power fell like manna from heaven
in 1991 were confused and rudderless. They were cautious and wanted
good relations with all. The United States encouraged Turkey’s
efforts as it was afraid that Russia would try to wrest back control
of its “near abroad”, which it tried in many ways, but the horse had
already bolted from the stable.

Fears that Iran would export its version of fanatic Islam and support
anti-US regimes in Central Asia also proved far-fetched. After a
debilitating eight-year-long war with Iraq in the 1980s, in which
Iran lost a million young people, there was little energy or money
left to spread the message of Shi’ite revolution.

Except for the Azeris and some other pockets, most people in Central
Asia are Sunni Muslims, closer to the more mystic Sufi way of life.
They have a very high level of education and a lifestyle of drinking
and good living. With deep-grained nomadic habits, they could not
easily be led to Islamic fundamentalism. It was the ill-conceived US,
Saudi and Pakistani policies that brought Wahhabi Islam to Central
Asia. It was further aggravated by former communists, now rulers,
using the fear of Islamic fundamentalism to crush all forms of
opposition to their dictatorial rule, based on clan and regional
linkages only.

Except for the Caspian basin, because of its energy resources, and in
Kyrgyzstan, the US leadership soon lost interest (except after
September 11, 2001). The Caspian basin has between 100 billion and
200 billion barrels of oil. The US courted Kyrgyz President Askar
Akayev, touting him as a democrat, and helped his country join the
World Trade Organization in 1998. The reason was to have a friendly
regime with freedom to base personnel and sensing equipment to
monitor China, next door. Akayev has proved no different than leaders
of other Central Asian republics in terms of his record on democracy,
though.

The early 1990s were an opportune moment for Turkey, which under the
dynamic leadership of Turgut Ozal had successfully undergone a decade
of economic reforms, opening its economy to the West, especially
Europe. The country had many trained managers and experts who,
because of ethnic, linguistic and religious similarity, became
advisers and even ministers in the new Turkic republics in Central
Asia (CARs). Both at state level and in the private sector, Turkey
made large investments in Central Asia and Azerbaijan. The Turkish
government provided loans amounting to $750 million to Azerbaijan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Turkish private
investment runs into billions of dollars. Turks have established
successful industries and run hotels and textile and other
businesses.

Turkey also arranged to train 10,000 students and teachers from the
new republics. Turkish as spoken in Turkey has been purified by
excluding many Arabic and Persian words. Many European words,
especially from French, have been added. The Azeri language is quite
similar to Turkish, as well as the Turkmen language. The languages
spoken by Uzbeks, by Kyrgyz and in Kazakhstan are somewhat different.
Originally, Soviet Russians prescribed Latin script for the Central
Asian languages, but when Ataturk changed to Latin script from
Arabic, the Russians changed to Cyrillic. Many Turks have opened
schools in Central Asia, too. Turkey also started beaming Avrasia TV
programs to Central Asia, but with uneven results.

The initiative to bring the new Central Asian Turkic countries
together was taken by Ozal, but unfortunately he died in 1993. But
Turkey’s efforts to create an area of influence in Central Asia were
opposed by the newly independent leadership. A loose organization of
Turkic states exists without having achieved much. The Central Treaty
Organization (CENTO) was reorganized, with the CARs joining in to
create the new Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). To soothe the
Russians, a Black Sea organization was also created, but it remains
equally ineffective. Many Turkish leaders complained in the mid-1990s
that the Central Asian governments did not repay Turkish loans, while
they paid back Western ones. The author was told that the new CARs’
leadership would like to establish authoritarian political regimes
and try to follow the capitalist system of East Asia. They have
certainly succeeded rather well in the first objective.

Problems in the Caucasus
The Russians might have plotted the borders of the Soviet republics
in such a way that there are territorial disputes among almost all
neighboring states that became independent after the collapse of the
USSR, eg between Armenia and Azerbaijan, between Ossetias in Russia
and Georgia, and among Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and Tajiks in the Ferghana
Valley, to name only a few. But Russia, too, was caught in the sudden
denouement. This writer recalls the Russian ambassador in Baku, the
capital of Azerbaijan, forced to operate his mission from a suite of
rooms in a rundown Intourist hotel, while the US, United Kingdom and
even Israel occupied prime property.

To avoid loss of control in the Muslim North Caucasus, ie Chechnya
and Dagestan, which would result in the disintegration of the Russian
Federation itself, Russian objectives remain that it maintain
military bases and influence in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia,
deploy Russian troops to guard the external frontiers of the three
Trans-Caucasian states, use exclusive Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS – ie Russian) peacekeeping troops in the region and
station more Russian tanks and armored vehicles in the North
Caucasus, even though this violates the terms of regional treaties.

Russia also wants Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to route
their oil and gas exports via Russia. It is thus clear that Russian
and Turkish interests (or rather of the US as well) are bound to
clash in the Caucasus.

Therefore, soon after the collapse of the USSR, nationalist Russian
politicians, ex-communist cadres, ambitious Russian generals, local
mafia, Turkish groups and international oil executives all entered
the fray to play their part for personal or national gains on the
Caucasian chessboard.

Ten million inhabitants of Turkey come from families that originate
in the North Caucasus and the Trans-Caucasus, which were once parts
of the Ottoman Empire. It is estimated that there are 25,000 Turkish
citizens of Chechen decent alone. About 50 official Caucasian
solidarity associations are active in Turkey. These groups invariably
pressure the Turkish government to oppose Russian involvement in the
Trans-Caucasus and against Russian military operations in Chechnya.
Even Turkey was put in an embarrassing situation when the late
Azerbaijani president Heydar Aliyev accused a Turkish group in 1995
of trying to overthrow him with the help of his opponents in Baku.

Turkey remains wary of Russian military bases in Georgia and Armenia
as a potential threat. Ankara would also like CIS peacekeeping forces
in the South Caucasus to be replaced by international forces, since
these peacekeeping troops are mostly Russian.

At the same time, Russia is also unhappy with Turkish military and
security officials’ cooperation with their counterparts in Georgia
and Azerbaijan. In January 2002 in Ankara, Azerbaijan, Georgia and
Turkey concluded a tripartite agreement on regional security. Moscow
is especially unhappy with Turkish assistance in modernizing the
Marneuli Air Base near Tbilisi in Georgia. In October 2002, a Turkish
military delegation attended the formal opening of the United
Military Academy in Tbilisi, set up and co-staffed by the Turkish
armed forces. Speaking at the opening ceremony, Georgian
Lieutenant-General David Tevzadze stressed that instructions would
comply with NATO standards.

Zeyno Baran, director of the Caucasus Project at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, pointed out recently, “In the
past, Georgia had asked the Russians for help against the Ottomans,
but today Georgia receives military, economic and political
assistance from Turkey.” Turkey has become Georgia’s main trading
partner, with a flourishing border trade. There has been talk of
improving railway connection between the two countries, but no
concrete steps have been taken. But as long as Georgia has problems
with Russia, it will need Turkey and the US. Apart from strategic
reasons, Turkey also needs Georgia for its Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline.

It appears that everyone is coming to Georgia’s aid. “For example,
the boots of our soldiers are from Turkey, and their uniforms, worth
9 million euros [$10.8 million], are from Italy. The UK, Romania,
Bulgaria, Israel and the US also help. We do not conceal this,” said
a Georgian press report. The Georgian army will be equipped with
Israeli-made Tavors instead of the classic Kalashnikov (AK-47).

But the US remains the main actor and has successfully replaced an
aging Eduard Shevardnadze with a more pliable Georgian leader. The
skirmishes, or the Great Game, despite the US being embroiled in
Iraq, go on.

K Gajendra Singh, Indian ambassador (retired), served as ambassador
to Turkey from August 1992 to April 1996. Prior to that, he served
terms as ambassador to Jordan, Romania and Senegal. He is currently
chairman of the Foundation for Indo-Turkic Studies. E-mail
[email protected].

The Ottawa Sun
August 26, 2004 Thursday Final Edition

WHO KILLED TURKISH DIPLOMAT?;
22-YEAR HUNT FOR ASSASSIN

BY LAURA CZEKAJ, OTTAWA SUN

Someone knows who committed the cold-blooded murder of a Turkish
military attache in Ottawa 22 years ago tomorrow.

The question is whether the passage of time will give that person the
courage to come forward.

“Hopefully some day we will get something solid to follow up on,”
said RCMP Sgt. Andre Bigras.

Until then, the RCMP will continue to search for the killer of Col.
Atilla Altikat, who was shot to death on Aug. 27, 1982, as he sat in
his car stopped at a red light on the Ottawa River Pkwy. at Island
Park Dr.

The gunman conducted the brazen killing in plain view of other
motorists and disappeared without a trace.

HISTORICAL FEUD

“It was something you don’t expect to see in Canada,” Bigras said
about the assassination.

The Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide claimed responsibility
for the killing — another violent act in the longstanding feud
between Turks and Armenians.

“These attacks caused by Armenians were a result of passing hate from
generation to generation,” said Dr. Kevser Taymaz, a representative
of the Federation of Canadian Turkish Associations.

“Both sides lost lives and what we want is to commemorate those lives
together.”

Armenians say the Turkish government of the Ottoman Empire carried
out genocide on the Armenian minority in Turkey from 1915-1916 and
1922-23.

They say the massacre of more than a million Armenians was systematic
and repeated to eliminate the Armenian minority and create space for
Turkish development.

COMMEMORATION

Turkey denies the accusation of genocide almost a century ago, but
hatred between the two nationalities endures.

Each year, Turkish mourners commemorate the anniversary of Altikat’s
assassination in Ottawa by gathering at the intersection where he was
gunned down.

This year’s commemoration ceremony starts at noon tomorrow and is
expected to attract Turkish Canadians from Toronto, Montreal,
Kingston and Brockville. Altikat’s relatives are not expected to
attend.

“We want to remind people that … we should raise our children with
tolerance and understanding,” said Taymaz.

Canada NewsWire

ARMENIA – Photographer assaulted in the north of the country

MONTREAL, Aug. 26 /CNW Telbec/ – Photographer Mkhitar Khachatrian, of the
PhotoLur agency was assaulted after taking photos of politicians’ private
holiday villas in Tsaghkadzor in the north of the country.

Reporters Without Borders called on Armenia’s prosecutor-general Aghvan
Hovsepyan to do everything possible to track down and punish those
responsible.

Khachatrian and Anna Israelian, of the independent daily Aravot, were
working on a report on the destruction of the forest caused by
house-building
in the region.

They were photographing private homes, chiefly belonging to parliamentary
deputies, on 24 August when a guard ordered them to stop. The journalists
refused to comply.

The same evening the guard, accompanied by a group of thugs, found the
pair in a local café. One of them struck Khachatrian and threatened to kill
him. He then ordered him to hand over his camera containing shots of the
villas, and the photographer handed him the disk.

Assaults on journalists have escalated since the start of the year. On 5
April several journalists were manhandled on the sidelines of a
demonstration
while security forces looked on. In June, two of the assailants were fined
about 150 euros in connection with the assaults. Security forces beat up two
more journalists at a demonstration on 13 April. In its letter to the
prosecutor general, the international press freedom organisation stressed
that, “Coming after the incidents in April it would be dangerous to all
journalists if a climate of impunity were allowed to take hold”.

For further information: Emily Jacquard, Responsable de la
communication, Reporters sans frontières Canada, [email protected],
(514) 521 4111, Cell: (514) 258 4208, Fax: (514) 521 7771

—

Armenian presidential aide accuses authorities of inaction in summer

Hayots Ashkarh, Yerevan
25 Aug 04

An interview with an advisor to the [Armenian] president, Garnik
Isagulyan. He comments on possible domestic political developments in
the autumn.

[Hayots Ashkarh correspondent] Mr Isagulyan, what strategy do you
think the opposition will adopt in the autumn? What developments can
we expect?

[Garnik Isagulyan] I do not think that in a strategic sense there will
be any change in the positions of the opposition. The pivot of their
demands will again be the president’s resignation. Some developments
are possible in the sense of people’s participation, as the end of the
harvest is nearing. Unfortunately, we cannot say that farmers are
fully satisfied by the sale of this year’s harvest or by attention of
relevant state structures. But it is difficult to say whether the
opposition will manage to have the support of people in the regions.

[Correspondent] Do you think that the authorities have failed to use
this relatively calm period to strengthen their positions?

[Isagulyan] We have managed to do little in this sense. I thought that
the known speech of the president in Strasbourg should have resulted
in increased activity on the part of the authorities. Unfortunately,
the expected changes in the country did not take place. The same
people work in the government. Prospects of real reforms of the
legislative field are still unclear. We have failed the dialogue with
the opposition on the election law. Moreover, the coalition forces
themselves failed to come to an agreement in this issue. Today’s
package of constitutional reforms does not considerably differ from
the previous ones. I think this will also create a certain basis for
the opposition activity.

[Correspondent] Is the opposition itself united to raise a new wave?

[Isagulyan] It does not matter. There have always been disagreements
among opposition leaders, there are still disagreements over the
successful fulfilment of their claims and over the role of the only
leader. This is natural. But the opposition was guided from a certain
centre, I mean the Armenian Pan-National Movement, and it will
continue guiding them. In case of any significant or minor wave of
displeasure, the opposition will immediately get united.

[Correspondent] What should the authorities do to stop such
developments?

[Isagulyan] Unfortunately, our political elite, in particular senior
officials, have always had one permanent shortcoming: when everything
is calm because of hot weather in the summer or cold in the winter,
everybody forget that the situation was completely different a month
or two months ago. Naturally, public discontent because of different
problems might grow if they are not resolved on time. This summer was
not an exception either. The ruling coalition found itself in an inert
situation, and as was the case last year, the parties were mainly
trying to strengthen their own position within the authorities.
People’s problems were ignored once again.

[Passage omitted: problems at entrance examinations; farmers have
problems buying fertilizers]