17:00,
YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 28, ARMENPRESS. On February 28, President of Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh) Arayik Harutyunyan chaired a meeting of the Security Council.
The humanitarian situation resulting from the blockade of the Lachin Corridor, as well as steps taken by the authorities to overcome the problems were on the agenda, according to a read-out issued by Harutyunyan’s office.
14:42,
YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 28, ARMENPRESS. The functioning of the Lachin Corridor must comply with the 9 November 2020 trilateral statement, it does not envisage any checkpoints, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said at a joint press conference with his Azeri counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov, TASS reports.
“[The Lachin corridor] functioning mode must be in full compliance with the 9-10 November 2020 trilateral statement, which means the need to ensure the free movement of exclusively civilian and humanitarian cargo and civilians. That’s what we are striving for, first of all through the Russian peacekeeping contingent. It is not envisaged to create any checkpoints there,” Lavrov said.
20:08,
YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 27, ARMENPRESS. On February 27, Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan met with the delegation led by Djuna Bernard, the Deputy Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies of Luxembourg, ARMENPRESS was informed from MFA Armenia.
The parties commended the high level of political dialogue between Armenia and Luxembourg, and touched upon the prospects of expanding cooperation based on democratic values, common perceptions and mutual trust. Vahan Kostanyan highly appreciated the principled stance of the Chamber of Deputies of Luxembourg on issues of vital importance for Armenia, which was reflected in the motions adopted by the Parliament.
During the meeting, the parties discussed issues of regional and international security.
The Deputy Minister presented the efforts of the Republic of Armenia towards establishing peace and stability in the region. The imperative of addressing the humanitarian situation in Nagorno-Karabakh resulting from Azerbaijan’s blockade of the Lachin Corridor was underscored. The parties touched upon the latest developments in the normalization process of Armenia-Turkey relations.
Blocking the only highway that connects 120,000 people of Nagorno-Karabakh with the outside world, a fur coat-wearing woman held a dove in one hand and a megaphone in the other as she yelled that the besieged region “belongs to Azerbaijan.” But instead of flying once released, the strangled dove dropped dead. This was meant to resemble an environmental demonstration.
Masqueraded as activists protesting the environmental impacts of ore mining operations, rotating affiliates of the authoritarian regime of Azerbaijan have blockaded the Armenian-populated mountainous region of Nagorno-Karabakh since December 12. This has left the disputed region, which is still recovering from the 2020 war launched by Azerbaijan, in the cold and on the brink of starvation.
The mining operations, along with much of Nagorno-Karabakh’s economy, have since halted, but the illegal blockade that violates the 2020 ceasefire has not. On Feb. 22 the International Court of Justice ordered Azerbaijan to end the blockade. But without an immediate enforcement mechanism, Azerbaijan may try to buy some extra time. Food and fuel are in such low supply in Nagorno-Karabakh that the local authorities now distribute coupons to ratio key groceries. Only vehicles belonging to Russian peacekeepers and the Red Cross have been allowed through, bringing in small quantities of vital supplies for the most vulnerable. But, according to Amnesty International, that’s not enough. On Feb. 9 the human rights watchdog reported that “access to healthcare has become the most pressing issue in the blockaded region”—a cardiologist sees only five or six patients per month, down from the typical 30 to 40, due to insufficient stent supply.
Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s dynastic president—whose 20-year recipe to remain in power has consisted of cultivating anti-Armenian hatred and weaponizing Azerbaijanis’ trauma of losing the first Nagorno-Karabakh war in the 1990s—makes no secret of the blockade’s ultimate goal. Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh are free to leave: “the road [to Armenia] is open,” he says, suggesting ethnic cleansing as the resolution. It’s not the first time that his regime blends ethnic cleansing with environmentalism: Azerbaijan celebrated the 2020 war victory against Armenians with a stamp of a biohazard remediator fumigating Nagorno-Karabakh.
At the ICJ on January 30 Azerbaijan’s lawyers argued that there is no blockade and that the protesters are engaged in grassroots environmental demonstrations. Never mind that oil-rich Azerbaijan—one of the most repressive regimes according to Freedom House, and home to “the ecologically most devastated area in the world,” including a city dubbed “an ecological Armageddon”—doesn’t tolerate public protest. To science-wash the blockade, as a prominent academic exposed last month, Azerbaijan sought out professors abroad to rubber stamp the ongoing “eco-protest” in media outlets.
This weaponization of environmentalism sets a dangerous precedent for other dictatorships to hijack vital causes.
Scholars have diagnosed such bad-faith goodwill as “sharp power,” a term proposed in 2017 by the National Endowment for Democracy to describe authoritarian states’ efforts to influence the world’s perception of their actions through manipulation and distraction. While the term is new, the phenomenon is not. Exploiting fragile Western institutions and using popular causes is an ongoing authoritarian practice. In environmentalism, Azerbaijan has found a convenient, universal cause. Since losing the first Nagorno-Karabakh war to Armenians in the 1990s, it has long claimed “ecocide” in territories Armenians controlled until the second war in 2020.
But neither private nor public criticism has stopped Azerbaijan from weaponizing environmental movements. Even now, as international bodies and Western governments condemn the blockade, Azerbaijan doubles down on its messaging. It recently announced a “historic” environmental legal action against Armenia under the Bern convention over forest loss and other delinquency in the areas Armenians controlled until 2020. The announcement explicitly justified the blockade, stating that “these protests were not orchestrated by the Government of Azerbaijan.” Commenting on this move, a forest watchdog noted that satellites tell a different story: “between roughly 2000 and 2020, the region had gained more tree cover than it lost.”
More recent forest loss is connected with Azerbaijan’s activities, such as its use of white phosphorus against Armenian forces in 2020, as analyzed by the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, along with the ongoing “victory road” construction. The 63-mile highway follows the military attack route of Azerbaijan’s capture of a key city in late 2020, during which the entire south of Nagorno-Karabakh was ethnically cleansed of Armenians. As a U.N. environmental assessment report requested by Azerbaijan notes, this construction “is also having a significant impact on forest cover.” Satellites show oversized swaths of greenery gone for good.
And as Caucasus Heritage Watch’s satellite reports show, the “victory road” and another highway construction are often accompanied with the flattening of Armenian villages and sacred sites, despite the IJC’s December 2021 provisional order to the contrary. Most ironically, there is also ongoing deforestation caused by the blockade: Nagorno-Karabakh, whose gas supply, electricity, and imported fuel are under Azerbaijan’s siege, is utilizing firewood to survive the winter.
Before the ICJ’s Feb. 22 decision, President Aliyev bragged that nothing would stop his efforts in the Lachin corridor, and he had reason to believe so. The European Union is repeatedly courting him as a “reliable partner” in substituting Russian gas supplies, and the U.S. has continued to waive Section 907 sanctions, a U.S. law meant to stop Azerbaijan’s aggression against Armenians. “No one can influence us. There may be some phone calls and some statements, but we do not need to pay attention. We take those phone calls simply out of political courtesy,” he states, “but this will not change our position.”
The remarks primarily target the U.S. and France. During the U.N. Security Council hearing in December and in subsequent statements, both countries, among others, called on Azerbaijan to end the blockade. Russia—the third mediator of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict along with the U.S. and France—has been largely silent on the situation.
Read More: History Suggests This Winter Could Be Dangerous for Armenians
There is something brazenly cynical about a repressive petro-aggressor weaponizing environmentalism in 2023. Not only does it make a mockery of the existential crisis we face as a species, it serves to further corrode Azerbaijan’s civil society. By undermining the credibility of what is likely the most important cause in the world, Aliyev is setting an example for fellow dictators to pursue “sharp power.” He sends a message that there is no cause too sacred to exploit and no lie too absurd to pronounce if it allows the leader to stay in power.
When Aliyev’s activists transported doves to the blockade, the stunt was in line with a new tradition in Azerbaijan that reimagines the birds as victory symbols of war. But instead, the strangled dove symbolized the blockade’s methodology: choke the besieged people of Nagorno-Karabakh until they have no choice but to flee—an ethnic cleansing strategy of strangle-and-release, sugar-coated as environmentalism.
11:39, 23 February 2023
YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 23, ARMENPRESS. The Armenian government is sending a third batch of humanitarian aid – over 32 tons – to the quake-hit Syria.
The aid is being sent by the order of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.
The 32 tons of aid includes food and medication.
Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan is traveling to Syria to supervise the delivery.
The transportation of the cargo was organized by the ministry of emergency situations.
The aid was sent on board an IL-76 aircraft from Yerevan’s Erebuni airport to Aleppo.
TASS, February 23. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan discussed over the phone on Thursday the implementation of agreements between the Russian, Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders on stabilizing the situation in the region, the Kremlin press service said.
"The sides discussed issues of implementing trilateral agreements between the leaders of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan with the goal of ensuring stability and security in the region. They also touched upon the current situation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border," the statement said.
Head of the Press Service of the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry Aykhan Hajizada commented in his Twitter account on the decision of the UN International Court of Justice on on the application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Azerbaijani media reported.
As might be expected, the essence of the commentary boils down to the fact that Azerbaijan is not going to do anything.
The International Court ruled on the second request for interim measures on the applications filed by Azerbaijan and Armenia on the application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (the rulings are not a decision on the merits of the case).
"The Court has rejected 2 out of 3 provisional measures request by Armenia, concerning allegations on Azerbaijan orchestration and support of protests’” and on “immediate full restoration and refraining from disrupting the provision of natural gas"…
On 3rd measure, contrary to Armenia claims, the Court didn’t order what Armenia wanted: 1) Court excluded wordings “free” and “all” and 2) Added two important wording such as “pending the final decision in the case” & “take all measures at its disposal.
Since Azerbaijan never blocked or impeded the Lachin road, and took all measures within its power to ensure safe movement along the road, it will continue to do so after relevant Court order as well.
The Court has reaffirmed its call for Armenia to refrain from any action, which might aggravate or extend the dispute between 2 nations. Per Dec 2021 Order, Armenia remains obligated to take urgent action to prevent the incitement & promotion of racial hatred agns Azerbaijanis.
Azerbaijan will continue to hold Armenia to account for its ongoing and historic grave violations of human rights of Azerbaijanis." Hajizada wrote.
BY TALEEN SETRAKIAN
Special to Asbarez
“Who are the Armenians?” This is a question I receive almost every time I meet someone new. “How should I answer that question to ensure they remember us?” This is something I ask myself each time. My first urge is to respond by speaking about the not-so-well-known Armenian Genocide of 1915, but most people don’t always have empathy or patience for tragic or negative stories.
I have learned that the best way to get people to care about you is to speak to their interests, making them feel connected to you.
To most people, I ask—”Are you familiar with Cher? What about Charles Aznavour? Serj Tankian?” To the sports fanatics—”Do you know Andre Agassi? What about David Nalbandian? Henrikh Mkhitaryan?” To the tech nerds — “what’s your take on Alexis Ohanian? “To the celebrity-obsessed — “do you know Kim Kardashian is Armenian?” I can go on and on because, in every corner of the world and any field, there is at least one important Armenian acclaimed for what they do.
As someone who has worked in the arts for over eight years, I constantly talk to my colleagues about the successful Armenians in this business sector. “Did you see the Armenian pavilion at the Venice Biennale? Do you know Larry Gagosian? What about Arshile Gorky? Parajanov? And Aivazovsky?”
A few weeks ago, several people in the Armenian community realized that The Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York had changed Ivan Aivazovsky’s biography to state that he is Ukrainian.
Many of us were angry, but most of all, we were concerned. Some of us wrote emails to the department, including me. I wrote,
“I am writing to correct your records on Aivazovsky’s biography on your website. Aivazovsky is an Armenian artist, not a Ukrainian artist. I am not sure what the protocol is for listing his ethnicity as Ukranian, but he is not, and the records need to be corrected immediately. As you write in his bio, he was born into an Armenian family. How is one born into an Armenian family but does not retain their ethnic origins?”
After seeing this listing on one of the most renowned institution’s websites, I decided to explore some other museums’ biographies of Armenian artists. My first virtual stop was on the Museum of Modern Art’s website, and I checked the listing for Arshile Gorky. I discovered that the MoMA has listed that Gorky was born in “Van Province, Ottoman Empire (present-day Turkey.)”
This listing worried me even more than the inaccurate listing of Aivazovsky’s biography on The Met’s website. Not only did I find this information reductionist, but I also found it offensive. An average person who sees this listing will never know where the historical Van that Gorky was born in existed geographically (Armenia) or how it was taken away from us in the 1915 massacres of over 1.5 million Armenians by the Ottoman Turks.
One of the most famous paintings by Gorky pays homage to his mother, who died from starvation after a death march during the Genocide. Gorky spent most of his life haunted by the tragic past that all Armenians wear on their shoulders to this day. It is only decent for the Museum of Modern Art to ensure that his birthplace, “Van Province (former-day Western Armenia, present-day Turkey,)” is listed accurately and fairly.
In today’s global affairs, politicians often lay truths under the rug, and western journalism fails to deliver real news, and thus our histories are constantly rewritten. This is why global art institutions must lead in preserving our roots and identities.
In a world where people are constantly being forced out of their homes due to unfair regimes and where minorities rarely receive acknowledgment of their suffering, it is essential to acknowledge and respect their histories and origins.
In conclusion, I wish to make a simple request to those who work in the cultural sphere of truth–the arts, museums, galleries, universities, and publishers: while we Armenians do everything we can to ensure our legacies are honored, we ask that you, with your due diligence, ensure that the proper credit is given to our culture and others’ culture altogether.
An 1879 self-portrait of Ivan Aivazovsky (left) and Arshile Gorky
[Editor’s Note: Readers may contact the Metropolitan Museum of Art at [email protected] or the Museum of Modern Art at [email protected]].
Taleen Setrakian is a multidisciplinary visual artist and graphic designer born and based in New York City. She graduated from Parsons, The New School for Design, in 2015. She is co-founder and creative director of QAMI JAN, a lifestyle brand featuring limited edition objects inspired by the Armenian Highlands. Her role as an artist is a part-time effort, and she works full-time professionally in the art business. Setrakian is committed to globalizing Armenian culture and heritage, using art as a tool to enlighten and inspire those who know little about our people. She is connected to her cultural roots and dedicated to channeling her aspirations for the future of Armenia and the country’s legacy. She lives by the idea that “Armenia is ours if we let it be ours.”
As the blockade of the truncated Nagorno-Karabakh region by Azerbaijani nationalists continues, Armenia is growing impatient with Russia’s seeming inactivity.
Food, fuel, and medicines for the large Armenian community in the area are running low, while images have been emerging of Russian troops, deployed as peacekeepers, standing yards from the blockades but taking no action. The mood is fast souring, making the current crisis in Armenia-Russia relations the worst in recent decades.
Allied from the 1990s, right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, relations between Russia and Armenia have entered a turbulent period. Reasons vary from immediate issues to deeper, geopolitical differences, yet one inescapable conclusion is that Russia is no longer able to provide for its security dependencies and that its influence in the South Caucasus is in decline.
The Kremlin has on numerous occasions turned down Armenia’s requests for help through the framework of the six-member Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which includes Armenia but not Azerbaijan. The problem for Armenia is that wider strategic imperatives drive Russia to seek improved ties with Azerbaijan, which is a critical transit route for Russia’s ambitious projects to connect to Iran. Azerbaijan has also chosen its friends wisely — Turkey’s ally, which has, as a result of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, established itself as a major power in the South Caucasus. It is therefore sheltered from Russian adventurism.
To this changed geopolitical landscape should be added a recent spate of signals showing Armenia’s growing disillusionment about Russia. In January, the country’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan argued that “Russia’s military presence in Armenia not only does not guarantee Armenia’s security but, on the contrary, creates threats to Armenia’s security.” He also argued that the Russian peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh are “becoming silent witnesses” to the unfolding tragedy. Earlier Yerevan even canceled CSTO drills in Armenia, and Pashinyan refused to sign a joint declaration with CSTO member states in Yerevan, presumably for failing to address the country’s worsening geopolitical situation.
This has provided an opening for Iran. Politicians in Yerevan increasingly seek diversification of foreign affairs and military ties. Unhappy with Azerbaijan’s ambitions to attain greater regional influence and of attempts to coerce Armenia into allowing the operation of the so-called Zangezur corridor through the Syunik province (thus connecting the main Azeri lands with its Nakhchivan exclave), Iran sees a meeting of self-interest and opportunity. The opening in 2022 of the Iranian consulate in a strategically located south-eastern city of Kapan, which is located on the only major road between the two countries, indicated the Islamic Republic’s growing displeasure with the changed balance of power in the South Caucasus – especially growing Turkish influence.
Armenia has meanwhile been trying to patch up things with Turkey. In February, Armenian rescuers were sent to Turkey to help Ankara battle the devastating effects of the recent earthquake. This follows continuous hints and practical moves by both sides signaling that a long-closed border could soon open and bilateral trade grow, something underlined on February 15 when the two foreign ministers met in Ankara.
Armenia is also developing ties with the European Union (EU) which announced on January 23 it would be deploying a mission of some 100 observers to the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. The mission would in itself be a significant upgrade from a much weaker, 40-member mission sent to Armenia following a significant escalation in September 2022 when Azerbaijan bombed several cities deep in Armenia, and far from Nagorno-Karabakh.
Armenia is also working on diversifying military contacts. Almost entirely dependent on the Kremlin for its security, it has apparently struggled to import modern Russian weaponry. Pashinyan said in September that Armenia lacked arms and that the country’s allies had failed time and again to supply ordered weaponry. This pushes Armenia to seek alternatives; several military contracts signed with India underline the trend.
Tensions in Armenia-Russia relations will likely continue to grow and there are indications that there is a bigger malaise hampering Russia’s influence — the latter’s war against Ukraine. The aggression reverberates throughout the South Caucasus, where countries constantly test Russian weakness. Armenia is no exception. A preoccupied Kremlin provides Armenia with room for maneuver, which in other times would have been unthinkable. As the war in Ukraine will likely continue for a long time, so will Armenia’s willingness to question the foundation of its alliance with a weakened Russia.
Those weaknesses have become palpable in the way Moscow-led multilateral groupings have operated since the war in Ukraine began. The first is CSTO. Although many ordinary Armenians see the organization’s passivity as a deliberate Russian instrument of sabotage, there are indications that the problem with the grouping might be much more profound. CSTO’s feeble response to fighting on the Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan border in September 2022 was much like its inactivity on the South Caucasus front. Moreover, since the all-out war in Ukraine began, CSTO member states have been passive, bordering on hostile, to the Kremlin’s campaign. This begs the question of CSTO’s purpose if it won’t help the smaller members and the smaller members won’t help Russia.
It must be acknowledged that it would be a long and difficult process for Armenia to free itself from Russian influence. The country’s economic and security ties are linked to its giant neighbor to the north, whether it likes that or not. A near-70% growth in bilateral trade was registered in 2022.
And while Russia is distracted, it is not asleep. It will try to regain momentum. For instance, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov argued on February 9 that Moscow is working on a trilateral meeting between the foreign ministers of Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.
Nevertheless, a trend is undeniable. A multipolar era has begun in the South Caucasus where growing competition from other actors limits Russia’s old claim to be the dominant power in the region. When the EU unveiled details of its new mission to Armenia, the Kremlin was reduced to blustering that the bloc was stirring up geopolitical confrontation in the region. It was a far cry from the old days.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University and the Director of Middle East Studies at the Georgian think-tank, Geocase.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
https://cepa.org/article/armenia-russias-disgruntled-ally/
The Republic of Artsakh, also known as the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, is a breakaway region in the South Caucasus. With a majority ethnic Armenian population, it is recognized internationally as part of Azerbaijan. It is a de facto enclave within Azerbaijan, with the only land route to Armenia through the Lachin corridor, which has been under the control of Russian peacekeepers since the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020. The situation in Artsakh is tense, with frequent ceasefire violations and sporadic outbreaks of violence. For more than two decades, this unresolved, highly militarized ethno-nationalist territorial conflict continues to be a source of tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Amid rising tensions since late 2022, Check Point Research identified a malicious campaign against entities in Armenia. The malware distributed in this campaign is a new version of a backdoor we track as OxtaRAT, an AutoIt-based tool for remote access and desktop surveillance.
The tool capabilities include searching for and exfiltrating files from the infected machine, recording the video from the web camera and desktop, remotely controlling the compromised machine, installing web shell, performing port scanning and more.
Figure 1 – The infection chain of the campaign
Compared to previous campaigns of this threat actor, the latest campaign from November 2022 presents changes in the infection chain, improved operational security and new functionality to improve the ways to steal the victim’s data.
The threat actors behind these attacks have been targeting human rights organizations, dissidents, and independent media in Azerbaijan for several years. This is the first time there is a clear indication of these attackers using OxtaRAT against Armenian targets and targeting corporate environments.
Although not widely discussed, previous versions of the OxtaRAT backdoor were used in earlier attacks against Azerbaijani political and human rights activists – or, when the targets were not disclosed publicly, their lures referenced Azerbaijan-Armenia tensions around Artsakh. The older versions of OxtaRAT have significantly less functionality than the new variant but contain similar code and names for most of the commands and the same C&C communication pattern.
Harmony Endpoint provides comprehensive endpoint protection at the highest security level, enriched by the power of ThreatCloud. ThreatCloud, the brain behind all of Check Point’s products, combines the latest AI technologies with big data threat intelligence to prevent the most advanced attacks- crucial to avoid security breaches and data compromises.
In addition, Check Point customers remain protected against the threat described in this research with
Trojan.WIN32.OxtaRAT.A
Trojan.WIN32.OxtaRAT.B